Jean Monnet Module Erasmus+

European Values and Identity Studies
587684-EPP-1-2017-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE

Vitalii Lebediuk, Dmytro Shevchuk, Olena Shershnyova

Course

“EUROPEAN IDENTITY POLITICS”

Academic year 2018-2019

Didactic materials

Ostroh 2019
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project “European Values and Identity Studies”</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course: “European Identity Politics”</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Texts:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avraham Rot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructing Identity and Embracing Boredom in United Europe</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliette Chevée</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructing a European identity: yes, but how?</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The manifesto of European patriots Fight for Europe –</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or the wreckers will destroy it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Fukuyama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Identity Politics</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About Jean Monnet</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About ERASMUS+ Jean Monnet Programme</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROJECT
“EUROPEAN VALUES AND IDENTITY STUDIES”

Project Title: European Values and Identity Studies (587684-EPP-1-2017-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE)

Timing of the Project: 01.09.2017 – 31.08.2020

Project Beneficiary: The National University of Ostroh Academy

Project objective and specific tasks:
– raise awareness of the target audience in the field of European values and identity Studies, of the EU and the EU-Ukraine relations, based on new teaching technologies and visions;
– initiate the active public debate on European values and identity policy at local, regional and national levels;
– involvement of the academic community, civil society, local authorities and the representatives of institutions, interested in the sustainable development of Ukraine, based on European values, that will ensure European standards of living and decent place of Ukraine in the world;
– coordination of partner cooperation in informing the society on European integration of Ukraine between authorities at the regional level, NGOs and other interested institutions.

Target group:
The project has 4 basic target audiences: students of NUOA; scientists and experts, members of interested institutions; government officials, practitioners from Ukraine and UE countries, NGOs members and Internet users.

Specific activities:
– 3 teaching course for Political Studies «East European Studies», Cultural Studies «European Cultural Studies», International Relations «EU Studies» students, who came from different sides of Ukraine;
– book with project results, web site of this project, MOOC “What do we need to know about Europe and its values?”;
– 2 peer-reviewed articles, based on research made in this project;
– 2 international conferences, dedicated to the problem of cultural identity, European values and education, workshop for teachers, roundtable for representatives of public administration, NGO’s activists, students, academic staff, researchers.

**Expected outcomes:**
– enriching students interest in the topic of European values and identity studies and promotion of idea of a United Europe;
– getting an adequate level of information on the education of young people in a spirit of common European values, promoting partnerships with European youth NGOs, supporting Ukraine’s course toward integration into European structures. Increase of interest and mobility of young researchers in the European Union;
– creating new types of research assignments on MOOC or project web site, that include education and information component, archive materials about research, online platform for the knowledge exchange on the most pressing issues of the EU and European values and identity studies;
– carrying out of research activities on the themes about European Union, European values, and identity;
– learning to form leadership skills, ability to make responsible decisions, and gain experience in organizing information campaigns, spreading knowledge about European values and identity studies. To increase overall intellectual level by finding information, development of new printed and electronic sources in this topic, that relevant for graduates in their professional life.
COURSE:
“EUROPEAN IDENTITY POLITICS”

Topic 1: The study of cultural identity: multi-disciplinary field of research

Cultural anthropological approaches to cultural boundaries and cultural change. The underestimated strength of cultural identity between localising and globalising tendencies in the European Union. Local identity and historical memory of community. Relationships and interactions between culture and identity. It will embrace research into the roles of linguistic, social, political, psychological, and religious factors, taking account of historical context.

Topic 2: Constructing identity in Europe


Topic 3: Europe Undivided: issue of identity politics in European Union

Topic 4: European identity as political instrument and political vision


Topic 5: Nationalism in contemporary Europe


Topic 6: Identity and migration in Europe: multidisciplinary perspectives


Topic 7: Mapping Eastern Europe: imaginary and integration projects

Mapping Eastern Europe: political and cultural cartography. Imagining Eastern Europe: a discourse and narrative identity cases. The main geopolitical models of Central and Eastern Europe. Jerzy
Gedroyc’s conception of Central and Eastern Europe. Visegrad Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). Russia and Europe relations: historical and modern aspects. Ukraine and Intermarrium project.

**Topic 8: Multicultural societies in Europe: the main models**

**Topic 9: Tolerance and value of Other**
The philosophical conceptions of tolerance. Repressive tolerance. The issue of authentic tolerance. Tolerance as necessary element of modern societies. Tolerance as value of modern Europe.

**Topic 10: Image of the Enemy in Central and Eastern Europe**

**Topic 11: Politics of memory and constructing European identity**

**Topic 12: Religious identity. Dialogue between state and religion**

**Topic 13: The Islamic discourse in Europe**

**Topic 14: “Cultural wars” and conflicts of values**
Conflict of values. Religious wars in Europe. Conflicts in Europe in the 20th century. Two cultural wars in modern Europe: postmodern relativism vs. the defenders of traditional morality; cultural diversity vs. national monoculture. The danger of European cultural wars. Ways to overcome the conflicts of values.

**Topic 15: European Union cultural policy**
Cultural policy as element of integration and growth of countries. European Agenda for Culture. EU Cultural Policy between Community-building and Market-making. The culture sector as a source of job creation, contributing to growth in Europe. EU’s culture and media programmes.
TEACHERS

Vitalii Lebediuk
Ph.D. in Public Administration, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science, Dean of Faculty of Political Studies and Information Management at the National University of Ostroh Academy. 12 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Candidate’s degree (Ph.D.): Organizational development of political parties in Ukraine: optimization of state influence mechanism (February 10, 2012). Research interests: Comparative politics, European Studies, Political Parties and Party Systems, Election Systems and Voting Behaviour, Quantitative Research Methods, Transition in post-Communist Europe.

Dmytro Shevchuk
Doctor of science in field of philosophy, Associated Professor of Department of Culture Science and Philosophy at National University of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Doctor of Science’s degree: “The ontological dimensions of contemporary political world: a philosophical analysis” (April 28, 2015). Research interests: contemporary political philosophy, methodology of cultural studies, problems of identity, cultural and political processes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Olena Shershnova
Ph.D. in Public Administration, Senior Lecturer of Department of Document Science and Informational Activities at National University of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Candidate’s degree (Ph.D.): “The public administration’s mechanisms in the sphere of informational providing of tourism activities (on example of Rivne region)” (October 15, 2010). Research interests: information security in EU and Post-Soviet republics, sustainable development of local communities in UE and Ukraine, ICT for sustainable development, policy in local communities in UE and Ukraine, tragedy of the commons and its avoiding, problems of values in communities.
Much intellectual and institutional effort is invested in the attempt at understanding and bridging the gap between the European Union and its citizens. Numerous studies and projects have been set up with this aim and dedicated to the task of discovering or defining the meaning of European identity in postwar and post-wall Europe. [1] The sought after identity should be strong enough to bring a sense of shared fate into European consciousness, motivate civic involvement and engagement in EU-level politics, nourish a vital European public sphere and reinforce Europe-wide solidarity. It should be strong enough to make up for the Union’s infamous democratic deficit, neutralize explosive national antagonisms and promote further integration in controversial policy fields, such as welfare, migration, security and foreign affairs, in order to alleviate internal socio-economic disparities, prevent “negative spillovers” from without the EU and for the EU to gain a say as a global power. Moreover, the possibility or actuality of such an identity has sparked off the imagination of many who believe that the EU heralds the emergence of an innovative, postmodern, post-Westphalian or even neo-medieval sort of political identity beyond the longstanding political order of nation states. [2] Much is at stake and much is written and said, yet reality seems to stagnate as far as it has to do with popular involvement and identification with politics at the European level. A stubborn obstacle separates European politics from its citizens. Straightforwardly put, this obstacle and much more which is essential and systematic to the European integration project can be encapsulated in the notion of boredom.

The EU-demos interface problem, or what is more commonly known as “the democratic deficit”, is often explained as a consequence of the Union’s highly complex, bureaucratized and detached institutional structure, technocratic staff, abstract iconography and faceless leaders,
which render politics at the European level inaccessible to the wider public. At a deeper level one can dig out the more systematic causes of the insipidness of European politics in the shape of the orientation toward compromise and consensus and the focus on the more technical and economic policy fields rather than on the political and controversial ones. The weakness of the European Parliament – the only institution of the EU which is directly elected by the citizens – in the decision making processes is, of course, another important contributor to the overall democratic deficit and popular disinterest. The many attempts at fostering an all-embracing European identity cannot evade the ultimate comparison to the national experience: Instead of the heavily fought-over geopolitical borders, charismatic leaders, racial hierarchies, national narratives and heroic histories, the citizens of Europe are presented with diffuse free-trade areas, rationalized administration, hackneyed universal values, worn out political slogans and fading, anti-heroic collective memories as sources for political orientation and identification. To discuss and analyse any one of these aspects of the democratic deficit would run the risk of producing research as tiresome as its subject. But if we call a spade a spade and name “boredom” as that which blocks the EU-demos interface, not only will we gain access to the core of the problem, which is initially and ultimately a problem of emotional involvement, but we will also be in a position to draw insights from the individual experience of boredom, the type of reflection it invites and its constant reevaluation in the overall context of the modern and postmodern conditions; these insights may enable us to better understand how such experience, reflection and reevaluation occur when it comes to collective and institutionalized confrontation with the vanity of ideology, futility of utopia, disenchantment of nostalgia and meaninglessness of self-identity.

At first glance the notion of boredom may be conceived both as too simplistic and too elusive and subjective for a theoretical examination of subtle and complex issues such as political identity and civic engagement. It is commonly from the mouths of children and adolescents that we hear the word ‘boring’ uttered, usually as a complaint addressed to the responsible adult around. Nagging my mother about feeling bored, I
used to get the reiterative reply: “It is OK honey; no one dies out of boredom.” Often too there is a childish or youthful air to grownups when they employ this word. Its attribution to a certain person, event or object would usually be meant as an unsophisticated and straightforward expression of disregard or poor opinion toward that thing. We are likely to find the word in the newspaper columns with regard to something which is supposed to supply entertainment (e.g. a play, film, novel, football match etc.) but falls short of delivering. With relation to politics, however, although it too is prone to accusations of boredom inducement, such charges seem to be essentially irrelevant since it is assumed that politics’ purpose is not to amuse or entertain; politics is a serious business.

Yet seriousness, in spite of the semantic proximity, does not necessarily imply boredom; political dramas have always drawn much popular attention, especially at crucial historical moments (as in times of war) but also in times of tranquility or even stagnation (then it would usually be in the shape of political scandals or gossip). Nor is boredom a matter to be offhandedly dismissed as unserious. Granted, no one dies as a direct consequence of boredom, but much irrational behavior, such as gambling, drug abuse, sexual abuse, murder and suicide is explainable in terms of boredom. [3] Boredom is often also understood as a cause for non-harmful or even positive irrational behavior, as in the case of behavior that seems nonsensical, extravagant or ridiculous, or activity we might call “artistic”. On top of the explanatory value commonly ascribed to boredom, it has much expressive value too: Through the notion of boredom we can articulate our discontent or uneasiness with something with which we fail to engage and which, therefore, appears to us as meaningless – whether it is a book, a lecture, a party, our relationship or our life. Much more can be said about boredom but for the moment this short illustration of the linguistic functions of the notion of boredom should already hint at the significance of its psychological and social functions (or rather dysfunctions).

Although often overlooked, boredom is surely a matter for serious consideration as it was indeed taken to be by profound thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Simmel, Benjamin and Heidegger – to mention but
And in spite of the comparative marginality of the notion of boredom in theoretical discourse, a substantial amount of literature which is dedicated to its investigation on its psychological, sociological, philosophical, historical and aesthetic aspects has accumulated over the years. [4] Paradoxically enough, boredom appears to be everything but boring when it comes to reflecting over it and trying to understand it in depth. It unfolds as integral to the very foundations of the experience of modernity: secularism, urbanism, industrialism and technology. And, correspondingly, it shares a conceptual field with basic sociological notions such as alienation, anomie, automatization, standardization, bureaucratization and routinization. Yet none of these notions has the expressive value that boredom has. None of them is as prevalent in informal discourse and colloquially used to describe the frustration – but not only the frustration – that we experience in our daily encounters with the bars of the golden cages by which we are enclosed as students, employees, spouses, customers, artists, researchers or citizens. This is why boredom might have appeared as too simplistic or banal a notion to work with in the field of political identity at first glance. And this is partly why it is all the more powerful and worthy of closer examination.

As mentioned above, the word “boredom” is commonly employed in the context of complaining and criticizing. And indeed it supplies a reference point to much criticism of European politics: An article in the British, Eurosceptic newsletter Eurofacts, whose title reads “Boredom is the Europhiles’ Secret Weapon”, explains how the EU avoids critical examination and real public debates by maintaining itself in a “state of ennui”. [5] A post by a British blogger, entitled “The EU: Boring People into Servitude”, explains how “a cabal of unelected politicians siphon off powers from the sovereign states of europe [sic]” by breaking down policy goals “into 1000’s of individual regulations” thereby rendering “their day to day operations so monumentally tedious that it is hard with a casual glance for any european [sic] to see”. [6] In the context of the NO vote to the Lisbon Treaty in the first referendum in Ireland, political scientist Ivan Krastev has said that “European Union’s leaders’ strategy in dealing with crisis […] could […] be described as one of ‘evasion by trivialisation’”, and further explained that “European citizens are
bored to death with their leaders” and that this weakness is very much an outcome of the “very strength of the European project – its focus on piecemeal engineering and institutional reforms”. [7] According to these critics, boredom is not just an unfortunate byproduct of European politics; it is systematic and intentional; it has a political function which is undemocratic in essence.

By others, however, this very boredom is celebrated as a virtue rather than condemned as a manipulating mechanism. Historian Timothy Garton Ash, for instance, claims that, to a large extent, Europe being “nice, boring and irrelevant” is “a great achievement”. [8] European Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy, Margot Wallstroem, writes, on the occasion of Europe Day, an article entitled “So who says the EU is boring?”, in which she admits that not many people may be enthusiastic about this event or too much concerned about the EU altogether but that she, in fact, considers this situation as possibly the “greatest success” of the Union. Wallstroem further writes: “The EU doesn’t really do passion. If you tried to market the EU as an aphrodisiac, it would rate up there with a nice pair of socks. If anything, the EU flag stands for boring reason over passion [sic]”. [9] Likewise, European Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, has expressed his wish that, with the help of European involvement, the Balkans will become “normal, prosperous and boring”. [10] “Boredom”, so it appears, is by no means considered as a swear word by EU officials and other supporters of the integration project; it is a desirable state of affairs. Once again, we are confirmed that boredom is systematic to the EU, or as publicist Isolde Charim has incisively put it, “the European Union is a pathos-annihilating machine” (Pathosvernichtungsmaschine). [11]

But how are we to understand the Union’s ambition to foster a European identity when even the person in charge of its communication strategy so readily announces that, at bottom, all that can be communicated is sheer boredom. Or is boredom a part of the communication strategy itself? Do passion and reason stand in essential contrast when it comes to politics? And if this is indeed the case, what about the undemocratic nature of boring politics? Is an ideal-typical rational-legal authority
such as the EU bound to be emotionally detached from the public and, therefore, undemocratic in essence?

At this point a deeper look into the nature of boredom is instructive. In his lectures on the basic concepts of metaphysics delivered in the late 1920s, Heidegger has paid much attention to the ‘ground mood’ (Grundstimmung) of boredom (Langeweile). Several of his observations are highly relevant to our current investigation but for the moment we shall mention only one, namely that “boredom is at all possible because each thing […] has its own time”. [12] This observation stems closely from the Heideggerian morphological methodology and the fact that the German word for boredom, Langeweile, literally means a “long while”. Nevertheless it applies to the English case as well. For instance, we can also find this idea, that boredom is an outcome of some sort of rhythm discrepancy, in the writings of the American sociologist Orrin Klapp, who has dealt extensively with boredom in the context of the information society and explained it as a “lag in which the slow horse of meaning is unable to keep up with the fast horse of mere information”. [13] According to Giddens’ structuration theory, every individual is simultaneously “positioned” in two different durations: the duration of daily life and the “longue durée of institutions”. [14] Considering all this, we may conclude that boredom lurks in every encounter of the individual with institutions; it strikes when there is an attunement failure, i.e. when the individual-institutional temporal gap is not bridged over.

But what does it mean that each thing has its own time? And how can such temporal gaps be bridged? Generally speaking, we can say that not only institutions and individuals have different life spans and rhythms of change, but also celestial bodies, generations and public transportation systems. Having to wait for a train – which is Heidegger’s example of the first and least profound form of boredom – can be described as a synchronization procedure, in which the individual’s time merges with the time of the machine through empty and boring postponement. Likewise all other queuing and waiting in public space may also induce this feeling of impatience due to the interruption of the time flux of the self in its daily activity. These are all situational examples of temporal alignment. When it comes to the self and its life
as a unified whole, becoming synchronized with the social structures is a matter of the faculty that vouches for the diachronic consistency of the self, namely the faculty of memory. Institutions are custodians of social memory, which is encrypted in their sets of rules and laws and embodied in their structures through the events of history. The individual becomes attuned to these longer-wave frequencies of historical change by the means of processes which were conceptualized by the sociologist of time, Eviatar Zerubavel, as “mnemonic synchronization” and “mnemonic socialization”. [15] Through these processes, which take place in rituals, ceremonies, family gatherings, media events, museums, education systems and other apparatuses and mechanisms whereby societies generate and dissipate meaning, the individual becomes synchronized with the longue durée of institutions and becomes capable of imagining herself as part of a greater ‘we’ of which these institutions are representatives. Complementary to this temporally imagined, or collectively remembered, “we”, is, of course, the long lasting, still “alive and kicking”, spatially imagined communities of nation states. But geopolitics is never boring because it is basically synchronic and, as such, does not involve temporal discrepancies. Memory politics, on the other hand, is prone to frazzle and decay in meaning, since it is subject to entropy, the natural disintegrating effect of time.

As for the time being, the institutions of the European Union exhibit outstanding flexibility as far as it has to do with territorial demarcation. The Union’s modus operandi, so it seems, is biased towards inclusion and its legal structure is formed in a diffusible way. Its geopolitical representability is somewhat misleading since it is the Member State’s borders that are actually being represented. As Jacque Delors famously said, “the EU is an unidentifiable political object”. Indeed, the European integration project is not an entity: it is a process, and, as such, it is demarcated within time, not within space. The ultimate other of the Union is its history of war and disunity. [16] Thus, the importance of mnemonic socialization as a precondition for civic engagement with European politics becomes clear. The European Union is a monument of the Second World War; it is a site of memory, but it was not designed to be communicative of its history; it is fascinating as a historical reaction
and when posed against the longue durée historical background of Europe, but its time does not correspond with the time of daily life.

However, its extreme technocratic appearance, which is perceived as boring, is, paradoxically, the aesthetical interface through which the elusive meaning of post-national Europe can be grasped. Political boredom is the unavoidable outcome of conflict management mechanisms which operate in security communities such as the EU. Like insurance companies, they systematically eradicate contingency and colonize the future, rendering subjectivity and personhood, to a certain extent, meaningless. This difficulty of defining meaning is registered as boredom. But boredom (as opposed to ennui) is not a static condition; it is rather a drive that constantly pushes the individual toward innovative sources of meaning. [17] The fear of getting bored nourishes the entertainment industries which allegedly shift popular awareness and involvement away from politics. When private consumption exhausts its effectiveness, however, the meaninglessness of ephemerality (to paraphrase Hirschman’s “Shifting Involvements” thesis) brings us back to the public sphere where we give voice to our frustration with the golden cage of rationalized politics and try to channel collective action toward new horizons of meaningful engagement, such as the protection of the environment and remotely fought wars. [18]

Boredom is not the essence of being but, as it facilitates Heidegger’s investigation into the temporality of being-in-the-world, it allows us a glimpse into the temporality of being in society. Such existential terminology seems appropriate when we hear about projects with names such as “A Soul for Europe” being initiated in the European public sphere. [19] It also seems appropriate to accommodate the Habermasian vision of Europe establishing itself as distinguishably secular. As was acknowledged by existentialist thinkers, the individual’s experience of boredom is important in the constitution of the modern and secular self, which is devoid of transcendental solace. On a similar note we can say that a collective experience of boredom is essential for the constitution of postmodern society, which is deprived of the idols and ideologies of nationalism, authoritarianism and communism.
Cited Work:


Notes:

[1] It should be noted that this discourse on European identity has grown intensive mainly since the 1990s whereas, in the first decades of European integration, the intellectual debate on the EC (commonly known under the label neo-functionalism versus intergovernmentalism) revolved mainly around issues of legitimacy and authority (Thomas Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity and the Puzzles of European Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 2 [2005]: 294). As Ute Frevert remarks, during most of the years of integration questions of European tradition and values were largely ignored, and only lately has this ‘dramatic’ shift of interest occurred (“Braucht Europa eine kulturelle Identität? Zehn kritische Anmerkungen“. Transit, 28 (2004/5): 111). However, historical landmarks heralding this shift can be traced back to 1973, when the European Council, meeting in the configuration of the nine Foreign Ministers of the Community, declared that “time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity [sic]” (Document on European Identity Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973, in Copenhagen. Available: http://www.ena.lu). The same year also saw the launching of the “Eurobarometer” public-opinion survey instrument (however, it was only since 1992 that questions about identity have been polled [Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Europe’s Blues: Theoretical Soul-Searching after the Rejection of the European Constitution,” Political Science and Politics 39 (2006) 247]). In 1979, first direct elections to the European Parliament took place. In the 1980s, the problem of the “democratic deficit” started to gain wide attention and the symbols of flag and hymn were decided upon. Still the real shift took place in the 1990s, when the strong civic symbols of citizenship and, later on, currency were incorporated into the Union’s legal structure. The establishment of the “Convention on the future of Europe” and the attempts at a constitution in the past decade are another expression of these efforts of the Union “to get closer to the people”. The recently ratified Lisbon Treaty is another such expression; however, its success in “giving Europe a face”, simplifying the Union’s legal and institutional structure and giving more substantive power to the Parliament are debatable. Currently several offices, think
tanks and agencies focus on “bridging the gap between the EU and its citizens”. Noteworthy are the European Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy; the “European Citizen and Action Service”; “Euroactive”; and “Friends of Europe”. The numerous projects and studies on European identity cannot be detailed here but I trust the informed reader to be aware of their prevalence.


[19] I refer here to the project “A soul for Europe” (“Europa eine Seele geben”), which was initiated in Berlin in 2003. Originally, this slogan was taken from a speech delivered by Delors in 1992, in which he expressed his view that the “semi-automatic” process of integration had culminated with the completion of the free market, which is marked by the Maastricht Treaty. From then on, so he claimed, the task was to construct the meaning of Europe – to give it a soul – lest the all enterprise would turn out to be a sheer “waste of time”. Parts of this speech, which was delivered to an audience of Christian leaders, can be found in a book that uses the same slogan as its title: Erhard Busek, Eine Seele für Europa – Aufgaben für einen Kontinent (Wien: Verlag Kremayr & Scheriau KG, 2008).

Published:
http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxviii/avraham-rot-2/
Juliette Chevée

Constructing a European identity: yes, but how?

A few weeks ago on the occasion of the summit of the Heads of State on the budget negotiations Pascal Lamy acknowledged the difficulties in building a European identity. “Communities are forged on national warrior myths. The myth of the homeland is a nation in danger. The problem of Europe is that it was born on a contra-myth, peace”, explained the president of the WTO in a tribune in Le Monde dated 21st November 2012.

The problem presented by Pascal Lamy is not new. And yet, the projects to construct a civic and cultural Europe have multiplied, from the first cultural action plan launched by the European Commission in 1977 to the widely spread Erasmus program.

But are these efforts really successful? In the French university system, the national average number of students coming back from an Erasmus year, reported to the size of their university, was 1% in 2008-2009 (according to the Europe-Education-Formation-France agency). And a social mix of students enjoying this program is far from being achieved. The crisis is not helping for these poor results, as there is a threat of funds’ withdrawal.

The European identity, an artificial concept?

Facing such difficulties, the moment has come when it is legitimate to ask whether the encountered problems are due to the fact that there is no pre-existing European identity. The stories of ‘common heritage’ that are constantly hammered upon to try to prove somehow that a German has enough in common with a Greek in order to pull him out of the stagnation he is in are maybe only inventions? Creator myths put in place to consolidate and justify an economic union with a political union?

According to certain Europhiles, the seeds of the European Union existed already in the mind of Immanuel Kant. The debate on the candidature of Turkey continues to raise questions on the limits of Europe and this famous ‘common heritage’. But when thinking about it, is this artificial characteristic not common to any identity? Identity is never innate,
it is constructed starting from some elements that a group of individuals consider as shared. This is demonstrated by the French identity: “Our ancestors, the Gaules…” was a common formula used in the history books of the Third Republic (and often even in the current books in a more subtle form), to teach the students the roots that bounded the French people. But this did not mean that much to students from the distant overseas territories to whom it was imposed without any distinction.

From the “school of the Republic” to the “school of Europe”

However, the ‘black hussars of the Republic’ have proved two things. First, a national identity, even if it tries to be based on historical facts, remains mainly a mental construct. Secondly, but this is quite evident, the school plays an important role in the acquisition of shared values on a large scale.

We want to construct a European identity? It has to go through school. Of course, you could argue, we are taught (a bit) about Europe at school. And our members endeavour to pass the message. But to create a real feeling of unity among Europeans, there has to be more of it.

A couple of weeks ago, one of our collaborators suggested to set up a YEE (Year of European Education). The principle is there, but the idea is without doubt a bit too ambitious: Although a part of the costs would be compensated by the fact that there would be ‘exchange between young people’, there would still be at least the cost of a plane or train ticket and not everybody can afford this. And, given the threats that already weigh on the Erasmus program, it is not certain that the EU is willing to finance such a project.

Besides, we should also consider that living a year abroad is not everyone’s dream. How would you manage to make Eurosceptics change their mind by pushing them to send their child to the other side of Europe, with strangers? The experience would be too brutal to be beneficial.

Finally, imagine the mess in the ministries if from one day to another, they would have to make a one year cut to school programmes in order to be able to send the students abroad!
But we could possibly transform this idea in a sort of ‘European civic service’. During decades we have financed military services and the conscription still exists in some countries of the EU (Denmark, Austria, Finland). We could imagine on a similar model a mandatory period, not anymore at the service of a national army, but at the service of another European state. But the problem of costs would still exist.

**A common programme for common values**

A more timid idea, that already seems very ambitious to some, would be to establish some common school programmes, or at least to coordinate the ministries of education. Unifying the programmes in their entirety would obviously be too complicated, given that each reform of the French programme is prone to controversy. But why not replace the ‘classes of civic education’ (by the way, rather useless these days) by ‘classes of European civic education’? Certainly, it would be feasible to create a common class for all Europeans, which programme would be unified.

In an even less restrictive way, we could at first create a chapter that each state would commit to include in its programme (for example in France in the history-geography course), either during the last year of secondary education or during each year of high school. Preferably, this chapter should also be included in the programme of the “baccalauréat” (and of its European equivalents) in order to encourage students to become interested in it.

Not daring enough for someone, complicated to set up for others (but in the EU, everything is complicated), it would only be a droplet in what the students learn during the year, but at least it would be shared among young Europeans.

The construction of an identity is a matter of education. Education goes through school. The harmonization of what is taught at school is thus an obvious step towards the construction of a European identity.

*Translated by Sarah Declercq*

**Published:**

https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/Constructing-a-European-identity-Yes-but-how,05571
The manifesto of European patriots
Fight for Europe – or the wreckers will destroy it

The idea of Europe is in peril.

From all sides there are criticisms, insults and desertions from the cause.

“Enough of ‘building Europe’!” is the cry. Let’s reconnect instead with our “national soul”! Let’s rediscover our “lost identity”! This is the agenda shared by the populist forces washing over the continent. Never mind that abstractions such as “soul” and “identity” often exist only in the imagination of demagogues.

Europe is being attacked by false prophets who are drunk on resentment, and delirious at their opportunity to seize the limelight. It has been abandoned by the two great allies who in the previous century twice saved it from suicide; one across the Channel and the other across the Atlantic. The continent is vulnerable to the increasingly brazen meddling by the occupant of the Kremlin. Europe as an idea is falling apart before our eyes.

This is the noxious climate in which Europe’s parliamentary elections will take place in May. Unless something changes; unless something comes along to turn back the rising, swelling, insistent tide; unless a new spirit of resistance emerges, these elections promise to be the most calamitous that we have known. They will give a victory to the wreckers. For those who still believe in the legacy of Erasmus, Dante, Goethe and Comenius there will be only ignominious defeat. A politics of disdain for intelligence and culture will have triumphed. There will be explosions of xenophobia and antisemitism. Disaster will have befallen us.

We, the undersigned, are among those who refuse to resign themselves to this looming catastrophe.

We count ourselves among the European patriots (a group more numerous than is commonly thought, but that is often too quiet and too resigned), who understand what is at stake here. Three-quarters of a century after the defeat of fascism and 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall there is a new battle for civilisation.
Our faith is in the great idea that we inherited, which we believe to have been the one force powerful enough to lift Europe’s peoples above themselves and their warring past. We believe it remains the one force today virtuous enough to ward off the new signs of totalitarianism that drag in their wake the old miseries of the dark ages. What is at stake forbids us from giving up.

Hence this invitation to join in a new surge.

Hence this appeal to action on the eve of an election that we refuse to abandon to the gravediggers of the European idea.

Hence this exhortation to carry once more the torch of a Europe that, despite its mistakes, its lapses, and its occasional acts of cowardice, remains a beacon for every free man and woman on the planet.

Our generation got it wrong. Like Garibaldi’s followers in the 19th century, who repeated, like a mantra, “Italia se farà da sé” (Italy will make herself by herself), we believed that the continent would come together on its own, without our needing to fight for it, or to work for it. This, we told ourselves, was “the direction of history”.

We must make a clean break with that old conviction. We don’t have a choice. We must now fight for the idea of Europe or see it perish beneath the waves of populism.

In response to the nationalist and identitarian onslaught, we must rediscover the spirit of activism or accept that resentment and hatred will surround and submerge us. Urgently, we need to sound the alarm against these arsonists of soul and spirit who, from Paris to Rome, with stops along the way in Barcelona, Budapest, Dresden, Vienna and Warsaw, want to make a bonfire of our freedoms.

In this strange defeat of “Europe” that looms on the horizon; this new crisis of the European conscience that promises to tear down everything that made our societies great, honourable, and prosperous, there is a challenge greater than any since the 1930s: a challenge to liberal democracy and its values.

Other signatories: Vassilis Alexakis (Athens), Svetlana Alexievich (Minsk), Anne Applebaum (Warsaw), Jens Christian Grøndahl (Copenhagen), David Grossman (Jerusalem), Ágnes Heller (Budapest), Ismaïl Kadaré (Tirana), György Konrád (Debrecen), António Lobo
Antunes (Lisbon), Claudio Magris (Trieste), Ian McEwan (London), Adam Michnik (Warsaw), Herta Müller (Berlin), Ludmila Oulitskaïa (Moscow), Rob Riemen (Amsterdam), Fernando Savater (San Sebastián), Roberto Saviano (Naples), Eugenio Scalfari (Rome), Simon Schama (London), Peter Schneider (Berlin), Abdullah Sidran (Sarajevo), Leïla Slimani (Paris), Colm Tóibín (Dublin), Mario Vargas Llosa (Madrid), Adam Zagajewski (Cracow)

Published:
https://www.youscribe.com/BookReader/Index/3034942/?documentId=3421607
BEGINNING A FEW DECADES AGO, WORLD POLITICS STARTED TO EXPERIENCE A DRAMATIC TRANSFORMATION. From the early 1970s to the first decade of this century, the number of electoral democracies increased from about 35 to more than 110. Over the same period, the world’s output of goods and services quadrupled, and growth extended to virtually every region of the world. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty plummeted, dropping from 42 percent of the global population in 1993 to 18 percent in 2008.

But not everyone benefited from these changes. In many countries, and particularly in developed democracies, economic inequality increased dramatically, as the benefits of growth flowed primarily to the wealthy and well-educated. The increasing volume of goods, money, and people moving from one place to another brought disruptive changes. In developing countries, villagers who previously had no electricity suddenly found themselves living in large cities, watching TV, and connecting to the Internet on their mobile phones. Huge new middle classes arose in China and India – but the work they did replaced the work that had been done by older middle classes in the developed world. Manufacturing moved steadily from the United States and Europe to East Asia and other regions with low labor costs. At the same time, men were being displaced by women in a labor market increasingly dominated by service industries, and low-skilled workers found themselves replaced by smart machines.

Ultimately, these changes slowed the movement toward an increasingly open and liberal world order, which began to falter and soon reversed. The final blows were the global financial crisis of 2007–8 and the euro crisis that began in 2009. In both cases, policies crafted by elites produced huge recessions, high unemployment, and falling incomes for millions of ordinary workers. Since the United States and the EU were the leading exemplars of liberal democracy, these crises damaged the reputation of that system as a whole.
Indeed, in recent years, the number of democracies has fallen, and democracy has retreated in virtually all regions of the world. At the same time, many authoritarian countries, led by China and Russia, have become much more assertive. Some countries that had seemed to be successful liberal democracies during the 1990s – including Hungary, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey – have slid backward toward authoritarianism. The Arab revolts of 2010–11 disrupted dictatorships throughout the Middle East but yielded little in terms of democratization: in their wake, despotic regimes held on to power, and civil wars racked Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. More surprising and perhaps even more significant was the success of populist nationalism in elections held in 2016 by two of the world’s most durable liberal democracies: the United Kingdom, where voters chose to leave the EU, and the United States, where Donald Trump scored a shocking electoral upset in the race for president.

All these developments relate in some way to the economic and technological shifts of globalization. But they are also rooted in a different phenomenon: the rise of identity politics. For the most part, twentieth-century politics was defined by economic issues. On the left, politics centered on workers, trade unions, social welfare programs, and redistributive policies. The right, by contrast, was primarily interested in reducing the size of government and promoting the private sector. Politics today, however, is defined less by economic or ideological concerns than by questions of identity. Now, in many democracies, the left focuses less on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and LGBT people. The right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion.

Identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs.

This shift overturns a long tradition, dating back at least as far as Karl Marx, of viewing political struggles as a reflection of economic conflicts. But important as material self-interest is, human beings are motivated
by other things as well, forces that better explain the present day. All over the world, political leaders have mobilized followers around the idea that their dignity has been affronted and must be restored.

Of course, in authoritarian countries, such appeals are old hat. Russian President Vladimir Putin has talked about the “tragedy” of the Soviet Union’s collapse and has excoriated the United States and Europe for taking advantage of Russia’s weakness during the 1990s to expand NATO. Chinese President Xi Jinping alludes to his country’s “century of humiliation,” a period of foreign domination that began in 1839.

But resentment over indignities has become a powerful force in democratic countries, too. The Black Lives Matter movement sprang from a series of well-publicized police killings of African Americans and forced the rest of the world to pay attention to the victims of police brutality. On college campuses and in offices around the United States, women seethed over a seeming epidemic of sexual harassment and assault and concluded that their male peers simply did not see them as equals. The rights of transgender people, who had previously not been widely recognized as distinct targets of discrimination, became a cause célèbre. And many of those who voted for Trump yearned for a better time in the past, when they believed their place in their own society had been more secure.

Again and again, groups have come to believe that their identities – whether national, religious, ethnic, sexual, gender, or otherwise – are not receiving adequate recognition. Identity politics is no longer a minor phenomenon, playing out only in the rarified confines of university campuses or providing a backdrop to low-stakes skirmishes in “culture wars” promoted by the mass media. Instead, identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs.

That leaves modern liberal democracies facing an important challenge. Globalization has brought rapid economic and social change and made these societies far more diverse, creating demands for recognition on the part of groups that were once invisible to mainstream society. These demands have led to a backlash among other groups, which are feeling a loss of status and a sense of displacement. Democratic societies are fracturing into segments based on ever-narrower identities, threatening
the possibility of deliberation and collective action by society as a whole. This is a road that leads only to state breakdown and, ultimately, failure. Unless such liberal democracies can work their way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, they will doom themselves – and the world – to continuing conflict.

**THE THIRD PART OF THE SOUL**

Most economists assume that human beings are motivated by the desire for material resources or goods. This conception of human behavior has deep roots in Western political thought and forms the basis of most contemporary social science. But it leaves out a factor that classical philosophers realized was crucially important: the craving for dignity. Socrates believed that such a need formed an integral “third part” of the human soul, one that coexisted with a “desiring part” and a “calculating part.” In Plato’s Republic, he termed this the thymos, which English translations render poorly as “spirit.”

In politics, thymos is expressed in two forms. The first is what I call “megalothymia”: a desire to be recognized as superior. Pre-democratic societies rested on hierarchies, and their belief in the inherent superiority of a certain class of people – nobles, aristocrats, royals – was fundamental to social order. The problem with megalothymia is that for every person recognized as superior, far more people are seen as inferior and receive no public recognition of their human worth. A powerful feeling of resentment arises when one is disrespected. And an equally powerful feeling – what I call “isothymia” – makes people want to be seen as just as good as everyone else.

The rise of modern democracy is the story of isothymia’s triumph over megalothymia: societies that recognized the rights of only a small number of elites were replaced by ones that recognized everyone as inherently equal. During the twentieth century, societies stratified by class began to acknowledge the rights of ordinary people, and nations that had been colonized sought independence. The great struggles in U.S. political history over slavery and segregation, workers’ rights, and women’s equality were driven by demands that the political system expand the circle of individuals it recognized as full human beings.
But in liberal democracies, equality under the law does not result in economic or social equality. Discrimination continues to exist against a wide variety of groups, and market economies produce large inequalities of outcome. Despite their overall wealth, the United States and other developed countries have seen income inequality increase dramatically over the past 30 years. Significant parts of their populations have suffered from stagnant incomes, and certain segments of society have experienced downward social mobility.

Perceived threats to one’s economic status may help explain the rise of populist nationalism in the United States and elsewhere. The American working class, defined as people with a high school education or less, has not been doing well in recent decades. This is reflected not just in stagnant or declining incomes and job losses but in social breakdown, as well. For African Americans, this process began in the 1970s, decades after the Great Migration, when blacks moved to such cities as Chicago, Detroit, and New York, where many of them found employment in the meatpacking, steel, or auto industry. As these sectors declined and men began to lose jobs through deindustrialization, a series of social ills followed, including rising crime rates, a crack cocaine epidemic, and a deterioration of family life, which helped transmit poverty from one generation to the next.

Over the past decade, a similar kind of social decline has spread to the white working class. An opioid epidemic has hollowed out white, rural working-class communities all over the United States; in 2016, heavy drug use led to more than 60,000 overdose deaths, about twice the number of deaths from traffic accidents each year in the country. Life expectancy for white American men fell between 2013 and 2014, a highly unusual occurrence in a developed country. And the proportion of white working-class children growing up in single-parent families rose from 22 percent in 2000 to 36 percent in 2017.

But perhaps one of the great drivers of the new nationalism that sent Trump to the White House (and drove the United Kingdom to vote to leave the EU) has been the perception of invisibility. The resentful citizens fearing the loss of their middle-class status point an accusatory finger upward to the elites, who they believe do not see them, but also
downward toward the poor, who they feel are unfairly favored. Economic distress is often perceived by individuals more as a loss of identity than as a loss of resources. Hard work should confer dignity on an individual. But many white working-class Americans feel that their dignity is not recognized and that the government gives undue advantages to people who are not willing to play by the rules.

This link between income and status helps explain why nationalist or religiously conservative appeals have proved more effective than traditional left-wing ones based on economic class. Nationalists tell the disaffected that they have always been core members of a great nation and that foreigners, immigrants, and elites have been conspiring to hold them down. “Your country is no longer your own,” they say, “and you are not respected in your own land.” The religious right tells a similar story: “You are a member of a great community of believers that has been betrayed by nonbelievers; this betrayal has led to your impoverishment and is a crime against God.”

The prevalence of such narratives is why immigration has become such a contentious issue in so many countries. Like trade, immigration boosts overall GDP, but it does not benefit all groups within a society. Almost always, ethnic majorities view it as a threat to their cultural identity, especially when cross-border flows of people are as massive as they have been in recent decades.

Yet anger over immigration alone cannot explain why the nationalist right has in recent years captured voters who used to support parties of the left, in both the United States and Europe. The rightward drift also reflects the failure of contemporary left-leaning parties to speak to people whose relative status has fallen as a result of globalization and technological change. In past eras, progressives appealed to a shared experience of exploitation and resentment of rich capitalists: “Workers of the world, unite!” In the United States, working-class voters overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party from the New Deal, in the 1930s, up until the rise of Ronald Reagan, in the 1980s. And European social democracy was built on a foundation of trade unionism and working-class solidarity.
But during the era of globalization, most left-wing parties shifted their strategy. Rather than build solidarity around large collectivities such as the working class or the economically exploited, they began to focus on ever-smaller groups that found themselves marginalized in specific and unique ways. The principle of universal and equal recognition mutated into calls for special recognition. Over time, this phenomenon migrated from the left to the right.

**THE TRIUMPH OF IDENTITY**

In the 1960s, powerful new social movements emerged across the world’s developed liberal democracies. Civil rights activists in the United States demanded that the country fulfill the promise of equality made in the Declaration of Independence and written into the U.S. Constitution after the Civil War. This was soon followed by the feminist movement, which similarly sought equal treatment for women, a cause that both stimulated and was shaped by a massive influx of women into the labor market. A parallel social revolution shattered traditional norms regarding sexuality and the family, and the environmental movement reshaped attitudes toward nature. Subsequent years would see new movements promoting the rights of the disabled, Native Americans, immigrants, gay men and women, and, eventually, transgender people. But even when laws changed to provide more opportunities and stronger legal protections to the marginalized, groups continued to differ from one another in their behavior, performance, wealth, traditions, and customs; bias and bigotry remained commonplace among individuals; and minorities continued to cope with the burdens of discrimination, prejudice, disrespect, and invisibility.

This presented each marginalized group with a choice: it could demand that society treat its members the same way it treated the members of dominant groups, or it could assert a separate identity for its members and demand respect for them as different from the mainstream society. Over time, the latter strategy tended to win out: the early civil rights movement of Martin Luther King, Jr., demanded that American society treat black people the way it treated white people. By the end of the 1960s, however, groups such as the Black Panthers and the Nation
of Islam emerged and argued that black people had their own traditions and consciousness; in their view, black people needed to take pride in themselves for who they were and not heed what the broader society wanted them to be. The authentic inner selves of black Americans were not the same as those of white people, they argued; they were shaped by the unique experience of growing up black in a hostile society dominated by whites. That experience was defined by violence, racism, and denigration and could not be appreciated by people who grew up in different circumstances.

Multiculturalism has become a vision of a society fragmented into many small groups with distinct experiences.

These themes have been taken up in today’s Black Lives Matter movement, which began with demands for justice for individual victims of police violence but soon broadened into an effort to make people more aware of the nature of day-to-day existence for black Americans. Writers such as Ta-Nehisi Coates have connected contemporary police violence against African Americans to the long history of slavery and lynching. In the view of Coates and others, this history constitutes part of an unbridgeable gulf of understanding between blacks and whites.

A similar evolution occurred within the feminist movement. The demands of the mainstream movement were focused on equal treatment for women in employment, education, the courts, and so on. But from the beginning, an important strand of feminist thought proposed that the consciousness and life experiences of women were fundamentally different from those of men and that the movement’s aim should not be to simply facilitate women’s behaving and thinking like men.

Other movements soon seized on the importance of lived experience to their struggles. Marginalized groups increasingly demanded not only that laws and institutions treat them as equal to dominant groups but also that the broader society recognize and even celebrate the intrinsic differences that set them apart. The term “multiculturalism” – originally merely referring to a quality of diverse societies – became a label for a political program that valued each separate culture and each lived experience equally, at times by drawing special attention to those that had been invisible or undervalued in the past. This kind of multiculturalism at
first was about large cultural groups, such as French-speaking Canadians, or Muslim immigrants, or African Americans. But soon it became a vision of a society fragmented into many small groups with distinct experiences, as well as groups defined by the intersection of different forms of discrimination, such as women of color, whose lives could not be understood through the lens of either race or gender alone.

The left began to embrace multiculturalism just as it was becoming harder to craft policies that would bring about large-scale socio-economic change. By the 1980s, progressive groups throughout the developed world were facing an existential crisis. The far left had been defined for the first half of the century by the ideals of revolutionary Marxism and its vision of radical egalitarianism. The social democratic left had a different agenda: it accepted liberal democracy but sought to expand the welfare state to cover more people with more social protections. But both Marxists and social democrats hoped to increase socioeconomic equality through the use of state power, by expanding access to social services to all citizens and by redistributing wealth.

As the twentieth century drew to a close, the limits of this strategy became clear. Marxists had to confront the fact that communist societies in China and the Soviet Union had turned into grotesque and oppressive dictatorships. At the same time, the working class in most industrialized democracies had grown richer and had begun to merge with the middle class. Communist revolution and the abolition of private property fell off the agenda. The social democratic left also reached a dead end when its goal of an ever-expanding welfare state bumped into the reality of fiscal constraints during the turbulent 1970s. Governments responded by printing money, leading to inflation and financial crises. Redistributive programs were creating perverse incentives that discouraged work, savings, and entrepreneurship, which in turn shrank the overall economic pie. Inequality remained deeply entrenched, despite ambitious efforts to eradicate it, such as U.S. President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society initiatives. With China’s shift toward a market economy after 1978 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Marxist left largely fell apart, and the social democrats were left to make their peace with capitalism.
The left’s diminished ambitions for large-scale socioeconomic reform converged with its embrace of identity politics and multiculturalism in the final decades of the twentieth century. The left continued to be defined by its passion for equality – by isothymia – but its agenda shifted from the earlier emphasis on the working class to the demands of an ever-widening circle of marginalized minorities. Many activists came to see the old working class and their trade unions as a privileged stratum that demonstrated little sympathy for the plight of immigrants and racial minorities. They sought to expand the rights of a growing list of groups rather than improve the economic conditions of individuals. In the process, the old working class was left behind.

FROM LEFT TO RIGHT

The left’s embrace of identity politics was both understandable and necessary. The lived experiences of distinct identity groups differ, and they often need to be addressed in ways specific to those groups. Outsiders often fail to perceive the harm they are doing by their actions, as many men realized in the wake of the #MeToo movement’s revelations regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault. Identity politics aims to change culture and behavior in ways that have real material benefits for many people.

By turning a spotlight on narrower experiences of injustice, identity politics has brought about welcome changes in cultural norms and has produced concrete public policies that have helped many people. The Black Lives Matter movement has made police departments across the United States much more conscious of the way they treat minorities, even though police abuse still persists. The #MeToo movement has broadened popular understanding of sexual assault and has opened an important discussion of the inadequacies of existing criminal law in dealing with it. Its most important consequence is probably the change it has already wrought in the way that women and men interact in workplaces.

So there is nothing wrong with identity politics as such; it is a natural and inevitable response to injustice. But the tendency of identity politics to focus on cultural issues has diverted energy and attention away from
serious thinking on the part of progressives about how to reverse the 30-year trend in most liberal democracies toward greater socioeconomic inequality. It is easier to argue over cultural issues than it is to change policies, easier to include female and minority authors in college curricula than to increase the incomes and expand the opportunities of women and minorities outside the ivory tower. What is more, many of the constituencies that have been the focus of recent campaigns driven by identity politics, such as female executives in Silicon Valley and female Hollywood stars, are near the top of the income distribution. Helping them achieve greater equality is a good thing, but it will do little to address the glaring disparities between the top one percent of earners and everyone else.

Today’s left-wing identity politics also diverts attention from larger groups whose serious problems have been ignored. Until recently, activists on the left had little to say about the burgeoning opioid crisis or the fate of children growing up in impoverished single-parent families in the rural United States. And the Democrats have put forward no ambitious strategies to deal with the potentially immense job losses that will accompany advancing automation or the income disparities that technology may bring to all Americans.

Moreover, the left’s identity politics poses a threat to free speech and to the kind of rational discourse needed to sustain a democracy. Liberal democracies are committed to protecting the right to say virtually anything in a marketplace of ideas, particularly in the political sphere. But the preoccupation with identity has clashed with the need for civic discourse. The focus on lived experience by identity groups prioritizes the emotional world of the inner self over the rational examination of issues in the outside world and privileges sincerely held opinions over a process of reasoned deliberation that may force one to abandon prior opinions. The fact that an assertion is offensive to someone’s sense of self-worth is often seen as grounds for silencing or disparaging the individual who made it.

A reliance on identity politics also has weaknesses as a political strategy. The current dysfunction and decay of the U.S. political system are related to extreme and ever-growing polarization, which has made
routine governing an exercise in brinkmanship. Most of the blame for this belongs to the right. As the political scientists Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein have argued, the Republican Party has moved much more rapidly toward its far-right wing than the Democratic Party has moved in the opposite direction. But both parties have moved away from the center. Left-wing activists focused on identity issues are seldom representative of the electorate as a whole; indeed, their concerns often alienate mainstream voters.

But perhaps the worst thing about identity politics as currently practiced by the left is that it has stimulated the rise of identity politics on the right. This is due in no small part to the left’s embrace of political correctness, a social norm that prohibits people from publicly expressing their beliefs or opinions without fearing moral opprobrium. Every society has certain views that run counter to its foundational ideas of legitimacy and therefore are off-limits in public discourse. But the constant discovery of new identities and the shifting grounds for acceptable speech are hard to follow. In a society highly attuned to group dignity, new boundaries lines keep appearing, and previously acceptable ways of talking or expressing oneself become offensive. Today, for example, merely using the words “he” or “she” in certain contexts might be interpreted as a sign of insensitivity to intersex or transgender people. But such utterances threaten no fundamental democratic principles; rather, they challenge the dignity of a particular group and denote a lack of awareness of or sympathy for that group’s struggles.

In reality, only a relatively small number of writers, artists, students, and intellectuals on the left espouse the most extreme forms of political correctness. But those instances are picked up by the conservative media, which use them to tar the left as a whole. This may explain one of the extraordinary aspects of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which was Trump’s popularity among a core group of supporters despite behavior that, in an earlier era, would have doomed a presidential bid. During the campaign, Trump mocked a journalist’s physical disabilities, characterized Mexicans as rapists and criminals, and was heard on a recording bragging that he had groped women. Those statements were less transgressions against political correctness than transgressions
against basic decency, and many of Trump’s supporters did not necessarily approve of them or of other outrageous comments that Trump made. But at a time when many Americans believe that public speech is excessively policed, Trump’s supporters like that he is not intimidated by the pressure to avoid giving offense. In an era shaped by political correctness, Trump represents a kind of authenticity that many Americans admire: he may be malicious, bigoted, and unpresidential, but at least he says what he thinks.

And yet Trump’s rise did not reflect a conservative rejection of identity politics; in fact, it reflected the right’s embrace of identity politics. Many of Trump’s white working-class supporters feel that they have been disregarded by elites. People living in rural areas, who are the backbone of populist movements not just in the United States but also in many European countries, often believe that their values are threatened by cosmopolitan, urban elites. And although they are members of a dominant ethnic group, many members of the white working class see themselves as victimized and marginalized. Such sentiments have paved the way for the emergence of a right-wing identity politics that, at its most extreme, takes the form of explicitly racist white nationalism.

Trump has directly contributed to this process. His transformation from real estate mogul and reality-television star to political contender took off after he became the most famous promoter of the racist “birther” conspiracy theory, which cast doubt on Barack Obama’s eligibility to serve as president. As a candidate, he was evasive when asked about the fact that the former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke had endorsed him, and he complained that a U.S. federal judge overseeing a lawsuit against Trump University was treating him “unfairly” because of the judge’s Mexican heritage. After a violent gathering of white nationalists in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 – where a white nationalist killed a counterprotester – Trump averred that there were “very fine people on both sides.” And he has spent a lot of time singling out black athletes and celebrities for criticism and has been happy to exploit anger over the removal of statues honoring Confederate leaders.

Thanks to Trump, white nationalism has moved from the fringes to something resembling the mainstream. Its proponents complain that
although it is politically acceptable to talk about black rights, or women’s rights, or gay rights, it is not possible to advocate the rights of white Americans without being branded a racist. The practitioners of identity politics on the left would argue that the right’s assertions of identity are illegitimate and cannot be placed on the same moral plane as those of minorities, women, and other marginalized groups, since they reflect the perspective of a historically privileged community. That is clearly true. Conservatives greatly exaggerate the extent to which minority groups receive advantages, just as they exaggerate the extent to which political correctness muzzles free speech. The reality for many marginalized groups remains unchanged: African Americans continue to be subjected to police violence; women are still assaulted and harassed.

What is notable, however, is how the right has adopted language and framing from the left: the idea that whites are being victimized, that their situation and suffering are invisible to the rest of society, and that the social and political structures responsible for this situation – especially the media and the political establishment – need to be smashed. Across the ideological spectrum, identity politics is the lens through which most social issues are now seen.

**A NEED FOR CREED**

Societies need to protect marginalized and excluded groups, but they also need to achieve common goals through deliberation and consensus. The shift in the agendas of both the left and the right toward the protection of narrow group identities ultimately threatens that process. The remedy is not to abandon the idea of identity, which is central to the way that modern people think about themselves and their surrounding societies; it is to define larger and more integrative national identities that take into account the de facto diversity of liberal democratic societies.

Human societies cannot get away from identity or identity politics. Identity is a “powerful moral idea,” in the philosopher Charles Taylor’s phrase, built on the universal human characteristic of thymos. This moral idea tells people that they have authentic inner selves that are not being recognized and suggests that external society may be false and repressive. It focuses people’s natural demand for recognition of their
dignity and provides language for expressing the resentments that arise when such recognition is not forthcoming.

It would be neither possible nor desirable for such demands for dignity to disappear. Liberal democracy is built on the rights of individuals to enjoy an equal degree of choice and agency in determining their collective political lives. But many people are not satisfied with equal recognition as generic human beings. In some sense, this is a condition of modern life. Modernization means constant change and disruption and the opening up of choices that did not exist before. This is by and large a good thing: over generations, millions of people have fled traditional communities that did not offer them choices in favor of communities that did. But the freedom and degree of choice that exist in a modern liberal society can also leave people unhappy and disconnected from their fellow human beings. They find themselves nostalgic for the community and structured life they think they have lost, or that their ancestors supposedly possessed. The authentic identities they are seeking are ones that bind them to other people. People who feel this way can be seduced by leaders who tell them that they have been betrayed and disrespected by existing power structures and that they are members of important communities whose greatness will again be recognized.

The nature of modern identity, however, is to be changeable. Some individuals may persuade themselves that their identity is based on their biology and is outside their control. But citizens of modern societies have multiple identities, ones that are shaped by social interactions. People have identities defined by their race, gender, workplace, education, affinities, and nation. And although the logic of identity politics is to divide societies into small, self-regarding groups, it is also possible to create identities that are broader and more integrative. One does not have to deny the lived experiences of individuals to recognize that they can also share values and aspirations with much broader circles of citizens. Lived experience, in other words, can become just plain experience – something that connects individuals to people unlike themselves, rather than setting them apart. So although no democracy is immune from identity politics in the modern world, all of them can steer it back to broader forms of mutual respect.
The first and most obvious place to start is by countering the specific abuses that lead to group victimhood and marginalization, such as police violence against minorities and sexual harassment. No critique of identity politics should imply that these are not real and urgent problems that require concrete solutions. But the United States and other liberal democracies have to go further than that. Governments and civil society groups must focus on integrating smaller groups into larger wholes. Democracies need to promote what political scientists call “creedal national identities,” which are built not around shared personal characteristics, lived experiences, historical ties, or religious convictions but rather around core values and beliefs. The idea is to encourage citizens to identify with their countries’ foundational ideals and use public policies to deliberately assimilate newcomers.

Combating the pernicious influence of identity politics will prove quite difficult in Europe. In recent decades, the European left has supported a form of multiculturalism that minimizes the importance of integrating newcomers into creedal national cultures. Under the banner of antiracism, left-wing European parties have downplayed evidence that multiculturalism has acted as an obstacle to assimilation. The new populist right in Europe, for its part, looks back nostalgically at fading national cultures that were based on ethnicity or religion and flourished in societies that were largely free of immigrants.

The fight against identity politics in Europe must start with changes to citizenship laws. Such an agenda is beyond the capability of the EU, whose 28 member states zealously defend their national prerogatives and stand ready to veto any significant reforms or changes. Any action that takes place will therefore have to happen, for better or worse, on the level of individual countries. To stop privileging some ethnic groups over others, EU member states with citizenship laws based on jus sanguinis – “the right of blood,” which confers citizenship according to the ethnicity of parents – should adopt new laws based on jus soli, “the right of the soil,” which confers citizenship on anyone born in the territory of the country. But European states should also impose stringent requirements on the naturalization of new citizens, something the United States has done for many years. In the United States, in
addition to having to prove continuous residency in the country for five years, new citizens are expected to be able to read, write, and speak basic English; have an understanding of U.S. history and government; be of good moral character (that is, have no criminal record); and demonstrate an attachment to the principles and ideals of the U.S. Constitution by swearing an oath of allegiance to the United States. European countries should expect the same from their new citizens.

In addition to changing the formal requirements for citizenship, European countries need to shift away from conceptions of national identity based on ethnicity. Nearly 20 years ago, a German academic of Syrian origin named Bassam Tibi proposed making Leitkultur (leading culture) the basis for a new German national identity. He defined Leitkultur as a belief in equality and democratic values firmly grounded in the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment. Yet leftist academics and politicians attacked his proposal for suggesting that such values were superior to other cultural values; in doing so, the German left gave unwitting comfort to Islamists and far-right nationalists, who have little use for Enlightenment ideals. But Germany and other major European countries desperately need something like Tibi’s Leitkultur: a normative change that would permit Germans of Turkish heritage to speak of themselves as German, Swedes of African heritage to speak of themselves as Swedish, and so on. This is beginning to happen, but too slowly. Europeans have created a remarkable civilization of which they should be proud, one that can encompass people from other cultures even as it remains aware of its own distinctiveness.

Compared with Europe, the United States has been far more welcoming of immigrants, in part because it developed a creedal national identity early in its history. As the political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out, a U.S. citizen can be accused of being “un-American” in a way that a Danish citizen could not be described as being “un-Danish” or a Japanese citizen could not be charged with being “un-Japanese.” Americanism constitutes a set of beliefs and a way of life, not an ethnicity.

Today, the American creedal national identity, which emerged in the wake of the Civil War, must be revived and defended against attacks
from both the left and the right. On the right, white nationalists would like to replace the creedal national identity with one based on race, ethnicity, and religion. On the left, the champions of identity politics have sought to undermine the legitimacy of the American national story by emphasizing victimization, insinuating in some cases that racism, gender discrimination, and other forms of systematic exclusion are in the country’s DNA. Such flaws have been and continue to be features of American society, and they must be confronted. But progressives should also tell a different version of U.S. history, one focused on how an ever-broadening circle of people have overcome barriers to achieve recognition of their dignity.

Although the United States has benefited from diversity, it cannot build its national identity on diversity. A workable creedal national identity has to offer substantive ideas, such as constitutionalism, the rule of law, and human equality. Americans respect those ideas; the country is justified in withholding citizenship from those who reject them.

**BACK TO BASICS**

Once a country has defined a proper creedal national identity that is open to the de facto diversity of modern societies, the nature of controversies over immigration will inevitably change. In both the United States and Europe, that debate is currently polarized. The right seeks to cut off immigration altogether and would like to send immigrants back to their countries of origin; the left asserts a virtually unlimited obligation on the part of liberal democracies to accept all immigrants. These are both untenable positions. The real debate should instead be about the best strategies for assimilating immigrants into a country’s creedal national identity. Well-assimilated immigrants bring a healthy diversity to any society; poorly assimilated immigrants are a drag on the state and in some cases constitute security threats.

European governments pay lip service to the need for better assimilation but fail to follow through. Many European countries have put in place policies that actively impede integration. Under the Dutch system of “pillarization,” for example, children are educated in separate Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and secular systems. Receiving
an education in a state-supported school without ever having to deal with people outside one’s own religion is not likely to foster rapid assimilation.

In France, the situation is somewhat different. The French concept of republican citizenship, like its U.S. counterpart, is creedal, built around the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. France’s 1905 law on laïcité, or secularism, formally separates church and state and makes impossible the kinds of publicly funded religious schools that operate in the Netherlands. But France has other big problems. First, regardless of what French law says, widespread discrimination holds back the country’s immigrants. Second, the French economy has been underperforming for years, with unemployment rates that are twice those of neighboring Germany. For young immigrants in France, the unemployment rate is close to 35 percent, compared with 25 percent for French youth as a whole. France should help integrate its immigrants by making it easier for them to find jobs, primarily by liberalizing the labor market. Finally, the idea of French national identity and French culture has come under attack as Islamophobic; in contemporary France, the very concept of assimilation is not politically acceptable to many on the left. This is a shame, since it allows the nativists and extremists of the far-right National Front to position themselves as the true defenders of the republican ideal of universal citizenship.

In the United States, an assimilation agenda would begin with public education. The teaching of basic civics has been in decline for decades, not just for immigrants but also for native-born Americans. Public schools should also move away from the bilingual and multilingual programs that have become popular in recent decades. (New York City’s public school system offers instruction in more than a dozen different languages.) Such programs have been marketed as ways to speed the acquisition of English by nonnative speakers, but the empirical evidence on whether they work is mixed; indeed, they may in fact delay the process of learning English.

The American creedal national identity would also be strengthened by a universal requirement for national service, which would underline the idea that U.S. citizenship demands commitment and sacrifice. A
citizen could perform such service either by enlisting in the military or by working in a civilian role, such as teaching in schools or working on publicly funded environmental conservation projects similar to those created by the New Deal. If such national service were correctly structured, it would force young people to work together with others from very different social classes, regions, races, and ethnicities, just as military service does. And like all forms of shared sacrifice, it would integrate newcomers into the national culture. National service would serve as a contemporary form of classical republicanism, a form of democracy that encouraged virtue and public-spiritedness rather than simply leaving citizens alone to pursue their private lives.

ASSIMILATION NATION

In both the United States and Europe, a policy agenda focused on assimilation would have to tackle the issue of immigration levels. Assimilation into a dominant culture becomes much harder as the numbers of immigrants rise relative to the native population. As immigrant communities reach a certain scale, they tend to become self-sufficient and no longer need connections to groups outside themselves. They can overwhelm public services and strain the capacity of schools and other public institutions to care for them. Immigrants will likely have a positive net effect on public finances in the long run – but only if they get jobs and become tax-paying citizens or lawful residents. Large numbers of newcomers can also weaken support among native-born citizens for generous welfare benefits, a factor in both the U.S. and the European immigration debates.

Liberal democracies benefit greatly from immigration, both economically and culturally. But they also unquestionably have the right to control their own borders. All people have a basic human right to citizenship. But that does not mean they have the right to citizenship in any particular country beyond the one in which they or their parents were born. International law does not, moreover, challenge the right of states to control their borders or to set criteria for citizenship.

The EU needs to be able to control its external borders better than it does, which in practice means giving countries such as Greece and
Italy more funding and stronger legal authority to regulate the flow of immigrants. The EU agency charged with doing this, Frontex, is understaffed and underfunded and lacks strong political support from the very member states most concerned with keeping immigrants out. The system of free internal movement within the EU will not be politically sustainable unless the problem of Europe’s external borders is solved.

In the United States, the chief problem is the inconsistent enforcement of immigration laws. Doing little to prevent millions of people from entering and staying in the country unlawfully and then engaging in sporadic and seemingly arbitrary bouts of deportation – which were a feature of Obama’s time in office – is hardly a sustainable long-term policy. But Trump’s pledge to “build a wall” on the Mexican border is little more than nativistic posturing: a huge proportion of illegal immigrants enter the United States legally and simply remain in the country after their visas expire. What is needed is a better system of sanctioning companies and people who hire illegal immigrants, which would require a national identification system that could help employers figure out who can legally work for them. Such a system has not been established because too many employers benefit from the cheap labor that illegal immigrants provide. Moreover, many on the left and the right oppose a national identification system owing to their suspicion of government overreach.

Compared with Europe, the United States has been far more welcoming of immigrants, in part because it developed a creedal national identity early in its history.

As a result, the United States now hosts a population of around 11 million illegal immigrants. The vast majority of them have been in the country for years and are doing useful work, raising families, and otherwise behaving as law-abiding citizens. A small number of them commit criminal acts, just as a small number of native-born Americans commit crimes. But the idea that all illegal immigrants are criminals because they violated U.S. law to enter or stay in the country is ridiculous, just as it is ridiculous to think that the United States could ever force all of them to leave the country and return to their countries of origin.
The outlines of a basic bargain on immigration reform have existed for some time. The federal government would undertake serious enforcement measures to control the country’s borders and would also create a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants without criminal records. Such a bargain might receive the support of a majority of U.S. voters, but hard-core immigration opponents are dead set against any form of “amnesty,” and pro-immigrant groups are opposed to stricter enforcement.

Public policies that focus on the successful assimilation of foreigners might help break this logjam by taking the wind out of the sails of the current populist upsurge in both the United States and Europe. The groups vociferously opposing immigration are coalitions of people with different concerns. Hard-core nativists are driven by racism and bigotry; little can be done to change their minds. But others have more legitimate concerns about the speed of social change driven by mass immigration and worry about the capacity of existing institutions to accommodate this change. A policy focus on assimilation might ease their concerns and peel them away from the bigots.

Identity politics thrives whenever the poor and the marginalized are invisible to their compatriots. Resentment over lost status starts with real economic distress, and one way of muting the resentment is to mitigate concerns over jobs, incomes, and security. In the United States, much of the left stopped thinking several decades ago about ambitious social policies that might help remedy the underlying conditions of the poor. It was easier to talk about respect and dignity than to come up with potentially costly plans that would concretely reduce inequality. A major exception to this trend was Obama, whose Affordable Care Act was a milestone in U.S. social policy. The ACA’s opponents tried to frame it as an identity issue, insinuating that the policy was designed by a black president to help his black constituents. But the ACA was in fact a national policy designed to help less well-off Americans regardless of their race or identity. Many of the law’s beneficiaries include rural whites in the South who have nonetheless been persuaded to vote for Republican politicians vowing to repeal the ACA.
Identity politics has made the crafting of such ambitious policies more difficult. Although fights over economic policy produced sharp divisions early in the twentieth century, many democracies found that those with opposing economic visions could often split the difference and compromise. Identity issues, by contrast, are harder to reconcile: either you recognize me or you don’t. Resentment over lost dignity or invisibility often has economic roots, but fights over identity frequently distract from policy ideas that could help. As a result, it has been harder to create broad coalitions to fight for redistribution: members of the working class who also belong to higher-status identity groups (such as whites in the United States) tend to resist making common cause with those below them, and vice versa.

The Democratic Party, in particular, has a major choice to make. It can continue to try to win elections by doubling down on the mobilization of the identity groups that today supply its most fervent activists: African Americans, Hispanics, professional women, the LGBT community, and so on. Or the party could try to win back some of the white working-class voters who constituted a critical part of Democratic coalitions from the New Deal through the Great Society but who have defected to the Republican Party in recent elections. The former strategy might allow it to win elections, but it is a poor formula for governing the country. The Republican Party is becoming the party of white people, and the Democratic Party is becoming the party of minorities. Should that process continue much further, identity will have fully displaced economic ideology as the central cleavage of U.S. politics, which would be an unhealthy outcome for American democracy.

A MORE UNIFIED FUTURE

Fears about the future are often best expressed through fiction, particularly science fiction that tries to imagine future worlds based on new kinds of technology. In the first half of the twentieth century, many of those forward-looking fears centered on big, centralized, bureaucratic tyrannies that snuffed out individuality and privacy: think of George Orwell’s 1984. But the nature of imagined dystopias began to change in the later decades of the century, and one particular strand spoke to the
anxieties raised by identity politics. So-called cyberpunk authors such as William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and Bruce Sterling saw a future dominated not by centralized dictatorships but by uncontrolled social fragmentation facilitated by the Internet.

Stephenson’s 1992 novel, Snow Crash, posited a ubiquitous virtual “Metaverse” in which individuals could adopt avatars and change their identities at will. In the novel, the United States has broken down into “Burbclaves,” suburban subdivisions catering to narrow identities, such as New South Africa (for the racists, with their Confederate flags) and Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong (for Chinese immigrants). Passports and visas are required to travel from one neighborhood to another. The CIA has been privatized, and the aircraft carrier the USS Enterprise has become a floating home for refugees. The authority of the federal government has shrunk to encompass only the land on which federal buildings are located.

Our present world is simultaneously moving toward the opposing dystopias of hypercentralization and endless fragmentation. China, for instance, is building a massive dictatorship in which the government collects highly specific personal data on the daily transactions of every citizen. On the other hand, other parts of the world are seeing the breakdown of centralized institutions, the emergence of failed states, increasing polarization, and a growing lack of consensus over common ends. Social media and the Internet have facilitated the emergence of self-contained communities, walled off not by physical barriers but by shared identities.

The good thing about dystopian fiction is that it almost never comes true. Imagining how current trends will play out in an ever more exaggerated fashion serves as a useful warning: 1984 became a potent symbol of a totalitarian future that people wanted to avoid; the book helped inoculate societies against authoritarianism. Likewise, people today can imagine their countries as better places that support increasing diversity yet that also embrace a vision for how diversity can serve common ends and support liberal democracy rather than undermine it.

People will never stop thinking about themselves and their societies in identity terms. But people’s identities are neither fixed nor necessarily
given by birth. Identity can be used to divide, but it can also be used to unify. That, in the end, will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.

Published:
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/andrea-mitchell-center/francis-fukuyama-against-identity-politics
ABOUT JEAN MONNET

Jean Monnet,
(born Nov. 9, 1888, Cognac, France – died March 16, 1979, Houjarray), French political economist and diplomat who initiated comprehensive economic planning in western Europe after World War II. In France he was responsible for the successful plan designed to rebuild and modernize that nation’s crumbled economy.

During World War I Monnet was the French representative on the Inter-Allied Maritime Commission, and after the war he was deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations (1919-23). Then, after reorganizing his family’s brandy business, he became the European partner of a New York investment bank in 1925.

At the start of World War II he was made chairman of the Franco-British Economic Co-ordination Committee. In June 1940 it was he who suggested a Franco-British union to Winston Churchill. After the Franco-German armistice he left for Washington, D.C., and in 1943 he was sent to Algiers to work with the Free French administration there.

After the liberation of France, Monnet headed a government committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction and modernization of the French economy. On Jan. 11, 1947, the Monnet Plan was adopted by the French government, and Monnet himself was appointed commissioner-general of the National Planning Board. In May 1950 he and Robert Schuman, then the French foreign minister, proposed the establishment of a common European market for coal and steel by countries willing to delegate their powers over these industries
to an independent authority. Six countries – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – signed the treaty in 1951 that set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). From 1952 to 1955 Monnet served as the first president of the ECSC’s High Authority. The ECSC inspired the creation of the European Economic Community, or Common Market, in 1957.

In 1955 Monnet organized the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and served as its president from 1956 to 1975. In 1976 the heads of the nine Common Market governments named Monnet a Citizen of Europe. In the same year, he published his Mémoires (Memoirs, 1978).

Source:
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Monnet
Jean Monnet Programme has transformed into Jean Monnet Actions under ERASMUS+ Programme since 2014.

Within the Erasmus+ Programme, the Jean Monnet Activities aim at promoting excellence in teaching and research in the field of European Union studies worldwide. These activities also aim at fostering the dialogue between the academic world and policy-makers, in particular with the aim of enhancing governance of EU policies.

Key activities include courses, research, conferences, networking activities, and publications in the field of EU studies.

European Union studies comprise the study of Europe in its entirety with particular emphasis on the European integration process in both its internal and external aspects. The discipline also covers the role of the EU in a globalised world and in promoting an active European citizenship and dialogue between people and cultures.

Jean Monnet Activities supported are 3 types:
• Teaching and Research: Jean Monnet Modules, Chairs and Centres of Excellence.
• Support to Associations: Jean Monnet Associations.
• Policy Debate with the Academic World: Jean Monnet Networks and Jean Monnet Projects.

Jean Monnet Activities are described in details in the Programme Guide and Call is published at: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/selection-results/jean-monnet-activities-2018_en
The Erasmus+ Programme Guide includes Jean Monnet Actions Chapters: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/resources/programme-guide_en

Statistics for Ukraine’s participation in Jean Monnet until 2018 are in Jean Monnet Project database: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/JeanMonnetDirectory/#/search-screen/

Selection results at: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus-plus/sele...
Vitalii Lebediuk, Dmytro Shevchuk, Olena Shershnyova

Course “EUROPEAN IDENTITY POLITICS”

Academic year 2018-2019

*Didactic materials*

Комп'ютерна верстка Крушинської Наталії

Формат 42х30/4. Ум. друк. арк. 3,49. Наклад 100 пр. Зам. № 51–19. Папір офсетний. Друк цифровий. Гарнітура «TimesNewRoman»

Оригінал-макет виготовлено у видавництві Національного університету «Острозька академія», Україна, 35800, Рівненська обл., м. Острог, вул. Семінарська, 2. Свідоцтво суб’єкта видавничої справи РВ № 1 від 8 серпня 2000 року.