



HUB OF THE EU SOLUTIONS

ERASMUS+ PROGRAMME

MODERN CHALLENGES:

SECURITY AND THE EU

A handbook of
the certificate
program

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 Erasmus+

Jean Monnet
Programme



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MODERN CHALLENGES: SECURITY AND THE EU

A HANDBOOK OF THE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM

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This handbook is meant to be a resource for students enrolled in certificate programs being administered by the Department of English Philology, Institute of Linguistics, Institute of Law, Institute of International Relations and National Security, the National University of Ostroh Academy. The book deals with issues of modern challenges and security threats connected significantly with Russian aggression against Ukraine, hybrid warfare, information attacks, modern-day aggression, terrorism, international law violations and other security threats in Europe. Some topics are dedicated to the conflicts of values in modern Europe as a security matter. The received knowledge and skills are useful for effective analysis of current situation in the regional and global world, realizing the state politics in the sphere of security.

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УКР

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the book is to acquaint Ukrainian students with modern challenges and security issues. Young people will find out about modern challenges and EU's security issues. We will pay attention to the regional and global challenges for the EU, its military, political, social and cultural dimensions. This work also provides a vision of a hybrid war and its characteristics.

The book embraces a set of topics ranging from security issues connected significantly with Russian aggression against Ukraine to hybrid warfare, information attacks, modern-day aggression, terrorism and other security threats in Europe. Some topics will be dedicated to the conflicts of values in modern Europe as a security matter. The received knowledge and skills are useful for effective analysis of current situations in the regional and global world, realizing the state politics in the sphere of security, establishing relations between state and experts in security issues, and overcoming conflicts in multicultural societies.

The approach presupposes studying of historic development of basic notions and terms, modern approaches of native and foreign researches to the problem of modern challenges and European security, and application of the methodology of analysis of former and the current situation in the East of Europe taking in consideration a full-fledged war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The core idea of the book is studying of theoretical foundation and developing practical skills in modern challenges and European security.

The material of the book is thematically structured. There is an introduction, syllabus of the discipline "Modern challenges: security and EU", lecture material, illustrating academic and expert approaches to security issues, modern challenges, the EU has been facing, hybrid threats and hybrid warfare analysis, NATO-EU-Ukraine cooperation in combating security threats, Russian

aggression against Ukraine and the role of Ukraine in European security architecture. In addition, there is a list of references for every lecture.

The book can be useful for students, professors and a wide range of interested people.

National University of Ostroh Academy

SYLLABUS

Of the discipline:

Modern challenges: security and EU

Discipline type: optional

Discipline code: 256 «National security»;
291 “International relations, social communication
and regional studies”;
052 “Political science”; 081 “Law”; 035 “Philology”.

1-2 semesters of 2024 academic year

Name, title of the author	Khudoliy Anatoliy Oleksiyovych, PhD in Political science, professor of the department of International Relations
Credits and the number of hours:	Full time academic year, 5 ECTS (150 hours); hours: lectures: 38 hours; seminars: 34 hours; self-learning: 78 hours per semester; credit session.
Discipline status:	optional
Language of teaching:	English
Form of teaching and studying:	Full time academic year
Level of education:	Bachelor’s and Master’s

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CONCEPT OF THE COURSE

"MODERN CHALLENGES: SECURITY AND EU"

The world today is safer than ever before, according to statistics, and yet the feeling of insecurity has increased steadily in Europe. In the past decade the European security environment has experienced several significant changes. We have left behind the post-Cold War world order, but a new order is still to emerge. The technological revolution penetrates all areas of life, affecting also the thinking about security, conflict and war; the media landscape has changed; the interconnectedness and complexity of networks are of very different nature than ever before in human history; and new domains like space and cyber have emerged. This has contributed to a feeling of insecurity since the effects of the changes are not clear and the related security challenges are often 'invisible'. The course will discuss the changes in the security environment, clarify the mechanisms preventing threats and how the EU is responding to them. It will also look into the future to assess the security challenges the EU will face during the next decade.

Europe's security environment has changed dramatically, with the key development dominating security agendas. To the East, Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, has challenged the core principles of international law. Russia's sophisticated use of large-scale, well-coordinated hybrid warfare tactics has compromised Ukraine's territorial integrity and has strived to destabilize the larger neighborhood. Further, through ambiguity and veiled threats, they have been seeking to divide the international community, including the EU which they often portray not merely as a biased party but also as the instigator of the conflict.

Course gives strong understanding for Ukrainian students about multidisciplinary field of research in studying of modern challenges and EU's security issues. We will pay attention to the global challenges for the EU, its military, political, social

dimensions. Course provides a vision of hybrid conflicts and hybrid wars.

Teaching this course addresses issues of modern challenges, security issues connected significantly with Russian aggression against Ukraine, hybrid warfare, information attacks, modern-day aggression, terrorism and other security threats in Europe. Teachers will also try to model the biggest threats to the European security system and predict its future. Some topics will be dedicated to the conflicts of values in modern Europe as a security matter. The received knowledge and skills are useful for effective analysis of current situations in the regional and global world, realizing the state politics in the sphere of security, establishing relations between state and experts in security issues, and overcoming conflicts in multicultural societies.

The discipline presupposes studying of historic development of basic notions and terms, modern approaches of native and foreign researches to the problem of modern challenges and European security, and application of the methodology of analysis of former and the current situation in the East of Europe taking in consideration a full-fledged war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The core idea of the discipline is studying of theoretical foundation and developing practical skills in modern challenges and European security.

The purpose and tasks of the course

The purpose of the discipline is to identify and examine national, regional, and collective security capacity and capabilities requirements to support a comprehensive approach to countering security threats. Participants will identify key government and private sector organizations, ministries, and law enforcement partners; consider political processes that promote or impede cooperation and explore new policies and cooperation frameworks; and analyze a cogent and reasonable methodology that supports operational and strategic understanding,

willingness, collaboration, and, ultimately, execution of a viable approach to counter security threats in the field.

It facilitates to get acquainted with diplomatic, institutional, legal and operational issues related to security threats and moreover to security issues at strategic level.

Course objectives of «Modern challenges: security and EU» are as follows:

1. To provide up-to-date knowledge about security threats.
2. Facilitate the selection of topics that are relevant to the development of Bachelor’s and Masters’ level syllabus on tackling Security Threats and EU.
3. Contribute to the selection of topics for research that should support the syllable development.
4. Identify end-user (EU and 3rd countries’ internal security, law enforcement) authorities’ needs that would be taken into consideration during syllable development.
5. Raise awareness of a wider audience, including political level, entrepreneurs and private sector on hybrid threats and related problems.

Topics of the course:

The daily course instruction includes a variety of methods to include direct teaching, discussion, case studies, classroom exercises and projects. Course topics may include:

The course will discuss the changes in the security environment, clarify the mechanisms behind security threats (in areas such as critical infrastructure, disinformation, radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism) and the EU response to them. The purpose of the discipline is to identify and examine national, regional, and collective security capacity and capabilities requirements to support a comprehensive approach to countering security threats. The course presupposes analysis of the following issues:

Topic 1. Contemporary challenges of security in the EU. The conceptual framework of modern challenges and threats.

Topic 2. EU approaches to security. Evolution of challenges and security issues.

Topic 3. Current global and transregional threats. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges.

Topic 4. Security landscape in the EU & hot spots.

Topic 5: Energy security. The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis.

Topic 6: The migration crisis in the EU.

Topic 7: The European Union and Russia relationships.

Topic 8. Terrorism and security of the EU, anti-terrorism policy and instruments.

Topic 9. EU's security issues and hybrid threats.

Topic 10: Information security, its principles and information security policy.

Topic 11. Protection rules and principles. Data Protection Laws in the EU: the GDPR.

Topic 12. Conventional vs hybrid war. The concept of hybrid war.

Topic 13. Global terrorism and security of the EU. The EU response to terrorism. Counter-terrorism instruments. European anti-terrorism policy.

Topic 14. European security and defense cooperation. EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries. NATO-EU-Ukraine cooperation in terms of combatting security threats (including hybrid threats).

Topic 15. Ukraine as an integral part of modern European security architecture.

Topic 16. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. NATO response to hybrid threats.

At the end of this course, participants will be able to:

- Understand the historical context, conditions, precedents, and examples for the emergence of security threats;
- Understand the conceptual and practical perspectives of security threats;

- Evaluate existing and emerging national, European Union (EU), and NATO concepts for defining and understanding security (including hybrid) threats;
- Discuss current examples of security threats;
- Analyze emergent multi- and cross-domain threats;
- Appreciate the opportunities, limitations, and requirements for the effective application of a comprehensive approach.
- Describe and explain the major developments in the field of the current security environment;
- Critically assess the dynamics of mechanisms behind the security threats and the way the EU counters them.

According to the syllable students will have the following **skills:**

- professionally interpret basic terms of the discipline;
- identify different types of approaches to the basic notions;
- distinguish vital problems of European security on modern stage of civilization development, follow modern events, critically perceive them and analyze them in complex with other events;
- consciously apply methods of political analysis and forecasting;
- be selective in data gathering for European security and hybrid threats;
- analyze modern political technologies, technologies of decision making, form personal political and civil position;
- hone skills of civilized discussion, acquire skills to prove their point of view;
- apply theoretical knowledge practically;
- analyze political situation, make its functional and strategic forecasting;
- define major priorities and vectors of foreign policy activity of European countries;
- assess effectiveness of strategies applied by the EU regarding security issues and hybrid threats, level of its influence in short, medium and long terms;

- analyze and forecast the development of Russian war against Ukraine;
- develop basic and advanced strategies.

Methodology

Lectures, discussions, eLearning and working groups. In order to complete the course, participants have to accomplish all learning objectives, which are evaluated based on the active contribution in the residential Module, including their syndicate session and practical activities as well as on their completion of the eLearning phases: course participants are supposed to prepare presentations and do a teamwork project on the topic of “Modern challenges: security and EU”. Active and critical observation by the course instructor is used.

Cross discipline ties: the discipline “Modern challenges: security and EU” is connected with the following disciplines: “Propaganda and counterpropaganda; “Conflict studies”; “National security of Ukraine”; “Management of information security”; “Analysis of public politics”; “Think Tanks in the sphere of security”.

Course Description

Time period	Course	Semester	ECTS	Total amount of hours	Including					Form of the final control	
					Class hours			Independent study		Exam	Credit
					Lectures	Seminars	Consultations	Self-preparation	Course work (Project)*		
Full time	1-2	1, 2	5	150	38	34	-	78	-	-	+

**Syllabus of the discipline
 «Modern challenges: security and EU»**

№	Module and its contents	Number of hours				
		Lectures (38 hours)	Seminars (32 hours)	Module control 2 hours	Self- preparation (78 hours)	Total 150
1	Module I. Modern Challenges of Security for the EU.					
	Topic 1. Security of the EU approaches.	1	2		4	7
	Topic 2. The conceptual framework of modern challenges and threats.	1			4	5
	Topic 3: Evolution of challenges and security issues.	2	2		4	8
Total		4	4		12	20
2	Module II. Conflicts and the EU.					
	Topic 1. Current global and transregional threats.	2	1		4	7
	Topic 2. Security landscape in Europe & hot spots.	2	1		4	5
	Topic 3: The EU’s role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges.	2	2		4	6
Total		6	4		12	22
3	Module III. Security issues and the EU.					
	Topic 1: Energy security. The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis.	2	2		4	8
	Topic 2: The migration crisis in the EU.	2	2		4	8
	Topic 3: The EU and Russia relationships.	2	2		4	8
Total		6	6		12	24

4	Module IV. Conventional vs hybrid warfare.					
	Topic 1. The concept of hybrid war; approaches and meanings.	2	2		4	8
	Topic 2: Conventional vs hybrid war.	2	2		4	8
	Total	4	4		8	16
5	Module V. EU's security issues and hybrid threats.					
	Topic 1. EU's security and hybrid threats.	1			2	5
	Topic 2: Information security, its principles and information security policy.	1	2		2	3
	Topic 3. Protection rules and principles. Data Protection Laws in the EU: the GDPR.	1	2		2	5
	Topic 4: EU Security Union Strategy.	1			2	3
	Total	4	4		8	16
6	Module VI. Global terrorism and security of the EU.					
	Topic 1: Terrorism and security of the EU.	2	1		4	7
	Topic 2. The EU response to terrorism. Counter-terrorism instruments.	1	1		4	1
	Topic 3: European anti-terrorism policy.	1	2		4	5
	Total	4	4		8	16
7	Module VII. European security and defense cooperation.					
	Topic 1. EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries.	2	2		4	8
	Topic 2. NATO response to threats.	2			4	6
	Topic 3. NATO-EU-Ukraine cooperation in combating security threats (including hybrid threats).	2	2		4	6
	Total	6	4		12	22

8	Module VIII. Ukraine as an integral part of modern European security architecture.		2		2
	Topic 1: Ukraine’s crisis – evolving European security architecture.	2		4	6
	Topic 2: The role of Ukraine in European security architecture. Perspectives and future of the EU.	2		2	4
	Total	4	2	6	12
9	Module control (credit)			2	2
10	Total	38	32	2	78

Lectures’ description

1. Modern Challenges of Security for the EU. Security of the EU, approaches.
2. The conceptual framework of modern challenges and threats. Evolution of challenges and security issues.
3. Current global and transregional threats. Security landscape in Europe & hot spots.
4. The EU’s role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges.
5. Energy security. The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis.
6. The migration crisis in the EU.
7. The EU and Russia relationships.
8. The concept of hybrid war, approaches and meanings. Conventional vs hybrid war.
9. EU’s security and hybrid threats. EU Security Union Strategy.
10. Information security, its principles and information security policy. Protection rules and principles. Data Protection Laws in the EU: the GDPR.
11. Terrorism and security of the EU.
12. The EU response to terrorism. Counter-terrorism instruments. European anti-terrorism policy.
13. EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries.

14. NATO response to threats.
15. NATO-EU-Ukraine cooperation in combatting security threats (including hybrid threats).
16. Russian aggression against Ukraine. Global and regional consequences.
17. Ukraine's crisis – evolving European security architecture.
18. The role of Ukraine in European security architecture.
19. Perspectives and future of the EU.

Seminars' description

Seminar № 1. Modern Challenges of Security for the EU.

1. Security of the EU, approaches.
2. Evolution of challenges and security issues. Historic changes and the consequences.
3. Major directions of threats for the European Union.
4. European foreign policy. Security of the EU. Scholars and their works, documents.

Reading list:

1. A stronger EU on security and defence. European Union external action. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/stronger-eu-security-and-defence_en
2. Balla Evanthia. The Evolution of the EU's Security Model Through the Lenses of the Balkans. *International Relations and Diplomacy*, June 2021, Vol. 9, No. 06, 232-243. doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2021.06.003
3. European Security – Challenges at the Societal Level. Working Group | Wolfgang Zellner (principal drafter) | Irina Chernykh | Alain Délétroz | Frank Evers | Barbara Kunz | Christian Nünlist | Philip Remler | Oleksiy Semenyi | Andrei Zagorski. OSCE. URL: https://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/documents/European_Security-OSCE_WEB.pdf
4. How European security is changing. Alice Billon-Galland, Rita Floyd, Hans Kundnani. Chatham House. URL: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/01/how-european-security-changing>

5. RALUCA CSERNATONI. EU Security and Defense Challenges: Toward a European Defense Winter? Carnegie Europe. JUNE 11, 2020. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defense-challenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032>Szucs Agnes. 20 challenges awaiting EU in 2020. AA. 02.01.2020. URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/20-challenges-awaiting-eu-in-2020/1690153#>

6. Solana Javier. European Foreign Policy and Its Challenges in the Current Context. URL: <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/european-foreign-policy-and-its-challenges-in-the-current-context/>

7. Thanos Dokos. Threats and Challenges to European Security and the Need for Well-informed Parliamentarians. URL: <https://www.openeuropeandialogue.org/download-file/983/>

8. The seven most important challenges facing the European Union in 2022. Atalayar. 2022. URL: <https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/seven-most-important-challenges-facing-european-union-2022/20211230132923154439.html>

Seminar № 2. Conflicts and the EU.

1. Current global and transregional threats.
2. Security landscape in Europe & hot spots.
3. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges.

Reading list:

1. Conflict prevention, peace and stability. 2021. URL: https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/conflict-prevention-peace-and-stability_en

2. European security strategy council of the European Union. A secure Europe in a better world. 2009. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>

3. 14 futures for 2024. Edited by Florence Gaub. CHAILLOT PAPER /157 January 2020. EUISS. URL: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/what-if-14-futures-2024>

4. Heinrich Schneider. The “European Security Model for the 21st Century”. 1997. <https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/97/Schneider.pdf>

5. Nanette C. Gantz, James Steinberg. Five Models for European Security. 1992. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3446.html>

6. Security Hot Spots: How Conflict, Elections, and Sports will Shape the Security Landscape in 2022. Concentric. URL: <https://www.concentric.io/blog/security-hot-spots-how-conflict-elections-and-sports-will-shape-the-security-landscape-in-2022>

7. Wootton Andrew B., Davey Caroline L., Soomeren Paul van & Heinrich Dagmar P. The European Security Model. Briefing paper. 10 February, 2022. URL: <https://www.cuttingcrimeimpact.eu/resources/european-security-model/>

8. Zhongping Feng. Europe’s Security Landscape Faces Major Changes. China Watch Vol. 2, No. 18, May 2022. URL: <https://china-cee.eu/2022/05/10/europes-security-landscape-faces-major-changes/>

Seminar № 3. Energy security and the EU.

1. Energy security.
2. The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis
3. The European Union response to the energy crisis.

Reading list:

1. Davis Ian. Armed conflict and peace processes in Europe. SIPRI Yearbook 2021. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/05>

2. EU migration crisis: the inside story. European Union. 2015. URL: https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/eu-migration-crisis-inside-story_en

3. EU-Russia relations. Fact Sheets on the European Union. European Parliament. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/177/russia>

4 Fasanotti Federica Saini. The EU’s endemic migration crisis. Politics. November 15, 2022. URL: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-migration-crisis/>

5. Juncos Ana E. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges. *Global Affairs*. Volume 4, 2018. Issue 2-3. P.131-140. URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619>

6. Maćkowiak-Pandera Joanna. Europe needs a new energy security strategy. EURACTIV. URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/europe-needs-a-new-energy-security-strategy/>

7. Masters Jonathan. Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. October 11, 2022. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>

8. Meister Stefan. A Paradigm Shift: EU-Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine. November 29, 2022. Carnegie Europe. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476>

9. Russell Martin. Energy security in the EU's external policy. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA\(2020\)649334_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA(2020)649334_EN.pdf)

10. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts. Heinrich Boll Stiftung. URL: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/12/10/role-european-union-current-global-conflicts>

11. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts'. https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/event_report_eu-globalconflicts-3.pdf

12. Youngs Richard. The EU and International Conflicts. April 15, 2014. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55341>

Seminar № 4. Migration crisis in the EU.

1. The migration crisis in the EU. Situation analysis.

2. Migration routes, tendencies.

3. Consequences of the migration crisis.

Reading list:

1. Davis Ian. Armed conflict and peace processes in Europe. SIPRI Yearbook 2021. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/05>

2. EU migration crisis: the inside story. European Union. 2015. URL: https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/eu-migration-crisis-inside-story_en

3. EU-Russia relations. Fact Sheets on the European Union. European Parliament. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/177/russia>

4. Fasanotti Federica Saini. The EU's endemic migration crisis. Politics. November 15, 2022. URL: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-migration-crisis/>

5. Juncos Ana E. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges. Global Affairs. Volume 4, 2018. Issue 2-3. P.131-140. URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619>

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8. Meister Stefan. A Paradigm Shift: EU-Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine. November 29, 2022. Carnegie Europe. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476>

9. Russell Martin. Energy security in the EU's external policy. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA\(2020\)649334_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA(2020)649334_EN.pdf)

10. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts. Heinrich Boll Stiftung. URL: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/12/10/role-european-union-current-global-conflicts>

11. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts'. https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/event_report_eu-globalconflicts-3.pdf

12. Youngs Richard. The EU and International Conflicts. April 15, 2014. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55341>

Seminar № 5. The EU-Russian relationships.

1. The EU and Russia relationships. Western European countries and the RF.

2. Russia's policy in Central Europe.

3. Russia and Eastern European countries.

Reading list:

1. Davis Ian. Armed conflict and peace processes in Europe. SIPRI Yearbook 2021. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/05>

2. EU migration crisis: the inside story. European Union. 2015. URL: https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/eu-migration-crisis-inside-story_en

3. EU-Russia relations. Fact Sheets on the European Union. European Parliament. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/177/russia>

4. Fasanotti Federica Saini. The EU's endemic migration crisis. Politics. November 15, 2022. URL: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/eu-migration-crisis/>

5. Juncos Ana E. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges. Global Affairs. Volume 4, 2018. Issue 2-3. P.131-140. URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619>

6. Maćkowiak-Pandera Joanna. Europe needs a new energy security strategy. EURACTIV. URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/europe-needs-a-new-energy-security-strategy/>

7. Masters Jonathan. Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. October 11, 2022. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/background/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>

8. Meister Stefan. A Paradigm Shift: EU-Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine. November 29, 2022. Carnegie Europe. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476>

9. Russell Martin. Energy security in the EU's external policy. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA\(2020\)649334_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210517/EPRS_IDA(2020)649334_EN.pdf)

10. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts. Heinrich Boll Stiftung. URL: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/12/10/role-european-union-current-global-conflicts>

11. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts'. https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/event_report_eu-globalconflicts-3.pdf

12. Youngs Richard. The EU and International Conflicts. April 15, 2014. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55341>

Seminar № 6. Hybrid warfare.

1. The concept of hybrid war, approaches and meanings.

2. Hybrid war instruments. Fakes and Russian propaganda.

Reading list:

1. Conflict prevention, peace and stability. Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. 2021. URL: https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/conflict-prevention-peace-and-stability_en

2. Juncos Ana E.. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges. URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1502619>

3. The Role of the European Union in Current Global Conflicts. 2018. Heinrich Boll Stiftung. URL: <https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/12/10/role-european-union-current-global-conflicts>

4. Masters Jonathan. Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. October 11, 2022. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>

5. Davis Ian. Armed conflict and peace processes in Europe. SIPRI Yearbook 2021. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2021/05>

6. Youngs Richard. The EU and International Conflicts. April 15, 2014. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/55341>

Seminar № 7. Conventional vs hybrid war.

1. Conventional vs hybrid war.

2. Differences and commonalities.

3. Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine: prerequisites, process and results.

4. Instruments of the Russian Federation in the warfare against Ukraine.

Reading list:

1. Yuriy Danyk; Tamara Maliarchuk; Chad Briggs. Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts. Connections. URL: <http://connections-qj.org/article/hybrid-war-high-tech-information-and-cyber-conflicts>

1. Frank Hofmann. Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. 02/18/2022. DW. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/russias-hybrid-war-against-ukraine/a-60829873>

3. Josias David Valle Guerrero. Ukraine Conflict: Hybrid Warfare and Conventional Military Intervention. July 7, 2022. URL: <https://ceeep.mil.pe/2022/07/07/ukraine-conflict-hybrid-warfare-and-conventional-military-intervention/?lang=en>

Seminar № 8. EU's security issues and hybrid threats.

1. EU's security and hybrid threats for the EU.

2. Information security, its principles and information security policy. Guidance documents and relevant links.

Reading list:

1. A Europe that protects: Countering hybrid threats (June 2018). An official website of the European Union. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/46393_en

2. Costa Rita (2021). Hybrid Threats in the Context of European Security. Report of the international conference organized at the National Defence Institute (IDN) on 18 May 2021 under the framework of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union. URL: <https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/ebriefing/Documents/E-Briefing%20Papers/E-Briefing%20Papers%203.pdf>

3. Demertzis Maria and Wolff Guntram (2019). Hybrid and cybersecurity threats and the European Union's financial system. Policy Contribution Issue n°10 | September 2019. URL: <https://>

www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-10_2019.pdf

4. EU policy on fighting hybrid threats. URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/eu-policy-on-fighting-hybrid-threats/>

5. Hybrid threats. European commission. URL: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/hybrid-threats_en

6. Hajduk J. and Stępniewski T. (2016). Russia's Hybrid War with Ukraine: Determinants, Instruments, Accomplishments and Challenges. *Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs*, 2/2016, 37-52.

7. Hybrid threats. European commission. URL: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/hybrid-threats_en

8. Hybrid threats to Ukraine and public security. The EU and Eastern Partnership experience. Analytical report. Editor V. Martyniuk. Expert group of the project: M. Gonchar, A. Chubyk, S. Zhuk, O. Chyzhova, H. Maksak, Yu. Tyshchenko, O. Zvarych. Kyiv, 2018. URL: https://www.civic-synergy.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/blok_XXI-engl-last.pdf

9. Kalniete Sandra, Pildegovičs Tomass (2021). Strengthening the EU's resilience to hybrid threats. *European View 2021*, Vol. 20(1) 23–33. [ps://doi.org/10.1177/17816858211004648](https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858211004648)

10. Parkes Roderick (2019). Protecting Europe. The EU's response to hybrid threats. *European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (2019)*. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21143.1.pdf>

Seminar № 9. EU response to hybrid threats.

1. EU policy regarding hybrid threats. Protection rules and principles. Data protection laws in the EU.

2. EU Security Union Strategy.

Reading list:

1. A Europe that protects: Countering hybrid threats (June 2018). An official website of the European Union. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/46393_en

2. Costa Rita (2021). Hybrid Threats in the Context of European Security. Report of the international conference organized at the National Defence Institute (IDN) on 18 May 2021 under the framework of the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union. URL: <https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/ebriefing/Documents/E-Briefing%20Papers/E-Briefing%20Papers%203.pdf>

3. Demertzis Maria and Wolff Guntram (2019). Hybrid and cybersecurity threats and the European Union's financial system. Policy Contribution Issue n°10 | September 2019. URL: https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-10_2019.pdf

4. EU policy on fighting hybrid threats. URL: <https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/eu-policy-on-fighting-hybrid-threats/>

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7. Hybrid threats. European commission. URL: https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/hybrid-threats_en

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Seminar № 10. Global terrorism and security of EU.

1. Terrorism and security of the EU.
2. The history of terrorist acts in Europe.

Reading list:

1. Costa Bruna. Transnational terrorism: the European Union's fight against terrorism. May 22, 2023. URL: <https://esthinktank.com/2023/05/22/transnational-terrorism-the-european-unions-fight-against-terrorism/>

2. Delivet Philippe. The European Union and the fight to counter terrorism. 29 March 2016. URL: <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

3. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2023 (TE-SAT). Europol. 31 August 2023. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2023-te-sat>

4. EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. 25 March 2004. URL: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10010-2004-REV-3/en/pdf>

5. EU counter-terrorism strategy. EURACTIV. URL: <https://www.euractiv.com/topics/eu-counter-terrorism-strategy/>

6. Kaunert Christian, MacKenzie Alex, and Léonard Sarah. The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor. European Security and Justice Critiques series. 16 August 2022. URL: <https://www.elgaronline.com/monobook-oa/book/9781782548287/9781782548287.xml>

7. Magnus Ekengren (2004). The interface of external and internal security in the EU and in Nordic policies. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06BaHeSu/SIPRI06BaHeSu15.pdf>

8. The EU's response to terrorism (2022). European council. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>

9. The European region. URL: <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>

10. Zakharchenko Anna I. (January 2007). The EU and U.S. Strategies against Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study. George C. Marshall. European Center for Security studies. URL: <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/occasional-papers/eu-and-us-strategies-against-terrorism-and-proliferation-wmd-comparative-study-0>

Seminar № 11. The EU response to terrorism.

1. EU response to terrorism.
2. Counter-terrorism instruments.
3. European anti-terrorism policy.

Reading list:

1. Costa Bruna. Transnational terrorism: the European Union's fight against terrorism. May 22, 2023. URL: <https://esthinktank.com/2023/05/22/transnational-terrorism-the-european-unions-fight-against-terrorism/>

2. Delivet Philippe. The European Union and the fight to counter terrorism. 29 March 2016. URL: <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0386-the-european-union-and-the-fight-to-counter-terrorism>

3. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2023 (TE-SAT). Europol. 31 August 2023. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2023-te-sat>

4. EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. 25 March 2004. URL: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10010-2004-REV-3/en/pdf>

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7. Magnus Ekengren (2004). The interface of external and internal security in the EU and in Nordic policies. URL: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI06BaHeSu/SIPRI06BaHeSu15.pdf>

8 The EU's response to terrorism (2022). European council. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/>

9. The European region. URL: <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>

10. Zakharchenko Anna I. (January 2007). The EU and U.S. Strategies against Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD: A Comparative Study. George C. Marshall. European Center for Security studies. URL: <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/occasional-papers/eu-and-us-strategies-against-terrorism-and-proliferation-wmd-comparative-study-0>

Seminar № 12. NATO, European security and defense cooperation.

1. EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries.

2. NATO-Ukraine relationships. History of relationships.

Reading list:

1. Betalleluz Ariana (2022). European security and defense review: Towards European Armed Forces? URL: <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/european-security-and-defense-review-towards-european-armed-forces->

2. EU cooperation on security and defence (2022). European council. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

3. EU common security and defence policy (2022). URL: <https://kam.lt/en/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy/>

4. EU's new defence and security initiatives (2019). EU2019. URL: https://eu2019.fi/en/back-grounders/new-defence-and-security-initiatives?cfchl_tk=_BANiYvfvwiSY8w6FtvEvRUNqBIQGPvsaxZTifGysEE-1671373066-0-gaNycGzNCKU

5. Giovanna De Maio (December 2021). Opportunities to deepen NATO-EU Cooperation. Foreign Policy at Brookings. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP20211203nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf

6. Ratsiborynska, V. (2021). EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries against hybrid threats: From the EU Global Strategy till the war in Ukraine, *Horizon Insights*, 4(4), 20-31. URL: https://behorizon.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Horizon_Insights_Volume-4-Issue-4_2022_March.pdf

7. Raluca Csernatonu (December 2021). The EU's Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex. *Carnegie Europe*. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884>

8. Pawlak, Patryk (2017). Countering hybrid threats: EU-NATO cooperation. *EPRS*. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599315_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI(2017)599315_EN.pdf)

9. Szymański, Piotr (2020). Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats. *OSW Commentary*. NUMBER 328. Centre for Eastern Studies. URL: https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_328.pdf

Seminar № 13. NATO, European security and defense cooperation.

1. NATO response to threats.

2. NATO-Ukraine during the Russian aggression.

Reading list:

1. Betalleluz Ariana (2022). European security and defense review: Towards European Armed Forces? URL: <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/european-security-and-defense-review-towards-european-armed-forces->

2. EU cooperation on security and defence (2022). *European Council*. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/>

3. EU common security and defence policy (2022). URL: <https://kam.lt/en/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy/>

4. EU's new defence and security initiatives (2019). EU2019. URL: https://eu2019.fi/en/back_grounders/new-defence-and-security-initiatives?cfchl_tk=_BANiYvfvwiSY8w6FtvEvRUNqBIqGPvsaxZTifGysEE-1671373066-0-gaNycGzNCKU

5. Giovanna De Maio (December 2021). Opportunities to deepen NATO-EU Cooperation. Foreign Policy at Brookings. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP20211_203nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf

6. Ratsiborynska, V. (2021). EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries against hybrid threats: From the EU Global Strategy till the war in Ukraine, *Horizon Insights*, 4(4), 20-31. URL: https://behorizon.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Horizon_Insights_Volume-4-Issue-4_2022_March.pdf

7. Raluca Csernatonu (December 2021). The EU's Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex. *Carnegie Europe*. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884>

8. Pawlak, Patryk (2017). Countering hybrid threats: EU-NATO cooperation. EPRS. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599315_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI(2017)599315_EN.pdf)

9. Szymański, Piotr (2020). Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats. *OSW Commentary*. NUMBER 328. Centre for Eastern Studies. URL: https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_328.pdf

Seminar № 14. NATO–EU-Ukraine cooperation in combating “hybrid” threats.

1. NATO's potential on countering conventional wars and hybrid threats.

2. NATO response to hybrid threats.

3. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.

4. EU-NATO actions regarding hybrid threats.

Reading list:

1. Giovanna De Maio (December 2021). Opportunities to deepen NATO-EU Cooperation. Foreign Policy at Brookings. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP_20211203_nato_eu_cooperation_demaio.pdf

2. Pawlak Patryk (2017). Countering hybrid threats: EU-NATO cooperation. EPRS. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599315_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI(2017)599315_EN.pdf)

3. Ratsiborynska, V. (2021). EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries against hybrid threats: From the EU Global Strategy till the war in Ukraine, *Horizon Insights*, 4(4), 20-31. <https://doi.org/10.31175/hi.2021.04.03> URL: https://behorizon.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Horizon_Insights_Volume-4-Issue-4_2022_March.pdf

4. Szymański Piotr (2020). Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats. *OSW Commentary*. NUMBER 328. Centre for Eastern Studies. URL: https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Commentary_328.pdf

Seminar № 15. Ukraine as an integral part of modern European security architecture.

1. Ukraine crisis – evolving European security architecture.

2. The role of Ukraine in European security architecture.

3. Perspectives and future of the EU.

Reading list:

1. Burke-White William (Spring 2022). A Need for a New European Security Architecture. *THE GLOBAL ORDER AFTER RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE*. Perry World House. URL: <https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/perry-world-house/burke-whiteukrainethoughtpiece.pdf>

2 Deugd Nienke de (2007). *UKRAINE AND NATO The Policy and Practice of Co-operating with the Euro-Atlantic Security*

Community. With a Preface by Leonid Polyakov First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine. CESS. URL: <https://cess.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Harmonie-paper.nr-20.pdf>

3. Dutta Ankita (20 May 2022). Ukraine Crisis – Evolving European Security Architecture. URL: https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7400&lid=4976

4. EU support to Ukraine and the security architecture in Europe (2022). An official website of the EU. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-support-ukraine-and-security-architecture-europe_en

5. Ham van Peter (2015). The Elephant in the Room. The EU, Russia and the Quest for a New European Security Bargain. Clingendael Report NOVEMBER 2015. URL: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/eu_russia_rapport/5_the_elephant_in_the_room/

6. The EU-Ukraine security partnership: status and prospects (2021). The report was prepared by the Razumkov Centre team, including: Project Manager Oleksiy MELNYK, Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes, Coordinator of International Projects; Mykhailo PASHKOV, Co-Director of Foreign Relations and International Security Programmes; Leonid POLYAKOV, Visiting Senior Fellow; and Mykola SUNHUROVSKYI, Director of Military Programmes. URL: https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_eu_ukraine_security.pdf

Seminar № 16. Perspectives for the future of European Security.

1. European defence and the future. Ukraine – a key state.

2. Future challenges. The future of NATO.

3. European security 2030.

Reading list:

1. Donmez Beyza Binnur and Aliyev Jeyhun (2022). Future of European security depends on how EU handles Ukraine-Russia crisis. URL: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/future-of-european-security-depends-on-how-eu-handles-ukraine-russia-crisis/2497980>

2. European Security 2030. The Results of the Dahrendorf Foresight Project (September 2019). Editors: Monika Sus and Marcel Hadeed. URL: <https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Dahrendorf-Foresight-Report.pdf>

3. Foreign interventions and the future of European defence (2022). URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-interventions-and-future-european-defence_en

4. Raynova Denitsa (2017). What future for European defence? Views and Recommendations from the ELN Caucus. European Leadership Network. URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17679>

5. The European Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty: State of the Play and Future Prospects' (2022). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. URL: <https://www.kas.de/pt/web/brasilien/einzeltitel/-/content/the-european-security-and-defence-policy-under-the-lisbon-treaty-state-of-the-play-and-future-prospects->

Questions for the Credit or Exam.

1. Security of the EU, approaches. Changes and the consequences.
2. Evolution of challenges and security issues. Historic changes and the consequences.
3. Major directions of threats for the European Union.
4. European foreign policy. Security of the EU. Official documents of the European council.
5. Current global and transregional threats.
6. Security landscape in Europe & hot spots.
7. The EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: four key challenges.
8. Energy security.
9. The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis
10. The European Union response to the energy crisis.
11. The migration crisis in the EU. Situation analysis.
12. Migration routes, tendencies.
13. Consequences of the migration crisis.
14. The EU and Russia relationships. Western European countries and the RF.

15. Russia's policy in Central Europe.
16. Russia and Eastern European countries.
17. The concept of hybrid war, approaches and meanings.
18. Hybrid war instruments. Fakes and Russian propaganda.
19. Conventional vs hybrid war.
20. Differences and commonalities.
21. Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine: prerequisites, process and results.
22. Instruments of the Russian Federation in the warfare against Ukraine.
23. EU's security and hybrid threats for the EU.
24. Information security, its principles and information security policy. Guidance documents.
25. EU policy regarding hybrid threats. Data protection laws in the EU.
26. EU Security Union Strategy.
27. Terrorism and security of the EU.
28. The history of terrorist acts in Europe.
29. EU response to terrorism.
30. Counter-terrorism instruments.
31. European anti-terrorism policy.
32. EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries.
33. NATO-Ukraine relationships. History of relationships.
34. NATO response to threats.
35. NATO-Ukraine during the Russian aggression.
36. NATO's potential on countering conventional wars and hybrid threats.
37. NATO response to hybrid threats.
38. Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.
39. EU-NATO actions regarding hybrid threats.
40. Ukraine crisis – evolving European security architecture.
41. The role of Ukraine in European security architecture.
42. Perspectives and future of the EU.
43. European defence and the future. Ukraine – a key state.
44. Future challenges. The future of NATO.
45. European security 2030.

Assessment by the national scale and the scale of ECTS

Score	Assessment by the national scale	Assessment by the scale of ECTS	
		Grades	Explanation
90 – 100	excellent	A	excellent (insignificant amount of errors)
82 – 89	good	B	Very well (above average)
75 – 81		C	Well (insignificant amount of errors)
67 – 74	satisfactory	D	Satisfactory (not bad, but with considerable amount of drawbacks)
60 – 66		E	Satisfactory (meet the minimal criteria)
35 – 59	bad	FX	Bad (with opportunity to redo)
1 – 34		F	Bad (compulsory additional course taking)

Recommended list of literature

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Policy of the course

Specifics of the discipline teaching by means of distance learning technologies.

According to the Regulations on distance learning at the National University of Ostroh Academy (NaUOA) (https://www.oa.edu.ua/publik_information/polojennia_dystanc_navchannia.pdf), in case of implementing quarantine measures, lectures, seminars and

consultations are delivered by means of Google Meet system (the code word AO) that provides two-way communication between a professor and a student. The corporate post boxes of Ostroh Academy also serve this purpose. All the necessary materials for the learning of the course are available in the Moodle system of NaUOA: <https://moodle.oa.edu.ua> ; <https://moodle.oa.edu.ua/course/view.php?id=2583>).

Academic honesty code

Professor and students are obliged to follow the principles of academic honesty:

- Any work submitted by students during the course learning should include only the results of their own work.
- Do not make steps that can improve your own results or worsen/improve the results of other students.
- In case of plagiarism or any other academic misconduct the student will lose an opportunity to get a score.
- Do not publish in public domain answers to the questions used for the assessment of students' level of knowledge.
- At the final assessment session, it is obligatory to work independently.
- It is forbidden to speak or discuss any issue, or copy documents, or use any electronic means of obtaining information.

Violation of academic honesty code at tests and assessment sessions will lead to losing scores or implementing measures, provided by the Code of Academic Honesty of Ostroh Academy (https://www.oa.edu.ua/publik_information/CODEX.pdf).

LECTURE 1

SECURITY OF EUROPEANS

As mentioned in the 2017 survey analysis, people in the EU continue to have a strong feeling of security in the places in which they live and in their country in general. However, the proportion of those who think that the EU is a secure place to live in has fallen significantly: 68% say so in 2017 compared with 79% in 2015.

According to the 2017 survey among EU citizens, 5 challenges to the internal security of the EU seen as important were: terrorism (95 %), organized crime (93 %), natural and human made disasters (89 %), and cybercrime (87 %) [1].

The European Commission published in November 2010 a Communication aiming at putting the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) into action. The Communication envisages 5 key strategic objectives for the EU's internal security: disrupt organised crime, prevent terrorism, raise levels of security in cyberspace, strengthen external borders management and increase the EU's resilience to natural disasters.

Polls and focus groups (views of experts and stakeholders show that different groups of policymakers, experts, and members of the public have similar perceptions and concerns regarding security. For example, according to the 2019 edition of the Global Risks Landscape produced by the World Economic Forum, the most probable risks are extreme weather events, natural and human-made disasters, cyber-attacks, and migration.

Finally, according to the European Political Strategy Centre, which analyses the threat perception of 10 EU member states, the most important threats to European security are terrorism, cyber-threats, hybrid threats, uncontrolled migration, energy vulnerability, climate change and natural disasters, threats to critical infrastructure, regional conflicts, and failing states. Among the main threats are the following ones: external threats, great-

power competition, regional conflicts, weak/failed States and the Russian war against Ukraine [2, p. 8].

The conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 demonstrated that the EU's most significant neighbor, Russia, is prepared to use hard power to achieve its objectives. The Arab revolts caught Europe by surprise and its contribution to regional crisis management efforts since has been far from satisfactory.

Hybrid threats. Although there are several slightly different definitions of hybrid threats, there is general agreement that they combine conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives.

Hybrid campaigns are multidimensional, using conventional and unconventional tools and tactics. They are designed to be difficult to detect.

These threats target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create confusion to hinder swift and effective decision-making.

Hybrid threats can range from cyberattacks on critical information systems, through the disruption of critical services such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions [3].

Critical infrastructure is an asset or system that is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions. The destruction or disruption of a critical infrastructure through natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity, or malicious behavior, may have a significant negative impact on the security of the EU and the well-being of its citizens.

Reducing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and increasing their resilience is becoming one of the major objectives of the EU.

Therefore, migration flows due to economic, environmental, or security reasons will remain for the foreseeable future a critical challenge for Europe, which will need to develop an efficient long-term migration-management policy.

Europe is forced to confront a growing cyber threat against physical assets. Non-states hackers and foreign governments are increasingly targeting industrial control systems and networks—power grids, chemical plants, aviation systems, transportation networks, telecommunications systems, financial networks, and even nuclear facilities.

Large-scale attacks against information systems and various other forms of cybercrime, such as online identity theft or online child abuse, are subject to rapidly evolving technological developments.

The EU's responses to such crimes are equally innovative and flexible, ranging from support for cross-border cyber investigations and training of police to legislative measures [4].

The Energy-Security Nexus. There is still concern about dependency on a limited number of external suppliers, especially in the gas sector. The energy relationship with Russia and the construction of new pipelines (Nord Stream 2, Turk Stream) will remain controversial issues, but as the EU moves toward an Energy Union, with infrastructure being built and regulations being put in place, physical availability and price are becoming issues of relatively secondary importance (although affordability remains an issue for many European citizens). As a result of the energy transition there will be winners and losers at the global and regional level, and the key challenges for the future will be the emerging technological dependency, the control of specific raw materials (cobaltum, lithium etc.) and of technological know-how (especially in renewable energy storage), with the leaders potentially acquiring an important economic and geopolitical advantage. In addition to possible state threats to Europe's energy security, there are also potential non-state ones (terrorism, cyber, accidents) as digitization and decentralization lead to increased vulnerability.

Black Swan Events. A Black Swan event is an event that was unprecedented and unexpected at the time it occurred and has an

extreme impact. For example: the transformation of one or more EU states into weak or failed states, the collapse of the EU, a war with Russia, the fall of a meteor, a solar flare, a major wave of mass migration, an incident of catastrophic terrorism (including the use of nuclear/radiological, biological, and chemical weapons), a war between the United States and China, or even a nuclear war between non-European countries somehow implicating the EU [5].

Conclusion. Europe's security will be challenged in multiple ways by internal and external threats from state and non-state actors, physical phenomena, or technological changes and accidents. Terrorism, hybrid threats, and organized crime know no borders.

Some of the other threats and challenges presented above can be dealt with efficiently only at the EU level. This calls for tighter institutional links between external action and the internal area of freedom, security, and justice.

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LECTURE 2

Modern challenges for the EU

Since the Eurozone crisis of 2009, the EU has been turbulent by the uncontrolled influx of refugees, Brexit, Covid-19, and a full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine. While major geopolitical rivalries hold their pragmatic interests, more political turmoil, economic recessions, and social inequalities will emerge in 2023 and beyond. The current state of affairs is being worsened by the deepening global warming that urges tougher responses from the EU member-states.

Rising prices, inflation, and cost of living is the main concern of Europeans at the EU level, followed by energy supply, the international situation and the economic situation.

Six in ten Europeans say that the war in Ukraine has had financial consequences for them. More than half of all Europeans are overall satisfied with the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The seven most important challenges facing the EU in 2022.

Energy and inflation.

With gas prices and their automatic reflection in consumers' electricity bills and little prospect of the situation improving in the first few months of the year, the energy price crisis will continue to be one of the European Union's major headaches in 2022.

Climate and digitalization.

At the same time, the EU is beginning to develop legislation to reduce its emissions by 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 as a path

to decarbonise the economy by the middle of the century, a debate that will last for years and is expected to be intense. It will also try to pass its two main laws in the first quarter of 2022 to limit the power of large internet platforms such as Google, Facebook and Amazon [1].

Security and defence.

The EU's great defence commitment for 2023, which should be approved in March, is to gain autonomy in security and defence matters in the face of new challenges such as hybrid or cyber threats, and which envisages being able to deploy rapid action forces of some 5,000 troops. The greatest threat the EU currently faces in its immediate surroundings is the war between Ukraine and Russia.

Rule of law.

The authoritarian drift of Hungary and Poland, both with post-pandemic recovery funds blocked until they reverse their violations of the principles on which the EU is based, such as judicial independence, will remain one of the EU's main internal challenges in 2023. The Polish Supreme Court's questioning of the primacy of European law and Hungary's anti-LGTBIQ+ regulations have increased the tension between Budapest and Warsaw with Brussels. The parties will have to seek areas of understanding because neither Hungary nor Poland intends to leave the EU, nor can the other partners expel them [2].

Migration.

Within the EU, the division continues between Spain and other frontline countries, which are calling for an equitable distribution of responsibility in migration matters, and others such as the Visegrad countries – Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary – that are reluctant to take in refugees. On the other hand, a new threat has emerged in the last year: the use of migratory flows as a political weapon by states such as Morocco and Belarus.

The report, titled "Europe Today and Tomorrow: What

Europeans Want,” shows that surveyed residents of the member states want the EU to work closer together and be more integrated. However, sharp lines divide the population on key matters. “There is also clear dissatisfaction with the EU’s distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and a plurality of respondents agree that freedom of movement has brought more costs than benefits for their country.” More people agreed (37%) with the statement “free of movement has had more costs than benefits for my country,” than disagreed (32%,) the report states [3].

Freedom and movement.

In richer countries such as France and Germany the survey respondents were even more likely to think the cost of freedom of movement outweighed the benefits. For instance, the figure was 45% in France and 40% in Germany. Freedom of movement is a vital part of the treaty that binds the EU together and is part of a post-WW2 goal of creating a United States of Europe. And without freedom of movement the EU dream will remain just that, a dream.

The war in Ukraine is underway.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provoked urgent mobilization of the EU’s external policies to facilitate Ukraine through the application of tougher sanctions against Moscow and the delivery of weapons. Putin’s aggression imposed harsh implications on the EU governments. Delivery of military support to Ukraine has come as an unprecedented challenge for the EU. It has tested the Union for the quality of integration of its member states [4].

Under the threat of further aggression from Putin’s regime, the EU has intensified security measures, including energetic safety and cyber security. On the energy security front, ECFR initiated a new EU Energy Deals Tracker to lessen the dependence of the EU member states on Russian gas. In June 2022, the European Commission initiated a new EU Cybersecurity Strategy to withstand cyber-attacks.

The EU is largely viewed as a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity. For much of the last decade, however, many EU

countries have faced considerable economic difficulties. Despite an improved economic situation in the EU since 2017, economic pressures and societal changes have contributed to the rise of populist and anti-establishment political parties, at least some of which harbor anti-EU or “eurosceptic” sentiments. Such trends have complicated the EU’s ability to deal with multiple internal and external challenges. Among the most prominent challenges are the pending departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU (“Brexit”); democracy and rule-of-law concerns in Poland, Hungary, and other EU members; migration and related societal integration concerns; a resurgent Russia; and a heightened terrorism threat.

Amid these difficult issues, some are questioning the future shape and character of the EU. Supporters of the EU worry that certain aspects of EU integration could be stopped or reversed. Others contend that the multiple crises could produce some beneficial reforms and ultimately transform the EU into a more effective, cohesive entity. Recently, considerable attention has focused on developing a “multi speed EU,” in which some EU members could pursue greater integration in specified areas while others could opt out [5].

Conclusions. Despite the challenges faced by European countries, the EU makes decisive steps and implements measures in order to pave the way for a secure world even though it is traveling through uncharted waters.

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LECTURE 3

Evolution of challenges for European security

During the Cold War, the world seemed well defined and easy. It was a bipolar world, divided between 2 great powers, the USSR and the USA and their spheres of influence and domain. Europe was also divided between East and West, protected by 2 superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, hopes for a new era of prosperity and peace arose. But Europe came under pressure due to a dramatic crisis in Yugoslavia. The rapid escalation of the war and the atrocities that accompanied the struggle involved most international players.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security model of Europe has been evolving as a response to internal as well as to external challenges. The Balkans has since played a key role in the European security system and governance.

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by the war on terror. The aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, and particularly the Iraq War, intensified

concerns over terrorism, religious fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states. Similarly, the rise of the powerful and influential alliance of 5 major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) seriously undermined the post-war liberal world order.

BRICS. The admission of Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will reflect how geopolitics is changing: the world is becoming more multipolar and middle powers more assertive in challenging the Western-led order. Rising tensions between the West and China, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, mean emerging powers see the BRICS as a vehicle for more independent foreign policies. For China, the bloc is a potential counterweight to the G7 [1].

Islamic terrorism in Europe. Islamic terrorism in Europe has been carried out by the Islamic State (ISIL) or Al-Qaeda as well as Islamist lone wolves since the late 20th century. Europol, which releases the annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report, used the term "Islamist terrorism" in the years 2006–2010, "religiously inspired terrorism" 2011–2014, and has used "jihadist terrorism" since 2015. Europol defines jihadism as "a violent ideology exploiting traditional Islamic concepts" [2; 3].

In the early 2000s, most of the Islamic terrorist activity was linked to Al-Qaeda and the plots tended to involve groups carrying out coordinated bombings. The deadliest attacks of this period were the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 193 civilians (the deadliest Islamist attack in Europe), and the 7 July 2005 London bombings, which killed 52.

There was a rise in Islamic terrorist incidents in Europe after 2014. The years 2014–16 saw more people killed by Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe than all previous years combined. Most of this terrorist activity was inspired by ISIL, and a number of plots involved people who entered or re-entered Europe as asylum seekers during the European migrant crisis, and some attackers had returned to Europe after fighting in the Syrian Civil War.

Most attacks since 2014 have been carried out by individuals using guns, knives and vehicles. The deadliest attacks of this period have been the Nov. 2015 Paris attacks (130 killed), the July 2016 Nice truck attack (86), the June 2016 Atatürk Airport attack (45 killed), the March 2016 Brussels bombings (32), and the May 2017 Manchester Arena bombing (22 killed). These attacks and threats have led to major security operations and plans such as Opération Sentinelle in France, Operation Vigilant Guardian and the Brussels lockdown in Belgium, and Operation Temperer in the United Kingdom. The Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting in May 2014 was the first attack in Europe by a returnee from the Syrian war [2; 3].

Rethinking the European security leadership (2014-2020)
In the framework of this phase, several significant changes have taken place in the ESA. NATO, while maintaining the objectives acquired over the years, has returned to its origins and has once again focused its attention on Russia. Russia's assertiveness in Ukraine has given the OSCE the opportunity to regain some of the relevance lost in the last twenty years, although the lack of trust among its participants remains a major constraint on its progress. The EU, for its part, has experienced the greatest development in its history in terms of progress in security and defence instruments. Russia's actions in Europe have marked the evolution of the various ESA actors since 2014, specifically since the annexation of Crimea between February and March of that year. It has certainly not been the only factor, as the incidence of Daesh terrorism in several European states has also kept the continent on the rack [4, p. 5]. At the same time, the migrant crisis, the effects of the Syrian civil war and important decisions such as Brexit and changes in the leadership of several governments have also had an impact on the architecture [5, p. 196]. The latter include but are not limited to the election of President Trump in the US, the change promoted in Turkey by its president Erdogan from a parliamentary regime to a presidential one in 2014, and results favourable to nationalist populist leaders in Hungary and Poland. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating effects

on society and the world's economy, may entail a rethinking of security, in addition to producing tragic results whose magnitude is still unknown [6; 7].

Conclusions. Terrorism is a constant threat for all countries of the European Union and it needs common efforts to reduce it to minimum.

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LECTURE 4

Evolution of challenges for the EU and Ukraine

The polycrisis which the European Union (EU) has been facing in the last decade(s) has generated an intense debate on the bloc's relevance and power as a regional, as well as a global player. For its critics, the EU has been viewed as a less credible actor, incapable of decisively responding to key international challenges. 27 countries out of 44 in Europe make the decision process more complicated [1, p. 232].

The EU cooperates with Ukraine in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern regional dimension, the Eastern Partnership, with the objective to bring Ukraine closer to the EU.

TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY AND DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the European security environment. The EU and its member states are committed to supporting Ukraine in its self-defence in the long-term. In recent years, the EU has become an important actor in the security area, complementary to NATO, which carries out collective defence as its core task. This raises the question of how the EU-Ukraine relationship in security and defence should be shaped [2].

Future EU-Ukraine security relations. Long-term security assistance to Ukraine: the EU should commit itself to providing long term military assistance to Ukraine in order to strengthen Ukraine's ability to defend and protect itself against Russian aggression. Although these measures are to a large extent already in place (through for example the EPF and EUMAM), this policy could be extended to long-term security programmes – also depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. For this purpose, a multi-year EU fund could be created, dedicated entirely to the training and provisioning of the AFU. The EU is currently

considering creating such a four-year fund with a budget of € 20 billion. This is similar to the 'Israel model' of the United States: applied to Ukraine, EU member states will not commit to be actively involved in defending Ukraine, but rather commit to assisting the country in creating the necessary military, political and economic conditions to be able to defend itself [2, p.3-4].

Engaging Ukraine in capability development: the deliveries of military equipment to Ukraine have proven to be difficult in reality for two reasons. European states use varying equipment, lacking standardisation, in particular regarding ammunition. In that sense, fragmentation in the European military equipment market has been exported to Ukraine. Secondly, Ukrainians have to be trained by Europeans because they are unfamiliar with the equipment. If Ukraine is incorporated into common procurement and acquires the same weapons as EU member states, this would help to create uniformity. Naturally, this will take time and, certainly at the start, financial assistance will be needed. Already in 2015, the EDA and Ukraine signed an Administrative Arrangement that enables Ukraine's participation in the Agency's military-technological projects and programmes, while it also offers the context for cooperation in capability development.²¹ The EDA's seven-year project for the common procurement of artillery and missile ammunition to replenish national stocks is a practical example of such military cooperation. A total of 26 countries have signed the project arrangement [3].

Ukraine is a priority partner for the European Union. The EU supports Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous and democratic future for its citizens. The Association Agreement (AA), including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together, promoting deeper political ties, stronger economic links and respect for common values. Since 2014, Ukraine has embarked on an ambitious reform programme to accelerate economic growth and improve the livelihoods of its citizens. Since 2014, the EU and the Financial Institutions have mobilised more than €17 billion in

grants and loans to support reforms, while applying conditionality dependent on their progress [4].

Institution. The U-LEAD with Europe programme EU aims at improving the transparency and accountability of local and regional authorities, as well as their capacity to offer better services, with an overall envelope of €158 million for the period 2016-2023. The EU remains steadfast in its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU strongly condemns the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and continues to condemn this violation of international law [5].

Economy. The DCFTA is a major milestone in bilateral trade offering new economic opportunities to both sides. The AA triggers the reform of Ukraine's legal framework, aiming to align it with that of the EU. These reforms will improve the overall business climate in Ukraine, including by curbing corruption.

Green. Security of energy supply is a key area, which the EU continues to support. The European Commission facilitated the 2019 agreement on gas transit framework through Ukraine until 2024, which is based on EU rules and contributes to the security of supply. The EU contributes substantially to the Ukrainian Energy Efficiency Fund and supports raising public awareness for energy efficiency investments. The EU and Ukraine have launched a dedicated dialogue on the European Green Deal and Ukraine's Green Transition. A strategic partnership on raw materials and batteries has been launched [5].

Society. Since 2015, more than 11,500 Ukrainian and nearly 5,500 European students and academic staff benefited from higher education exchange opportunities through the Erasmus+ programme. Ukraine has participated in 48 Erasmus+ Capacity building for higher education projects [5].

DIGITA. The EU has also allocated €25 million to support digital transformation in Ukraine, including e-governance, cybersecurity and implementation of the EU acquis in the area of telecommunications as foreseen in the DCFTA.

Ukraine's EU path

On 28 February 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership. On 17 June 2022, the European Commission presented its Opinions on the applications submitted by Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. Based on the Commission's Opinion, Ukraine was given a European perspective on 23 June 2022 by unanimous agreement between the leaders of all 27 EU Member States [6].

The Commission's Opinion outlined seven steps which Ukraine needed to address in order to progress on the path to the EU. It was complemented by Commission's analytical report on country's alignment with EU acquis of 2 February 2023. A more detailed review was part of the 2023 Enlargement Package reports, presented on 08 November 2023, where Ukraine was included for the first time. The Commission also recommended opening accession negotiations with Ukraine. On 14 December 2023, European Council decided to open accession negotiations with the country [7].

What we do

Together with the EU Delegation to Ukraine we have been working relentlessly to coordinate support for Ukraine and rapidly mobilise emergency assistance to the country (apart from humanitarian aid and aid through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism):

a) By Re-purposing of ongoing projects.

The EU Delegation to Ukraine is fully operational. It is currently re-purposing up to €200 million worth of ongoing projects to deliver emergency assistance to meet pressing needs of the Ukrainian population and authorities [8].

b) €120 million State and Resilience Building Contract (SRBC) – Budget Support.

As part of an emergency package for Ukraine announced on 24 January 2022, a €120 million grant in the form of a State and Resilience Building Contract was approved by the European Commission on 17 March. During her visit to Ukraine on 8 April, President von der Leyen announced the full disbursement of the €120 million grant. The programme aims at strengthening civilian crisis preparedness and management at both central and local levels, an area of utmost importance for Ukraine at present. This will contribute to continue addressing existing vulnerabilities against crises affecting the society as a whole, as well as critical infrastructure, including the transport network, information and communication systems [8].

c) Emergency support programme of €330 million.

Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and host communities will be the core part of the programme – housing and social services (around €200 million). Focus will be also placed on the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, including possibly energy equipment; support to digital and cybersecurity is also foreseen. The program will also support independent media and civil society [8].

According to the results of previous KIIS surveys, 82% of respondents agree that the future of Ukraine as a prosperous free country depends on whether it becomes a member of the EU (February 2023). At the same time, 92% of Ukrainians would like Ukraine to become a member of the EU, and 89% – a member of NATO (May 2023). That is, there is currently a consensus in society regarding the support of European and Euro-Atlantic integration [8].

Conclusions. Challenges evolve within time and they require the European Union as a unity and each of its member maximum efforts to cope with them. Only in unity is the way to a strong position and adequate responses to the incoming challenges.

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LECTURE 5

Security landscape in the EU & hot spots

The European security landscape is ever-evolving and increasingly complex. Instability and domestic extremism have increased the threat of terrorism in Europe. The EU faces hybrid threats that permeate different aspects of life. Cyberspace and social media have become the new battleground for state and non-state groups. There is a growing concern in Europe about the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials for malicious purposes. According to the UNO, since 24 February 2022, more than 12 million people have been displaced by the conflict in Ukraine [1].

Conflicts in different regions of the world are a major driver of terrorist activity, which is a serious threat to Europe – not only because it poses a direct danger of attack to the public, infrastructure and sites/artefacts of cultural heritage, but also because it has wider repercussions.

Radicalism creates a feeling of insecurity, fuels distrust among different groups in society and towards the government, feeds prejudices and extremist views, and erodes the sense of community.

Radicalism. Alongside conflict in different regions of the world, research into the root causes of radicalisation in Europe identifies the root causes of radicalisation, which requires strengthening resilience, fostering social inclusion, enhancing mutual understanding and tolerance, tackling inequalities, and preventing marginalisation and stigmatisation of groups or communities. It also highlights the importance of the crime-terrorism nexus, and the role prisons play in radicalising individuals.

Far right politicians and movements. Far-right politics, or right-wing extremism, is a spectrum of political thought that tends to be radically conservative, ultra-nationalist, and authoritarian. The name derives from the left–right political spectrum, with

the “far right” considered further from center than the standard political right.

Contemporary definitions now include neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, the Third Position, the alt-right, racial supremacism and other ideologies or organizations that feature aspects of authoritarian, ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, xenophobic, theocratic, racist, homophobic, transphobic, or reactionary views [2].

Germany. In the 21st century, the German far right consists of various small parties and two larger groups, namely Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Pegida. In March 2021, the Germany domestic intelligence agency Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution placed the AfD under surveillance, the first time in the post-war period that a main opposition party had been subjected to such scrutiny.

Netherlands. Despite being neutral, since the end of World War II, the Netherlands has had a number of small far-right groups and parties, the largest and most successful being the Party for Freedom led by Geert Wilders. Other far-right Dutch groups include the neo-Nazi Dutch People’s Union (1973–present), the Centre Party (1982–1998), the Dutch Block (1992–2000), New National Party (1998–2005) and the ultranationalist National Alliance (2003–2007) [2].

According to the nearly complete vote count in the Netherlands’ parliamentary elections, the far-right “Party for Freedom,” led by anti-Islam populist Geert Wilders, is in the lead. According to BBC, Wilders’ victory is seen as a shake-up in Dutch politics. The party leader has consistently argued that the Netherlands should stop supplying weapons to Ukraine, claiming they need arms for their defense. However, none of the parties he could potentially form a government with share these ideas.

Wilders also strongly opposes migration, promising to “close borders”. However, he softened his anti-Islamic rhetoric on the eve of the vote. Wilders wants to hold a referendum on leaving the EU, known as Nexit, although he acknowledges there is currently

no national mood for it. He also believes that the Netherlands should significantly reduce its payments to the EU and block the accession of any new members.

France: The largest far-right party in Europe is the French anti-immigration party National Rally, formally known as the National Front. The party was founded in 1972, uniting a variety of French far-right groups under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Since 1984, it has been the major force of French nationalism. Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter Marine Le Pen was elected to succeed him as party leader in 2012. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, the party sparked outrage for hate speech, including Holocaust denial and Islamophobia [2].

Far right politicians and movements: Marine Le Pen. She may sound more moderate but the policies she embraces are no less radical than before on immigration, nationality and Islam. And yet she already fared better than her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who made it to the run-off in 2002 on an anti-immigrant, law-and-order platform. He was trounced because 82% of voters rejected his policies as toxic. Her campaign nowadays features the slogans Marine Présidente and "For all French people". There isn't a hint of the Le Pen name; the cleansing of the brand is almost complete.

But financing a far-right party was toxic in France and she went cap in hand to Russia for €11m in loans in the same year Putin staged a land-grab in Ukraine. She even threw her support behind the Kremlin's sham of an annexation vote in Crimea. Le Pen focused on perceived threats against French life: "Islamification", globalisation, the EU and the euro. Although she was well beaten by Emmanuel Macron in the presidential run-off, she had nevertheless attracted 7.7 million votes [3].

Marine Le Pen has been on a journey, taking France's far right to within touching distance of the presidency. Even after she took over the leadership of her father's National Front in 2011, she spent years trying to reach the point of dédemonisation (de-demonisation) considered necessary to turn an extremist force into a party that believes it is on the verge of power. Her

policies on immigration and prioritising homes and jobs for French nationals are still far-right, but the woman who leads the revamped Rassemblement National, or National Rally, conveys a moderate, approachable image of populism.

France's far-right leader Marine Le Pen, on a visit to Budapest, accused the EU of "ideological brutality" and voiced support for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán [4].

"Hungary in 2021, under your leadership, is once again at the forefront of the fight for the freedom of peoples," the French presidential candidate said at a joint press conference with Orbán. Le Pen hailed Orbán's "courage" and "determination" and promised that if she is elected president next year, France will back a "reorienting" of the European Union "whose ideological brutality threatens the very idea of sovereignty". Le Pen on Tuesday spoke of a "centralised Brussels power intoxicated with its own existence, its power and its omnipotence" [4].

Conclusions. The European security landscape has been evolving. It is increasingly complex. Instability and domestic extremism have increased the threat of terrorism in Europe.

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LECTURE 6

The migration crisis in the EU

Finally, according to the European Political Strategy Centre, which analyses the threat perception of 10 EU member states, the most important threats are terrorism, cyber-threats, hybrid threats, uncontrolled migration, energy vulnerability, climate change and natural disasters, threats to critical infrastructure, regional conflicts, and failing states.

446.7 million inhabitants living in the EU. 23.8 million are non-EU citizens (5.3% of EU's total population). 38.0 million people were born outside the EU (8.5% of all EU inhabitants) [1].

There is concern about population movements from the southern Neighborhood to EU countries. Europe will be significantly short of labor by several million within the next 25 years, due to the ageing of populations and negative demographic growth in most European countries, with France and the United Kingdom the main exceptions.

Illegal Migratory routes into Europe. A lot of migrants move along the Central Mediterranean route. 15717 cases of illegal border crossing were detected during four months, from January to April. Among the dominant migrants' countries of origin were Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Bangladesh, Guinea and Sudan.

The Western Balkan route was quite intensive from the point of view of migration. 14723 cases of illegal border crossing were registered between January and May 2021. Migrants came from Syria, Afghanistan, Morocco and Libya.

The Eastern Mediterranean route was not as tense as the central one, but nevertheless there were 6215 illegal border crossings in 2021, between January and April. Among the top countries of migration there were Turkey, Syria, Congo and Afghanistan and Nigeria. The Eastern Mediterranean route refers to the migratory route to Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria, primarily by way of Turkey. In addition, traffickers found new routes to transfer people from the Turkish and Lebanese coasts to Italy.

Therefore, migration flows due to economic, environmental, or security reasons will remain for the foreseeable future a critical challenge for Europe, which will need an efficient long-term migration-management policy. In December 2022, 82 305 first-time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the EU, -17 % compared with November 2022. In December 2022, there were 5 945 subsequent asylum applicants, a 5 % decrease compared with November 2022.

An emigrant is someone who emigrates — moves away from a country. An immigrant is someone who immigrates—moves to a different country. Both words can apply to the same person—a person must first emigrate to immigrate. However, these terms are often used to distinguish different groups, such as when tracking how many people are moving to a country and how many are moving away [2].

Germany and Luxembourg: respectively, the largest absolute number of total immigrants and the highest rate of immigration in 2021.

Germany reported the largest total number of immigrants (874 400) in 2021, followed by Spain (528 900), France (336 400) and Italy (318 400). Germany also reported the highest number of emigrants in 2021 (543 200), followed by Spain (380 800), Romania (216 900) and Poland (201 600) [1].

Migration crisis and Ukraine 2022-2024. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (except Poland). 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, mainly to Poland. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid residence cards.

In 2021, asylum seekers came from around 140 countries. Re temporary migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. In the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian citizens.

In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 104,000 in June 2015 [3].

Germany. 1.1 million arrivals of people from Ukraine in 2022. Since Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022, millions of people have left the country. Roughly 1.1 million arrivals of people from Ukraine were recorded in Germany in 2022. This is reported by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) on the basis of provisional results and an ad-hoc evaluation of migration statistics. Just over two thirds (68%) of the immigrants came between March and May 2022, that is, in the first three months after the attack [4].

139,000 departures from Germany to Ukraine registered. Net immigration from Ukraine in 2022 (+962,000) was higher than that from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq together in the period 2014 to 2016 (+834,000). Ukrainian citizens were the second largest foreign population group after Turkish citizens in October 2022. Proportion of Ukrainians in the total population is highest in Berlin and Hamburg, lowest in Schleswig-Holstein, according to latest figures [5].

Conclusions. Migration is a serious problem for the European Union, so it requires fast reaction and decisive measures taken by the EU in order to ease the burden and solve the problems.

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LECTURE 7

Regional and transregional threats

EU's Instrument for Stability: a key contributor in EU responses to international conflicts and crises in 2012.

The European Commission today adopted a report on the activities undertaken in 2012 under the Instrument for Stability (IfS), one of the key European Union instruments for external assistance. This (sixth) annual report [1] demonstrates the wide range of contributions that the mobilisation of EUR 286 million of IfS funds in 2012 has made to the EU's work in helping prevent conflicts and responding to crises and security and other threats worldwide [1 EU's Instrument for Stability: a key contributor in EU responses to international conflicts and crises in 2012].

Trans-regional threats and CBRN risks

Among the new areas that the IfS addressed in 2012 as part of efforts to tackle global and trans-regional threats to peace and security are cybercrime / cyber security and the fight against the

illicit market of falsified medicines. Programmes were devised to support capacity building for preventing and combating terrorism in priority regions. There was a continuing focus on capacity-building of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the effective control of illegal trade and transit and also on building capacities for the protection of critical infrastructure (including maritime routes). Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) programmes helped mitigate risks related to accidental, natural or malevolent CBRN issues and aimed at improving safety and security culture by spreading best practices and raising the general level of security and safety awareness [1].

Countering hybrid threats. The world as we know it is experiencing change and evolution at a rapid pace in every area of life. A technological revolution gives rise to massive shifts in global politics, economics, the media landscape, and the ways in which we all live, work, communicate, connect with and trust one another, locally and globally. The very nature of war, committing acts of aggression, and sowing seeds of discontent have evolved. Hybrid threats are a product of these changes and are part of our modern world, EU-HYBNET (Pan-European Network to Counter Hybrid Threats) is a project that works towards protecting the EU against them.

To enhance the EU's resilience to hybrid threats, an ever-growing state-of-the-art network has been established. The project is the 1st EU initiative which brings together pan-European practitioners and stakeholders to identify and analyse common challenges, and requirements to counter hybrid threats. It conducts research, highlights innovation initiatives, arranges training events to test innovations and makes recommendations for the uptake, industrialisation and standardisation of these innovations. These results are shared with EU practitioners and EC policymakers which positively influences the public procurement process [2].

Migration. In 2021, asylum seekers came from around 140 countries. 632,300 applications, including 537,300 first time applications, were lodged in the EU in 2021, an increase of 34% in comparison to 2020, but 10% less than in 2019, before COVID [3].

A significant share of applicants come from visa-free countries (15% of first-time applicants in 2021, down from 25% in 2020 because of less applicants from Latin America) who enter the EU legally, mostly from: Venezuela (2.8% of all first-time applications); Georgia (2.3%); Colombia (2.2%); Albania (1.8%); Moldova (1.2%). In 2021 Most first-time applications were lodged in: Germany (148,200); France (103,800); Spain (62,100); Italy (45,200); Austria (37,800).

Looking at the period between January and July, in 2022 there was an increase in crossings on the Central Mediterranean (+42%, 41,500), the Eastern Mediterranean (+122%, 21,500) and the Western Mediterranean routes (+1%, 16,400) compared to the same period in 2021 [4].

Between January and July 2022, there was a decrease in crossings on the Eastern borders route (-21%, 3,300) compared to the same period in 2021. 33% decrease of deaths at sea: 1,533 persons were reported dead or missing in January-August 2022 on the three main routes, compared to 2,278 in the same period of 2021.

Ukraine in 2022. The humanitarian situation in Ukraine has deteriorated rapidly following the launch of the Russian Federation military invasion on 24 February 2022, resulting in mass movement of the civilian population throughout the country and to neighbouring countries. Prior to the Russian Federation invasion, some 2.9 million people were already in need of humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas in Ukraine (OCHA, 2022) [5].

As of 24 August 2022, almost 18 million people (40% of Ukraine's population) are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2022B). More than 7.4 million refugees from Ukraine have been recorded across Europe between 24 February

and 22 September 2022 (UNHCR, 2022). An estimated 6.9 million persons are internally displaced within Ukraine, as of 23 August 2022 (IOM, 2022).

Previous representative assessments of the general population found that there were an estimated 5.9 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 5 December 2022 (IOM, 2022a); 6.54 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 26 October 2022 (IOM, 2022b); 6.97 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 23 August 2022 (IOM, 2022d); 6.64 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 23 July 2022 (IOM, 2022e); 8 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 3 May 2022 (IOM, 2022h); 6.48 million IDPs within Ukraine as of 16 March 2022 (IOM, 2022k) [6].

The EU agrees to sweeping immigration reforms. The reform provides for stricter procedures. Migrants are to be housed in detention-like conditions — with no exceptions for families with children. A mandatory solidarity mechanism between member states is also set to ease the burden on border countries. It dictates that if a member state refuses to accept asylum-seekers, it must make up for this refusal with financial compensation or other contributions.

The EU reached a migration agreement with Tunisia in 2023. In exchange for over €1 billion in financial aid, the country would prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean for Europe. The agreement has yet to yield any significant results. Meanwhile, relations have reached a standstill, when in October Tunisian President Kais Saied rejected a multimillion-euro payment from the EU as a “handout” [7].

Migration diplomacy will become even more important in 2024. The Tunisia deal isn’t the EU’s first attempt to motivate third countries to keep migrants out of Europe. Similar agreements had already been reached with Turkey and Libya, and another such deal is in the works with Egypt.

Unofficially, it’s said in Brussels that an asylum policy agreement was needed to slow the rise of right-wing populists. European parliamentary elections are due to take place in June, and migration has often played a major political role in many member state polls — most recently in the Netherlands, where

far-right lawmaker Geert Wilders' anti-Islam, anti-immigration Party for Freedom emerged victorious.

However, experts are skeptical that the new asylum rules can help to make the issue less explosive, because the reality is that migration will continue [7].

The European Union initiatives. The European Union has also launched an initiative to fund support for those fleeing Ukraine. On March 8th, the Commission adopted the Cohesion Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE), which consists of emergency support to be used to address the demands that may arise from the new refugee inflows such as temporary accommodation, food, medical care and water supply. On 23 March, the European Commission OUTLINED ACTIONS to support member states in meeting the needs of those fleeing the war in Ukraine, including special protection for children, access to education, access to healthcare, access to jobs and access to accommodation and housing (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2022) [8].

Conclusions. It is true that this crisis led to innovations in migration policy, such as an expansion of the capacities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (also known as Frontex), the body charged with supporting the policing of external borders, and those of the European Union Agency for Asylum, an agency aimed at helping and coordinating member states' asylum policies. Moreover, the EU became more active on the external dimension of migration policy.

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LECTURE 8

EU Security and Hybrid Threats

Thomas Huber found that hybrid warfare was just an extension of compound warfare, which mixes regular and irregular force – hybrid warfare providing simply new tools such as terrorism. Hybrid warfare is a theory of military strategy, first proposed by Frank Hoffman, which employs political warfare and blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare and foreign electoral intervention [1, p. 4]. The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics

and practitioners due to its disputed constitutive elements, and its alleged historical distortions.

General George Casey, former Chief of Staff of the US Army, insisted that a key component of a hybrid threat is its “decentralisation”. The US military doctrine defines a hybrid threat as dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities adapting to counter traditional advantages – meaning those held by the West [1, p. 4].

British military doctrine, in contrast, follows Huber’s definition, and captures hybrid warfare as an aspect of irregular warfare.

Some argue that the hybrid concept is not something unique at strategic and operational levels but only at tactical level. Others argue that hybrid warfare plays simultaneously at a strategic and a tactical level because the blending of conventional, unconventional, criminal, and terrorist means compresses the levels of war thereby accelerating tempo – and gaining a more or less concrete strategic advantage.

Still others hold that hybrid organisations rely on inherently defensive type operations – whereas NATO emphasises the offensive use of hybrid warfare, especially by Russia. One could easily argue that Russian operations can be defensive-offensive, the first aspect at strategic level (defending a geostrategic space) and the second at tactical-operational level.

So the hybrid concept expanded significantly over time: it is no longer limited to a specific portion of the capability spectrum between irregular and conventional warfare, but now it embraces any aspect related to the increasing complexity of modern conflicts – including terrorism, economic warfare, mass migration, organised crime and so on.

This galaxy of definitions and interpretations spurred Élie Tenenbaum to conclude that “hybrid warfare” was “an originally sound concept whose meaning has been diluted to the point of absurdity.” At the same time, many authors noted that the very idea of mixing various means of fighting at the same time is not as new as it seemed when the term “hybrid” was coined.

Secondly, hybrid warfare has a new outlook – and again, is perceived by the West as more threatening than it was in the past – because of the unprecedented impact of new forms of technology [1, p. 6].

Hybrid warfare is warfare which includes the following aspects: A non-standard, complex, and fluid adversary. A hybrid adversary can be state or non-state. For example, in the Israel–Hezbollah War of 2006/2023 and the Syrian Civil War, the main adversaries are non-state entities within the state system [2].

The non-state actors can have independent agendas as well. For example, Iran is a sponsor of Hezbollah, but it was Hezbollah's agenda that resulted in the kidnapping of Israeli militaries that led to the Israel–Hezbollah War. On the other hand, Russian involvement in Ukraine (pre-2022) can be described as a traditional state actor waging a hybrid war although Russia denies involvement in the 2014 Ukraine conflict.

Methods and tactics may include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, irregular formations, diplomacy, politics, terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence, and criminal activity. A hybrid adversary may also use clandestine actions. A current example is the Islamic State's transnational aspirations, blended tactics and cruel use of terrorism as part of its arsenal.

Use of mass communication for propaganda. The growth of mass communication networks offers powerful propaganda and recruiting tools. The use of fake-news websites to spread false stories is a possible element of hybrid warfare. Three distinct battlefields. They are the conventional battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone = conflict zone indigenous population, and the international community.

Another change brought about by technology is the new window of opportunity hybrid actors have of doing the greatest possible harm to opponents and their societies while at the same time leaving a probability to remain, if not anonymous, at least not easily identifiable – thus receiving less punishment or escaping punishment altogether.

Consider the absence of any laws prohibiting cybercrime in some countries, the complete lack of control over biological or chemical agents in others, and the entire collapse of domestic law and order in others [1, p. 7].

More importantly, the hybridity of a conflict lies not only in the exploitation of all available tools simultaneously, but also in the way they are combined at the various levels of warfare. And finally, a major distinction between current and past hybrid wars is that the various tools that are used in a hybrid conflict can be more easily managed by a single commander – the overall direction is facilitated by the use of modern technologies.

The war between Georgia and Russia. In August 2008, the war between Georgia and Russia broke out. Along with the conventional conflict, Georgia experienced massive cyber-attacks against its government, banking services and media websites. The strategy evolved into General Valery Gerasimov's 2014 doctrine of "non-linear war", that focused on the previous experiences of the US "coloured revolutions" and inspired the Russian campaign in Ukraine the following year [3].

Russian activities in the 2010s. The Russian government's wide use in conflicts, the Syrian Civil War and the Russo-Ukrainian War, of private military contractors (the Wagner Group) was in 2018 singled out by experts as a key part of Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare to advance its interests. Specifically, Russia employed a combination of traditional combat warfare, economic influence, cyber strategies, and disinformation attacks against Ukraine. General Philip Breedlove, in February 2016, claimed that Russia is using refugees to weaken Europe and is directing the influx of refugees to destabilize areas and regions to create social unrest [1, p. 4].

Poland and the Baltic states have accused Belarus of conducting hybrid warfare against the European Union by organizing illegal border crossings with migrants into Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with the aim of destabilizing the 27-nation bloc [2].

The Russian world.

At the beginning of the XXI c. the RF, strengthening its military potential and the Putin authoritarian regime of power was trying to influence international relations and the formation of the foundations of the modern world order. The political matrix in implementing its plans in the post-Soviet space has become an ideologeme of the “Russian world”, which is a symbiosis of the modernized Soviet formula of “fraternal East Slavic peoples”, which reinforces hierarchical superiority of the Russian people as “elder brother”.

According to Panarin, such a war rages between the Third Rome (Russia) and the Third Carthage (western world), which clearly corresponds with the geopolitical vision. Colour revolutions (instigated by USA), constitute a significant threat for the Russian world order, and ought to be opposed internationally. They pose a significant threat to the “Russian World” – the area of the Orthodox, encompassing countries having the same, Russian, cultural and civilisational core. According to Aleksandr Dugin, the Russian World constitutes the only alternative civilization / space offering a counterbalance for the “American World” [2].

Conclusions. Understanding the nature of hybrid warfare is important because its emergence in today’s security scenario is a symptom of a major change in international governance and the future of war and organised violence. The new technologies tend to create a world of many-to-many threats, a world in which every individual, group, or state may regard every other individual, group, or state as at least a potential security risk.

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LECTURE 9

Hybrid warfare vs information warfare vs information confrontation

Hybrid war – military actions carried out by combining military, quasi-military, diplomatic, informational, economic and other means in order to achieve strategic political goals [1].

Military aggression in the East of Ukraine and the Crimea; Full-fledged war against Ukraine in 2022; shelling of peaceful settlements, hospitals and schools in Syria; targeted direction of refugee flows to Europe, in particular to Germany; a series of terrorist bombings in France; interference of Russian special services in election processes in many countries and even in the USA.

Forms of information confrontation. Political, diplomatic and economic actions; information & psychological operations; support & overall assistance in political & cultural life for breaking of national and state foundations of society; intrusion in state management system.

Levels of information confrontation:

Information expansion;

Information aggression;

Information warfare [2, p.83].

Information expansion – activity for pursuing interests by means of non-conflict interference in information space of another state. Scholars distinguish physical, information and virtual spaces of people. Virtual – arts, culture, ideology, denomination etc. Expansion occurs in information and virtual spaces.

Stages of forced transformation of the information landscape of Crimea:

capture of the media and forceful interference in the activities of the media and journalists (February-March 2014); forced transfer of Ukrainian mass media to the Russian legislative field, repression against journalists (2014-2015); pressure on public journalists and the local population of Crimea (2015-2021). During the occupation, about 70,000 people left Crimea, and more than 700,000 civilians and soldiers moved there from Russia. Since 2014, more than 5,000 human rights violations have been recorded on the peninsula, mostly involving Crimean Tatars. According to human rights activists, after 2014, Crimea has become “a model of Russian colonization activities.” Yevhen Bondarenko, head of the Information Support Department of the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, suggests that the period of cognitive deoccupation of Crimea may take 10 to 20 years [3].

Methods of information expansion:

- 1) a gradual and imperceptible change in the system of social relations by the model of system of the source of expansion;
- 2) superseding provisions of national ideology and system of values & substitution of their own values and ideological attitudes;
- 3) increasing of influence and control over strategic information resources, information-communication structure and national mass media (in 2001, a Russian media center was opened in Kyiv; until 2014, Russian newspapers were sold, Russian channels were broadcasted all over Ukraine);
- 4) influence increase of alien mass media in the information sphere of the object under control.

The aggressive information campaign of the Russian media, constant provocations by the preparation of rocket attacks, the destruction that the Ukrainian army allegedly carries out, affect the emotional state of people in constant stress and oppression, which contributes to even greater destabilization [4, p.43].

The Times: Operation Troy - Russia's blueprint for spreading chaos in Ukraine. The Times published news about the «Troy operation: Russian plan to spread chaos in Ukraine». The author of the article, Tom Parfitt, reports on the secret “Troy” plan, which was sent to the Kremlin in November 2014 by the former member of the Russian Duma from Putin’s United Russia party, Oleksiy Muratov, who was later appointed Putin’s representative to the Donetsk separatists. Plans included names of Russian insurgents’ leaders, preparation of insurrection in Zaporizhia. A new report based on the leaked emails of a deputy to Vladislav Surkov, the influential Kremlin aide who some call Putin’s Rasputin, reveals a strategy to prepare the people of Zaporizhia region in eastern Ukraine for a pro-Russian takeover.

Later cracked by a team of hackers, the code protected document outlined the plan titled “Troy”, allegedly drawn by Alexei Muratov (MP from Kursk region bordering Ukraine and “envoy to Russia of the unrecognized “Donetsk People’s Republic”) who had sent his plan to a Kremlin official in November 2014, according to The Times [5].

Allocated costs included \$40,000 to organize protests, \$10,000 to maintain a network of agents in the SBU and interior ministry and \$49,000 to be spent on vehicles. The document was part of a third tranche of emails revealed by a network of Ukrainian hackers last November, after two releases in 2016, and studied in depth by Mr Seely. The Kremlin has dismissed material released by the group as fabricated, although some people who sent messages to Surkov that were exposed have said they were genuine.

If genuine, the hacked emails demonstrate an extensive attempt to massage politics in Ukraine in favor of the Kremlin, sowing division and promoting autonomy for regions with

significant Russian-speaking populations as a means of eroding central government control. Such methods were allegedly used in parallel with Moscow's direct military intervention in the Donbas conflict in eastern Ukraine [6].

Major state sources of info spreading: TV RT (Russia Today) embraces audience of about 700 mln. people all around the world; Platform of digital media Sputnik News; Russia Beyond the Headlines – online portal along with leading papers and magazines.

Internet trolls.

Conclusions. Hybrid warfare is a very popular term, created to describe a new version of warfare. Hybrid warfare has a significant relevance today – and is perceived by the West as more threatening than it was in the past. The global security landscape has itself become hybrid. This is an undesired effect of globalisation.

Understanding the nature of hybrid warfare is important because its emergence is a symptom of a major change in international governance and the future of war. The new technologies tend to create a world of many-to-many threats, a world in which every individual, group, or state may regard every other individual, group, or state as at least a potential security risk.

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LECTURE 10

EU-NATO and European security

NATO is also facing significant challenges in relation to the conflict in Syria, where different member states are pursuing different and even conflicting strategies. Moreover, the latent dispute over transatlantic burden-sharing is serious in times of scarce resources (Trump threats re NATO) [1, p.11].

The Ukraine crisis has triggered political concerns among member states over Russia's role and has revealed the fact that their national interests suffer severely from the confrontation between Russia and the West. Particularly in the context of the current crisis, Russia's allies are emphasizing their multi-vector foreign and security policies and seeking to expand their relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions to balance their relations with Russia Zellner Wolfgang [1, p.12].

At the same time, Russia's involvement in the Ukraine crisis has raised concerns in the West, especially among Russia's neighbors, that Moscow is pursuing a revisionist policy that seeks to revise the post-Cold War European order. This has moved Russia's neighbors, which have recently become members of the EU and NATO, to seek credible reassurances from the Alliance and to move towards a deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.

The Russian-Western disputes are only one part of the larger problems that plague the OSCE space. Patiently overcoming these divisions and shaping cooperation between Russia and the West serves the interests of all OSCE states and that failure to cooperate will make appropriate adjustments to the current challenges of an increasingly hard mission. For achieving sustainable and pragmatic cooperation in the OSCE space, dialogue is indispensable [1, p.12].

Efforts to deepen EU-NATO cooperation had intensified since 2014 due to changes in Europe's strategic environment. Russia's hybrid aggression against Ukraine showed that the lines between civilian and military threats blur. The combination of terrorism and migration demonstrated that internal and external threats are now much harder to delineate. These changes in the strategic environment showed that NATO needs the EU if it seeks to tackle complex security challenges below the threshold of Article 5.

On 10 July 2018, the leaders of the two organisations renewed their commitment to EU-NATO cooperation in another Joint Declaration. They stressed the need to deepen cooperation based on the existing proposals and to focus on implementation with "swift and demonstrable progress". While the Communiqué of the 2016 Warsaw Summit only mentioned efforts to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation in passing, the 2018 final document welcomes the EU's defence efforts as contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing and supporting "an overall increase in defence spending".

In November 2016, the Commission presented the European Defence Action Plan foreseeing the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF). The Fund is supposed to foster more joint defence research, capability development and procurement. For 2021-27, the Commission proposed providing €4.1bn for joint

defence research and €8.9bn to co-finance (20%) the collaborative development. In May 2017, the Council established the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to foster the synchronisation and adaptation of national defence planning cycles. It should help identify collaboration opportunities to address the joint military capability gaps listed by the EU's Capability Development Plan and inform PESCO and EDF projects [2, p.10].

Four key areas of implementation.

Military mobility:

One of the key deliverables of EU-NATO cooperation that illustrates the potential for synergy is cooperation on military mobility.

In autumn 2017, former US NATO General Ben Hodges had called for a 'military Schengen zone' in order to lower logistical and regulatory barriers to moving heavy military equipment or hazardous substances across Europe's borders in case of crisis.

The proposal was taken up by the Dutch, which are now leading the PESCO project on military mobility [2, p.10].

Coordinated exercises.

Joint EU-NATO exercises continue to be blocked by the Turkey-Cyprus issue. However, cooperation has intensified in terms of parallel and coordinated exercises (PACE) and mutual invitations. Every year, one organisation takes the lead in preparing the PACE scenario. NATO staff is participating in EU planning meetings and workshops and includes elements of the EU scenario on its own. In 2017, the EU participated, for the first time, as full participant rather than observer, in NATO's Cyber Coalition exercise in Estonia. In early 2018, NATO sent observers to the EU's maritime exercise MILEX 18 in Spain [2, p.10].

Maritime operational cooperation.

In light of the migratory crisis, the EU and NATO have engaged in new forms of operational cooperation in the maritime domain. Since 2016, NATO Operation Sea Guardian has provided the

EU's naval anti-smuggling operation EUNAVFOR Sophia in the Southern Central Mediterranean with logistical support including refuelling. NATO also deployed its Standing Maritime Group 2 in 2016 to support Greece, Turkey and the EU's border management agency Frontex with reconnaissance and surveillance in the Aegean Sea.

These new forms of operational cooperation rely on informal civil-military information-sharing mechanisms including liaison arrangements between NATO and Frontex and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction in the Mediterranean forum (SHADE MED). However, the inability to share classified material remains a key obstacle. In its 2017 report on EU-NATO cooperation, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly stated that there are still "significant gaps in maritime surveillance coordination". As the EU still lacks capacities in maritime Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR), there are important deficiencies in situational awareness [2, p.10].

NATO's reaction to Russia's invasion. NATO's reaction to Russia's invasion in 2022 prioritized internal security. Each official statement in winter-spring 2022 underlined the defensive nature of NATO, and each of NATO's actions was aimed at increasing its military presence at the borders. This response contradicted the previous vision when partners' security played a role in a holistic, 360-degree security approach. The new NATO Strategic Concept, presented in June 2022, did not provide adequate answers but only repeated the previous references to NATO cooperation with partners in different spheres, including countering hybrid threats, and the need to support partners in being more secure and resilient [3].

Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation. On the 10th of March 2023 a joint Declaration made by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the NATO: Russia's brutal war on Ukraine violates international law and the principles of the

UN Charter. It undermines European and global security & stability. NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its Allies and essential for Euro Atlantic security. We recognise the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. We will further strengthen our cooperation and expand and deepen our cooperation in the growing geostrategic competition, protection of critical infrastructures, technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference [4]. In signing this declaration, we will take the NATO-EU partnership forward in close consultation and cooperation with all NATO Allies and EU Member States, in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy of our respective organisations.

Conclusions. NATO and the EU face challenges, so their cooperation is more fruitful and efficient when the two above-mentioned organizations join efforts in order to find appropriate decisions for complicated issues. Their cooperation develops within time and proves the correctness of the chosen way.

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LECTURE 11

NATO-EU-Ukraine cooperation in combating security threats (including hybrid threats)

The security of Ukraine is of great importance to NATO and its member states. The Alliance fully supports Ukraine's inherent right to self-defence, and its right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine's future is in NATO. Relations between NATO and Ukraine date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantial of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas. Since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, NATO and Allies have provided unprecedented levels of support [1].

Evolution of NATO-Ukraine relations.

Dialogue and cooperation started when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994).

Relations were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, and further enhanced in 2009 with the Declaration to Complement the Charter, which reaffirmed the decision by NATO Leaders at the 2008 Bucharest

Summit that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. The 1997 Charter established the NATO-Ukraine Commission as the main body responsible for developing the NATO-Ukraine relationship and for directing cooperative activities. In 2023, the Commission was replaced by the NATO-Ukraine Council, where Allies and Ukraine sit as equals. This change demonstrates the strengthening of political ties and Ukraine's increasing integration with NATO. Cooperation has deepened over time and is mutually beneficial. Ukraine has a long track record of active contributions to NATO-led operations and missions [1].

Political and practical support for Ukraine.

NATO condemns Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. This aggression gravely undermines Euro-Atlantic and global security, and is a blatant violation of international law. NATO Allies, in concert with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly, demand that Russia stop the war immediately, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from Ukraine. The Allies do not and will never recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexations, including of Crimea. Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of its aggression in eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has reinforced its support for capability development and capacity-building in Ukraine, alongside Allied training of tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops.

Since the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO's practical support for Ukraine is set out in the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine. At the 2022 Madrid Summit, Allies strengthened the CAP to provide even more support to Ukraine. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, Allies agreed to further develop the CAP into a multi-year programme of assistance, to help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defence sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO.

NATO stands in unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land and our shared values. The Alliance fully supports Ukraine's

inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter [1].

Ukraine's membership aspirations.

In response to Ukraine's aspirations for NATO membership, Allies agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. They also agreed that Ukraine's next step on its way to membership was the Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO's programme of political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal reforms for aspirant countries. In 2009, the Annual National Programme was introduced as Ukraine's key instrument to advance its Euro-Atlantic integration and related reforms.

From 2010 to 2014, Ukraine pursued a non-alignment policy, which it terminated in response to Russia's aggression. In June 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted legislation reinstating membership in NATO as a strategic foreign and security policy objective. In 2019, a corresponding amendment to Ukraine's Constitution entered into force.

In September 2020, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved Ukraine's new National Security Strategy, which provides for the development of the distinctive partnership with NATO with the aim of membership in NATO. In September 2022, following Russia's illegal attempted annexations of Ukrainian territory, Ukraine reiterated its request for NATO membership.

The tragedy of 24 February 2022 has become a verdict for one of the core elements of European security architecture established after the Cold War – namely, that Ukraine was confined to a 'grey zone', sandwiched between an enlarged but increasingly risk-averse NATO and a resurgent Russia. This made Kyiv vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Major documents such as the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine (July 1997) or revamped US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership (November 2021) [2] proceeded from the assumption that the security of Ukraine is an indispensable element of a secure Europe. Alas,

those statements have been more declaratory rather than a guide to specific actions. After 24 February 2022, it has become starkly evident that without guarantees of Ukraine's long-term security there cannot be a secure and peaceful Europe. There is now a consensus among NATO members that Ukrainian security needs to be strengthened by concrete actions. Such consensus, among other things, has been fostered by the UK, in both the private and public sphere.

In addition to changed perceptions at the political level, the events after 24 February 2022 disproved some military arguments that were used to make a case against Ukraine's immediate accession to NATO. First and foremost, Ukraine made clear that if it is provided with enough weaponry, it can implement air and sea denial strategies and conduct effective defensive and offensive operations on land. In other words, there is no need to immediately place substantial NATO forces on Ukrainian territory to ensure the credibility of Article 5, despite claims made before the full-scale invasion. In the future, Ukraine – as a NATO member – could hypothetically implement a deterrence-by-denial strategy to win enough time for a NATO interservice grouping of forces to come and reclaim temporarily lost territories. There is therefore no need to station a permanent major NATO grouping of forces in Ukraine from Day 1 of the country's membership [3].

At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, Allies reaffirmed their commitment that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. Recognising Ukraine's increased interoperability and substantial progress with reforms, they decided that Ukraine's path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan. Allies will continue to support and review Ukraine's progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required on its path towards future membership. NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Programme. NATO will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met [1].

Response to Russia's war against Ukraine.

NATO condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's illegal, unjustifiable and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which gravely undermines Euro-Atlantic and global security and stability, and is a blatant violation of international law. NATO Allies, in concert with relevant resolutions of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, demand that Russia stop the war immediately, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from Ukraine.

Furthermore, NATO Allies call on Russia to fully respect international humanitarian law, and to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to all persons in need. There can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, such as attacks against civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, which deprives millions of Ukrainians of basic human services. All those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly against Ukraine's civilian population, including the forced deportation of children and conflict-related sexual violence.

Russia's war has also had a profound impact on the environment, nuclear safety, energy and food security, the global economy, and the welfare of billions of people around the world. Allies and Ukraine strongly condemn Russia's decision to withdraw from the Black Sea grain deal and its deliberate attempts to stop Ukraine's agricultural exports, on which hundreds of millions of people worldwide depend. Allies are working to revitalise the grain deal and to enable the continued exports of Ukrainian grain by land and sea, including in cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations.

NATO also condemns Russia's illegal attempt to annex four regions of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – in September 2022, which is the largest attempted land grab in Europe since the Second World War. The sham referenda in these regions were engineered in Moscow and imposed on Ukraine. They have no legitimacy, and NATO will not recognise them. These

lands are Ukraine and will always be Ukraine. The overwhelming vote in the United Nations General Assembly condemning Russia's attempted annexations sent a clear and strong message that Russia is isolated and that the world stands with Ukraine, in defence of the rules-based international order.

Since 2014, regular consultations have taken place in the NATO-Ukraine Commission in view of the direct threats faced by Ukraine to its territorial integrity, political independence and security. The Commission met for extraordinary meetings following Russia's aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, after Russia's unjustified use of military force against Ukrainian ships near the Kerch Strait in November 2018 and during Russia's threatening military build-up in April 2021. Other extraordinary meetings of the Commission took place at NATO Headquarters in January and February 2022, focused on Russia's military build-up and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Throughout the war, NATO and Ukraine continued to consult on the security situation and Allied support to Ukraine through the Commission. In July 2023, at the Vilnius Summit, the Commission was upgraded into the NATO-Ukraine Council, demonstrating the strengthening of political ties and Ukraine's increasing integration with NATO [1].

On 18 March 2024, the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council Strategic Communications Committee took place at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The Ukrainian side was represented by Deputy Minister of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko, and Director of the Department of Communications and Public Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Viktoriia Lialina-Boiko [4].

Taras Shevchenko briefed the participants of the meeting on the work in the field of information security and measures to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation. Particular attention was paid to the issue of communications with the population in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and mechanisms for the safe delivery of truthful and reliable information to fellow citizens under occupation.

NATO member states emphasised that the Alliance is particularly interested in learning from Ukraine's unique experience in conducting successful communications in times of war and views the newly established Committee as an effective tool for cooperation in this area [4].

Conclusions. Ukraine faces challenges countering Russian aggression not only in conventional, but also in information threats. Ukraine is the number one target of Russia's disinformation attacks though it has acquired significant experience in countering it. It is urgent to strengthen cooperation between Ukraine and NATO on countering disinformation.

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LECTURE 12 Russian aggression against Ukraine

Beginning in 2021, Russia built up a large military presence near its border with Ukraine, including within neighbouring Belarus. Russian officials repeatedly denied plans to attack

Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin expressed irredentist views and denied Ukraine's right to exist. He criticized the enlargement of NATO and demanded that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the military alliance. Russia recognized the DPR and LPR as independent states. On 24 February 2022, Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine, claiming Russia had no plans to occupy the country. The Russian invasion that followed was internationally condemned; many countries imposed sanctions against Russia and increased existing sanctions. In the face of fierce resistance, Russia abandoned an attempt to take Kyiv in early April. From August, Ukrainian forces began recapturing territories in the north-east and south. In late September, Russia declared the annexation of four partially-occupied regions, which was internationally condemned. Russia spent the winter conducting inconclusive offensives in the Donbas [1].

Feb. 17, 2024: Ukraine withdraws from Avdiivka. Ukrainian soldiers retreated from Avdiivka on Feb. 18 after months of fierce fighting resumed in October 2023. The city, located north of Russian-occupied Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, had been a Ukrainian stronghold for 10 years and a target of Russia's since 2014. Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said that the decision to withdraw was made to avoid encirclement and to preserve the lives of fighters, however, some of them were captured by Russian troops during the withdrawal [2].

In spring 2023, Russia dug into positions ahead of another Ukrainian counteroffensive, which failed to gain significant ground. The war has resulted in a refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths [1].

Russian military aggression against Ukraine has its own features. They are as follows:

Russia planned military aggression against Ukraine in advance. Victory of the revolution of dignity was only a convenient pretext. Russia launched its well-planned armed aggression against Ukraine on 20 February 2014 with the military

operation of its Armed Forces on seizing a part of the Ukrainian territory–Crimean Peninsula [3].

Russian aggression aimed at destroying Ukraine as an independent state. Illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol was just the first Russian step aimed at undermining independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. The Kremlin has always been firmly convinced that Russia will never become a world leader without control over Ukraine, meanwhile a democratic and prosperous Ukraine is a threat to the current authoritarian rule in Russia [3].

Military aggression is just one element of Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine. Military aggression is just one element of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine. Other elements encompass: 1) propaganda based on lies and falsifications; 2) trade and economic pressure; 3) energy blockade; 4) terror and intimidation of Ukrainian citizens; 5) cyber-attacks; 6) a strong denial of the very fact of war against Ukraine despite large scope of irrefutable evidence; 7) use of pro-Russian forces and satellite states in its own interests; 8) blaming the other side for its own crimes [3].

Courage of Ukrainians and the solidarity of the international community stopped the Russian invasion. Courageous Ukrainian soldiers, National Guard and other defense and law enforcement servicemen stopped the active phase of the Russian military invasion against Ukraine. On 27 March 2014 the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution 68/262 «Territorial Integrity of Ukraine» which confirmed the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine and the absence of any legal basis to change the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The same stance was confirmed by the UN General Assembly resolution 71/205 “Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)” of 19 December 2016 [3].

Russian aggression has led to dire humanitarian impacts.

Russian aggression against Ukraine has left about 9940 people killed and up to 23455 wounded (UN data). Economy of Donbas has been completely destroyed. Equipment of the main industrial facilities of Donbas was dismantled and transported to the territory of Russia. Situation with flooded mines threatens environmental disaster. Russian authorities do not allow access to experts for assessing the threats and seeking ways to mend the situation [3].

Russia violates the Minsk agreements on a regular basis. The Minsk Agreements (Protocol of 5 September 2014, Memorandum of 19 September 2014 and Package of measures of 12 February 2015) are a basis for political resolution of the conflict in Donbas. Debaltseve is one of the most telling examples of how Russia violates the Minsk Agreements [3].

By launching military aggression against Ukraine, Russia violated fundamental norms and principles of international law, bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Resorting to the military aggression against Ukraine, Russia violated fundamental norms and principles of international law, enshrined, in particular, in:

UN Charter (1945);

Helsinki Final Act (1975);

Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter (1970);

UN GA Resolution 3314 "Definition of Aggression" (1974);

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (1965);

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (1981);

Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations (1987).

Russia had also violated number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, namely:

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances related to the Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1994);

Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (1997);

Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian state border (2003);

Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on cooperation in use of the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait (2003);

Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine (1999).

Russian occupation and further attempted annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as Russian illegal actions in Donbas, fall under the definition of aggression according to the points a), b), c), d), e) i g) Art.3 of the Annex to UN General Assembly Resolution "Definition of Aggression" (3314(XXIX)). The following actions are a serious crime against international peace, which entails international responsibility of the Russian Federation at the state level and international criminal responsibility of its leadership [3].

Constant inflow of Russian troops and weaponry is the main obstacle to peace in Donbas. Russia continues to supply weapons, ammunition and fuel to the occupied territory through the uncontrolled section of the Ukrainian-Russian state border in order to strengthen the units of its regular troops, deployed in Donbas, as well as the illegal armed formations it backs. Russia refuses to fulfill its obligation under paragraph 4 of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 on the establishment of security zones in border areas of Ukraine and Russia with ensuring permanent border monitoring and verification by the OSCE.

Military aggression and hybrid warfare is Russia's standard practice. Russia's aggressive policy targets not only Ukraine. Russia violated territorial integrity of Moldova and

Georgia, announced its territorial claims and the willingness to “protect” the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States [3].

February 24, 2022 Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. At 5 in the morning, cities all over the country shook from explosions. Russian troops began the invasion in multiple directions in the Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Kyiv regions. Russian invaders took over Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant. February 24, 2022 Russia captured Zmiinyi Island (Snake Island) in the Black sea. Ukrainian border guards stationed there refused to surrender and gave a response that later became known worldwide instead: “Russian warship, go fuck yourself”. They were taken into Russian captivity [4].

The battle of Kyiv had begun. Despite Russia’s plans to take over the Ukrainian capital in three days, Ukrainian defenders resisted heroically and repelled the attack of Russian forces after a month of ruthless fighting.

April 2, 2022: Liberation of Kyiv Oblast. After more than a month of heavy fighting, Russia’s attempts to encircle Kyiv failed. Its troops retreated from the outskirts of the capital while Ukrainian flags were raised over Hostomel, Irpin, and other Kyiv suburbs. Ukraine’s victory was overshadowed by evidence of the horrific war crimes that the Russian army committed against civilians in the towns of Kyiv Oblast uncovered after liberation. Hundreds of residents of the Kyiv suburb of Bucha were found to have been tortured, raped, and executed [2].

April 14, 2022: Sinking of the Moskva. The Russian flagship Moskva, the pride of its fleet, sank in the Black Sea a day after Ukraine hit it with two domestically-produced Neptune anti-ship missiles. One of the most symbolic and expensive losses in the war, the sinking of the Moskva paved the way for the liberation of Snake Island, which helped to unblock shipping trade routes, and reduce threats of Russia’s attacks from the Black Sea, Ukraine’s military intelligence said.

Russian aggression can be stopped only by stepping up pressure on the Kremlin. Political and economic sanctions were

imposed on Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine, therefore, stopping Russian military aggression against Ukraine and the reinstatement of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity may be the only reason for their cancellation. In other circumstances, Russia will continue its aggression, extending it to other states in the region [3].

Conclusions. Russia's aggressive policy targets not only Ukraine, but also other neighboring countries. Russia poses threats for Europe and threatens NATO with nuclear war, so only decisive steps made by the USA and the EU will halt Russians from new aggression.

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LECTURE 13

Two years since Russia's full-scale invasion

Two years since Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine has recaptured 54 percent of occupied territory, while Russia still occupies 18 percent of the country. Ukraine's counteroffensive efforts have stalled, and Russia has fortified its defensive lines in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities and blockade its ports, and Ukraine has stepped up drone attacks on Russian ships and infrastructure. Since January 2022, Ukraine has received about \$278 billion in aid, including \$75 billion from the United States, though it warns of donor fatigue.

Background.

Armed conflict in eastern Ukraine erupted in early 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. The previous year, protests in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's decision to reject a deal for greater economic integration with the European Union (EU) were met with a violent crackdown by state security forces. The protests widened, escalating the conflict, and President Yanukovich fled the country in February 2014 [1].

In October 2021, months of intelligence gathering and observations of Russian troop movements, force build-up, and military contingency financing culminated in a White House briefing with U.S. intelligence, military, and diplomatic leaders on a near-certain mass-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In early February 2022, satellite imagery showed the largest deployment of Russian troops to its border with Belarus since the end of the Cold War. Negotiations between the United States, Russia, and European powers—including France and Germany—failed to bring about a resolution. In late February 2022, the United States warned that Russia intended to invade Ukraine, citing Russia's growing military presence at the Russia-Ukraine border. President Putin then ordered troops to Luhansk and

Donetsk, claiming the troops served a “peacekeeping” function. The United States responded by imposing sanctions on the regions and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline a few days later. Nevertheless, just prior to the invasion, U.S. and Ukrainian leaders remained at odds regarding the nature and likelihood of an armed Russian threat, with Ukrainian officials playing down the possibility of an incursion and delaying the mobilization of their troops and reserve forces [1].

On February 24, 2022, during a last-ditch UN Security Council effort to dissuade Russia from attacking Ukraine, Putin announced the beginning of a full-scale land, sea, and air invasion of Ukraine, targeting Ukrainian military assets and cities across the country. Putin claimed that the goal of the operation was to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and end the alleged genocide of Russians in Ukrainian territory. U.S. President Joe Biden declared the attack “unprovoked and unjustified” and issued severe sanctions against top Kremlin officials, including Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov; four of Russia’s largest banks; and the Russian oil and gas industry in coordination with European allies. On March 2, 141 of 193 UN member states voted to condemn Russia’s invasion in an emergency UN General Assembly session, demanding that Russia immediately withdraw from Ukraine [1].

The Russian seizure of several Ukrainian ports and subsequent blockade of Ukrainian food exports compounded an already acute global food crisis further exacerbated by climate change, inflation, and supply chain havoc. Prior to the conflict, Ukraine had been the largest supplier of commodities to the World Food Program (WFP), which provides food assistance to vulnerable populations. In July, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement to free more than twenty million tons of grain from Russian-controlled Ukrainian ports. The first grain shipments to leave Ukraine since the Russian invasion departed from Odesa on August 1, 2022; they arrived in Russian-allied Syria on August 15, although their originally presumed destination had been Lebanon. On October 29, Russia suspended the grain deal in response to an alleged Ukrainian attack on Russian naval forces, which Ukraine called a “false

pretext.” Nonetheless, Russia did not enforce the blockade when Ukraine defiantly continued shipments. Turkey quickly negotiated Russia’s return to the deal, which was consistently extended until July 17, 2023, when Russia quit the deal [1].

In September 2022, Ukrainian forces made strong advances in the northeast and mounted a revitalized southern counteroffensive. Ukraine retook significant territory in the Kharkiv region, surprising Russian forces and cutting off important supply lines at Lyman before stalling and settling into a new front line. Shortly after, in southern Ukraine, Russia hastily withdrew across the Dnipro River as Ukrainian forces retook the city of Kherson and all territory west of the river.

Recent Developments.

Following a winter stalemate, Putin announced plans in February to take all of Donbas by March 2023 in an offensive surge. However, the attack made little progress and devolved into a months-long siege of Bakhmut, a town of limited strategic value with a pre-war population of seventy thousand. The United States estimates Russia suffered one hundred thousand casualties in Bakhmut, including twenty thousand deaths. Ukraine also took heavy casualties in urban warfare. By late May, Russia claimed to have taken the city [1].

Since February 24, 2022, the United States has committed nearly forty billion dollars in assistance to Ukraine, including nineteen billion in immediate military aid and sixteen billion in humanitarian aid. Additionally, in early 2023 the Biden administration approved the provision of increasingly advanced weaponry, such as the Patriot air defense system, crucial for defending against Russian airstrikes, and top-tier battle tanks. The United States has also dramatically increased U.S. troop presence in Europe, bringing the total to more than one hundred thousand. While the United Nations, Group of Seven member states, EU, and others continue to condemn Russia’s actions and support Ukrainian forces, Russia has turned to countries like North Korea

and Iran for intelligence and military equipment and continues to sell discounted oil and gas to India and China, among others [1].

In November 2023, Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi said the war had reached a stalemate after Ukraine's failed counteroffensive. This assessment resulted in months of tensions between Zaluzhnyi and Zelenskyy over strategy and tactics. On February 8, Zelenskyy replaced Zaluzhnyi with General Oleksandr Syrsky, who led two successful counter offensives since the beginning of the invasion. Soon after his appointment, Syrsky ordered the withdrawal of troops from Avdiivka, a strategically important town in Donetsk, where fighting was ongoing for four months. He argued the retreat was necessary to avoid being encircled. The decision, however, handed Russia its most significant battlefield victory since the capture of Bakhmut in May 2023 [1].

The politics of conflict. But it isn't just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict. In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine becoming an increasingly partisan issue.

In early February, the Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill for Ukraine and Israel that would see US\$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill's fate in the House is unknown. And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, calling them "stupid," and has long argued that Americans shouldn't be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and threatened not to adhere to the alliance's commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia. And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load [2].

There are also migration issues connected with the war. European Union members have had to absorb the majority of

the 6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies.

The Russian war has taught Ukrainians a set of important though unwelcome lessons. At least, three of them.

1. The values and principles that have kept Europe and the western countries at peace after hundreds of years of constant wars are not shared by everyone. Russia sees itself as a separate civilization and explicitly rejects respect for human rights, international law, state borders and other countries' sovereignty as alien to it. "Russian borders do not end anywhere", President Putin claims.

2. Ukraine had spent 8 years trying to settle the conflict caused by Russian hybrid aggression in the Donbas. The process involved more than 200 negotiation rounds and 20 ceasefire agreements and still ended with the war. Western leaders including US President Biden, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel had many phone calls and meetings with the Russian President attempting to assuage his alleged security concerns as he was getting ready for the full-scale invasion. These efforts lead only to accusations and escalating demands, the last of them being the retreat of NATO to the 1997 borders. We are learning the hard way that Russia perceives the willingness to compromise as weakness and this only stimulates its appetites.

3. Russia's perceived exercise of restraint construed by some in the west as an intention to avoid further escalation is, in fact, Russia preserving its escalation options for future use. Russia saves the options to apply them at a more opportune moment. This was the case during the Minsk negotiations when Russia stepped up its military pressure to extract concessions from Ukraine when it saw fit. This was the case with the full-scale aggression launched at the time of a comedian becoming President of Ukraine and changes in the leadership of some key western countries. This was the case with the Black Sea Grain Initiative, when Russia withdrew from the Grain Deal and launched a series of attacks on the Ukrainian

port and grain storage facilities on the eve of the new harvest. In addition, Russia is showing no desire to stop and is clearly gearing up for another round of aggression [3].

The limits of the European and US defence industries and the need for adaptation. Military donations to Ukraine have drastically drained North American and European arsenals that were not fit for a large-scale, prolonged, attrition war mainly fought on the land domain. Therefore, stockpiles of ammunitions, armoured vehicles, anti-tank missiles, air and missile defence system – including man-portable air defence systems – and main battle tanks rapidly dwindled and subsequently de facto constrained the amount and timing of Western support to Ukraine [4, p. 65-75]. The European and, to a lesser extent, the US defence industries found it difficult to ramp up production for a variety of reasons, which has further limited the international support to Kyiv.

Two years after the beginning of the Russian invasion, Europe and the US find themselves deprived of much of their pre-2022 stockpiles of certain capabilities, and are unable to simultaneously replenish them and increase the pace or quantity of deliveries to Ukraine. Over the last two years, the US, Germany, France, Poland and other NATO members have begun to adjust their military budget and procurement to cope with the war implications, but such adaptation will be long, costly and hard to implement. Against this backdrop, a sober assessment of the available international support to Ukraine is necessary. At the end of the day, if Europe and the US are unable to provide Ukraine with what it needs for another counter-offensive, it is not sensible to plan for the latter [5].

There is a growing interdependence between European and international security.

The Ukraine war is an international conflict, not just a European one. Russia has secured supplies and support from Iran, North Korea, China and some of its post-Soviet neighbours, and

has looked to nonaligned countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia for diplomatic cover for its actions. Ukraine's transatlantic partners have forged ties with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and others over sanctions and weapons supplies, and have endeavoured to ensure that swing states, such as India and Turkey, are onside as much as possible. While major conflagrations in Europe in the 20th century drew in the rest of the world, reflecting Europe's then-centrality to global security, the Ukraine war has highlighted that economic, military-industrial, diplomatic and military power has diffused around the globe. Europe now needs the rest of the world to contain Russia effectively, but is currently struggling to achieve this. With the debate about how to manage the challenge posed by China rising rapidly in Europe, European states will increasingly have to redefine traditional ideas of European security to take account of wider security and military developments, notably in the Indo-Pacific [6].

In March 2022, the Strategic Compass was approved, which became the first EU plan of action in security and defense. One of the main ideas of the document is the establishment of the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops. Defense cooperation between the EU countries can strengthen the Alliance, and in the long term, transatlantic solidarity and cooperation with NATO in providing security guarantees and strengthening the defense capabilities of Europe. In turn, Ukraine, which already has one of the most combat-ready armies in Europe, even as a candidate for the EU, should take part in the initiatives.

The speedy integration of Ukraine into NATO will help strengthen security in the Eastern European region. Successful opposition to Russian troops leaves no chance for the complete occupation of Ukraine, as the next are Moldova, Poland and the Baltic countries. Thus, by providing security guarantees to Ukraine, the Alliance will simultaneously protect Eastern Europe from Russian aggression, which will help avoid new risks and threats to European stability. The communiqué of the NATO Madrid Summit notes that Ukraine is "vital" to maintaining the stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Ukraine's entry into NATO will be a

mutually beneficial solution for both sides, because Ukraine will be able to improve its defense capabilities, and other members of the Alliance will receive a reliable and well-armed ally who, in the event of repeated Russian attacks, will be able to quickly repel an enemy attack [7].

The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, 2022. Attacks by Russian forces were reported in major cities across Ukraine, including Berdyansk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, and the capital Kyiv. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified 10,582 deaths of civilians in Ukraine during the war as of February 2024. The war resulted in a humanitarian crisis, as thousands of Ukrainians were internally displaced or fled abroad. Neighboring Poland recorded the highest number of border crossings from Ukraine, at around 17.3 million as of December 2023, followed by Hungary, Romania, and Russia [8].

Ukraine's Security Role Enlarges.

Ironically, Ukraine, the country that, according to Russian president Vladimir Putin, does not actually exist, today has unquestionably assumed a robust role in Europe's security system while achieving a deeper integration with NATO and the EU than Russia could ever hope to. The creation of a NATO-Ukraine council could mean that NATO considers Ukraine a unique partner, one critical for the whole Alliance. It will be painful for Russia to realize that it has lost the battle for the hearts and minds of Ukrainians to NATO, even though Ukrainians under past administrations were divided over joining NATO and NATO was not particularly excited about Ukraine's NATO aspirations [9].

Ironically, Russian propaganda sought to present Ukraine as anti-Russia to justify the war. Now, because of the Russian invasion, the most fantastic of Moscow's prognoses has come true. Ukraine really is becoming anti-Russia insofar as its mission is to preserve its sovereignty and independence, and as a side effect to serve as a shield on Europe's eastern front. Moscow has been ceding its role in Euroatlantic policy even as Ukraine has increased its presence.

Russia will not fully lose its influence, but it has been significantly weakened: fear is the last source of its influence in the region.

From a broader perspective, according to the UK-based think tank RUSI, what is urgently needed is a redesign of Europe's security architecture that preserves a lesser – and conditional – role for Russia in a system with stronger guarantees of stability for the continent. And this task should not be NATO's alone [9].

Conclusions. Despite all the efforts of Russia to occupy Ukraine, it is still fighting back, standing strong in its efforts to be independent. The EU and NATO member-states support Ukraine. Ukraine's role in European security is growing.

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LECTURE 14

Information security and EU policy

EU institutions, bodies and agencies each have their own security rules for protecting sensitive information. This makes it hard to ensure that they protect and exchange such information in a similar way. This initiative aims to create strict common standards for the secure exchange of information. These will be mandatory and will apply to all EU institutions, bodies and agencies. Back in 2016, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Directive 5 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. This Directive was the first EU wide legislative measure meant to increase the cooperation between Member States on cybersecurity.

While the Commission has adopted in December 2020 a proposal for the review of this instrument, introducing supervisory measures for the national authorities, the Union administration remains outside its scope. In the same vein and to complement the efforts of Member States in the area of security, it is of paramount importance that the Union institutions and bodies achieve a high level of protection for their information and their related Information and Communication Systems with a view to safeguarding the information security. In July 2020,

the Commission adopted the Security Union Strategy 6, with a comprehensive commitment from the EU to complement Member States' efforts in all areas of security. This Strategy runs from 2020 to 2025 and outlines four main pillars of action: a future-proof security environment, tackling evolving threats, protecting Europeans from terrorism and organised crime and a strong European security ecosystem. Several of the topics addressed under these pillars focus on security of information, cybersecurity, cooperation and information exchange, and critical infrastructure.

In line with the Security Union Strategy, the European Commission proposes the creation of a minimum set of rules on information security across all the Union institutions and bodies, which will trigger mandatory and high common standards for the secure exchange of information. This initiative represents the engagement of the institutions and bodies to set within the European administration the same level of ambition in the field of security as required from the Member States. On 16 December 2020, the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a new EU Cybersecurity Strategy 7. It set out priorities and key actions to build up Europe's resilience, autonomy, leadership and operational capacity in the face of growing and complex threats to its network and information systems, and to advance a global and open cyberspace and its international partnerships thereof. It is equally important that the Union institutions and bodies contribute to the achievement of these priorities by establishing equivalent requirements in the field of both information security and cybersecurity [1, p. 2].

Consistency with other Union policies. This initiative also takes account of other Union policies that are relevant to information security. In the area of data protection and applicable to the European Union and European Atomic Energy Community ('Euratom') administration there is Regulation (EU) 2018/17258 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data. In the same line,

we need to mention that for some Union institutions and bodies the EU legislators have adopted specific relevant rules for the protection of personal data.

In the area of transparency, this proposal builds on the principles enshrined in the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, with respect to other relevant rules [1, p. 2].

Fundamental rights The EU is committed to ensuring high standards of protection of fundamental rights. This initiative ensures full compliance with the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union¹⁰, as follows:

- The right to good administration; By enhancing the security of information they handle when treating the affairs of European citizens, the Union institutions and bodies contribute to the achievement of the principle of good administration.
- Protection of personal data. All processing of personal data in the framework of this proposal would be conducted in trusted environments and in full respect of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
- Right of access to documents. Public access to EUCI and sensitive non-classified documents remains fully governed by Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
- Right to intellectual property [1, p. 6].

Information assurance and communication and information systems (Articles 9 to 11). The Regulation establishes a sub-group on information assurance with the objective of enhancing the coherence across the Union institutions and bodies between the information security rules and the cybersecurity baseline as defined by the Regulation laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union. The Union institutions and bodies are required to comply with the principles mentioned

under these articles and adopt separate internal rules for specific security measures, adjusted to their own security environment. Non-classified information (Articles 12 to 17 and Annex I) The Regulation provides for 3 categories of non-classified information: information for public use, normal information and sensitive non-classified information. All categories are defined, while markings and handling conditions are stipulated for protecting such information. With a view to coordinating the work on equivalence between particular categories established by some Union institutions and bodies and common categories provided by the Regulation, the proposal sets up a sub-group on non-classified information.

EN 9 EN EUCI (Articles 18 to 58 and Annexes II to VI). As the most voluminous of the proposal, this chapter is structured in seven sections, as follows: General provisions, Personnel security, Physical security, Management of EUCI, Protection in communication and information systems, Industrial security and Sharing EUCI and exchanging classified information. The section on general provisions provides for four levels of EUCI: TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET, SECRET UE/EU SECRET, CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL, RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED and provides for an obligation of Union institutions and bodies to take the necessary security measures in accordance with the results of an information security risk management process. Each of the remaining sections focus on the standards of EUCI protection, related to their specific area. The details for this protection of EUCI are specified in the Annexes II to V. Annex VI provides for the table of equivalence of EUCI with the security classifications of Member States and European Atomic Energy Community. With the aim to streamline the relevant processes in the field and to avoid duplication of effort, the Regulation sets up sub-groups on information assurance, on non-classified information, on physical security, on accreditation of communication and information systems handling and storing EUCI and on EUCI sharing and exchange of classified information [1, p.8-9].

The European Cyber Defence Policy. On 18 November 2014, the European Council adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. It was prepared pursuant to earlier European Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013 and the Council Conclusions on CSDP of November 2013.

Cyberspace is the fifth domain of operations, alongside the domains of land, sea, air, and space: the successful implementation of EU missions and operations is increasingly dependent on uninterrupted access to a secure cyberspace, and thus requires robust and resilient cyber operational capabilities. The objective of the updated CDPF is to further develop EU cyber defence policy by taking into account relevant developments in other relevant fora and policy areas and the implementation of the CDPF since 2014. The CDPF identifies priority areas for cyber defence and clarifies the roles of the different European actors, whilst fully respecting the responsibilities and competences of Union actors and the Member States as well as the institutional framework of the EU and its decision-making autonomy [2].

The updated EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) endorsed by the EDA Steering Board in June 2018 identifies cyber defence as a key element, recognising the need for defensive cyber operations in any operational context, based on sophisticated current and predictive cyberspace situational awareness, including the ability to combine large amounts of data and intelligence from numerous sources in support of rapid decision making and increased automation of the data gathering, analysis and decision-support process. The CDP 2018 identifies cyber defence capability priorities in the following areas: cooperation and synergies with relevant actors across cyber defence and cybersecurity areas; cyber defence research and technology activities; systems engineering frameworks for cyber operations; education, training, exercises and evaluation (ETEE); addressing cyber defence challenges in Air, Space, Maritime and Land [2].

Six priority areas have been identified in the updated CDPF. A primary focus of this policy framework is the development of

cyber defence capabilities, as well as the protection of the EU CSDP communication and information networks. Other priority areas include: training and exercises, research and technology, civil-military cooperation and international cooperation.

In the area of training, emphasis is given to the upscaling of Member States' cyber defence training and of cyber awareness training of the CSDP chain of command. It is also important that the cyber dimension is adequately addressed in exercises in order to improve the EU's ability to react to cyber and hybrid crises by improving decision-making procedures and availability of information.

Cyberspace is a rapidly developing domain and new technological developments need to be supported, both in the civilian and military domains. Civil-military cooperation in the cyber field is key to ensure a coherent response to cyber threats. Last, but not least, enhancing cooperation with international partners could help enhance cybersecurity within the EU and beyond, and to promote EU principles and values [2].

What is the GDPR? Europe's new data privacy and security law includes hundreds of pages' worth of new requirements for organizations around the world. This GDPR overview will help you understand the law and determine what parts of it apply to you. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the toughest privacy and security law in the world. Though it was drafted and passed by the European Union (EU), it imposes obligations onto organizations anywhere, so long as they target or collect data related to people in the EU. The regulation was put into effect on May 25, 2018. The GDPR will levy harsh fines against those who violate its privacy and security standards, with penalties reaching into the tens of millions of euros [3].

With the GDPR, Europe is signaling its firm stance on data privacy and security at a time when more people are entrusting their personal data with cloud services and breaches are a daily occurrence. The regulation itself is large, far-reaching, and fairly light on specifics, making GDPR compliance a daunting prospect, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) [3].

Conclusions. The European Council adopted the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework and made regular steps to counter cyber threats. Information security is an urgent need and a priority goal nowadays.

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LECTURE 15

EU-NATO and the Eastern Partnership Countries

The main aims of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Since its launch in 2009, the EaP has reflected the EU's desire to exert normative influence on its neighbors in order to spread common European values and norms, e. g., democratic institutions, the rule of law, good governance, etc. The EU's transformation aspirations stemmed from its experience of enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007. For post-communist Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 21st century, the EU's model had a magnetic power that led candidate countries to dramatic transformations, which the EU used successfully to stabilize the states of the former Yugoslavia [1, p. 130]. Moreover, this formula of transformative influence later became the basis of the European Neighborhood Policy, launched in 2003-2004, and the EaP as its eastern regional dimension since 2009. The main

aim of this model was to influence the behavior of the countries which wanted something from the EU.

The EaP has paved the way for the gradual and partial integration of partner countries with the EU, based on their progress with internal reforms. The innovation of its bilateral dimension was that all eastern neighbors got opportunities for the development of the relations, like those that the EU previously offered to Ukraine, i. e., Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, visa liberalization, integrated institutional development programs, etc. [2]. The instruments provided by the multilateral dimension, e. g., a summit, Council of Ministers, thematic platforms, working panels, flagship initiatives, Civil Society Forum, Euronest etc.) have become entirely new for the region [2]. The EaP aims to promote transformation processes in its member countries in order to spread EU norms and values, such as commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights, good governance, approximation of national legislation to the rules of the EU single market.

The results of this policy. After a brief presentation of the content and mechanisms of the initiative, it is sensible to analyze the real results of this policy. Despite the significant deepening of political and economic cooperation, i. e., the signing of the Association Agreements with three (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) of six partners in 2014, the launch of the EaP did not achieve the stated goals, especially in terms of its transformative impact [3]. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have made progress in ensuring free elections, developing many elements of civil society, and implementing European norms and standards in a number of areas, but the proper implementation of these norms and ensuring sustainability and irreversibility of change remain a challenge. Most of the problems that hinder effective reforms are systemic corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, and inefficient state institutions in partner countries.

For all states, including the EU's associate partners, there remain the same threatening problems, e. g., to fight against

corruption, ensure judicial independence and the rule of law, stop excessive state monitoring of the activities of non-governmental organizations, etc. Even the legal approximation of associate partners' legislation to the single market rules required by the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area parts of the Association Agreements has proved to be more difficult than expected due to the lack of funding needed to mitigate the inevitable costs [4].

On the other hand, the EU's desire to expand its economic and political influence in the region through the signing of Association Agreements and establishing the free trade zones has met resistance from Russia, which has seen such policies as interfering in its traditional sphere of influence. This situation has created new dividing lines as partner countries had to choose between two integration projects and centers of power. Thus, the EaP has also failed to ensure stability and security in the region, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict clearly illustrates it.

Thus, the EaP, as a regional branch of the European Neighborhood Policy, was launched as a tool to promote the transformation of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. However, its initiators did not consider the limitations of the EU's transformative power without the prospect of membership, significant internal obstacles to reforms in partner countries, the geopolitical situation in the region, and the power of Russian influence. The EU's inability to offer strong incentives to deliver real democratic reforms in partner countries, as well as the lack of effective geopolitical levers to counter Russia's presence in the region, have weakened the EU's approach. The tendency towards geopoliticization of the EaP, which can be traced back to the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is inevitable.

The NATO's strategy. The NATO's strategy in the post-bipolar era has not been entirely flawless. The policy of pretending that Ukraine and Georgia were on the path to membership in the Alliance when in fact they remained "suspended" after the 2008 Bucharest Summit was at least the losing approach if not a strategic mistake. The war in Ukraine is a painful result of Putin's

reaction to the NATO's Bucharest mistake. In our opinion, the declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join it, which some realists characterise as the worst possible solution, was not a fault. The mistake was that the Alliance did not implement this declaration immediately and did not start the process immediately by establishing safeguards (similar to those recently announced by the United Kingdom and the United States for Sweden and Finland at the time of their application for the NATO membership). Considering Putin's view of the NATO enlargement as a threat to Russia, this period of uncertainty provided him with an incentive, as well as an opportunity, to wage a preemptive war. The erroneous decision of the 2008 Bucharest Summit (not because Ukraine and Georgia were promised membership, but because they did not go far enough to specify when and how) was far from being resolved, left everyone dissatisfied and showed Putin that the West was hesitant, so there was an open window of opportunity to change the situation in his favor as long as these countries did not have a NATO "insurance policy".

Conclusions. In any case, today there is no alternative to reaffirming the NATO's traditional open-door policy, as the NATO officials have repeatedly confirmed since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, under the current conditions – until the end of the war – it is impossible to accelerate Ukraine's membership in the NATO. It is also clear that there will be no Allied troops entering Ukraine, no-fly zone or no persecution of Russian troops if the Ukrainians manage to expel them to their territory. Such actions pose serious escalation risks that the NATO seeks to avoid. However, at the same time, the Alliance will make every effort (to increase the supply of weapons to Ukraine, ammunition, intelligence data, military training) to prevent Moscow's victory in this conflict, not only for Ukraine's sake or because it would be immoral, but also because other option would be destabilizing in terms of Europe's future. Russia's war against Ukraine tragically demonstrates that a peaceful and

secure Europe depends as much on the stability of smaller states as it does on agreements between great powers.

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LECTURE 16
The increasingly strained relationship
between the EU and Russia

The Russian factor in Eastern Europe. A significant obstacle for the EU in terms of rapprochement with the EaP countries is the Russian factor, the importance of which the EU seems to have initially underestimated. The format of the EaP was deliberately aimed at shifting the main focus of the dialogue with neighboring countries from political issues related to the prospect of membership in the EU to the issues of gradual rapprochement and integration in certain practical sectors [1]. Russia, however, being hostile from the beginning, started looking for ways to stop the possible European drift of the common neighborhood countries (this is indicated by the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union

in 2015). The EU does not seem to have taken account of Russia's geopolitical concerns about its initiative and the strong leverage it has in the region.

Back then, the EU sought to avoid rivalry with Russia, which can be illustrated by the eloquent opinion of Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service Pierre Vimont on Brussels' strategies in the eastern neighborhood: "Hence there is a permanent weakness in most of the strategies developed by the European Union's institutions, lying precisely in the fact that they are not real strategies, since there is no significant geopolitical analysis. Therefore the Eastern Partnership carefully avoids the issue of relations with Russia... Procedures are put forward (association agreement monitoring), principles are delivered (differentiation), instruments are developed (simplified action plans), but all of this provides the feeling of a political and strategic vacuum from which all power dynamics, antagonisms, and lines of division between nations have been sucked out" [2, p. 143].

Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The movement towards closer ties between the EU and some partner countries, i. e., preparation of Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, has provoked resistance and opposition from Russia, so the region has become an arena for clashes between the two centers of power. The Russia-Ukraine conflict pertains to Ukraine's place in the continental system, as well as whether it will ever become a member of the EU. In 2013, the choice between the two centers of gravity was of the highest political importance for Ukraine. Just before the scheduled date for the signing of the Association Agreement at the EaP summit in Vilnius, the European normative power failed to attract Ukraine into its sphere. The power of opposition used by Moscow was too strong. The Kremlin played a geopolitical game, and the EU, remaining only a normative power and maintaining its geopolitical virtue, had nothing to oppose it [2, p. 143-144].

Geopolitical awakening of the EU. With the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the need to supplement the European normative power in the eastern neighborhood with a policy of broader tools, e. g., sanctions, rhetoric, and actions, has become obvious. For the European Union, this conflict has become one of the main factors in its geopolitical awakening and first steps towards clearer awareness of its own interests as political unity and its ability to defend them. Confrontation with the most serious opponent on the European continent led to the fact that the EU's political base outweighed economic interests, and the EU as a regulatory power had to recognize its existence as a geopolitical power capable of active diplomacy and pressure. Despite significant differences between the governments of individual European states on the issue of sanctions against Russia, their introduction and consistent continuation testifies to the unanimity of the view of the EU states on the fundamental nature of the threat and the strategic importance of a united front.

In recent decades, the strategy of the EU's eastern policy, i. e., not to create problems in relations with Russia, has appeared unsuccessful. Despite the EU's reluctance to clash with Russia, a confrontation with it is inevitable if the EU really seeks to promote democratization, modernization, and the gradual integration of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, as it directly contradicts Russia's interests in the region. The EU must not leave the region and stop supporting those Western-oriented states. The EU has already won in many ways in the area, e. g., Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine are trying to avoid Moscow's embrace and seek further rapprochement with Brussels. However, this 'victory' also means more responsibility. The EU must be ready to confront Russia and provide assistance to the EaP countries [3]. Instead, the refusal of the EU to support the transformation of the eastern neighborhood will untie Russia's hands and will not guarantee the restoration of stability in the region, and, as the situation in Ukraine shows, it could even pose more threats to the EU.

Conclusions. Leaving Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia alone will lead to new aggressive attempts by Russia to limit their

sovereignty. West-oriented citizens of these states will resist in response, which could lead to even more destabilization. In addition, such developments will not only weaken the EU's role in the eastern neighborhood but will also undermine its normative power as the basis of its foreign policy.

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LECTURE 17

Russia's war against Ukraine and the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture

Ukraine's role in European security. Ukraine plays an important role in maintaining European and international security, although for a long time this fact has been hardly taken into account. Now it has become one of the fronts of rivalry between the great powers, i.e., a renewed geopolitical confrontation between the collective West and Russia, which is likely to be one of the main features of the international order in the coming years. Russia's current war in Ukraine is much more than Ukraine itself and its possible membership in the NATO, rather it is about the future of the European, and perhaps global, order after the Cold War. By invading Ukraine, Putin seeks not only to bring the country back under his influence, but also to change the security architecture in Europe, which, he believes, ignores Russia's security concerns.

He wants to turn the clock back to the late 1990s until the NATO's first eastward expansion or to the late 1980s when Moscow ruled in this part of Europe.

The conflict, which before the beginning of the full-scale war on February 24, 2022 seemed terribly unbelievable, has marked the end of one era and the beginning of another, the contours of which are still unknown. They will be determined not only by the results of the fighting in Ukraine, but also by the global response to this unprovoked aggression.

Reorganization of the Euro-Atlantic security system. It is difficult to predict how profound this war will be for the world. This will largely depend on how the conflict unfolds. However, it is already significantly changing the contours of the European security architecture. We agree with Angela Stent that the third reorganization of the Euro-Atlantic security system since the end of World War II could be the end result of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The first one took place with the consolidation of the Yalta-Potsdam system into two warring blocs in the late 1940s and mid-1950s. The second (late 1980s – early 1990s) is connected with the collapse of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union, followed by the expansion of Western structures and especially the NATO to the East. Now Putin's actions in Ukraine are challenging this order [1].

Regarding the latter, Putin has already succeeded, but evidently not in the way he probably wanted. Instead of splitting the West, Putin's attack on Ukraine united it. In the days since the invasion, the United States and its allies have joined forces to impose tough sanctions on Russia, making it the world's heaviest sanctions country.

The second consequence of the Russian war in Ukraine, in addition to strengthening the collective West, was the strengthening of the North Atlantic Alliance and the course for its further expansion. Instead of withdrawing its forces from Eastern Europe, as Putin demanded, the NATO has doubled its fighting presence in the region and intensified its Response Force. About

50 countries have started or increased arms supplies to Ukraine. Russia's attack has reunited the NATO and made its enlargement much more likely. Among its most significant and unexpected geopolitical implications is that Finland and Sweden join the NATO. "NATO enlargement was never a cause of Mr. Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, but it is certainly a consequence... Sweden and Finland now see a Russia that is revanchist and revisionist in a way that is much more dangerous than during the latter part of the Cold War", Nathalie Tocci concludes in *The New York Times* [2].

Another consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian war is the rapid awakening of Europe, which has become apparent in recent months. For a long time before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe has been divided. Countries close to the Russian border, such as the Baltic states and Poland, have long taken the Russian threat seriously, based on bitter historical experience. Countries further west, including Germany and France, have underestimated Putin's ambitions [2]. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put an end to the era of European illusions about Moscow. European countries are trying to strengthen their defenses, the European Union is uniting to gradually get rid of its dependence on Russian energy, and Ukrainian refugees are being sheltered in Europe, although their numbers far exceed those who arrived in Europe in 2015 from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany has reconsidered its pacifist stance and embarked on a rearmament process, as evidenced by Olaf Scholz's announcement of a new € 100 billion defense fund and a firm commitment to spend 2% of GDP on the armed forces [3]. The EU countries will continue to increase their military strength, regardless of the end of hostilities in Ukraine. In the long run, these measures are likely to enhance Europe's long-standing desire for strategic autonomy to place less reliance on the United States in defense matters.

The USA. The United States will face many difficult dilemmas in the European direction. Russia's invasion of Ukraine came at a time when the US Grand Strategy focused on rivalry with China. Russian missiles and bombs have blown up not only a number

of Ukrainian cities, but this strategy as well. Many American politicians and scholars would prefer to continue to focus on long-term competition with China. But to deter an aggressive Russia, the United States will have to increase its military presence in Europe. The Biden Administration has already increased the number of American troops in Europe to about 100,000, a level not seen for decades [4].

We think it is a mistake for Stephen Wertheim to think that the United States should take advantage of the opportunity that falls once a generation, to put the European security order on the path to self-sufficiency, to encourage Europe to stand up to Russia, while the US should focus on “security in Asia and home renovations” because “such a division of labor is fair” [4]. We believe that the United States will continue to pay more attention to Europe and direct more resources and forces to it, at least until the end of Biden’s presidency. Europe’s quest for greater strategic autonomy is commendable and deserves the US support, but until the European security order is self-sufficient, America cannot afford to leave prematurely because it could have catastrophic consequences.

Conclusions. The West is facing a critical choice: to support Ukraine so that it can defend its territory and rebuild its forces for offensive operations, recapture the occupied lands and exhaust the aggressor to the point of imposing a lasting peace, or to give in to a Russia, which believes it can survive the will of the West. The former is desirable not only for Ukrainians. For Europe, Ukraine’s success or failure in this struggle will determine the security of the entire continent. For the United States, it will shape the future of the world order which it leads. Developing and following a consistent and realistic strategy for the victory of Ukraine will require greater and faster US and European military aid, investment by European countries in their defense industrial potential, strengthening of sanctions against Russia and better enforcement thereof, opening the way for Ukraine to join the EU

and NATO. It will benefit all Europeans by restoring and expanding the area of peace, prosperity and stability on the continent.

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LECTURE 18

The EU law protection system and citizenship rights

The EU law protection system. The EU law protection system is a complex and multi-layered system that provides a framework for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms within the European Union. The system is based on a combination of primary and secondary EU law, as well as international human rights instruments, and is enforced by the Court of Justice of the

European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

Primary EU law includes the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which establish the EU's legal framework and the principles of EU law. Secondary EU law includes regulations, directives, and decisions adopted by the EU institutions, which implement the principles of EU law and provide specific rules for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms

The CJEU plays a crucial role in the EU law protection system, as it is responsible for ensuring that EU law is interpreted and applied consistently across the EU. The CJEU has developed a significant body of case law on fundamental rights, which has helped to establish the EU as a human rights jurisdiction. The ECtHR also plays a key role in the EU law protection system, as it is responsible for ensuring that the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are respected by EU Member States. The ECtHR has developed a significant body of case law on the protection of human rights, which has helped to establish the ECHR as a cornerstone of human rights protection in Europe.

The EU citizenship rights. The EU law protection system and EU citizenship rights are closely intertwined. EU citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and is based on the principle that every person holding the nationality of an EU Member State is also a citizen of the EU. This concept is set out in Article 20(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which provides that citizenship of the Union is hereby established and that every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union [1]

EU citizens enjoy many freedoms and protections, including personal, civil, political, economic and social rights, personal data protection, anti-discrimination laws, and borderless travel through most EU countries. EU citizenship confers a set of rights, including the right to move and reside freely within the EU, the

right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, and the right to diplomatic protection in the territory of a third country by the diplomatic authorities of any Member State if the Member State of nationality is not represented there.[]

The protection of fundamental rights is also an important aspect of EU law and is closely linked to EU citizenship. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was incorporated into EU law by the Lisbon Treaty, sets out a list of fundamental rights that are protected by the EU. The CJEU has interpreted these rights broadly and has held that they are not limited to the rights listed in the Charter, but also include unwritten rights that are derived from the general principles of EU law [3] Every EU citizen enjoys the same fundamental rights based on the values of equality, non-discrimination, inclusion, human dignity, freedom and democracy. These values are fortified and protected by the rule of law, spelled out in the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU citizens have the right to live, work, study and get married in other EU countries. The EU works to keep Europeans' personal data safe and empowers them as consumers.

The relationship between EU citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights is complex and has been the subject of much debate and litigation. The CJEU has held that EU citizenship is not just a status, but also a set of rights that are derived from the EU Treaties and that are protected by the EU. This has led to a significant expansion of the rights of EU citizens, including the right to non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and the right to move and reside freely within the EU.

However, the EU citizenship rights are not without limitations. The CJEU has also held that EU citizenship is not a guarantee of equal rights for all Union citizens throughout the EU, but rather a status that allows its status holders to enjoy (almost) full membership in the Member States of which they do not possess nationality. This has led to criticism that EU citizenship is not a meaningful concept and that it does not provide sufficient protection for the rights of EU citizens. [4]

Conclusions. In conclusion, the EU law protection system is a complex and multi-layered system that provides a framework for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms within the European Union. The EU law protection system and EU citizenship rights are closely intertwined. EU citizenship confers a set of rights that are protected by the EU and is closely linked to the protection of fundamental rights. However, the EU citizenship rights are not without limitations and have been the subject of much debate and litigation.

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LECTURE 19

Rule of law in war time. Basic concepts of international humanitarian law

The rule of law in wartime. The principles of the rule of law and the protection of human rights are fundamental to civilized countries, and it is therefore fundamentally important that all these crimes are uncovered and the perpetrators brought to justice. The rule of law in wartime refers to the application of legal principles and norms to regulate the conduct of war and ensure that it is carried out in a manner that is consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights. The rule of law in wartime is essential for several reasons:

1. **Protection of civilians:** The rule of law in wartime helps to protect civilians from the effects of war, including the use of force, destruction of property, and displacement. It ensures that civilians are not targeted directly or indirectly, and that they are protected from violence, abuse, and exploitation.

2. **Protection of prisoners of war:** The rule of law in wartime ensures that prisoners of war are treated humanely and with dignity. It prohibits the use of torture, forced labor, and other forms of mistreatment, and ensures that prisoners are provided with adequate food, shelter, and medical care.

3. **Protection of humanitarian aid:** The rule of law in wartime ensures that humanitarian aid, such as food, water, and medical supplies, can reach those in need. It prohibits the obstruction of humanitarian aid and ensures that aid workers are protected from violence and intimidation.

4. Accountability for war crimes: The rule of law in wartime ensures that those who commit war crimes, such as murder, torture, and other serious violations of humanitarian law, are held accountable. It provides for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of war crimes, and ensures that those responsible are brought to justice.

5. Promotion of international cooperation: The rule of law in wartime promotes international cooperation and dialogue, and helps to prevent the escalation of conflicts. It encourages states to work together to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to promote peace and stability. [6]

The rule of law in wartime is based on a set of international legal principles and norms, including:

1. International humanitarian law: This includes the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, which regulate the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners of war.

2. Human rights law: This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties, which protect the rights of individuals during times of war and peace.

3. International criminal law: This includes the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which sets out the principles and procedures for the prosecution of war crimes and other serious violations of international law.

Much of what international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibits is commonplace: attacks on civilians and civilian property, the starving of civilians as a method of warfare, reprisals, the use of civilians as human shields, the destruction of objects essential to their survival, and the obstruction of relief supplies and assistance necessary for the survival of the civilian population. But despite the fact that IHL is legally binding on both State and non-State actors, many of its rules are disregarded.[4]

Rule of law in the face of Russia's full scale invasion. After The 2nd World War the countries united and said 'Never again', but since the beginning of 2014, Russia, its troops and

supporters have committed numerous grave international crimes on the territory of Ukraine, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the Art. 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC war crimes are 'great breaches' of Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949 (8 provisions) and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in [international] armed conflict' (26 provisions). Most evident war crimes committed in Ukraine: wilful killings, deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, unlawful confinement, torture and degrading treatment of civilians and POWs, rape and other sexual crimes and forced transfers, and deportations of children and adults, crimes against environment, pillaging.

Many of these accountable Russia's war crimes have features of genocide: systematic violence to destroy Ukrainian nation and identity, systematic violence to destroy Ukrainian nation and identity, attacks on civilian infrastructure far from the battlefields; denigration of the history, attacks of Ukrainian museums, churches, and libraries.

The International Criminal Court is expected to pursue cases against Russia related to two war crimes: the kidnapping of Ukrainian children to reeducate them and make them Russian, and attacks on civilian infrastructure far from the battlefields. This type of crime is explicitly part of the Genocide Convention, the 1948 international treaty codifying the crime of genocide.

There was no prosecution for the crime of aggression in 2014, when Russia launched it against Ukraine. This fact obviously allowed the aggressor to continue its criminal actions. Without ensuring accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, we will not be able to say that justice has been restored. Such a blatant and cynical act, which led to the largest war in Europe since 1945, cannot be ignored.

Ukraine is actively and effectively using all international legal means to protect its rights and bring Russia to justice. All available international legal mechanisms have been utilized: The International Court of Justice, international arbitrations on the law of the sea, the International Criminal Court, and the European

Court of Human Rights. But this is not enough. For us to be able to say with certainty that full, comprehensive accountability for the most serious crimes under international law committed on the territory of Ukraine has been ensured, two gaps need to be filled: the creation of a judicial body with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression against Ukraine and a compensation mechanism that will compensate victims of Russian crimes.

Today, we are witnessing unprecedented involvement of other countries and international organizations in the investigation of crimes committed on the territory of Ukraine, in particular, within the framework of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) across EU, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Violations in Ukraine, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is highly active. Despite different opinions, including those critical of the ICC's activities, it issued arrest warrants for Putin and other top Russian criminals.

A tool to ensure accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine is the establishment of a Special Tribunal. This difficult step is necessary in many respects, as there is currently no international court or tribunal that could try Russia's top political and military leadership for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The establishment of the Special Tribunal will close this gap.

The ICC cannot currently exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The Court is investigating the situation in Ukraine for the possible commission of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The ICC remains a key body of international criminal justice, and Ukraine actively cooperates with it. In particular, a law was passed amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, which establishes clear mechanisms for Ukraine's cooperation with the ICC, and an agreement was signed to open an ICC office in Ukraine. However, the International Criminal Court cannot investigate and prosecute individuals for committing the crime of aggression against Ukraine due to jurisdictional restrictions enshrined in the Rome Statute of the ICC (Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute and the Kampala Amendments on the crime of aggression; the UN Security Council

will not refer the situation in Ukraine to the ICC, as Russia will undoubtedly use its veto).

Conclusions. In conclusion, the rule of law in wartime is essential for protecting civilians, prisoners of war, and humanitarian aid, and for promoting international cooperation and accountability for war crimes. It is based on a set of international legal principles and norms that are designed to regulate the conduct of war and ensure that it is carried out in a manner that is consistent with human rights and humanitarian law.

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LECTURE 20

Environmental crimes during armed conflicts. Environmental protection in the EU

Environmental crimes during armed conflicts refer to the intentional or unintentional harm caused to the environment as a result of military activities. These crimes can take various forms, including pollution of water resources, damage to or destruction of industrial facilities, radiation-hazardous objects, and soil and vegetation in natural areas and agricultural lands. [4] The wanton destruction and humanitarian suffering caused by wars and armed conflicts often echo long into the future. Beyond the direct impact on people's lives, armed conflict and its consequences also impact natural resources, livelihoods, and ecosystems. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emphasizes the importance of protecting the environment during armed conflicts, highlighting that the environment is a *prima facie* civilian object and is entitled to the same layers of protection as any civilian person or object.

The World Conservation Congress has called for the establishment of an international organization empowered to monitor, report, and prosecute any damages to the environment and natural resources during armed conflicts. Additionally, the Congress has urged the creation of a compensation mechanism for any transgressions and violations against the environment during armed conflicts, reminiscent of the Polluter Pays Principle.

The International Bar Association has recognized that environmental degradation and exploitation can be both a cause and a consequence of armed conflict. The International Court of

Justice has acknowledged that environmental harm can be a war crime, and there is a growing trend towards holding states and non-state armed groups legally accountable for environmental damages.

Environmental protection in the EU. The European Union has a comprehensive environmental policy that aims to protect the environment and promote sustainable development. The policy was initiated in 1973 with the 'Environmental Action Programme', which marked the beginning of a long-term commitment to environmental protection within the EU [2]

The EU's environmental policy has evolved over the years, with a focus on integrating environmental considerations into all policy sectors. This approach, known as environmental policy integration, seeks to address environmental issues in a holistic manner, rather than treating them as separate from other policy areas.

The EU has implemented various policies and directives to achieve its environmental objectives. For example, the Water Framework Directive aims to ensure that rivers, lakes, and coastal waters are of 'good quality' by 2015. The Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive are also significant pieces of legislation that protect animals and plants, respectively.

The EU has also established the Environmental Crime Directive, which uses criminal law to protect the environment. This directive was updated in 2021 as part of the European Green Deal, with the aim of strengthening environmental protection.

The EU's environmental policy is guided by the concept of sustainable development, which balances economic, social, and environmental considerations. The EU's environmental research and innovation policy supports research and innovation in areas such as climate change, energy, and resource efficiency.

The EU's environmental policy is implemented through a variety of mechanisms, including the European Environment Agency, which provides scientific advice and monitoring of environmental issues. The EU also has a number of environmental

directives and regulations that are implemented by member states, such as the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) directive.

Environmental issues in the European Union. The EU is currently addressing a range of key environmental issues, including:

Air Pollution: The EU has identified air pollution as the single largest environmental health risk in the continent¹. The European Environment Agency (EEA) has reported that the majority of Europe's urban population is exposed to levels of air pollution deemed unsafe, with the highest concentrations of PM reported in central-eastern Europe and Italy. The EU has implemented policies such as the Clean Air Package, which set objectives for 2020 and 2030 to reduce emissions of major pollutants, and a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions [3].

1. **Climate Change:** Climate change is another pressing environmental issue in the EU, with impacts including warmer weather, increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, and health risks. The EU has outlined plans to implement climate change mitigation measures, including the European Green Deal, which aims to meet the bloc's climate change goals [1].

2. **Droughts:** Droughts are a significant environmental issue in Europe, particularly in warmer countries in the Mediterranean basin. Recurrent droughts have severe repercussions on water supplies, leading to crop failure, wildfires, and worsening public health conditions.

Water Pollution: Water pollution is a concern in the EU, with sources including industrial wastes, agricultural chemicals, and urban wastes³. The EU has implemented policies to address water pollution, such as the Water Framework Directive, which aims to ensure that rivers, lakes, and coastal waters are of 'good quality by 2015.

Protected Areas: The EU has designated protected areas to conserve biodiversity and natural habitats. These areas are

subject to special protection due to their environmental, cultural, or scientific significance.

Renewable Energy: The EU has set targets to increase the use of renewable energy sources, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and meet its climate change goals.

Pesticides: The EU has implemented policies to regulate the use of pesticides, aiming to reduce their impact on the environment and human health.

Waste Management: The EU has implemented policies to reduce waste, increase recycling, and promote sustainable waste management practices.

Biodiversity Loss: The EU is addressing biodiversity loss, which is a major environmental concern, by implementing policies to protect and conserve natural habitats and species.

3. Environmental Crime: The EU has implemented policies to prevent and punish environmental crime, including the Environmental Crime Directive, which uses criminal law to protect the environment.

These environmental issues are being addressed through a combination of EU-wide policies, directives, and regulations, as well as national and local initiatives. The EU's environmental policy is guided by the principles of sustainable development and seeks to integrate environmental considerations into all policy sectors.

Conclusions. The EU's environmental policy is a comprehensive and evolving framework that aims to protect the environment and promote sustainable development. It is guided by the principles of sustainable development and seeks to integrate environmental considerations into all policy sectors. Environmental crimes during armed conflicts are a serious concern that requires international cooperation and legal accountability. The protection of the environment during armed conflicts is essential for the well-being of both human populations and the natural world.

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