Reflection on human cognition has as long history as philosophical thinking. In antiquity and the Middle Ages, research on cognition existed on the fringes of philosophy, as the latter focused on metaphysical issues.

The cognitive science, called the theory of cognition or epistemology, emerged as a separate branch of philosophy only in modern times. This resulted from researchers’ demand that each emerging system of knowledge be preceded by a critical examination. It was also the sources of cognition and ways of cognition that were to be subject to a critical analysis. It was also to be subject to a critical analysis. It was also to be subject to a critical analysis.

Wojciech Dzieduszycki accepted the reality of the world at the starting point for reflections on cognition, and recognised cognition as a field secondary to the reality. He claimed that we cognise only the phenomena of things so called sensory data through our sensation. He did not, however, deny the existence of the basis of these phenomena. Declared that speaking of reality he is referring to what is commonly meant by this term. Limiting the realism of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki placed his theory of cognition in the sphere of indirect realism, he did not deny, however, the belief that we are able to acquire common and necessary knowledge. Thus he combined Aristotelian realism with modern criticism of cognition in the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm.

**Keywords:** research on cognition, realist tradition, modern criticism of cognition, W. Dzieduszycki.
Based on the observation of human cognitive activity, Dzieduszycki, in his academic works *O wiedzy ludzkiej* and *Roztrząsania filozoficzne o podstawach pewności*, emphasised the generally acknowledged fact that every human is capable of disinterested curiosity, that is of seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself – regardless of the utility of this knowledge [2, p. 24]. He pointed out that many people feel such a strong need for disinterested knowledge that they sacrifice other goods for it [3, pp. 50–51]. Dzieduszycki discerned that mainly scholars, scientists, thinkers and artists tend to engage in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. He noticed that discovery of new truth always brings joy mainly to this type of people [3, P. 51]. He stressed the necessity of scientific and artistic cognition in social life and its high importance making the status of the scholar highly valued in civilised countries [4, pp. 41–42].

1. The cognising subject – obviousness of his/her existence

As for the cognising person, Dzieduszycki adopted the Cartesian subjective starting point. He regarded the existence of the cognising subject as the basis for any cognition. However – unlike Descartes – he did not establish the certainty of his own existence starting with the fact of thinking (reasoning, *cogito*) but starting with the obvious fact of his own existence he ascertained that it is the existence of a spiritual being, ie. a being whose essence is to have a spiritual entity.

He regarded purely abstract cognition, achieved with the use of concepts, as the highest level of human cognition. However, we do not grasp the fact of existence – neither of the existence of the cognising subject nor the existence of the cognised object – with the use of the abstract cognition, as Dzieduszycki claimed in line with the epistemological realism. We do not establish the fact of existence using reasoning but we seek it in the factuality of existence of the subject – a cognising human being, and in the obviousness of the cognised object – a being perceived as something that is cognised. Thus the existence is not subject to conceptualisation and thereby not subject to scientific cognition. The fact of existence is ascertained directly (not through concepts), as visually obvious.

2. The object of cognition – what do we cognise: things or phenomena?

The case of cognitive realism becomes complicated when Dzieduszycki turns to the issue of the object of cognition. In this regard, his view differed considerably from the cognitive realism, according to which we cognise a thing through direct contact with it. He pursued the Cartesian tradition, derived from Augustinism [5, p. 276], which recognised that the primary area of investigation are the ideas contained in the mind of the cognising subject (later these ideas were defined as the data of our consciousness). He emphasised that it is our consciousness: «Jest tedy rzeczą jasną, oczywistą i konieczną, że nie znamy i nie możemy znać nic innego nad nasze myśli, nasze wyobrażenia i nasze uczucia. [...] Cały świat, który znamy, jest jedynie sumą naszych wiadomości, czyli naszych [T.Z.’s emphasis] wyobrażeń, i o żadnym innym świecie nie wiemy zgoda i nie możemy wiedzieć» [4, p. 2].

The ideas which we cognise, called by him «our notions», reflect the phenomena occurring in the world. Like Kant, Dzieduszycki assumed that what we cognise are phenomena grasped cognitively through our notions, differentiating between spiritual and sensory phenomena (or «sensory things» and «spiritual beings»), which is close to the Cartesian dualism). Thus we cognise sensory or spiritual phenomena (or: external or internal phenomena) [4, p. 102].

However, contrary to the Platonic idealism, Dzieduszycki did not deny the existence of the basis of these phenomena, and thus the reality of the world, its existence. He believed that the things being the basis of phenomena exist really and objectively and independently of the cognising subject. The objective existence of things is proved by real sensations («internal» and «external») received by the human mind from without. «External sensations» prove the existence of the material world, while the «internal sensations» – the existence of one’s self.

He claimed that phenomena can only occur in time. He regarded the existence of a phenomenon in time – both mental and sensory – as a criterion for the reality it. We obtain this criterion not through reasoning but through direct intuition. He considered the perception of time to be the domain of intuition. Unlike Kant, who claimed that time is a subjective category of mind, Dzieduszycki believed that time – understood as the inevitable succession of the past, present and future – is one of the common properties of phenomena. In line with the Christian interpretation, Dzieduszycki assumed that time was initiated by God [4, p. 145], and the existence of the world must occur in time.

He pointed out the independence from the (really existing) space as a characteristic of spiritual phenomena: spiritual phenomena – that is acts of mind, feeling and will – occur in the soul, and the soul, being immaterial, does not occupy any space. The thought also does not occupy any space, because it exists in mind which does not occupy any space either (it is sensory phenomena that occur in space). Dzieduszycki regarded Kant’s view of subjectivity of time and space as having no basis in human experience [4, p. 145].

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Although he limited the reality of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki did not deny the belief that we are able to acquire common and necessary knowledge.

3. Sources of cognition – with what do we acquire knowledge?

In his academic dissertations Dzieduszycki joined the discussion on the issue of ways of acquiring knowledge, which was popular among scholars in the second half the 19th century. In his dissertations this issue concretised in the question: «Which of human cognitive faculties have a decisive part in the acquisition of knowledge?» Generally, the history of human thought was dominated by two contradictory positions: one stated that experience is the source of knowledge, while the other expressed a belief that reason is the source of knowledge.

The Lviv scholar sought solution of this dilemma in philosophical systems of the ancient Greece. The analysis of positions and arguments of these systems led him to propose a thesis that the history of human thinking about cognition was determined by the epistemological position, established already in antiquity, which denied the legitimacy of extreme sensualism, i.e. the position that impressions of the senses are the only source of human knowledge [6, p. 206]. Dzieduszycki considered that the view denying the legitimacy of extreme sensualism contributed to strengthening the belief that sensory experience provides only the material for knowledge, not knowledge itself. In line with Plato, he stated that knowledge resulting solely from sensory experience is not a reliable knowledge. Neither is it the only knowledge that human beings can acquire. Such a position placed him in opposition to both pure intellectualism (apriorism) and pure empiricism (aposteriorism). At the same time, he combined cognitive apriorism with cognitive aposteriorism, which brought him, as a modern thinker, closer to the position of the Neo-Kantians. Contrary to empiricists and positivists, Neo-Kantians understood experience not as a simple reception of facts but as a complex product of mind.

3.1. Experience put in order by reason: genetic empiricism

Dzieduszycki agreed with the Neo-Kantian view that experience is the effect of many cognitive powers. He believed that knowledge arises only when impressions of the senses have been put in order by reason [6, p. 206]. Reasons for his belief in this respect were as follows: experience (empiria) is the source of knowledge, providing human thinking with content, but neither sensory experience alone (as empiricists claimed) nor reasoning alone (as rationalists wanted) can provide a reliable knowledge. This view, adopted by Dzieduszycki, is known as genetic empiricism.

The Lviv thinker recognised both sources of knowledge; he understood experience as both internal experience (introspection) and external experience (sensory experience). He regarded experience as the effect of not only sensory but also mental cognitive activities of a human being [4, pp. 4-7]. He pointed out that thanks to internal experience the subject cognises his/her own feelings and thoughts, while the external experience provides information on the phenomena of the sensory world.

3.2. Intuition as an important source of knowledge

In his research on cognition Dzieduszycki exhibited a high degree of innovativeness. He introduced intuition as a source of knowledge supporting the senses and reason – two traditional sources of cognition. («Rodzaj wiedzy, której nie nabywamy ani za pomocą zmysłowego, ani za pomocą umysłowego doświadczenia, a który nam nie pozwala wątpić o istnieniu umysłowej czy raczej duchowej istoty u drugich ludzi, nazywają intuicją, i musimy zatem intuicję zaznaczyć jako trzecie źródło doświadczenia, obok dostrzeżeń zmysłowych i umysłowych [T.Z’s emphasis]») [4, p. 102].

Regarding intuition as a specific kind of mental experience [4, pp. 149-150], he associated it with the intellect (and not with senses), and specifically with a specific «power» (ability) of the intellect as he considered conscience. It should be assumed that it will be an intellectual intuition – different from the sensory intuition, directly referred to the object experienced with the senses, but also different from discursive cognition [7, pp. 306–308].

Dzieduszycki’s notion of intuition was in line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas [8, p. 94]. But we can also perceive a reference to J.G. Fichte’s idealism in this regard, for whom intellectual intuition was the starting point of the whole system [9, pp. 544–548].

Claiming that intuition is the only source of reliable cognition, Dzieduszycki attributed to it the essential role in the process of discovering the fundamental truths of the world. Furthermore, he gave priority to intuition in terms of genetics, recognising that intuition always preceded reasoning («[…] tylko ta intuicja zamienia wnioski rozumowe w pewniki, że ona zawsze poprzedza rozumowanie, i że ma swoje źródło w najgłębszej naszej istocie, zwróconej ku spełnianiu praktycznych, a nie teoretycznych zadań») [4, p. 102].

More precise interpretation of the role of intuition in Dzieduszycki’s system is complicated by the fact that he did not specify in what sense he uses this term, which, by the way, was a feature not only of his philosophical writings [10, p. 175].
In the course of the history of human thinking the term «intuition» was given various meanings depending on the adopted concept of cognition. Aristotle showed two ways of intellectual exploration: discursive and intuitive. However, he did not contrapose one way to another, pointing out that both are performed thanks to the same power – reason. Thomas Aquinas, apart from the discursive way of cognition, assumed non-discursive cognition – the intuitive cognition [11, pp. 37–51]. This cognition, characterised by directness and simplicity of perception, was considered by him as a basis for reasoning [12, pp. 897–901]. It follows from the foregoing that Dzieduszycki’s position may be close to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, in which the word «intuition» is to define the direct, simple and understanding perception of the object or phenomenon. Other statements of the Lviv thinker indicate that he also attributed many features of the Augustinian illuminism to intuition [13, pp. 353–355].

Dzieduszycki believed that thanks to intuition a human being finds out the truths revealed by God, which are: the belief in the existence of oneself and other human beings, the existence of the world, the existence of God and the validity of the moral law.

3.3. Another source of cognition: imagination

In addition to experience, reasoning and intuition, the Lviv scholar introduced another source of knowledge – imagination. The emphasis on imagination as a source of cognition may be considered as the impact of the contemporary trends in psychologism and literary modernism.

Comparing imagination with reasoning, Dzieduszycki pointed out that there are two kinds of cognitive situations: those in which thinking (discourse) dominates the imagination, and those in which the imagination dominates the thinking. In line with the popular understanding, the dominance of reason over imagination was called by him reason. Interestingly, he attributed to reason – this Aristotelian virtue of virtues – the role of a brake on action, believing that excess of reason paralyses actions, limiting them to goals easy to be achieved [4, p. 37]. He perceived such a regularity especially in persons having faint imagination and mediocre intellect. The reverse situation – the predominance of imagination over reason – causes, as he claimed, that a person strives after unreasonable goals using unrealistic means.

From this he drew the conclusion that reason plays its role well only when it is supported by a vivid imagination, as imagination enables diverse non-standard association of notions. Appreciating the role of imagination, he claimed that creative imagination must be endowed to both a brilliant artist and a person achieving results in terms of practical actions, creating new areas of reality, because thanks to imagination he/she can find such opportunities to act which will lead to accomplishment of the set goals.

Dzieduszycki considered that beside creative activities – artistic and practical – also scientific and academic research requires imagination. He believed that in scientific and academic activities imagination allows formulation of accurate hypotheses, which – verified by experience – will become scientific and academic theories. He claimed that it is mainly thanks to imagination that genius arises – both artistic and scientific/academic.

4. Ways of cognition: how do we acquire knowledge?

Dzieduszycki believed that two ways of human cognition – indirect cognition and direct cognition – are adjusted to two types of phenomena occurring in the world – sensory and spiritual.

Sensory phenomena are cognised indirectly – through sensory impressions. This type of cognition occurs in natural sciences. Whereas the existence itself of objects (the properties of which we cognise indirectly, through sensations) is ascertained directly (without any mediation) [2, p. 59]. The sphere of spiritual phenomena is subject to direct cognition [14]. These phenomena are dealt with by philosophy. In philosophy, which examines spiritual phenomena being specific to human beings, the direct cognition is applicable. According to Dzieduszycki, direct cognition – non-discursive (independent of reasoning), intuitive – concerns cognition of the own existence, the existence of things, the existence of God and immortality of the human soul [4, p. 101].

5. The criterion of reliability and truth of cognition: really existing world

To search for the basis of reliable knowledge and the criterion of its truth is, in Dzieduszycki’s opinion, the task of philosophy. He recognised, however, that spontaneous ascertainment of the existence of the world, necessary in practical life, is not sufficient in the sphere of philosophy, so he started to seek sanction confirming this spontaneous cognition. He deemed conscience to be such a sanction. At this point the term conscience appears in his explanation of cognition. Dzieduszycki introduced it without any justification and without specifying how he understood it. It seems that he based on the seriousness of this term sanctioned by religion, but he used it in a sense far beyond this role. Conscience became the basic category of his system, and the judgment of conscience was sanctioned as the ultimate criterion of the existence of other human beings and the existence of the world.

This strong emphasis on the absolute validity of conscience as a guarantor of reliability in every area of human life, and not only in terms of moral actions, indicates a search for such a source of cognitive certainty which would be able to resist widespread relativism.
Epistemological starting point for philosophical reflection, focused on the question of the nature of the relationship between the cognising mind and the world of space-time objects, indicates that Dzieduszycki’s views regarding the theory of cognition are placed within the modern, widely understood philosophy of subject and those systems of thought in which reflection starts with an analysis of cognitive states.

6. A particular type of cognition – philosophical cognition

In the context of reflections on cognition, Dzieduszycki emphasised the specificity of philosophical cognition. He showed the distinctiveness of philosophical knowledge comparing it with the scientific knowledge. He noticed that the difference between a philosopher and a specialist in natural sciences lies in that a philosopher is not content to discover partial truths but tries to find out the nature of the truth [17].

Emphasising the non-utilitarian nature of the scientific cognition, Dzieduszycki stressed his opposition to the positivist conception of science as an area of human activity being at the service of utility [15, pp. 93–94]. Based on Plato’s understanding of science, he himself emphasised in it the disinterested pursuit of truth as a value in itself. Thus he emphasised the axiological value of science [16].

Dzieduszycki, in line with the realist tradition, accepted the reality of the world at the starting point for reflections on cognition, and recognised cognition as a field secondary to the reality [17]. He believed that the reality of the world, its existence independent of human beings, manifests itself in the form of real sensory and mental phenomena. He believed that the things being the basis of phenomena exist really and objectively and independently of the cognising subject. The objective existence of things is proved, in his opinion, by real sensations received by the human mind from without. External sensations prove the existence of the material world, while the internal sensations – the existence of one’s self. He claimed that we cognise only the phenomena of things – so called sensory data – through our sensation. He did not, however, deny the existence of the basis of these phenomena. Dzieduszycki declared that speaking of reality he is referring to what is commonly meant by this term, and any divagations on the existence of the world cannot fall within the scope of serious philosophical reflection. Limiting the realism of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki placed his theory of cognition in the sphere of indirect realism, he did not deny, however, the belief that we are able to acquire common and necessary knowledge. Thus he combined Aristotelian realism with modern criticism of cognition in the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm.

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