НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ
"ОСТРОЗЬКА АКАДЕМІЯ"

СТУДЕНТСЬКІ НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ

Національного університету «Острозька академія»

Серія «Філологічна»

Збірник наукових праць

Випуск 23

Острог
Видавництво Національного університету «Острозька академія»
2026

УДК: 81.161.2+
81.111
С 88

Рекомендовано до друку
засіданням ради Навчально-наукового інституту лінгвістики
Національного університету «Острозька академія»
(протокол № 11 від 17 червня 2026 року)

С 88 **Студентські** наукові записки Національного університету «Острозька академія». Серія «Філологічна» / ред. кол. : А. О. Худолій, І. В. Ковальчук. Острог : Видавництво Національного університету «Острозька академія». 2026. Вип. 23. 130 с.

DOI 10.25264/17.06.2026

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У збірнику містяться статті студентів, присвячені мультидисциплінарним дослідженням, що варіюються від досліджень у медичній сфері до культурологічних студій. Статті подано англійською мовою.

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УДК: 81.161.2+
81.111

UDC: 339.9:005.57

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MODERN TRENDS IN DIGITALIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The article examines current directions of digitalization of communications in transnational corporations under conditions of global digital business transformation. It is substantiated that digital communications are no longer limited to transmitting information to consumers but perform a strategic function of managing interaction with customers, employees, partners, investors and society. The study considers omnichannel integration, data driven communication, the use of artificial intelligence, platformization, digital content ecosystems, internal corporate platforms and crisis response tools. It is determined that the effectiveness of digitalization depends on data quality, ethical governance, local adaptation of messages and compliance with regulatory requirements.

Keywords: *digitalization, transnational corporations, digital communications, artificial intelligence, social media, corporate reputation.*

СУЧАСНІ ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ ЦИФРОВІЗАЦІЇ КОМУНІКАЦІЙ ТРАНСНАЦІОНАЛЬНИХ КОРПОРАЦІЙ

У статті досліджено сучасні напрями цифровізації комунікацій транснаціональних корпорацій в умовах глобальної цифрової трансформації бізнесу. Обґрунтовано, що цифрові комунікації не обмежуються лише передаванням інформації споживачам, а виконують стратегічну функцію управління взаємодією з клієнтами, працівниками, партнерами, інвесторами та суспільством. Розглянуто омніканальну інтеграцію, комунікацію на основі даних, застосування штучного *інтелекту, платформізацію, цифрові контентні екосистеми, внутрішні корпоративні платформи й інструменти антикризового реагування. Визначено, що ефективність цифровізації залежить від якості даних, етичного управління, локальної адаптації повідомлень та дотримання регуляторних вимог.*

Ключові слова: *цифровізація, транснаціональні корпорації, цифрові комунікації, штучний інтелект, соціальні мережі, корпоративна репутація.*

Topicality. Modern transnational corporations operate in an environment where digital channels have become the main infrastructure for interaction with markets, employees, partners, investors and society. In 2025, according to the International Telecommunication Union, about 6 billion people used the Internet, which was 74% of the world's population, but 2.2 billion people remained offline [1]. At the same time, UNCTAD notes that investments in the digital economy are growing rapidly, and their average annual volume in recent years has reached USD 122 billion [2]. This means that the digitalization of communications of transnational corporations is not only a marketing phenomenon, but also an important factor in international competition, reputation management, market expansion and maintaining confidence in global business. The relevance of the described problem is enhanced by the fact that transnational corporations operate simultaneously in many countries, where the level of digital infrastructure, legal requirements, language practices, cultural expectations and consumer behavior differ. Under such conditions, the simple use of social networks, websites or mobile applications is no longer effective. It becomes necessary to build a holistic digital communication system that combines data, technology, content, analytics, ethical standards and organizational procedures. That is why the scientific understanding of modern directions of digitalization of communications of transnational corporations is of practical importance for the development of international business, marketing, corporate governance and public communication.

Introduction. In scientific research, digitalization is considered as a multi-level process that encompasses not only the technological renewal of individual functions, but also the change in business models, organizational culture, and ways of creating value. The OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2024 report highlights that the digital economy is evolving under the influence of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, data analytics, digital security, and new platform solutions [3]. In the works of P. Verhoef and co-authors, digital transformation is interpreted as a process that changes the logic of the enterprise, since digital technologies affect products, sales channels, customer experience and internal organization [4]. In the studies of P. Kannan and H. Li, digital marketing is considered as a system of customer interaction through data, channels, and behavioral analytics [5], and K. Lemon and P. Verhoef emphasize the importance of comprehensive customer journey management at touchpoints [6]. A separate research area concerns social media, platforms, and new forms of consumer participation in creating brand content. Y. Dwivedi et al. argue that digital and social media are changing the nature of marketing research and practices, as interaction with the audience becomes continuous, personalized and analytically measurable [7]. G. Appel et al. link the future of social media marketing to the development of interactivity, personalization, visual formats, and new models of consumer engagement [8]. At the same time, the scientific literature has not yet systematically summarized the directions of digitalization of communications of transnational corporations as global entities that combine centralized brand management with local adaptation of messages.

The aim of the study. The article is aimed at theoretical and analytical substantiation of modern directions of digitalization of communications of transnational corporations and determination of their importance for increasing the effectiveness of interaction with key stakeholders in the context of global digital transformation.

Objectives. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to reveal the essence of digitalization of corporate communications, characterize the main technological and organizational directions of its development, determine the role of artificial intelligence, data, social media, omnichannel platforms and digital governance, as well as outline the risks that arise in the process of digital interaction of transnational corporations with audiences from different countries.

The results and discussion. In the traditional model, communication has mostly served as a consumer informing or persuasion, while in the digital environment it has become a mechanism for collecting data, personalizing offers, maintaining service, building communities, and monitoring reputation. This is especially relevant for transnational corporations, as they need to ensure global brand consistency while adapting messages to local markets, languages, cultural norms, and regulatory requirements.

Omnichannel integration of communications is one of the leading areas of digitalization. Its essence is to combine websites, mobile applications, social networks, email, instant messengers, contact centers, marketplaces, and physical touchpoints into a single customer experience system. In 2025, 63.57% of EU enterprises used social media, 52.74% used paid cloud services, and 33.02% performed data analytics in-house [9]. These indicators show that digital tools have already become a typical part of corporate infrastructure, and for transnational corporations they perform the function of coordinating different markets within a single communication logic.

Omnichannel is important not only as a technical combination of channels, but as a way to provide a consistent user experience. The client can see ads on the social network, go to the website, contact the chatbot, receive a personalized email, and complete the purchase in the mobile application. If these contacts are not connected, the corporation loses a holistic understanding of the consumer's needs. Therefore, modern transnational corporations are increasingly using CRM systems, cloud platforms, analytical panels, and automated communication scenarios. As a result, communication turns into a controlled process in which each interaction can be measured, analyzed and used to increase the relevance of future messages [5; 9].

Communication data is another important area. It means converting communication contacts into data that can be used to segment audiences, predict behavior, evaluate channel performance, and personalize content. For transnational corporations, data is of strategic importance, as it allows you to compare consumer behavior in different countries, identify micro-segments, adjust advertising budgets and identify reputational risks. At the same time, data on transactions, search behavior, reactions to content, service calls, and social media activity provide a deeper insight into the customer journey than traditional marketing surveys. However, such an advantage is accompanied by risks of excessive profiling, loss of privacy, and non-transparent use of personal information [6; 10].

The use of artificial intelligence in communication activities is an independent direction of digitalization. Artificial intelligence is used to automate responses, generate texts, translate, analyze sentiment, forecast demand, determine optimal communication times, personalize advertising messages, and identify signs of crisis situations. According to Eurostat, in 2025, 34.70% of EU businesses that used artificial intelligence technologies used them for marketing or sales [10]. The World Bank also emphasizes that artificial intelligence is changing economies and societies, but its spread requires appropriate institutional, infrastructural, and human prerequisites [11]. For transnational corporations, this means that artificial intelligence can provide scalable personalized communication, but requires quality control, transparency of algorithms, and responsible use of data. Generative artificial intelligence, which allows you to quickly create texts, images, scripts, presentations, and advertising message options for various local markets, is of particular importance. For corporations, this opens up the possibility of quickly adapting global content to the linguistic and cultural characteristics of specific countries. At the same time, full automation of content creation can lead to reputational errors, content inaccuracies, discriminatory wording, or the use of materials that do not meet copyright and ethical requirements. Therefore, it is not the replacement of a human communicator with an algorithm that is promising, but a combination of automation with editorial control, local expertise and corporate rules for the responsible use of artificial intelligence [11; 13; 16].

Communication platformization is also a significant area of digitalization. Social networks, video platforms, professional networks, marketplaces, review services, and user communities are changing the nature of interaction between the corporation and the audience. In the platform environment, the corporation no longer has full control over the content of communication, since a significant part of the messages are created by users themselves through comments, ratings, reviews, content distribution, and participation in public discussions. For transnational corporations, this means the need for constant social listening, working with influencers, maintaining user-generated content, and responding quickly to negative signals. In such conditions, communication acquires a network character, and the brand's reputation is formed not only by official messages, but also by the collective behavior of audiences [7; 8]. The development of digital content ecosystems forms a separate direction of digitalization. Transnational corporations are increasingly creating their own media platforms, blogs, video channels, podcasts, interactive reports, training resources, and information centers for various groups of stakeholders. Unlike a traditional advertising campaign, which has a limited time horizon, the digital content ecosystem functions continuously and supports long-term interaction with the audience. It allows you to explain complex products, build brand expertise, demonstrate social responsibility, and maintain trust. In the transnational dimension, the main task is to align the global brand identity with the local relevance of the messages, since the same content can be perceived differently in different cultural environments. Digitalization of internal communications is an equally important direction. For transnational corporations, internal communication is no less important than external communication, since employees can be placed in different countries, time zones and language environments.

Enterprise platforms, video conferencing, electronic knowledge bases, internal social networks, learning portals, and project management tools ensure coordination of global teams. At the same time, digital internal communications perform a cultural function, as they help to spread corporate values, explain strategic changes, maintain staff engagement, and form a common understanding of the company's goals. Without this, a transnational corporation risks a fragmented organizational culture in which departments operate according to different logics.

The digitalization of sustainable development communications and corporate responsibility has acquired signs of an independent direction. Today's consumers, investors, employees, and regulators expect corporations not only to make statements about social responsibility, but also to provide evidence of environmental, labor, and governance practices. Therefore, transnational corporations use interactive ESG reports, digital dashboards, online supply chain maps, raw material traceability tools, and open communication platforms to explain their own impact. Such communication increases transparency, but at the same time creates a risk of selective data submission or greenwashing. Therefore, digital communication for sustainable development should be based on verifiable indicators, comparable methodologies, and a clear explanation of constraints.

Digitalization of crisis communications is an independent direction, the relevance of which is constantly growing. In social networks, negative information can spread extremely quickly, and a reputational crisis can take on an international scale within a few hours. Therefore, transnational corporations need systems for monitoring mentions, sentiment analysis, information attack detection, scenario planning, and multilingual response protocols. An additional challenge is the spread of deepfakes, synthetic content, and manipulative messages that can mimic the official position of the company or its representatives. In this context, the legal regulation of the digital environment is of great importance. The Digital Services Act aims to create a safer and more transparent online environment, and the AI Act establishes harmonized rules for the use of artificial intelligence in the EU [13; 14].

Strengthening the ethical and regulatory governance of digital communications is another key area. In a global environment, transnational corporations must comply with requirements for personal data protection, transparency of advertising, consumer rights, non-discrimination, copyright, cybersecurity and responsible use of artificial intelligence. The GDPR enshrines important principles of personal data processing and pays attention to automated decision-making and profiling [12]. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework proposes an approach to AI risk management aimed at increasing trust in such systems [15], and the UNESCO Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence Ethics emphasizes human rights, transparency, fairness, and human oversight [16]. The effectiveness of digital communications increasingly depends not only on technological excellence, but also on the legitimacy of the ways in which data and algorithms are used.

In view of the above, it is advisable to consider the digitalization of communications of transnational corporations as a system of interrelated directions. Omnichannel ensures the integrity of the customer experience, data creation creates an analytical basis for personalization, artificial intelligence scales communication processes, platformization changes the nature of interaction with audiences, content ecosystems maintain trust, internal digital platforms coordinate international teams, and regulatory and ethical governance defines the boundaries of acceptable use of technology. For transnational corporations, the main task is to find a balance between global standardization and local adaptation. The central office can determine data policies, brand standards, and ethical rules, but local departments must tailor the message to specific linguistic, cultural, and regulatory conditions.

Conclusions. The study allows us to conclude that the digitalization of communications of transnational corporations is a complex process that encompasses technological, organizational, analytical, ethical and legal changes. Its modern specificity lies in the transition from the use of separate digital channels to the formation of an integrated communication ecosystem. Within this ecosystem, interaction with customers, employees, investors, partners, and society is carried out through data, platforms, algorithms, content, and constant feedback monitoring.

The most significant areas are omnichannel integration, dataification, the use of artificial intelligence, platformization, the development of digital content ecosystems, the digitalization of internal communications, sustainable development communications, crisis response, and ethical digital governance. Each of these areas increases the adaptability of a transnational corporation, but at the same time creates risks related to privacy, algorithmic bias, disinformation, loss of control over reputation and regulatory responsibility. Therefore, the effectiveness of digitalization cannot be evaluated only by the number of channels, the speed of automation, or the volume of digital reach.

It is advisable to connect the prospects for further research with the analysis of industry differences in the digitalization of communications of transnational corporations, the evaluation of the effectiveness of generative artificial intelligence in international marketing, the study of the influence of local culture on the perception of digital messages and the development of models of ethical management of personalized communications. In practical terms, the competitive advantages of transnational corporations will be determined not only by access to the latest technologies, but by the ability to combine digital efficiency with transparency, responsibility, local sensitivity and trust of audiences.

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UDC: 005.57:614

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION MODELS IN HEALTHCARE

The article examines the main models of public health communication as a tool for improving the effectiveness of health services. The linear communication model, the social and behavioral change model (SBCC), the PRECEDE–PROCEED model, and the information-motivational-behavioral model (IMB) have been analyzed. Their key characteristics, advantages, and limitations in the context of influencing population behavior have been identified. Particular attention has been paid to the role of two-way communication, adapting messages to target audiences, and using modern approaches to behavior change. Examples of effective application of communication strategies in different countries have been given, demonstrating their impact on improving health indicators. It has been substantiated that the integration of modern communication models contributes to improving the quality of health services, forming responsible behavior of the population, and reducing health risks.

Keywords: *public health, communication models, SBCC, PRECEDE-PROCEED, IMB model, behavior change, medical communication, disease prevention.*

ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ МОДЕЛЕЙ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ В СФЕРІ ОХОРОНИ ЗДОРОВ'Я

У статті розглядаються основні моделі комунікацій у сфері громадського здоров'я як інструмент підвищення ефективності медичних послуг. Проаналізовано лінійну модель комунікації, модель соціальних і поведінкових змін (SBCC), модель PRECEDE–PROCEED та інформаційно-мотиваційно-поведінкову модель (IMB). Визначено їхні ключові характеристики, переваги та обмеження у контексті впливу на поведінку населення. Особливу увагу приділено ролі двосторонньої комунікації, адаптації повідомлень до цільових аудиторій та використанню сучасних підходів до зміни поведінки. Наведено приклади ефективного застосування комунікаційних стратегій у різних країнах, що демонструють їх вплив на покращення показників здоров'я. Обґрунтовано, що інтеграція сучасних комунікаційних моделей сприяє підвищенню якості медичних послуг, формуванню відповідальної поведінки населення та зниженню ризиків для здоров'я.

***Ключові слова**: громадське здоров'я, комунікаційні моделі, SBCC, PRECEDE-PROCEED, IMB модель, зміна поведінки, медична комунікація, профілактика захворювань.*

Introduction. In the current conditions of the development of the health care system, communication is becoming a key tool for ensuring effective interaction between health care professionals, patients and society as a whole. The quality of communication processes directly affects the results of treatment, the level of trust in medical institutions and the willingness of the population to follow recommendations for the prevention and treatment of diseases. The importance of communication issues in the field of health care is evidenced by the development by the WHO European Office of the "European Action Plan for Strengthening Public Health Capacity and Services" [1]. It contains a brief description of some of the most important problems in the field of health care policies and systems in the WHO European Region, including those related to public health services and infrastructure.

The growing role of information technologies, the digitalization of health services and global challenges such as pandemics, wars and the spread of disinformation, necessitate the use of effective communication models in the process of forming a modern health care system. Today, public health practice demonstrates that traditional one-way communication models are gradually being replaced by interactive and patient (client)-oriented approaches. This necessitates a comprehensive analysis of existing communication models and determining their role in increasing the effectiveness of health services.

The relevance of the study is due to the growing need to increase the efficiency of medical services through the improvement of communication processes in the field of public health. Despite the development of medical technologies, a significant part of the problems in the health care system is associated with insufficiently effective communication between doctors and patients, as well as between institutions and the population. The issue of forming responsible behavior of the population, increasing the level of compliance and countering disinformation is of particular relevance. In these conditions, communication models are an important tool for influencing people's knowledge, attitudes and behavior. In addition, modern global challenges, in particular pandemics, the spread of chronic diseases and the need for a rapid response to crisis situations, require the implementation of effective communication strategies. This necessitates the scientific understanding and practical application of modern communication models to ensure the sustainable development of the health care system.

The purpose of the article is to analyze modern models of communication in the field of public health and determine their role in increasing the efficiency of medical services and shaping healthy behavior of the population. **The article objectives are** to investigate the essence and features of the main communication models in the field of public health; to assess the effectiveness of the application of communication models based on international experience; to substantiate the importance of integrating communication approaches for improving the quality of medical services.

Methodology. In the process of research, methods such as analysis and synthesis were used to generalize scientific approaches to determining the essence of communication models and their classification. The comparative method was used to compare different communication models in order to identify their advantages, disadvantages and areas of effective application. The system analysis method made it possible to consider communication in the field of public health as a holistic system of interaction between different subjects (patients, medical workers, state institutions). Content analysis of scientific sources, international reports and practical cases (in particular, the experience of different countries) made it possible to assess the effectiveness of the application of communication models in real conditions. Tabular and descriptive methods were also used to characterize each of the models and their structural elements to form conclusions about the role of communication in increasing the efficiency of medical services.

Literature review. In their works, M.A. Znamenska, G.O. Slabky, T.K. Znamenska [2] state that communication activities are not a priority for both scientists and health care organizers at all levels of government. In [3], O.R. Sitenko, E.M. Kryvenko, studying communications in the field of public health, argue that they are a means that promotes the promotion of a healthy lifestyle and counteracts the use of products that are dangerous to health. D. Batsenko, P. Braginsky, M. Buchma in [4] study communications in primary health care and define them as an act of transferring knowledge from one person to another using commonly understood signs and rules. O.V. Ustimchuk in [5] identifies the main trends in communication interaction in the conditions of a new model of management in the field of health care at the regional level. M.A. Znamenska, G.O. Slabky in [6] proposes a structural construction of a communications system consisting of several levels: industry (creation of resource centers); regional (creation of departments for organizing communicative activities on the basis of health centers); health care institution (the organizer and coordinator of communicative activities is the information and analytical center of the health care institution). E.M. Rudnychenko, N.I. Gavlovska, L.A. Krymchak, M.Yu. Tomshchuk, I.V. Lisovsky in [7] focus on information and communication technologies and their widespread use in the process of health care institutions. The issues of practical implementation of communicative activities in the practice of health care institutions in territorial communities, especially in conditions of martial law, remain unexplored. An important issue in the theory of communication in the medical sphere is the role of communication in the activities of health care institutions. According to the group of authors Aladwan M., Salleh H., Anuar M. M. et al., increasing patient satisfaction with communication with doctors and medical institutions leads to increased patient loyalty [8]. Park H.N., Park D.J., Khan S.I. et al. directly emphasize that patient experience can be important not only from the point of view of customer orientation and patient safety, but also as a key factor affecting the financial condition of health care systems [9]. A significant contribution to the development of the concept of communication for behavior change (SBCC) was made by international organizations, in particular the World Health Organization and UNICEF, which developed practical recommendations for the implementation of communication strategies in the field of public health [10,11,12]. In addition, researchers L. Green and M. Kreuter emphasize the importance of a systemic approach to the development, implementation and evaluation of public health programs [13]. In their work [14] Jeffrey D. Fisher and William A. Fisher describe a model of behavior change that depends on three key components: information, motivation, and behavioral skills. Thus, an analysis of scientific sources indicates the evolution of approaches to communication – from linear models to complex, interactive systems focused on changing the behavior of the population.

The results and discussion. For communication in the field of health care, different models and approaches are used depending on the purpose and concept. The communicative process can be represented as a structure reflected by a number of models that differ significantly from each other. The most widespread in communication theory is the linear model, developed back in the 40s of the 20th century. It considers communication as an action within which the sender first transforms ideas, emotions and feelings into a certain type of message, and then sends it to the recipient using the selected communication channel. In general, the linear model considers communication as a unidirectional process, therefore it is believed that it only partially characterizes the features of this multifaceted process. The key characteristics of the linear model are:

– one-sidedness;

– the presence of an active sender and a passive recipient of information (the community);

– the absence of feedback, when there is no instant reaction, which makes such communication ineffective for dialogue or behavior change (but makes communication effective for mass notification).

The comprehensive Social and Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC) model focuses not only on informing, but also on creating a supportive environment and sustainable behavioural change, taking into account social and cultural contexts. The SBCC model uses a variety of tools and methods to communicate with each target group and obtain information, as well as feedback in response. An effective SBCC model is based on:

1. Social and behavioural change objectives. The aim of SBCC is to change the knowledge, attitudes and practices of target groups and to stimulate social change at the local and national levels (for example, changing the attitude of a separate religious community towards vaccination).

2. Adapted messages. All creative messages and products (information materials, social advertising, videos on health topics) distributed through interpersonal, group and mass media channels should be based on in-depth knowledge of the target audience. Because what is interesting to teenagers may not be interesting to middle-aged people.

3. Two-way communication. In order to make adjustments to health programs, if necessary.

4. Measurement system. Provides for monitoring changes in attitudes and behavior, which helps to measure the impact of communications outlined by the goals of the behavioral change program in the public health system. This can be done by surveying the population, health workers, collecting and analyzing information from health information systems (MIS), where you can view reports, for example, on vaccination rates for a certain period.

The effectiveness of the SBCC model is confirmed by examples of positive changes in international practice regarding certain behavioral influences. In Vietnam, the combination of nationwide mass information strategies with interpersonal counseling on infant and young child nutrition led to an increase in both the minimum acceptable diet and dietary diversity. This has helped reduce stunting in children [15]. The Saloni Project in India for adolescent girls is a randomized controlled trial to improve nutritional, hygiene, and reproductive health behaviors based on a prevention model that incorporates Sadharanikaran, an ancient Indian theory of communication. The Saloni strategy involved a 10-session school-based intervention built on compassion, self-efficacy, emotional well-being, and support for adolescents and their parents, delivered in the form of short, easy-to-use training modules. The intervention had a significant impact on over 13 preventive health behaviors. About 65% of girls in the intervention group adopted 13 or more health behaviors. Behavioral effects were demonstrated in all three domains: nutrition, hygiene, and reproductive health. Research provides evidence that early adolescence is indeed a “starting point” for creating a culture of health [16]. In Bangladesh, sustained behavior change communication combined with cash food assistance led to improvements in mothers’ knowledge of infant and young child feeding [17].

In India, a study was conducted in 2015–2016 to assess the impact of health information on vaccination rates in rural areas, involving mothers of unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated children. Providing mothers with face-to-face information about the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP) vaccine increased immunization rates by 22% and complete immunization rates by 14%, and was cost-effective [18]. In 2008, the Hong Kong Health Centre introduced the Influenza Vaccination Subsidy Scheme, which was renamed the Vaccination Subsidy Scheme in 2016/2017. The scheme encourages children aged 6 months to 12 years to receive influenza vaccination. This increased childhood immunization rates by 25% [19]. Global community-based behavior change communication efforts have shown a reduction in neonatal mortality in many developing countries [20].

The PRECEDE–PROCEED model is used to plan and evaluate public health programs, including diagnosis, strategy development, and evaluation with a focus on behavior and the environment. Just as a medical diagnosis precedes treatment, this model assumes that a future possible diagnosis should precede a public health intervention. PROCEED provides a framework for implementing and evaluating a public health program. The basic approach of the PRECEDE–PROCEED model is to start with the desired outcome and work backward to the causes. The model includes the following steps:

1. Social assessment. Identifying the quality of life and social problems of a community by engaging residents themselves to identify their needs and aspirations.

2. Epidemiological assessment. Identifying specific health problems (morbidity, mortality rates) and the genetic, behavioral, and environmental factors that influence them.

3. Educational/environmental assessment. Classification of factors influencing behavior into three groups: facilitators (knowledge), reinforcers (social support), and enablers (availability of resources).

4. Administrative/political assessment and agreement on the intervention. Analysis of available resources, organizational capacity, budget, and legal frameworks needed to launch and sustain a health program.

5. Implementation. Immediate launch of the designed interventions and the beginning of their practical implementation.

6. Process evaluation. Monitoring whether the program is being implemented according to plan, whether the target audience is being reached, and whether sufficient resources are being used.

7. Impact evaluation. Measuring immediate changes that have occurred after the intervention, including changes in knowledge, attitudes, behavior, or the state of the environment.

8. Outcome evaluation. Long-term analysis of whether the program has led to real improvements in the health and overall quality of life of the community [21].

The Information–Motivation–Behavioral Skills (IMB) model combines information, motivation, and the development of skills necessary for healthy behavior. Originally developed to understand and promote prevention efforts for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the IMB model has been applied to a variety of health-related behaviors and interventions [22]. The model consists of three main components:

1. Information: refers to accurate and relevant knowledge about a behavior and its consequences. For example, in the context of HIV prevention, this includes understanding the virus, its transmission, and prevention strategies.

2. Motivation: This element is divided into personal and social motivation. Personal motivation reflects a person's attitudes and beliefs about the behavior, while social motivation refers to perceived social support and norms that influence a person's behavior.

3. Behavioral skills: This component encompasses both the objective skills required to perform a behavior and a person's self-efficacy, or belief in their ability to successfully follow the rules of behavior.

The IMB model has been widely used in public health interventions, including HIV prevention, chronic disease management, and adherence to treatment regimens. For example, it has been effectively applied in educational programs aimed at increasing HIV testing and safe sex practices among high-risk groups. The IMB model has now been extended to other health contexts, including diabetes self-management and antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence among HIV-positive individuals. The IMB model has been applied during the COVID-19 pandemic to promote preventive behaviors such as mask-wearing, social distancing, and vaccination [23]. By focusing on accurate information, personal and social motivation, and practical behavioral skills, the model takes into account factors such as employment type, living conditions, socioeconomic status, and health literacy that influence people's ability to adhere to preventive measures. The model also emphasizes the importance of a feedback loop, where successful preventive behavior reinforces positive health outcomes.

The comparative analysis of different communication models, presented in Table 1, shows that public health communication models are evolving from simple to more complex and interactive approaches.

Table 1

Comparative analysis of the main communication models in the healthcare sector

Criterion	Linear model	SBCC model	PRECEDE–PROCEED model	IMB model
Theoretical basis	Classical communication theories (Lasswell, Shannon-Weaver)	Theories of behavior change, social psychological approaches	Theories of planning in public health and behavioral change	Social psychology, theories of motivation and learning
The essence of the model	Transfer of information from source to recipient	Comprehensive communication to achieve sustainable behavior changes	Tool for planning, implementing and evaluating programs	Model of behavior change through information, motivation and skills
Type of communication	One-way	Two-way, multi-level	Multi-level, strategic	Interactive, individually oriented
Audience role	Passive recipient	Active participant in the process	Participant in evaluation and change	Active subject of behavioral change
Availability of feedback	Absent	Mandatory and constant	Present at assessment stages	Important for behavior correction
Main goal	Informing	Changing behavior and social norms	Planning effective programs	Forming healthy behavior
Tools	Mass media, advertising, announcements	Mass media, interpersonal communication, educational campaigns	Research, data analysis, strategic planning	Educational programs, trainings, consulting
Taking into account the social context	Minimal	High	High	Moderate (depends on adaptation)
Behavior change orientation	Low	High	High	High
Implementation complexity	Low	High	High	Medium

Effectiveness	High for informing, low for change	High for long-term use	High for systemic implementation	High at the individual level
Examples of use	Social advertising, instructions	Vaccination campaigns, prevention	National health programs	HIV prevention, chronic diseases
Main advantages	Simplicity, speed	Flexibility, adaptability, influence on behavior	Systematic and structured	Clear logic of influence on behavior
Main disadvantages	Lack of interaction	Involvement of a significant number of resources	Difficulty of implementation	Need for adaptation

Formalized by authors

The linear model is effective for rapid dissemination of information, but its capabilities are limited due to the lack of feedback. In contrast, the SBCC and IMB models are focused on behavior change and take into account individual and social factors, which significantly increases their effectiveness in the long term. The PRECEDE-PROCEED model is distinguished by its systematic nature and is used mainly at the level of planning and implementation of public health programs. Thus, the most effective is a combined approach that combines different models depending on the goals, audience and context of communication. This allows not only to inform the population, but also to form sustainable behavioral changes and increase the efficiency of health services.

Conclusions. The study found that communication models are an important tool for increasing the efficiency of medical services and shaping healthy behavior of the population. The linear model is effective for informing, but its capabilities are limited in influencing behavioral changes. In contrast, modern models, in particular SBCC, PRECEDE-PROCEED and IMB, provide a higher level of efficiency due to their orientation to two-way interaction, taking into account the social context and influencing behavioral factors. It has been proven that the combination of different communication approaches allows not only to disseminate information, but also to achieve sustainable changes in the attitude and behavior of the population. Effective communication also contributes to increasing the level of compliance, trust in the medical system and the quality of medical care. Therefore, the implementation of modern communication models is a necessary condition for the development of the public health system and increasing its effectiveness.

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UDC: 327-048.37(73):330.341(477)

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THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN U.S. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ON THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE: BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND THE VALUES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The purpose of this article is to analyze the structure of international financial assistance provided to Ukraine by the United States since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, examining it in the context of U.S. positioning in the international arena.

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine has created severe challenges for the Ukrainian state and economy. Large-scale destruction of infrastructure, human losses, internal displacement, and other consequences of the invasion have triggered a deep economic crisis. Amid a sharp decline in domestic resources and limited access to international financial markets, international financial assistance has become essential for ensuring the functioning of the state, maintaining economic stability, financing critical social programs, and creating conditions for post-war recovery and development.

The study is based on a structural-functional approach to the analysis of international relations, particularly U.S. assistance to Ukraine in various sectors and its implementation as an instrument of American global leadership.

The article analyzes the structure of U.S. international financial assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Particular attention is devoted to American assistance in the economic, energy, and military sectors, taking into account the *significance of the "Ukrainian factor" in the foreign policy strategies of the administrations of Joe Biden and Donald Trump.*

The paper also substantiates the necessity of maintaining long-term international financial support for Ukraine, directing it toward priority areas such as the restoration of critical infrastructure, economic modernization, support for the social sector, and the strengthening of state institutional capacity.

Keywords: *international financial assistance, U.S. foreign policy, aid to Ukraine, U.S. global leadership, international support for Ukraine.*

ВПЛИВ ЗМІНИ ПОЛІТИЧНОГО КЕРІВНИЦТВА США НА ДИНАМІКУ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ ДОПОМОГИ УКРАЇНІ: МІЖ ПРАГМАТИЗМОМ І ЦІННОСТЯМИ СТАЛОГО РОЗВИТКУ

Метою статті є аналіз структури міжнародної фінансової допомоги, наданої Україні з початку повномасштабного вторгнення зі сторони США крізь призму позиціонування Америки на міжнародній арені.

Повномасштабна війна, розпочата Росією проти України, стала викликом для української держави та її економіки. Масштабні руйнування інфраструктури, людські втрати, внутрішня міграція та інші негативні наслідки повномасштабного вторгнення призвели до глибокої економічної кризи. В умовах різкого скорочення внутрішніх ресурсів та обмеженого доступу до міжнародних фінансових ринків, міжнародна фінансова допомога відіграє вирішальну роль у забезпеченні життєдіяльності країни, підтримці економічної стабільності, фінансуванні критично важливих соціальних програм та створенні умов для подальшого відновлення та розвитку.

Дослідження ґрунтується на структурно-функціональному підході до аналізу міжнародних відносин, зокрема, допомоги Україні зі сторони США у різних сферах та її імплементації як інструменту позиціонування США на світовій арені крізь призму концепції глобального лідерства.

Поряд із вищезазначеними питаннями, автор проаналізував структуру міжнародної фінансової допомоги, наданої Україні з початку повномасштабного вторгнення, зі сторони США крізь призму позиціонування Америки на міжнародній арені. Зокрема, зроблено аналіз американської допомоги Україні у *таких сферах як економічна, енергетична та військова, що обумовлюється важливістю «українського» фактору у зовнішньополітичній стратегії адміністрації Дж. Байдена та Дональда Трампа.*

Також обґрунтовано необхідність продовження міжнародної фінансової підтримки України на довгострокову перспективу, її спрямування на пріоритетні напрями розвитку, такі як відновлення критичної інфраструктури, модернізація економіки, підтримка соціальної сфери та зміцнення інституційної спроможності держави.

Ключові слова: *міжнародна фінансова допомога, зовнішня політика США, міжнародна допомога Україні, глобальне лідерство США, міжнародна підтримка України.*

Introduction. Amid the ongoing war, the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States has acquired particular importance, as Washington's military and diplomatic support directly influences Ukraine's defense capabilities. U.S. military assistance to Ukraine extends beyond bilateral relations and has global significance, since Ukraine currently serves as one of the key pillars of European security.

At the same time, U.S. diplomatic influence plays an important role in forming an international coalition in support of Ukraine, imposing sanctions against Russia, and coordinating the efforts of allies within NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. In this context, analyzing U.S. policy toward Ukraine makes it possible to assess its effectiveness and determine the prospects for further bilateral cooperation. The issue of international financial assistance to Ukraine during and after the war is highly significant and multifaceted. The pace of the country's recovery, economic growth, and integration into European structures directly depends on the scale and effectiveness of such assistance. Under conditions of armed conflict, the study of international assistance remains a top priority for ensuring Ukraine's national security and socio-economic stability.

Topicality of the research. Russia's war against Ukraine has destabilized the international security environment and raised broader questions concerning the future of the global order. The international community is actively involved in supporting Ukraine, with the United States remaining one of the country's most significant partners.

The relevance of this topic is reinforced by changes in U.S. political leadership, which have been accompanied by shifts in foreign policy priorities directly affecting the conditions, volume, and structure of military, humanitarian, and financial assistance to Ukraine. Furthermore, analyzing how changes in U.S. political leadership influence the dynamics of international assistance to Ukraine allows for an assessment of the opportunities, prospects, and risks associated with future international support amid ongoing global transformations.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the structure of international financial assistance provided to Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion from the perspective of U.S. positioning in the international arena.

The objectives of the study are:

1. To examine how changes in U.S. political leadership during the administrations of Joe Biden and Donald Trump affected the intensity and scale of U.S. assistance to Ukraine;

2. To trace the development of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Methodology. The study employs several research methods, including event analysis, secondary data analysis, comparative analysis, and the case study method.

The case study method enables an in-depth understanding of Russia's war against Ukraine. Event analysis, as a qualitative research method, is used to explain and describe developments related to the research topic. Secondary data analysis, particularly the use of official statistics, provided information regarding the economic and military assistance Ukraine received from the United States. Comparative analysis contributed to a deeper understanding of Russia's aggressive policy toward Ukraine.

Literature review. The impact of changes in U.S. political leadership on international assistance to Ukraine is examined in the materials of research centers and publications issued by international organizations. A leading role in contemporary research is played by the Ukraine Support Tracker developed by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which compiles data on financial, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine provided by 41 countries and EU institutions since January 24, 2022.

These data make it possible to analyze the contributions of the United States, the European Union, and other international partners, particularly after political changes in donor states. Publications by Economists for Ukraine and Foreign Ukraine focus on comparing American and European approaches to supporting Ukraine. The balance between pragmatism and democratic values requires further examination. On the one hand, assistance to Ukraine serves as an instrument for deterring Russian aggression; on the other hand, it supports international law, democracy, human rights, and sustainable peace. Under current conditions, these approaches do not always coincide, since changes in U.S. administrations influence foreign policy priorities. Therefore, this article focuses specifically on aspects of the issue that have not yet received sufficient scholarly attention.

The results and discussion. The Biden Administration and U.S. Global Leadership. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine occurred during Joe Biden's presidency. At this time, the U.S. continues to implement the concept of global leadership, which is becoming a mechanism for shaping the modern world order and its hierarchical structure.

Assistance to Ukraine through the prism of U.S. foreign policy strategy should be considered in the following aspects: 1) by sector (economic, humanitarian, energy, military) from the U.S. side; 2) by the scale of the international community's involvement in building and shaping a new world order through the prism of the "balance of threats" concept.

Therefore, the following trend can be observed: official Washington is pursuing not only the idea of achieving global leadership but also uniting the world under America's leadership against a common threat–within the framework of the "balance of threats" concept, which allows for more effective positioning on the international stage.

U.S. assistance to Ukraine has a legal basis:

● The "Ukraine Emergency Assistance Act of 2022" provides nearly $14 billion in funding to respond to the situation in Ukraine in the event of an emergency [5].

● The "Ukraine Additional Appropriations Act of 2023" provides $47.332 billion in emergency funding to support Ukraine's efforts to repel Russian aggression and end the conflict [6].

In January 2023, the "Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Ukraine" was released, prepared by the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID OIG), which includes a report on the assistance provided to Ukraine. According to this document, the Biden administration stated that the U.S. government's efforts to assist and support Ukraine are aimed at achieving core national security objectives by promoting democracy, deterring future aggression, and ensuring a peaceful and stable Europe.

In terms of economic assistance, USAID has programs aimed at promoting the sustainability of Ukraine's agriculture and strengthening its energy and electricity systems, while the U.S. government and the U.S. Agency for Global Media are implementing measures designed to support access to independent information for Ukraine and combat disinformation. USAID also provides direct budget support to the Ukrainian government through the World Bank [4].

USAID provides $4.5 billion in assistance to Ukraine through a World Bank multi-donor trust fund known as the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity in Ukraine (PEACE) Fund. The PEACE Fund reimburses the Government of Ukraine for its expenditures on salaries for civil servants and public employees, workers in the education, health care, and emergency response sectors, social assistance and pension payments, as well as grants to internally displaced persons. As of December 2022, USAID had provided the PEACE Fund with $10.3 billion, including $5.8 billion from previous disbursements [1]. The convening of the International Advisory Group on Ukraine's Defense, initiated by U.S. Secretary of Defense L. Austin, whose first meeting took place on April 26, 2022, can be viewed as an effort to unite the global community in countering a common threat under U.S. leadership and to shape the global order through the lens of the "balance of threats" concept [7].

Subsequently, such meetings came to be known as the "Ramstein" format and are held on a regular basis; notably, "Ramstein-9" took place on February 14, 2023. Ukrainian Defense Minister O. Reznikov described this format of cooperation in support of Ukraine as follows: "Ramstein is becoming a true coalition of the free world in support of Ukraine" [5]. The largest aid package from the U.S. is directed toward Ukraine's military and defense sectors–from 2014 through January 25, 2023, it included over $29.9 billion in security assistance [2].

One of the key mechanisms for "deterring" and countering Russia, as well as assisting Ukraine, has been the sanctions policy pursued by the U.S. and supported by the international community. In particular, the U.S. imposed sanctions against 278 members of the Russian parliament for facilitating referendums on the annexation of four regions of Ukraine, as well as against 14 individuals linked to Russia's defense industry. The U.S. prohibited Russia from repaying debts in foreign currency held in American banks. Major Russian banks have been excluded from the SWIFT international financial messaging system. The UK, EU, and US have imposed bans on the export of dual-use goods, as well as a ban on all Russian flights through the airspace of the US, the UK, the EU, and Canada [8].

Let us summarize Joe Biden's policy on providing aid to Ukraine during his presidency. First, the U.S. positions itself on the international stage as a global leader, implementing a multi-vector policy in which Ukraine currently plays a prominent role. Second, the Biden administration has taken steps to rally the international community under American leadership in defense of Ukraine as part of implementing the "balance of threats" concept in shaping the global order, which is being carried out through the following formats: U.S. and allied sanctions against Russia, meetings of the International Advisory Group on Ukraine's Defense, namely the "Ramstein" meetings. Therefore, during the Biden administration, the "Ukrainian" factor and the provision of assistance to Ukraine serve not only as a vector of U.S. foreign policy strategy but also as an effective tool for achieving the goal of positioning America on the international stage.

The Trump Administration and the New Architecture of U.S. Foreign Policy: Challenges for Ukraine. Donald Trump's return to the office of U.S. president in January 2025 after a four-year hiatus has created an unprecedented situation in American and global politics, as this is the first such instance since Grover Cleveland (1885–1889, 1893–1897) that a president has returned to the White House after a hiatus.

The current policy of President Donald Trump's administration reflects a transformation in the United States' approach to its role in the international environment, particularly regarding transatlantic security and relations with European allies. The U.S. is creating political distance from Europe and demonstrating that European leaders can no longer rely on the U.S. as the primary guarantor and "first line" of defense, and therefore must significantly increase their own defense spending and capabilities.

The U.S. is reviewing its commitments in international organizations and alliances, refusing to fund global initiatives and demanding that allies increase their defense spending. The "America First" policy is exacerbating the crisis in multilateral diplomacy. In addition, the Trump administration is reducing its military presence in some regions while simultaneously employing aggressive rhetoric toward rival nations, which only heightens geopolitical tensions, as the lack of predictability in U.S. foreign policy increases the risk of conflict and destabilizes the international security system.

Washington is attempting to impose compromise solutions on Ukraine–ones that involve territorial concessions or a reduction in the level of military resistance–using both political and media channels. The reduction in military support for Ukraine, including the suspension of arms supplies and restrictions on intelligence sharing, is also a consequence of instability in the information sphere [5]. The PURL program is being implemented, and Ukraine has already received the first batch of weapons provided for under the agreement between the U.S. and NATO.

On September 17, 2025, the Donald Trump administration confirmed that Ukraine would receive weapons from U.S. stockpiles for the first time, funded by NATO allies, under the PURL mechanism. In August, it was reported that Germany and its allies would allocate $500 million to Ukraine through PURL for military equipment, specifically for air defense systems. Partner countries will soon send additional military aid packages [3]. According to a NATO representative, a portion of the U.S.-funded aid has been delivered to Ukraine. The list of Ukraine's priority needs is an initiative launched by the U.S. and NATO in July 2025 to accelerate the delivery of critically important military equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The mechanism's goal is to rapidly provide U.S. weapons and technologies to Ukraine through voluntary contributions from partner countries.

Statistics from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy indicate that U.S. grant-based military aid to Ukraine ended in June 2025. At the same time, Europe sharply increased its aid allocations: by 59 percent for financial and humanitarian aid and by 67 percent for military aid compared to the average for 2022–2024. As a result, the total volume of aid in 2025 remained close to the level of previous years [8]. A new resolution regarding Russian assets frozen worldwide was introduced in the U.S. Senate. The resolution calls on the executive branch and the leaders of the G7 countries and the European Union to confiscate the sovereign assets of the aggressor state, Russia, that are under the jurisdiction of G7 members [9]. It is proposed that the confiscated funds be paid to Ukraine in monthly installments of $10 billion until the frozen assets of the Russian Federation are fully exhausted.

Thus, it can be concluded that during Donald Trump's presidency, the U.S. has been moving unevenly, with pauses, partial resumptions, and attempts to reformulate its involvement through the Reconstruction Investment Fund, which represents not merely traditional aid but rather an investment bet on the future. Europe, on the other hand, has chosen a different path–one of rigorous consistency–with the Ukraine Facility, ERA, MFA, €90 billion in loans for 2026–2027, national programs, and synergy with international banks. Furthermore, in 2025, Europe surpassed the U.S. for the first time in terms of the total volume of support for

Ukraine–financial, humanitarian, and military. Consequently, the role of the U.S. has also changed. Washington is no longer focusing on Europe, but on other regions–the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. This approach means that Ukraine is no longer a central priority for the U.S.

Conclusions. Since February 2025, Ukraine has operated amid a systemic, multifaceted crisis involving military aggression by Russia, instability in international aid, and the transformation of the global security architecture. One of the key features of this period was the re-election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, which led to a shift in Washington's foreign policy direction. The Trump administration's new approaches to transatlantic security, NATO policy, and military support for Ukraine have created an environment of strategic uncertainty. For Ukraine, this means rethinking the model of external support, strengthening national defense and economic capabilities, intensifying communication with allies, and enhancing strategic planning. This becomes possible under conditions of a focused foreign policy, effective public administration, communication transparency, and proper financial monitoring.

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UDC: 069:004.9

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INTERNATIONAL METADATA STANDARDS (DUBLIN CORE, LIDO, CIDOC CRM) AS A SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF UKRAINIAN MUSEUM COLLECTIONS INTO THE GLOBAL DIGITAL SPACE

The article explores the role of international metadata standards (Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM) in the digitalization of Ukrainian museum collections and their integration into the global information space. The specific features of each standard, their advantages, and limitations for describing cultural heritage are analyzed. The OAI-PMH protocol is considered as the main tool for data aggregation. The main challenges and prospects of implementing these models in Ukrainian museum practice in the context of war are outlined, particularly focusing on initiatives to create national registers and the activities of specialized laboratories.

Keywords: *digitalization of museums, metadata, cultural heritage, Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM, Europeana, interoperability, OAI-PMH.*

МІЖНАРОДНІ СТАНДАРТИ МЕТАДАНИХ (DUBLIN CORE, LIDO, CIDOC CRM) ЯК НАУКОВА ОСНОВА ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ МУЗЕЙНИХ ФОНДІВ УКРАЇНИ У ГЛОБАЛЬНИЙ ЦИФРОВИЙ ПРОСТІР

У статті досліджується роль міжнародних стандартів метаданих (Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM) у процесі цифровізації музейних фондів України та їхньої інтеграції до світового інформаційного простору. Проаналізовано специфіку кожного стандарту, їхні переваги та обмеження для опису культурної спадщини. Розглянуто протокол OAI-PMH як основний *інструмент агрегації даних. Окреслено головні виклики та перспективи впровадження цих моделей в українську музейну практику в умовах війни, зокрема на прикладі ініціатив зі створення національних реєстрів та діяльності профільних лабораторій.*

Ключові слова: *цифровізація музеїв, метадані, культурна спадщина, Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM, Europeana, інтероперабельність, OAI-PMH.*

Introduction The modern paradigm of preserving cultural heritage in the context of global digitalization and geopolitical challenges requires the museum community of Ukraine to transition to high-tech methods of accounting, description, and presentation of objects. The process of digitizing museums is not just about scanning or photographing exhibits, but also about accounting for them and the ability to effectively manage them in the digital space [10, p. 10].

Topicality Creating a high-quality digital image of an object without semantically rich metadata turns it into a useless array of information. As experts from the Ukrainian Heritage Monitoring Lab (HeMo) emphasize, digitization is necessarily an "image + metadata". If there is only a photo without associated metadata, it is effectively "digital garbage" [11].

Professional cataloging today shifts the focus from the physical description of the item to its contexts, events, and ideas. The integration of national museum collections into global portals, such as Europeana, directly depends on the application of international data exchange standards. [8]The lack of regulated electronic accounting has escalated during the full-scale war, with estimates suggesting only about 10-15% of Ukraine's archival and museum materials have been digitized [4, p. 86]. Under such conditions, implementing international standards like Dublin Core, LIDO, and CIDOC CRM becomes the scientific basis for saving and integrating heritage, ensuring data interoperability and the possibility of in-depth analysis [2, p. 75].

Literature review The problems of digital transformation in museology and the development of Collection Management Systems (CMS) are widely discussed in contemporary scientific discourse. The fundamental principles of the ontological approach to metadata interoperability (CIDOC CRM) were developed by M. Doerr [1, p. 76]. Information modeling and digital systems architecture have been studied by I. Hensora, who researched the technical analysis of platforms like Omeka and the use of the Dublin Core standard [10, p. 47]. Aspects of consolidating information resources of libraries, archives, and museums were investigated by H. Lypak and N. Kunanets. The experience of preserving Ukrainian heritage during the war is highlighted by the Ukrainian Heritage Monitoring Lab (HeMo) and Y. Kovalenko [4]. However, the practical issue of mapping metadata from basic descriptive schemas to complex event-oriented ontologies in Ukrainian museums remains insufficiently systematized.

Purpose The purpose of the research is to analyze the specifics of international metadata standards (Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM) and data exchange protocols (OAI-PMH) and to justify their role as a fundamental scientific basis for the integration of Ukrainian museum collections into the global digital space

Objectives The main objectives are to investigate the architecture of Dublin Core and LIDO standards; to analyze the semantic capabilities of the CIDOC CRM ontology; to determine the technical requirements of global aggregators (using the Europeana Data Model as an example); and to consider the current state and problems of digitizing Ukrainian museums under martial law.

The results and discussion To ensure the full functioning of an object's "digital twin", a multi-level metadata system is used. The basic level of description is provided by the Dublin Core (DC) standard, which consists of 15 core elements [2]. This standard offers a universal foundation for cataloging, including fields such as *Title*, *Creator*, *Subject*, *Description*, *Date*, *Type*, *Format*, *Identifier*, *Coverage*, etc. [6, p. 945]. An important feature of DC is the "1:1 principle", meaning one metadata record describes only one version of a resource. Despite its ease of implementation and compatibility with most digital platforms (e.g., Omeka), Dublin Core has a significant drawback for museology–it has a "flat" structure. It cannot reflect complex hierarchical relationships, multiple creators, or the multi-stage history of a museum object.

To overcome these limitations, the museum community introduced the LIDO (Lightweight Information Describing Objects) standard. Rooted in CDWA Lite and museumdat, LIDO is a specialized XML schema designed for harvesting metadata from local museum databases into large aggregators like Europeana. [5] The main scientific innovation of LIDO is its event-based approach. An object's history is recorded not through static fields but through events (*Event*): creation, restoration, change of ownership, or exhibition history. This avoids data duplication and clearly structures the artifact's lifecycle. Furthermore, LIDO strongly supports multilingualism (via the xml:lang attribute), which is critical for international integration [5].

The pinnacle of the scientific description of cultural heritage is the CIDOC CRM (ISO 21127) standard. Unlike LIDO, which is an XML harvesting schema, CIDOC CRM is a formal ontology–a conceptual reference model consisting of classes (E-classes) and properties (P-properties) that link them [9; 1]. This approach solves the problem of semantic interoperability. Instead of a simple text field like "Created in 1850", CIDOC CRM builds a semantic graph: *E12 Production -> P108 has produced -> E22 Man-Made Object*. The production event itself has a time attribute: *E12 Production -> P4 has time-span -> E52 Time-Span (1850)*. This deep structuring allows computer systems and artificial intelligence algorithms to "understand" the relationships between artifacts, people, and historical events on the level of Linked Open Data [3].

An important technical link for integration is the OAI-PMH (Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting) protocol. It provides a standardized mechanism for the automated transfer (harvesting) of metadata from local systems to global aggregators [10, p. 42; 7]. While alternatives exist (REST API, SRU/SRW), OAI-PMH remains the de facto international standard in the cultural heritage sector [10, p. 46]. Aggregators impose strict data quality requirements. For integration into Europeana, the EDM (Europeana Data Model) is used, combining principles from Dublin Core and LIDO. According to the Europeana Publishing Framework, digital objects are classified by tiers. Achieving higher tiers requires providing metadata with links to controlled vocabularies (e.g., Getty AAT, Wikidata), using language tags, and supplying high-quality images with explicitly defined open licenses (e.g., Creative Commons) [8].

In the Ukrainian context, integration is complicated by active warfare and a historical lag in digitalization [4, p. 79]. The lack of proper accounting during the mass evacuation of collections can lead to an irreversible loss of the connection between an object and its documentation. To address this, initiatives like the Register of the Museum Fund of Ukraine ("eMuseum") have been launched to create a centralized management system with both internal and public components [12]. Significant contributions to saving and digitizing collections are made by independent initiatives, notably the Ukrainian Heritage Monitoring Lab (HeMo) [11]. The lab's specialists have developed mobile digitization centers that create high-quality digital copies (stacking photography, 3D models) according to international standards, including the use of colorcheckers and CIDOC CRM methodologies. However, there is still a lack of a comprehensive digitization strategy and adapted national standards, complicating the transition from paper inventory books to modern CMS platforms [4, p. 75, 80].

Conclusions The integration of Ukrainian museums into the global digital space is a complex, multi-level process whose scientific foundation relies on the implementation of international metadata standards (Dublin Core, LIDO, CIDOC CRM). This multi-level information infrastructure makes it possible to structure descriptions, ensure semantic consistency, and make Ukrainian heritage machine-readable. Using event-oriented models and standardized aggregation protocols (OAI-PMH, EDM) is a mandatory condition for presenting Ukrainian culture on platforms like Europeana. Under the conditions of Russian armed aggression, introducing electronic accounting with high-quality metadata ceases to be purely a scientific or technological task–it becomes a critical necessity for saving national memory, enabling its seamless identification, and preserving it for future generations.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL TIES

This article presents a theoretical analysis of the psychological mechanisms of digital communication and their impact on the transformation of social relations. The phenomenon of the "digital person" is examined in the context of the dichotomy between an individual's online and offline existence. It is determined that digital communication serves a compensatory function, allowing individuals to overcome social isolation – particularly in wartime – by fostering collective emotional support on social media. The advantages and risks of the digitalization of interpersonal interaction are outlined, specifically the asynchronous nature of communication and the threat that deep relationships may be replaced by superficial connections.

Keywords: *digitalization, social media, the digital person, psychological impact, social connections, digital communication, compensatory function.*

ПСИХОЛОГІЧНИЙ ВПЛИВ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ МЕРЕЖ НА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЮ СУСПІЛЬНИХ ЗВ'ЯЗКІВ

У статті проведено теоретичний аналіз психологічних механізмів цифрової комунікації та їхнього впливу на трансформацію суспільних зв'язків. Розглянуто феномен «цифрової людини» в контексті дихотомії онлайн- та офлайн-буття особистості. Визначено, що цифрова комунікація виконує компенсаторну функцію, дозволяючи долати соціальну ізоляцію, зокрема в умовах війни, через формування колективної емоційної підтримки в соціальних мережах. Окреслено переваги та ризики цифровізації міжособистісної взаємодії, зокрема асинхронність спілкування та загрозу підміни глибоких стосунків поверхневими зв'язками.

Ключові слова: *цифровізація, соціальні мережі, цифрова людина, психологічний вплив, суспільні зв'язки, цифрова комунікація, компенсаторна функція.*

Introduction. Recent trends indicate that digitalization is not merely a matter of following global trends, but rather a transformation of the civilizational dimension and the individual's living space, where business communication is just one form of interaction. Beyond the business sphere, the adoption of digital technologies significantly impacts other areas of life, including educational and administrative services and an individual's social life [8; 9].

When discussing the business sector, it is important to understand the main trends currently prevalent among the selected target audience. Their transience is both an advantage and a disadvantage. That is, the rapid change in value orientations in the digital space stimulates a shift in society's fundamental demands [8].

In the process of preparing this study, specifically for structuring the research plan, systematizing bibliographic sources, and refining the conceptual framework, artificial intelligence tools were utilized.

Topicality of the research. Continuing the topic of marketing and target audience assessment, it is important to note that, in addition to convenience for businesses, the adoption of new technologies offers benefits to consumers. There are personalization and augmented reality systems designed to bring customers closer to the products they are interested in. Thus, the more convenient and advanced an online service is, the more competitive the business becomes [3]. Significant contributions to this field have been made by researchers such as Rudenko M.V., Kirilyuk E.M., Baribina Y.O., Dugienko N.O., Taranenko O.O., Kostin M.D., Kostin Y.D., and Chobitok V.I., who have studied various aspects of marketing digitalization [1; 5; 8; 11].

When discussing the social component of the shift in the civilizational dimension with the emergence and adoption of digital technologies, the primary focus of contemporary research lies in changes to the environment and modes of communication. Important works on this topic include publications by the following scholars: Yarema I., Ponomariova N., Mandych O., Babko N., Lyshenko M., Shymchenko L., Miroshnichenko D., Kostenko D., Gasanenko T. [2; 6; 7; 12; 15].

The purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical analysis of the psychological mechanisms of digital communication and to examine how the civilizational dimension is being reshaped in the context of digitalization.

To achieve this, the following *objectives* were addressed:

1. To examine the phenomenon of the “digital person” in the context of online and offline existence.
2. To identify the compensatory functions and psychological risks of digital interaction.
3. To analyze the impact of social media on collective support and social integration during wartime.

Results and Discussion. The issue of human coexistence in the online and offline worlds is currently a major focus of academic discourse. Researchers identify the central issue as the dichotomy between the co-organized existence of an individual’s physical and virtual lives [3]. In addition to the digital dimension, which is a virtual environment, the term “digital person” has entered common usage. This concept was introduced in 2001 by American writer Mark Prensky to describe the generation born after the digital revolution [4; 16]. Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka was interested in this issue, specifically the conglomerate of human statuses, the primary one being, in fact, the digital human [3].

The concept of status implies social interaction as its foundational environment. The phenomenon of digital communication is realized through interpersonal interaction facilitated by digital technologies [13]. The primary motivation for this type of relationship is the maintenance of existing social ties or the formation of new ones despite geographical distance. Often, such communication serves a compensatory function and allows individuals to overcome social isolation with less effort. It is important to understand that such communication only partially satisfies the need and cannot fully replace face-to-face communication [13].

As previously mentioned, digital communication is facilitated by digital technologies: it utilizes online channels, public accounts, group chats, and bots [15]. Digital communication is asynchronous, meaning it does not require a specific person to be constantly available or to respond to messages immediately. The ability to maintain communication links with multiple centers simultaneously while being remote is the main advantage of digital communication [15].

Within the scope of our theoretical analysis, interpersonal communication via social media plays a significant role. A particularly relevant aspect is the use of digital technologies during wartime. As noted by researchers, particularly S. Zaseikin, posts sharing personal stories of wartime experiences have contributed to the formation of collective memory and emotional support [14; 17]. There are also studies on the role of digital technologies in the social integration and reintegration of people affected by war [10; 14].

Conclusions. The theoretical analysis conducted indicates that digitalization has transformed social connections, making virtual communication an integral part of modern civilization. It has been established that the phenomenon of the "digital person" is characterized by the dichotomy of simultaneously inhabiting both online and offline spaces. The psychological impact of social networks is twofold: on the one hand, they serve a compensatory function, helping to overcome isolation (especially in wartime by fostering collective emotional support); on the other hand, they create the risk of replacing deep interpersonal relationships with superficial "weak ties." Prospects for further research lie in studying the impact of artificial intelligence on the authenticity of human communication and the ethical aspects of PR technologies in the digital sphere.

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BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NAMING MODELS OF UKRAINIAN INITIATIVES IN DENMARK

The article explores the linguistic naming strategies of Ukrainian NGOs in the Kingdom of Denmark. A comparative analysis of ergonyms founded by diaspora representatives and Danish activists is conducted. The role of transliteration as a tool for asserting cultural subjectivity and marking the linguistic landscape is identified. The advantages and risks of using various linguistic models in the context of public diplomacy are outlined.

Keywords: *ergonym, public diplomacy, Denmark, naming, transliteration, organisation, linguistic landscape.*

МІЖ ІНТЕГРАЦІЄЮ ТА ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЮ: ПОРІВНЯЛЬНИЙ АНАЛІЗ МОДЕЛЕЙ НАЗВ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ ІНІЦІАТИВ У ДАНІЇ

У статті досліджено мовні стратегії неймінгу українських громадських організацій у Королівстві Данія. Проведено порівняльний аналіз ергонімів, заснованих представниками діаспори та данськими активістами. Виявлено роль транслітерації питомо українських слів як інструменту утвердження культурної суб’єктності та маркування лінгвістичного ландшафту. Окреслено переваги та ризики використання різних мовних моделей у контексті публічної дипломатії.

Ключові слова: *ергонім, публічна дипломатія, Данія, неймінг, транслітерація, організація, лінгвістичний ландшафт.*

Introduction. Modern public diplomacy is increasingly shaped by non-state actors who use soft power to mobilize international solidarity and influence transnational perceptions. In the wake of mass migration of Ukrainians, the rapid emergence of diaspora-led initiatives presents a compelling case study of how cultural groups communicate their core narratives to host societies. A critical, yet overlooked, element of this strategic communication is organizational nomenclature, where linguistic framing dictates whether a nation is portrayed as a passive recipient of aid or as an active geopolitical actor. This paper contextualizes these dynamics within Denmark, demonstrating how specific linguistic choices in ergonyms bridge the gap between reactive integration and proactive national branding.

Topicality. In today's geopolitical conditions, the role of public diplomacy as a tool of "soft power" is becoming crucial for strengthening security alliances and sustainable international support for Ukraine. After the mass forced migration of millions of Ukrainians to European countries, we are observing the formation of a network of local ambassadors of Ukraine from among the old (until 2022) or new (after 2022) diaspora. These are citizens of Ukraine who most often do not have previous experience in public diplomacy campaigns, so their activities are primarily intuitive and reactive, built on an inner sense of duty to the country. In particular, in Denmark, by 2022, 12 civil society organizations representing the interests of the Ukrainian community operated. After the full-scale invasion during 2022-2025, 31 new organizations were founded by the Ukrainian diaspora, which is 2.5 times higher than the number by February 2022. Given that the name of an organization, or ergonim, is the first step in the communication of Ukrainian organizations with Danish society, there was a need to analyze the proper names of organizations in order to investigate their impact on the perception of Ukraine as an object or subject of international relations. The relevance of the study is due to the need to analyze how the linguistic labeling of Ukrainian diaspora initiatives can promote or hinder the advancement of Ukrainian interests, using the example of Denmark.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The theoretical basis of the study is based on works on onomastics, in particular its section – ergonomies. According to the definition of Yu. O. Karpenko, ergonomies covers a huge group of names – from parties, societies, factories, educational institutions to cinemas, cooperatives, shops, firms, etc. [1]. These are the least studied units of the onomasticon, although today we can observe a kind of "ergonomies boom" – an explosion of interest in the names of firms, trade organizations, banks, various service institutions, enterprises, etc. According to O. O. Selivanova, ergonomies implement the following functions: attractive; informative; suggestive (influence on the subconscious); emotional (influence on the emotional sphere of consumers for advertising purposes); evaluative (establishing a positive attitude towards the object of the name); aesthetic (education of understanding and perception of the beautiful, useful, prestigious); identification [2. p. 193]. Ergonymy as a section of onomastics considers the name as a complex semantic structure that has nominative and pragmatic functions. However, in the context of international relations, naming takes on a deeper meaning. As Stanko Nik notes in his work "The Use of Language in Diplomacy", language in this area is not only a tool for conveying thoughts or a means of communication. It is "the very essence of the diplomatic vocation". [4, p. 39-44] According to this theory, every linguistic choice in the diplomatic space is an act of recognition, marking territory or establishing a hierarchy of relations. In public diplomacy, the name of an organization becomes the first and most important message [3]. The use of a certain language in ergonymy signals the political position and identity of the actor. Thus, the naming of diaspora organizations in Denmark can be considered as part of "diplomatic linguistics". Dmytro Kuleba, in his work "War for Reality," also emphasizes the importance of national branding, noting that the ability of communities to "attract" attention through cultural codes is the basis of modern soft power [5, p. 253-260]

The purpose of the article is to analyze their own names/ergonyms of Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Denmark by language. Objectives of the article:

1. Classify organizations founded by Ukrainians in Denmark based on the language of the organization's own name.
2. Compare the names of pro-Ukrainian organizations in Denmark founded by Ukrainians and Danes.
3. Identify the advantages of using transliterated Ukrainian names by diaspora organizations as a tool of Ukraine's public diplomacy in the world.

The results and discussion. The study is based on a database that was collected based on open data.Central Business Register of Denmark (CVR) for the purpose of analyzing the activities of Ukrainian diaspora organizations. During data collection, it was identified that some of the organizations containing the root Ukrain- in their names were founded by Danes to support Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion. Therefore, in this article, a list of organizations was formed for analysis: two groups of ergonyms: 43 names of organizations founded by representatives of the diaspora, and 69 names of associations created by Danish citizens to support Ukraine [6; 7].

Quantitative distribution and semantic analysis of names. To facilitate this analysis, two groups of ergonyms were identified: 43 organizations founded by diaspora representatives and 69 associations created by Danish citizens in support of Ukraine. The general structure by language is presented in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Quantitative analysis of names (ergonyms) of organizations by language among those founded by Ukrainians and Danes in Denmark

According to Figure 1, we can conclude that among Danish organizations that are aimed at helping Ukraine, there is almost an equal distribution between the use of English and Danish in names. Most likely, when choosing a name, two factors were taken into account: the clarity of the name for potential local donors (therefore, they chose the local language) or accessibility for Ukrainians and international donors, (therefore, they preferred English). When semantic analysis is performed, we see that 67 organizations (93%) founded by Danes contain a direct nomination through the root "Ukrain-" and are mostly in the form of a call to action. In this semantic model, Ukraine acts as a passive object of humanitarian aid, which is typical for humanitarian diplomacy. For example, Støt *Ukraine (Support Ukraine)* – a declarative name typical of Danish initiatives, which marks an exclusively objective approach to Ukraine. *Help Ukrainian children* – the name of an organization that focuses on a specific charitable goal (helping children), which helps attract local donors, but narrows the diplomatic potential of the initiative.

Instead, Ukrainian public organizations in Denmark have more diverse naming strategies, which have been grouped into the following types: integration, advocacy, and identity preservation. **Integration strategy:** 56% of organizations founded in Denmark use Danish as the name of their organization. The purpose of these organizations includes Ukrainian communities, military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, as well as 1 organization that advocates for Ukrainian interests in Denmark. Such a choice indicates the priority of institutional integration, the desire to gain the trust of local municipalities and residents. However, it is worth adding that there is currently no data that would reveal information about the duration of the founders' stay in Denmark before the organization was founded, so the choice of Danish as the language of the ergonim may not be due to the desire for integration, but rather its consequence in previous years. Of the striking examples, these are local communities of Ukrainians *Foreningen for ukrainere i Assens (Association of Ukrainians in Assens), Foreningen for ukrainere i Odense (Association of Ukrainians in Odense), Venskabs forening for ukrainere i Thy (Friendship Society of Ukrainians in Thy).*These organizations offer, among their activities: language courses, cultural events, and entertainment and educational activities for children.

Advocacy strategy. A substantial contrast is observed in naming language pReferences, with English being utilized by 50.7% of Danish-led initiatives, whereas only 16% of diaspora organizations adopt this approach. Danish organizations were mentioned above, and most likely English is used in the name as a language of global communication and an intermediary between Ukrainian and Danish. Ukrainian organizations use English three times less. Among the organizations that have English names, 2 organizations that are the largest in Denmark in the field of advocacy – *Ukraine House in Denmark and Ukrainian Dialogues.* From this we can conclude that English-language names are used to quickly attract international attention and readiness to work in the global media space. It should be noted that the above-mentioned organizations also use English as the main language of their public communication. The main disadvantage of such a strategy is the risk of an “alienation effect”, when the local community perceives the organization as temporary or “transit”.

Identity preservation strategy. While transliterated or hybrid names account for only 28% of the total, they represent a unique linguistic tool used exclusively by diaspora organizations. Using names such as *Lastivka, Rodovid* or *Faino* serves as a marker of the linguistic landscape. It is an invitation for Danish society to interact with the Ukrainian language as a living and distinctive system. The use of Ukrainian words in Latin transforms the name from an information "label" into a tool of public diplomacy and cultural influence by creating a space for communication, explaining the word and its meaning. According to Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power*, language and naming carry the capacity to define our world. As he notes, 'there is no social agent who does not aspire... to have the power to name and to create the world through naming' [8, p. 105], highlighting how naming acts as a tool to construct our shared reality. Therefore, the presence of Ukrainian words in transliteration performs two functions at once: strengthening the connection with Ukrainians abroad and marking the interaction between Denmark and Ukraine. This strategy has its risks, namely the "barrier of misunderstanding", when foreigners are unable to decipher the symbolic meaning of the word. That is why the most balanced form is hybrid ergonyms, since they retain the identity, but explain their purpose in Danish or English. For example, Ukrainian *School Rodovid* (Ukrainian School of Genealogy) is a hybrid ergonim that successfully combines the functional clarity of the Danish language and the authenticity of the Ukrainian concept of "genealogy" for children in the diaspora. Another example is the organization *Faino (Good, dialectism)* – a transliterated name of an organization that uses a Ukrainian word, also a dialectism, without additional explanation, which would have no semantic meaning for a Dane.

Conclusions. An analysis of the language strategies of Ukrainian diaspora organizations in Denmark proves that the choice of the language of the name has the potential to become a tool of public diplomacy and a direct introduction to Ukrainian culture. Although the practical needs of integration force organizations to use Danish more often (56%), it is transliterated and hybrid names (28%) that perform the function of promoting Ukrainian subjectivity. Compared to the "objective" approach of Danish initiatives, the diaspora marks the linguistic landscape of Scandinavia through naming, transforming the name from a "label," a geographical attachment, to an instrument of cultural influence. As diplomatic theory states, language is the "essence of diplomacy", and for the successful promotion of national interests it is necessary to combine the functionality of the Danish language with the uniqueness of Ukrainian linguistic markers. The optimal model is hybrid naming, which provides a balance between identity and integration.

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UDC: 327:316.77:004.738.5(477)

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF UKRAINE'S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON TRUST IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

This article explores how Ukraine's information environment has changed during the full-scale war and examines how social media influences trust in state institutions. Particular attention is paid to changes in media consumption between 2021 and 2025, especially the move from traditional media to messenger-based platforms. Drawing on data from sociological studies conducted by USAID-Internews and KIIS, the study shows a rapid increase in the use of social media as the main source of news and highlights the growing dominance of Telegram within Ukraine's information space.

The article also addresses the cognitive gap between how people perceive their media literacy and their actual ability to verify information. This gap increases vulnerability to disinformation and affects how audiences interpret news content. In addition, the study identifies a link between the rising popularity of digital platforms and changes in trust toward state institutions. It is argued that the dominance of informal communication channels in wartime creates new challenges for information security and state resilience.

Keywords: *media consumption, social networks, Telegram, information environment, trust, state institutions, media literacy.*

ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНОГО СЕРЕДОВИЩА УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ ВІЙНИ: ВПЛИВ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ МЕРЕЖ НА ДОВІРУ ДО ДЕРЖАВНИХ ІНСТИТУЦІЙ

У статті досліджено трансформацію інформаційного середовища України в умовах повномасштабної війни та проана-

лізовано вплив соціальних мереж на рівень довіри до державних інституцій. Особливу увагу приділено зміні моделей медіаспоживання у 2021-2025 роках, зокрема переходу від традиційних медіа до месенджер-центричних платформ. На основі даних досліджень USAID-Internews та КМІС виявлено стрімке зростання ролі соціальних мереж як основного джерела новин та встановлено домінування Telegram у структурі інформаційного споживання.

Проаналізовано феномен когнітивного розриву між суб'єктивною оцінкою медіаграмотності та реальними навичками верифікації інформації, що підсилює вразливість аудиторії до дезінформації. Встановлено взаємозв'язок між зростанням популярності цифрових платформ і зміною рівня довіри до державних інституцій. Обґрунтовано, що домінування неформалізованих каналів комунікації в умовах війни створює нові виклики для інформаційної безпеки та державної стійкості.

Ключові слова: *медіаспоживання, соціальні мережі, Telegram, інформаційне середовище, довіра, державні інституції, медіаграмотність.*

Introduction. Russia's armed aggression and full-scale invasion in 2022 became a catalyst for profound changes in Ukraine's information environment. Driven by an urgent need for instant access to news and security updates, Ukrainian audiences rapidly shifted from traditional media consumption to digital and messenger-based platforms. Consequently, social media superseded television as the primary source of information, significantly transforming society's perception of political and social reality.

Topicality of the research. The stability of state institutions during wartime is inextricably linked to the effectiveness of public communication and the level of societal trust. However, evolving media consumption patterns between 2021 and 2025 reveal a number of challenges that necessitate deeper scholarly attention. The increasing dominance of social media as a primary news source has coincided with noticeable shifts in public trust toward state institutions. According to the USAID-Internews study Ukrainian Media, News Consumption, and Trust, the proportion of users relying on social media for news has grown rapidly in recent years [1]. Simultaneously, surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology demonstrate considerable fluctuations in public trust in major state institutions throughout the period of the full-scale invasion [2]. Despite the availability of separate studies on media consumption and institutional trust, the interplay between the transformation of the information environment, vulnerability to manipulation, and changes in public trust remains insufficiently explored.

Literature Review

The transformation of the information environment and its influence on public consciousness has attracted considerable attention from both international and Ukrainian scholars. Fundamental aspects of media functioning in crisis situations, particularly during wartime, are explored in the works of Heorhii Pocheptsov, who conceptualizes the media sphere as an arena of cognitive warfare in which trust in information sources becomes a crucial element of state resilience [3]. His research emphasizes that, in times of conflict, information performs not only an informative role but also strategic and manipulative functions.

An important contribution to the study of the digital transformation of media ecosystems has been made by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Its annual reports document the global trend toward the "platformization" of news consumption, whereby social media and messaging applications increasingly displace traditional media as the primary channels of information dissemination [4]. However, these studies are largely macro-level in scope and pay limited attention to the specific conditions of states experiencing active armed conflict, particularly Ukraine, where the information environment is undergoing rapid and large-scale transformation.

Issues related to changes in media consumption, trust in information sources, and the audience's ability to critically evaluate news content within the Ukrainian context are systematically examined in annual analytical reports prepared by Internews with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In particular, the study *"Ukrainian Media, News Consumption, and Trust in 2025"* [1] traces the shift of audiences toward digital platforms and highlights the growing role of messaging applications as primary news sources. Of particular value is the combination of respondents' self-assessments with practical testing designed to evaluate their ability to recognize manipulative content, allowing for a more objective assessment of actual media literacy levels.

Despite the availability of substantial sociological data and theoretical research, the relationship between the rapid transition toward a messenger-centered model of news consumption and shifts in trust toward state institutions between 2021 and 2025 remains insufficiently explored. Most existing studies focus either on quantitative indicators of media consumption or on general trust ratings without examining them as interconnected elements of a broader information system. It is this research gap that the present study seeks to address by integrating findings from different monitoring initiatives to provide a comprehensive understanding of the transformation of Ukraine's information environment.

Purpose. This article aims to analyze the transformation of Ukraine's information environment between 2021 and 2025 and to determine how evolving media consumption patterns have influenced the dynamics of institutional trust.

Objectives:

- to examine shifts in the consumption of various media types between 2021 and 2025;
- to highlight the role of Telegram as the dominant channel for news consumption;
- to assess the discrepancy between self-perceived media literacy and actual information verification skills;
- to explore the relationship between the dominance of social media and shifts in trust toward state institutions.

Methodology. The study is based on a systematic analysis of secondary data obtained from sociological surveys conducted by USAID-Internews and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) [1], [2]. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of statistical indicators from the pre-invasion period and the period of martial law was employed to identify the interplay between information sources and levels of public trust.

Results and Discussion. The Transformation of Media Consumption (2021-2025). The dynamics of Ukraine's information environment during 2021-2025 demonstrate a radical departure from pre-war patterns of media consumption. While a relative balance between traditional and digital channels still persisted in 2021, the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 became an exogenous shock that sharply accelerated the transition toward a digitally oriented model of information consumption.

According to the USAID-Internews study [1], television remained one of the leading news sources in 2022, with an audience reach of approximately 46%. By 2025, however, this figure had declined to 33%, indicating the gradual marginalization of traditional broadcasting. This trend can largely be explained by the linear nature of television, which, under wartime conditions, is unable to compete with digital platforms in terms of the speed, flexibility, and continuity of information delivery.

In contrast, social media platforms demonstrated rapid expansion: the proportion of users receiving news through social networks increased from 63% in 2021 to 86% in 2025. Importantly, this growth was observed not only among younger audiences but also among older age groups, for whom digital platforms became an essential source of real-time information regarding security threats and wartime developments. This shift reflects the emergence of a new universal model of media consumption in which social media functions as the dominant channel of news dissemination.

At the same time, online news outlets have maintained relatively stable positions within the information environment. During 2021-2025, public trust in online news resources fluctuated between 50% and 55%, which allows them to be regarded as a comparatively stable segment of the media sphere aimed at audiences seeking more analytical, verified, and in-depth content than that typically available through short-form communication on social media platforms.

The Dominance of Telegram. An analysis of digital platform popularity demonstrates the rapid consolidation of Telegram as a central element of Ukraine's media consumption landscape. According to data from the USAID-Internews study [1], the growth in the use of Telegram as a news source has been particularly significant: while only 20% of respondents relied on the platform in 2021, this figure increased to 60% in 2022 and reached 72% by 2025. Such a more than threefold increase reflects a fundamental transformation in audience behavior and confirms the transition toward a messenger-centric model of information dissemination.

Telegram's expanding influence can be attributed to several functional advantages, including the speed of information distribution, ease of access, and the absence of rigid algorithmic moderation. In wartime conditions, these characteristics make the platform especially attractive for users seeking immediate updates on security threats and current developments. However, the same features simultaneously generate substantial systemic risks for the information environment.

The anonymity of a considerable number of Telegram channels, combined with the absence of transparent regulatory mechanisms, creates favorable conditions for the dissemination of manipulative or unreliable content. As a result, official governmental communication is compelled to compete for public attention within the same information space as unverified sources. In the context of insufficient media literacy, such competition complicates the formation of sustainable institutional trust and increases societal vulnerability to disinformation and information influence operations.

The Cognitive Gap. The transformation of news consumption channels has exposed a significant discrepancy between individuals' self-perceived media literacy and their actual ability to critically evaluate information. Data from the USAID-Internews study [1], based on a comparison between respondents' self-assessments and the results of practical testing, reveal the existence of a substantial cognitive imbalance. In particular, approximately 81% of Ukrainians assess their level of media literacy as relatively high and believe they are capable of independently identifying disinformation. However, the results of practical testing demonstrate a markedly different reality: in 2025, only 6% of respondents successfully completed the test by fully recognizing hidden manipulative techniques.

This discrepancy indicates that confidence in one's ability to detect misinformation does not necessarily correspond to actual analytical competence. By overestimating their resilience to manipulation, users become increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated influence operations within digital platforms and messaging applications. Consequently, low levels of practical media literacy, combined with high self-confidence, evolve into a systemic challenge for the information environment, as users may unconsciously contribute to the dissemination of disinformation. In the long term, this process distorts public perceptions of state institutions and weakens the stability of institutional trust.

Media Consumption and Trust in State Institutions. An analysis of trust indicators reveals significant shifts in patterns of institutional trust among Ukrainians. According to KIIS, in 2022 there was a sharp increase in trust in state institutions: trust in the President of Ukraine reached 84%, whereas Telegram at that time recorded only 14% trust [2]. However, beginning in 2023, this trend started to shift towards social media platforms. By 2025, trust in the President as a state institution had gradually declined to 53%, while Telegram strengthened its position, reaching 72% trust, thereby surpassing official government institutions in perceived credibility.

Equally important is that this high level of trust is accompanied by the platform's dominance in news consumption: as of 2025, 72% of respondents also reported using Telegram as a primary source of news. Thus, Telegram has become a dominant platform in shaping public opinion, overtaking traditional state communication channels across key indicators.

Conclusions. The transformation of Ukraine's information environment between 2021 and 2025 reflects a shift toward a digitally oriented, messenger-centric model of media consumption. In response to the challenges of digital warfare, Ukraine strengthened its regulatory framework in the field of media and information security in 2022, particularly through the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Media," which reflects attempts to adapt state communication policy to new informational realities.[5]. Within this context, Telegram has increasingly functioned as a substitute for traditional media and official communication channels. The rapid growth of the platform's influence during the full-scale invasion has contributed to a reconfigured information security environment, where high trust in the messenger (72%) coexists with critically low levels of practical media literacy (6%), contributing to the erosion of institutional trust and stability.

In parallel, trust in key state institutions has demonstrated a declining trend; trust in the President of Ukraine decreased from 84% in 2022 to 53% in 2025. The anonymity and decentralised structure of digital communication further complicate processes of information verification and credibility assessment.

As a result, the contemporary media landscape requires new state communication and verification strategies. The speed and emotional immediacy of content on Telegram increasingly outweigh the perceived authority of official sources, creating structural challenges for national informational resilience.

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UDC: 327.88 : 004.056

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INFORMATIONAL REINTEGRATION OF THE TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS A CHALLENGE FOR UKRAINIAN STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The article examines the issue of informational reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in the context of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war. The role of strategic communications in countering Russian propaganda, strengthening informational resilience and restoring the Ukrainian information space in the occupied territories is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the impact of digital media, information isolation and state communication policy on the reintegration process. The study identifies the main challenges and prospects for the development of Ukrainian strategic communications in the context of contemporary information warfare.

Keywords: *Ukraine, strategic communications, temporarily occupied territories, informational reintegration, information warfare, Russian propaganda, information security.*

ІНФОРМАЦІЙНА РЕІНТЕГРАЦІЯ ТИМЧАСОВО ОКУПОВАНИХ ТЕРИТОРІЙ ЯК ВИКЛИК ДЛЯ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ СТРАТЕГІЧНИХ КОМУНІКАЦІЙ

У статті досліджується проблема інформаційної реінтеграції тимчасово окупованих територій України в умовах повномасштабної російсько-української війни. Проаналізовано роль стратегічних комунікацій у протидії російській пропаганді, формуванні інформаційної стійкості населення та відновленні українського інформаційного простору на тимчасово окупованих територіях. Окрему увагу приділено впливу цифрових медіа, інформаційної ізоляції та комунікаційної політики *держави на процес реінтеграції. Визначено основні виклики та перспективи розвитку українських стратегічних комунікацій у контексті сучасної інформаційної війни.*

Ключові слова: *Україна, стратегічні комунікації, тимчасово окуповані території, інформаційна реінтеграція, інформаційна війна, російська пропаганда, інформаційна безпека.*

Introduction. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, significantly transformed the security, political and informational space of the state. Following the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the issue of the temporarily occupied territories (hereinafter – TOT) acquired an even greater scale, encompassing new regions of Ukraine (parts of the Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions) and intensifying challenges for the state information policy.

Under contemporary wartime conditions, control over the information space has become one of the key instruments of influence on the population of the occupied territories. The Russian Federation systematically uses propaganda, disinformation, censorship, informational isolation as components of hybrid warfare against Ukraine. In the TOT, the Ukrainian media space is being displaced, Ukrainian information resources are being blocked, local media are being replaced with Russian propaganda platforms and an alternative informational reality is being formed. Under such conditions, the informational reintegration of the population of the TOT becomes an important element of state policy and a component of the future de-occupation and restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. The role of strategic communications aimed at maintaining informational connections between the state and citizens residing in the occupied territories of Southern and Eastern Ukraine acquires particular importance.

The topicality of the research is determined by the growing role of the informational factor in modern wars and the necessity to develop an effective system of Ukrainian strategic communications regarding the temporarily occupied territories. The Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated that the information space is no less important than the military or political spheres, since media, digital platforms and information campaigns shape public perception of events, political loyalty and public opinion.

After 2014, the Russian Federation consistently created its own information infrastructure in the occupied territories aimed at legitimizing the occupation authorities, spreading anti-Ukrainian narratives and integrating the population of the TOT into the Russian political and cultural space. With the beginning of full-scale war in 2022, these processes intensified significantly through total control over television broadcasting, radio, mobile communications, internet providers and social media in the occupied territories, particularly through strengthening the activities of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media of Russia (Roskomnadzor).

The purpose of the article is to analyze the informational reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as one of the key challenges for Ukrainian strategic communications under conditions of full-scale war.

To achieve the stated purpose, **the following tasks** should be completed:

1. To analyze the role of strategic communications in the system of Ukraine's information security.
2. To examine the peculiarities of the functioning of the information space in the temporarily occupied territories.
3. To identify the main instruments of Russian propaganda in the TOT.
4. To characterize the problems and prospects of informational reintegration of the occupied territories.
5. To analyze the role of media and digital platforms in the process of restoring the Ukrainian information space.

The methodological basis of the research consists of methods of analysis and synthesis, content analysis of media materials, the comparative method, as well as monitoring of the information space of the temporarily occupied territories. The research uses materials from Ukrainian and international media, analytical reports, official documents and scientific publications in the field of strategic communications, information security and information warfare.

The issues of information warfare, strategic communications, and information security of Ukraine are studied in the works of Heorhii Pocheptsov, Yevhen Mahda, Oksana Moroz, Peter Pomerantsev, Jade McGlynn and other Ukrainian and foreign scholars who analyze the mechanisms of propaganda, disinformation and media influence under conditions of hybrid warfare. Considerable attention to the informational dimension of the temporarily occupied territories is paid by the The Center for Countering Disinformation (CPD under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine), "Detector Media", the Institute of Mass Information (IMI), the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence and EUvsDisinfo. Nevertheless, the issue of informational reintegration of the TOT specifically as a component of Ukraine's strategic communications remains insufficiently studied and requires further scientific analysis.

Theoretical foundations of strategic communications in the context of information security. In the modern security environment, strategic communications are considered one of the key instruments of state policy and national security. Today, there are more than 300 definitions of the concept of "strategic communications". In particular, NATO StratCom defines strategic communications as *the coordinated use of the communicative capabilities of the state – public diplomacy, public relations, information and psychological operations – to achieve political and security objectives* [5, p.8].

In the "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication" strategic communications are defined *as a toolkit aimed at shaping public opinion and influencing societal behavior through communication strategies* [13]. In this context, strategic communications are considered a component of national security and the foreign policy of the state.

The main documents defining Ukraine's strategic communications at the international level are the Communication Strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Public Diplomacy Strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for 2021-2025. The Communication Strategy states that *effective state communication acquires particular importance under crisis conditions, since the level of citizens' trust in state institutions directly influences the resilience of society* [2]. At the same time, these documents practically lack a separate communication strategy regarding the temporarily occupied territories, which actualizes the need for further development of state policy and improved practices in this direction.

Information control of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories. Researchers of information warfare emphasize that the *modern conflict between Ukraine and Russia has not only a military but also a large-scale informational dimension that encompasses the Ukrainian, Russian and international media spaces* [12]. Information control has become one of the main instruments of Russian occupation policy in the temporarily occupied territories.

According to the study conducted by "Detector Media" and the Centre for Information Resilience and published in 2024, a separate network of pro-Russian media resources and Telegram channels functioning as a centralized ecosystem of Russian propaganda has formed in the occupied territories. Within the framework of the study, 232 825 interconnections between pro-Russian web domains and approximately 200 active Telegram channels systematically spreading anti-Ukrainian narratives were identified [4]. This data demonstrates that Russian informational influence in the TOT is not fragmented but functions as a coordinated digital ecosystem aimed at shaping a controlled informational environment and limiting access to alternative narratives.

Similar conclusions regarding the centralized nature of the Russian media space in the temporarily occupied territories are also contained in the report by StopFake and the Centre for Information Resilience, which emphasizes the systematic use of Telegram channels and local media resources to coordinate informational influence on the population of the TOT [16].

Researchers also established that the media system in the TOT is coordinated through pseudo-ministries of information policy created by the occupation authorities and media holdings connected with the Kremlin [10]. After 2022, practically all local media in the occupied territories were either shut down or integrated into the Russian information space.

Telegram acquired particular significance under modern conditions as the main instrument of informational influence. Due to the high level of anonymity, the speed of content dissemination, and weak moderation, the platform became a key platform both for Ukrainian strategic communications and for Russian propaganda. One of the most active Ukrainian resources became the Telegram channel SPRAVDI, created by the Center for Countering Disinformation for operational refutation of fakes and dissemination of verified information [15].

The OpenMinds study "The Kremlin Connection: Mapping Telegram Networks in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus" also demonstrates the high level of interconnectedness of pro-Russian Telegram networks and their coordination in the information space of Russia, Belarus, and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine [11]. At the same time, Ukrainian analytical media systematically document the activities of bot networks, manipulative Telegram channels, and the use of artificial intelligence to create propaganda content. In 2025, Detector Media recorded large-scale campaigns involving the dissemination of AI-generated videos aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian government and intensifying social tensions. The coordination of such networks indicates that Telegram functions not only as a communication platform but also as an infrastructure for strategic influence operations and narrative synchronization.

Digital isolation and “news deserts”. Russian information policy in the occupied territories combines propaganda with technical control of digital infrastructure. After 2022, Ukrainian mobile operators and internet providers in the occupied territories were replaced by Russian telecommunication systems, which allowed Russia to control the population’s access to information.

The study “Russian Cyber Onslaught was Blunted by Ukrainian Cyber Resilience, not Merely Security” states that *Ukraine was forced to urgently transfer state and private data to foreign cloud servers in order to protect critical information infrastructure from Russian cyberattacks* [7]. The cyber resilience has become an essential component of state security and strategic communications during the war.

According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2025 report, Russia received 17 points out of 100 and the status “Not Free,” which indicates increasing digital censorship, blocking of VPN services, and state control over the digital environment [6], including in the TOT. In 2025-2026, Roskomnadzor also intensified the blocking of VPN platforms and restricted the operation of YouTube, WhatsApp, and Telegram.

The BBC Media Action study of 2023 demonstrated that women in the TOT had significantly limited access to Ukrainian media due to internet and mobile communication blocking. *To obtain information, they used VPN services, satellite antennas, and online media* [1]. However, social media remain the main source of information for Ukrainians. According to the USAID-Internews study “Ukrainian Media, Attitude and Trust in 2024,” *84% of Ukrainians receive information precisely through social media* [18]. According to the study, *60% of female television viewers in the TOT watched Russian television channels, while 38% used Russian media as their primary source of news.* Furthermore, *80% of women in the occupied territories expressed concern regarding the level of fake information, but only 61% were confident in their ability to distinguish truthful news from disinformation* [18].

A separate significant problem is the formation of so-called “information deserts” – territories where the population has limited access to independent journalism and alternative sources of information. According to the Media Development Foundation, *the problem of news deserts is particularly characteristic of frontline and occupied territories where local editorial offices were forced to cease operations or* *evacuate* [9]. The disappearance of local independent journalism creates favorable conditions for the monopolization of information by occupation authorities and pro-Russian media structures.

A special place in Russian information policy is occupied by the educational and cultural assimilation of children in the TOT. According to the Center of National Resistance SOF, after 2022 Russia fully integrated the educational system of the occupied territories into its own ideological space. The Ukrainian language and literature were removed from mandatory curricula, while Russian educational standards and *"patriotic upbringing"* were introduced instead [3]. The system of informational influence on children includes ideological indoctrination, militarization, cultural assimilation, and the promotion of *"Russkiy Mir"* (Russian World) narratives. Such policy is aimed not only at information control but also at transforming the national identity of the population of the occupied territories.

Prospects for informational reintegration. The problem of informational reintegration of the TOT requires a comprehensive state policy combining strategic communications, the development of independent media, digital security, and support for civil society.

K. Semchynskyi emphasizes that *effective reintegration of de-occupied territories presupposes the dissemination of Ukrainian cultural and value dominants, the development of the Ukrainian information space and the restoration of the educational and cultural environment* [14].

According to O. Tykhomyrov, *the state policy of informational reintegration should be based on the principles of human-centeredness, Ukraine-centeredness, inclusiveness, systemicity, and security* [17]. In addition, the reintegration mechanism should provide coordination between state authorities and civil society institutions [8]

Conclusion. Informational reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories remains one of the most difficult directions of Ukrainian strategic communications under conditions of full-scale war. Russia continues to use digital infrastructure, media and the educational sphere as instruments of long-term influence on the population of the TOT. Alongside this, the Ukrainian resistance movement continues to operate in the occupied territories, supporting the dissemination of pro-Ukrainian information and preserving connections with the Ukrainian information space. Despite the fact that a significant part of information about the activities of the resistance remains classified for security reasons, its existence indicates the preservation of pro-Ukrainian sentiments among part of the population of the TOT and the maintenance of ties with the Ukrainian information space.

An important role in countering Russian narratives is played by Ukrainian state institutions, independent media, civil society organizations, and international communication platforms working to disseminate reliable information about the occupied territories and dismantle narratives about "Russian Crimea" or "Russian Donbas." Effective informational reintegration requires a comprehensive state policy, the development of strategic communications, support for independent media and restoration of trust in the Ukrainian information space in the de-occupied territories..

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UDC: 069:005.35:316.7

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MUSEUM SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A STRATEGIC TOOL FOR SOCIAL RESILIENCE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE «MUSEUMS ON PRESCRIPTION» CASE STUDY

The article explores the concept of museum social responsibility (MSR) as a strategic resource for social resilience and an integral element of communication strategy in a globalized world. The main focus is on the theoretical substantiation of MSR and analysis of the European institutionalized model using the example of the British program «Museums on Prescription». The choice of this case is justified as a benchmark example of the transition of museum social responsibility from episodic charitable initiatives to the systemic integration of the museum into the ecosystem of social wellbeing and healthcare. It is proved that systemic social responsibility transforms the museum into an essential «social anchor» capable of restoring trust and supporting communities.

Keywords: *museum social responsibility (MSR), communication strategy, social resilience, inclusion, social purpose, museums.*

СОЦІАЛЬНА ВІДПОВІДАЛЬНІСТЬ МУЗЕЇВ ЯК СТРАТЕГІЧНИЙ ІНСТРУМЕНТ СОЦІАЛЬНОЇ СТІЙКОСТІ: ТЕОРЕТИЧНІ ЗАСАДИ ТА АНАЛІЗ ДОСВІДУ «МУЗЕЇВ ЗА РЕЦЕПТОМ»

У статті досліджується концепція музейної соціальної відповідальності як стратегічного ресурсу соціальної стійкості та невід'ємного елемента комунікаційної стратегії музейних установ в умовах глобалізації. Основну увагу зосереджено на теоретичному обґрунтуванні поняття та аналізі європейської інституціоналізованої моделі музейної соціальної відповідальності на прикладі британської програми «Museums on

Prescription». Обґрунтовано вибір даного кейсу як еталонного прикладу переходу музейної соціальної відповідальності від епізодичних благодійних ініціатив до системної інтеграції музею в екосистему соціального добробуту та охорони здоров'я. Доведено, що системна соціальна відповідальність трансформує музей у важливий «соціальний якір», здатний відновлювати довіру та підтримувати громади.

Ключові слова: *музейна соціальна відповідальність, комунікаційна стратегія, соціальна стійкість, інклюзія, соціальне призначення, музеї.*

Introduction. In the 21st century, concepts of sustainable development and social resilience are increasingly moving beyond purely economic or environmental interpretations. The combined pressures of global integration, mass migration, and widening social disparity are forcing modern societies to find new ways to stay united during crises. Thus, the role of cultural institutions has fundamentally shifted. Museums are stepping away from being passive guardians of the past to become dynamic participants in social development, actively anchoring public trust.

Topicality of the research. In an era where traditional institutions of social integration often lose public trust, the museum institution retains symbolic authority and the capacity to mediate between diverse social experiences. Consequently, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of museum institutions has become a matter of critical importance. However, in modern museum management, CSR is still often perceived as a secondary or optional activity rather than a strategic communication tool that builds social resilience [3, p. 42]. To fully grasp the potential of MSR, it is essential to analyze theoretical frameworks and mature, institutionalized practices.

The purpose of the article is to substantiate Museum Social Responsibility (MSR) as a strategic framework and communication tool for building social resilience, and to analyze its practical implementation through the highly institutionalized British «Museums on Prescription» program. The purpose presupposes the following objectives:

1) Conceptualize MSR as an institutional mechanism and trace its connection to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); 2) Provide a scientific justification for selecting the British model as a primary case study; 3) Conduct an analysis of the «Museums on Prescription» program as an evidence-based institutionalized MSR practice.

Methodology. Among methods used in the research, we find useful the following ones: conceptual analysis; a case study of Great Britain; use of secondary data; structural-functional analysis. The conceptual analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the adaptation of classic corporate social responsibility into Museum Social Responsibility (MSR) and its connection with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The case study method is applied to explore the British «Museums on Prescription» program as a highly institutionalized model of social resilience. Secondary data analysis provided us with information regarding the implementation of social prescribing based on research by University College London and UK Research and Innovation. Structural-functional analysis furthered our understanding of how museums operate as «social anchors» within the broader ecosystem of public healthcare and social wellbeing.

Literature review. The problem of the social role of museums is actively developed in modern scientific discourse. The foundational understanding of corporate social responsibility was shaped by A. B. Carroll's pyramid model, which is now actively adapted for the cultural sector to highlight the moral management of organizational stakeholders. Within the museum field, R. Dodd and R. Sandell emphasize the unique potential of museums to influence social inclusion, overcome marginalization and build a sense of belonging to a community [5, p. 31].

A group of researchers led by I.-L. Pop argues that social dimension of CSR is essential for ensuring the cultural sustainability of museum institutions. C. Camarero, M. J. Garrido, and E. Vicente have demonstrated that an orientation toward social responsibility influences institutional effectiveness directly and enhances levels of trust by audiences, donors and partners [8, p. 984]. Moreover, this paradigm shift was officially recognized at the institutional level when the International Council of Museums (ICOM) approved a new definition of a museum in 2022. It is stated that modern museums must be inclusive, accessible, and operate ethically and professionally with the participation of communities [7].

The results and discussions. In the cultural sector, the adaptation of classic CSR models is conceptually defined as Museum Social Responsibility. MSR means an institutional shift in the museum's logic, where the community is considered not as a passive audience but as a co-participant in the cultural process. Through inclusive programs, accessibility, ethical communication and trauma-informed practices, museums integrate abstract Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into their daily activities [6, p. 162].

MSR as a Mechanism for Localizing SDGs. In a globalized world, global information flows and cultural market integration create new opportunities but also exacerbate problems of social inequality and social fragmentation. In this tension between the global and the local, the museum acts as an institutional «translator» of the UN SDGs, capable of localizing universal values through specific social practices.

For instance, inclusive and accessible museum programs directly implement SDG 10 (reduced inequalities) and SDG 4 (quality education). Creating safe spaces for dialogue, trust-building, and mutual recognition aligns directly with SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions). From a communication management perspective, a museum that positions itself as a public good builds powerful social capital. This allows the institution to gain legitimacy and develop stable cross-sectoral partnerships, which directly correlates with SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals) [10]. Thus, MSR in a globalized world acts as a form of «soft governance» that strengthens social cohesion without coercion.

Justification of the Case Study Selection. To bridge the gap between MSR theory and practice, this research deliberately focuses on the British initiative «Museums on Prescription». The selection of this specific program is scientifically justified by several factors. Firstly, the United Kingdom currently demonstrates the highest level of institutionalization regarding museum «wellbeing» practices, seamlessly integrating them into the national healthcare ecosystem. Secondly, while many museums globally treat CSR as episodic charitable events, the British model provides a unique opportunity to study MSR not just as a communicative PR tool, but as an evidence-based mechanism with measurable social impact backed by strong academic research [9, p. 1087]. Finally, it perfectly illustrates the operationalization of SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 10, and SDG 17 within the cultural sector.

Analysis of the «Museums on Prescription» Model. The practical dimension of MSR is most visible when it is embedded in institutional logic through partnerships, stable programs, and interaction protocols. The «Museums on Prescription» program is built upon the logic of «social prescribing», a systemic approach where medical and social care professionals refer patients to non-clinical, community-based activities to improve their health and wellbeing.

In the framework of this initiative, the museum acts as an active partner in combating social isolation, particularly targeting vulnerable demographic groups such as the elderly who are at risk of loneliness and exclusion. Instead of relying solely on medical intervention, individuals receive a «prescription» for group museum activities [4, p. 25]. The central feature of Britain's case is its profound institutionalization. Initiated in 2014, the «Museums on Prescription» programme started as a foundational three-year research project led by University College London under the direction of Professor Helen Chatterjee, in partnership with the University of Canterbury Christ Church. Designed to evaluate the model of «social prescribing», the programme aimed to formalize museums as active partners in healthcare by referring vulnerable elderly individuals – at risk of social isolation – to non-clinical, community-based museum activities. During its pilot phase, the project successfully engaged 115 participants between the ages of 65 and 94, demonstrating significant improvements in wellbeing and proving the efficacy of museums as essential components of public health infrastructure [2].

Furthermore, this model demonstrates how MSR transitions into the realm of standardized mechanisms. The operational formula is clear: determining the target vulnerable group → establishing a partnership referral route (medical/social workers directing patients to the museum) → conducting specialized group activities in the museum → documenting the social outcome and arguing the program's value to the community. It is important to mention that the systematic approach is supported operationally by specialized networks like The Culture, Health&Wellbeing Alliance. Such associations provide reviews and guidelines emphasizing the role of museums as spaces for wellbeing.

This type of a model is highly effective from a communication strategy perspective as well. By actively participating in public health and social wellbeing networks, the museum broadcasts a powerful, authentic message: it is a relevant, socially responsible «anchor» institution [1, p. 259]. This cross-sectoral collaboration – linking museums, social services, the third sector, and academic researchers – ensures institutional sustainability, diversifies funding opportunities, and builds robust public trust.

Conclusions. Therefore, the corporate social responsibility of museum institutions is not an optional ethical superstructure, but a strategic resource for social resilience and essential element of modern communication strategies. The theoretical analysis proves that MSR transforms the museum into an active participant in localizing Sustainable Development Goals, acting as an institutional «translator» of global values into local community support.

The study of the «Museums on Prescription» program fully justifies the need to institutionalize these practices. The British model demonstrates that when a museum systematically integrates its MSR initiatives with cross-sectoral partners, it transcends its traditional boundaries. Museums will become «social anchors» capable of effectively combating social isolation, improving public wellbeing, and building long-term institutional legitimacy in a highly complex and globalized world. It is real in case of utilizing evidence-based mechanics like social prescribing, Prospects for further research involve: firstly, exploring methodologies for measuring the quantitative social impact of such MSR programs and, secondly, adapting these highly institutionalized models to support post-crisis recovery, particularly in Ukraine during its post-war reconstruction.

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UDC: 341.7:614.2+327.2

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EU HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR BUILDING HEALTHCARE RESILIENCE OF UKRAINE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF FULL-SCALE WAR

The purpose of this article *is to examine the EU's health diplomacy as a targeted mechanism for strengthening the resilience of Ukraine's healthcare system amid Russia's full-scale armed aggression. The article analyses the theoretical foundations of health diplomacy within contemporary academic discourse and outlines its key distinctions from classical humanitarian aid. Special attention is paid to the EU's core programmatic and financial instruments – including EU4Health, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Temporary Protection Directive – assessed through the lens of crisis response, institutional capacity-building, and the prospects for post-war healthcare reconstruction. The article argues that EU–Ukraine health cooperation has transcended the humanitarian register and acquired a strategic dimension, functioning as a tool of normative integration and trust-building towards the EU as a global health actor. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of health diplomacy as a constitutive element of contemporary foreign policy and offer empirically grounded insights into the EU's role in supporting Ukraine's institutional resilience.*

Keywords: *health diplomacy, global health, European Union, healthcare resilience, armed conflict, Ukraine.*

МЕДИЧНА ДИПЛОМАТІЯ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ ФОРМУВАННЯ СТІЙКОСТІ СИСТЕМИ ОХОРОНИ ЗДОРОВ'Я УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ ПОВНОМАСШТАБНОЇ ВІЙНИ

Метою статті *є аналіз медичної дипломатії Європейського Союзу як цілеспрямованого механізму формування стійкості* *системи охорони здоров'я України в умовах повномасштабної збройної агресії Російської Федерації. У статті досліджено теоретичні засади медичної дипломатії в сучасному науковому дискурсі та визначено її принципові відмінності від класичної гуманітарної допомоги. Особливу увагу приділено ключовим програмним та фінансовим інструментам ЄС – зокрема EU4Health, Механізму цивільного захисту ЄС та інституту тимчасового захисту – в контексті кризового реагування, інституційного зміцнення та перспектив післявоєнного відновлення охорони здоров'я. Обґрунтовано, що медична співпраця між ЄС та Україною вийшла за межі гуманітарного виміру і набула стратегічного характеру, функціонуючи як інструмент нормативної інтеграції та зміцнення довіри до Євросоюзу як глобального актора у сфері охорони здоров'я.*

Ключові слова: *медична дипломатія, глобальне здоров'я, Європейський Союз, стійкість системи охорони здоров'я, збройний конфлікт, Україна.*

Introduction. The Russian Federation's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, triggered a multidimensional systemic collapse across the national healthcare sector. Systematic targeting of civilian medical infrastructure, critical deficits in pharmaceuticals and life-sustaining equipment, the extreme functional overburden of healthcare personnel, and a measurable deterioration of population mental health indicators have collectively eroded the sector's capacity to fulfil its foundational public health mandate [8]. Under these conditions, healthcare has been repositioned as a matter of state security inextricably linked to the broader imperatives of national resilience and defence capacity. The European Union, operating through an integrated combination of immediate crisis response mechanisms and long-term structural instruments, emerged as the principal external actor in this domain. Nevertheless, a considerable share of the existing analytical literature treats such engagement predominantly through the prism of humanitarian solidarity – thereby underestimating its diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions. This analytical gap motivates the present inquiry into EU external action as a manifestation of health diplomacy within the broader architecture of contemporary foreign policy.

Topicality of the research. Scholarly engagement with health diplomacy intensified markedly in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, which made irrefutably clear that public health belongs not solely to the humanitarian domain but constitutes a geopolitical challenge of the first order. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further deepened this conceptual reorientation, confronting the international community with the imperative of transforming crisis-driven support into a sustained instrument of institutional capacity-building. The inadequate representation in academic discourse of the EU's specific role in this process – above all its capacity to simultaneously exercise crisis management and normative partnership functions – defines the scholarly relevance of the present article. Its focus encompasses the political, institutional, and programmatic dimensions of EU health diplomacy as deployed in the Ukrainian context under conditions of ongoing armed conflict.

The purpose of this article is to analyze EU health diplomacy as a coherent mechanism for building the resilience of Ukraine's healthcare system under conditions of ongoing full-scale war. The purpose presupposes the following objectives: 1) to examine the theoretical content of health diplomacy in contemporary academic discourse; 2) to characterize the conceptual foundations of healthcare resilience in conditions of armed conflict; 3) to systematize the EU's programmatic and financial support mechanisms directed at Ukraine; 4) to assess the practical impact of EU health diplomacy on Ukraine's healthcare reconstruction.

Methodology. The research employs the following methods: policy analysis; secondary data analysis of official EU institutional documents and reports; comparative analysis of pre-war and wartime healthcare support frameworks; content analysis of statements by EU officials and Ukrainian health sector representatives; and a case study of Ukraine's healthcare system under conditions of armed conflict. The combination of these approaches enables a multi-dimensional assessment of EU health diplomacy that encompasses both its institutional architecture and its practical outcomes.

Literature review. Within contemporary scholarship, health diplomacy is conceptualised as an inter-sectoral governance mechanism through which health-related concerns are systematically incorporated into the logic of international relations, global governance architecture, and security policy [10; 12]. I. Kickbusch identifies it as a practice oriented towards addressing transnational health challenges while concurrently advancing the strategic interests of states and multilateral organisations [11; 13]. R. Katz and co-authors argue that, in contradistinction to conventional humanitarian aid, health diplomacy is distinguished by its long-term horizon and its emphasis on institutional capacity-building, knowledge transfer, and regulatory standards harmonisation [12]. The notion of healthcare resilience under armed conflict conditions has been elaborated by the WHO and the OECD, both of which define it as the system's capacity to anticipate crises, mount an effective response, and recover from shocks while sustaining core operational functions [7; 9]. Ukraine's predicament is further compounded by over 1,200 verified attacks on healthcare facilities recorded by the WHO over the period 2022–2024 [8]. The dimension of EU strategic engagement in supporting Ukraine's healthcare system has yet to attract systematic scholarly treatment – a lacuna the present article addresses.

The results and discussions. Theoretical framework of health diplomacy. The concept of health diplomacy has undergone substantial theoretical refinement since its initial formulations in the opening decade of the twenty-first century. Contemporary scholarship increasingly situates health as a constitutive, rather than peripheral, element of foreign policy and international security architecture. I. Kickbusch's foundational contribution establishes health diplomacy as a practice unfolding at the convergence of health policy, foreign affairs, and global governance, in which states and international organisations deploy health-related instruments in pursuit of broader political objectives [11]. This conceptualisation is directly pertinent to the EU's mode of engagement with Ukraine: rather than confining its role to the supply of medicines or medical equipment, the EU has deliberately harnessed health cooperation as a vehicle for deepening Ukraine's integration into European normative frameworks. The concept of healthcare resilience – understood as the system's capacity to absorb external shocks, adapt to altered conditions, and restore core functionality [7] – serves throughout this article as the principal evaluative criterion against which the outcomes of EU instruments are assessed.

EU strategic health policy and Ukraine. The EU Global Health Strategy of 2022 formally inscribes healthcare within the EU's international security and stability agenda, recasting the Union's external role from that of an emergency aid provider to that of a systemic architect of resilient health systems in partner countries [1; 14]. The activation of the Temporary Protection Directive for persons displaced from Ukraine following 24 February 2022 extended access to emergency and primary healthcare services to millions of Ukrainian nationals across EU member states. Its significance transcends the purely humanitarian register: by incorporating Ukrainian citizens into the European medical space, the mechanism has generated durable institutional interconnections between the respective healthcare systems, thereby establishing preconditions for deeper regulatory and normative convergence over the medium and long term.

Programmatic instruments and their practical impact. EU4Health – the EU's principal multiannual health programme for 2021–2027 – constitutes the primary programmatic vehicle of EU health diplomacy [3; 4]. Following Ukraine's formal association with EU4Health in August 2022, the country gained access to EU financial allocations and expert resources, signalling a qualitative shift from ad hoc emergency relief to institutionalised long-term partnership [5]. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which became fully operational in the Ukrainian context from August 2022, coordinated large-scale medical evacuations and the delivery of critical equipment and pharmaceutical supplies; by the close of 2023, more than 3,500 patients had received specialised treatment in EU member states through this channel [6]. At the operational level, EU health diplomacy materialises across three interconnected lines of action: first, direct co-financing of mental health and psychosocial support programmes (EUR 28.4 million disbursed via the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) [3; 4]; second, integration of Ukrainian medical practitioners into European clinical expertise networks through access to European Reference Networks consultations for rare and complex conditions [5]; and third, targeted equipment transfers that have enabled a partial restoration of hospital operational capacity in conflict-affected oblasts [6].

Strategic and normative dimension of EU health diplomacy. In foreign policy terms, EU health diplomacy vis-à-vis Ukraine operates as a vehicle of normative integration. The progression from ad hoc situational assistance to formalised strategic partnership establishes the structural conditions for a gradual harmonisation of Ukraine's healthcare governance, financing, and service delivery standards with those prevailing across EU member states – a trajectory consistent with the broader logic of the accession process. Healthcare reform in Ukraine, including regulatory alignment with European standards and active participation in joint EU programmes, is accordingly treated not merely as a sectoral technical undertaking but as a substantive dimension of European integration. This normative dimension fundamentally distinguishes EU health diplomacy from transactional humanitarian assistance and underscores its constitutive role as an instrument of political influence, institutional convergence, and durable trust-building.

Conclusions. The foregoing analysis establishes that EU health diplomacy in response to the Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine has crystallised into a coherent, multi-level policy framework that organically integrates humanitarian, security, and institutional dimensions. Its practical significance extends far beyond the provision of healthcare access during a crisis phase: the central contribution of EU engagement resides in its capacity to construct Ukraine's long-term healthcare resilience through sustained knowledge transfer, regulatory harmonisation, and incorporation into the shared governance of transnational health risks. EU–Ukraine health cooperation has thus transcended the register of conventional humanitarian response, acquiring the defining characteristics of a strategic partnership – a concrete expression of health diplomacy as an active instrument of foreign policy. Prospective research should undertake a systematic assessment of the measurable effectiveness of individual instruments against quantifiable resilience indicators, and should examine the contribution of health sector cooperation to Ukraine's long-term stabilisation and post-conflict institutional reconstruction.

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UDC: 327.82:061.1ООН](477)

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HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN UKRAINE: COMMUNITY RECOVERY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT UNDER CONDITIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT

Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine has generated unprecedented destruction of critical and social infrastructure, elevating humanitarian diplomacy to the rank of a strategic instrument of international engagement. This article examines the role of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine as an actor of humanitarian and public diplomacy that implements community recovery projects not merely as humanitarian interventions but as mechanisms for building international trust, mobilising donor support, and advancing normative integration. The article argues that community recovery acquires the character of a practical diplomatic mechanism capable of transforming Ukraine's international status from a humanitarian aid recipient to a full-fledged subject of international partnership. It is established that the public demonstration of recovery outcomes constitutes a key element of trust-based public diplomacy and legitimises continued international support.

Keywords: *humanitarian diplomacy, public diplomacy, UNDP, community recovery, armed conflict, Ukraine, international engagement, donor support.*

ГУМАНІТАРНА ДИПЛОМАТІЯ ПРОГРАМИ РОЗВИТКУ ООН В УКРАЇНІ: ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ ГРОМАД ЯК ІНСТРУМЕНТ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ В УМОВАХ ЗБРОЙНОГО КОНФЛІКТУ

Повномасштабна збройна агресія Російської Федерації *проти України спричинила безпрецедентні руйнування критичної та соціальної інфраструктури й вивела гуманітарну дипломатію на рівень стратегічного інструменту міжнародної взаємодії. У статті досліджується роль Програми розвитку ООН (ПРООН) в Україні як суб'єкта гуманітарної та публічної дипломатії, що реалізує проєкти відновлення громад не лише як гуманітарні інтервенції, але й як механізм формування міжнародної довіри, залучення донорів та нормативної інтеграції. Обґрунтовується теза про те, що відновлення громад набуває характеру практичного дипломатичного механізму, здатного трансформувати статус України від реципієнта гуманітарної допомоги до повноправного суб'єкта міжнародного партнерства. Встановлено, що публічна демонстрація результатів відновлення виступає ключовим елементом публічної дипломатії довіри та легітимізує подальшу міжнародну підтримку.*

Ключові слова: *гуманітарна дипломатія, публічна дипломатія, ПРООН, відновлення громад, збройний конфлікт, Україна, міжнародна взаємодія, донорська підтримка.*

Introduction. The full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, launched on 24 February 2022, has caused profound destruction not only of the country's infrastructure but also of established mechanisms of international humanitarian engagement. According to the Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4), Ukraine's total recovery and reconstruction needs as of 31 December 2024 amount to USD 524 billion [1], of which over USD 176 billion represents direct damage to residential, transport, energy, educational, and medical infrastructure [1; 2]. More than 3,300 educational institutions and over 1,600 medical facilities have been damaged or destroyed [1], underscoring the scale of the humanitarian challenge and the imperative for systemic international response mechanisms.

In the context of a protracted armed conflict, humanitarian diplomacy has emerged as a central instrument for combining crisis response, institutional recovery, and the mobilization of international support. Nevertheless, the existing scholarly literature predominantly analyses the activities of international organizations in Ukraine through the lens of humanitarian assistance, without adequate attention to its diplomatic and strategic dimension. This gap defines the relevance of examining UNDP's humanitarian diplomacy in Ukraine through the prism of community recovery as an instrument of international engagement.

Literature Review. Contemporary scholarship conceptualizes humanitarian diplomacy as an inter-sectoral mechanism that integrates the principles of humanitarian law with the logic of diplomatic influence and international protection. L. Minear and H. Smith define it as a practice carried out by humanitarian organizations for the purpose of achieving humanitarian objectives through diplomatic means [7]. The development of humanitarian aspects of diplomacy is closely associated with efforts to protect human dignity under conditions of armed conflict [6]. M. Barnett examines humanitarianism as a normative phenomenon that transforms the character of international relations [8]. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement conceptualizes humanitarian diplomacy as an instrument for influencing governmental decisions in favor of the most vulnerable populations [9]. The UN Charter enshrines the foundational principles underpinning the humanitarian activities of United Nations system organizations [10].

Among Ukrainian scholars, V. Tsivatyi analyses humanitarian diplomacy in the context of contemporary local and regional conflicts, focusing on its international security, legal, and institutional dimensions [11]. The 2014–2015 experience is documented in the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment of Eastern Ukraine, which established a methodological foundation for subsequent programmes [4]. Nevertheless, the strategic diplomatic dimension of UNDP's recovery projects under conditions of full-scale war remains insufficiently studied, substantiating the need for a dedicated analytical inquiry.

Purpose of the Article. The article aims to examine UNDP's humanitarian diplomacy in Ukraine through the prism of community recovery as a practical mechanism for building international trust, mobilizing donor support, and strengthening long-term partnership under conditions of armed conflict.

Research Objectives. The pursuit of this aim requires: first, to elaborate the conceptual content of humanitarian diplomacy as a form of international engagement under armed conflict; second, to characterize UNDP's role in Ukraine as a subject of humanitarian and public diplomacy; third, to substantiate the diplomatic function of community recovery projects in building international trust and facilitating the transition to strategic partnership.

Main Results and Discussion

1. Humanitarian Diplomacy: Conceptual Foundations. Within the framework of this study, humanitarian diplomacy is understood not as a set of public communications or technical assistance measures, but as a structured form of international engagement aimed at mobilizing political and financial support, protecting vulnerable populations, and constructing trust between state and non-state actors. Its defining characteristic is the combination of humanitarian neutrality with targeted international advocacy [7; 8].

Under conditions of armed conflict, this form of diplomacy acquires a pronounced strategic dimension: it enables the integration of humanitarian response with processes of normative alignment and long-term partnership formation. It is precisely in this regard that UNDP's activities in Ukraine transcend the boundaries of conventional humanitarian action, acquiring the features of an instrument of international influence and public diplomacy [6; 9].

2. UNDP as a Subject of Humanitarian and Public Diplomacy. The United Nations Development Programme is a specialized agency of the UN system whose mandate encompasses the promotion of sustainable development, poverty reduction, strengthening of institutional capacity, and enhancement of societal resilience to crises. In Ukraine, UNDP operates as a key actor of humanitarian and development diplomacy, combining support for state institutions, local self-government bodies, and civil society with the mobilization of international financial and technical resources [3; 10].

In diplomatic terms, UNDP's activities consist in establishing a multilateral dialogue platform connecting Ukraine, donor states, and international financial institutions. This platform allows for the integration of humanitarian response and recovery programs into the broader context of long-term strategic partnership. As early as 2015, the joint Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment of Eastern Ukraine, prepared by the UN, the EU, and the World Bank, laid the methodological foundations of a comprehensive approach to recovery that retains its relevance today [4].

3. Community Recovery as a Practical Diplomatic Mechanism. Community recovery projects implemented by UNDP in partnership with international donors serve a threefold function: humanitarian (restoring basic living conditions), developmental (strengthening institutional resilience), and diplomatic (building a positive international image of Ukraine and attracting new partners). These include the Early Recovery Programme implemented jointly with the Ministry of Communities and the European Investment Bank [5], the Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme supported by Japan, Denmark, and Switzerland, and the EU4Recovery – Improving Communities of Ukraine initiative funded by the European Union [3].

Quantifiable evidence of the scale of this engagement is provided by RDNA4 data: total direct damage to buildings and infrastructure exceeds USD 176 billion, with over 3,300 educational and more than 1,600 medical facilities having sustained damage or destruction as a result of hostilities [1; 2]. UNDP's recovery projects are specifically targeted at addressing these losses, including in de-occupied and frontline territories where recovery serves not only as a practical function but also a symbolic and diplomatic one.

Trust-Based Public Diplomacy. The restoration of specific facilities – schools, hospitals, municipal infrastructure – financed by donor states is routinely accompanied by public events involving partner government representatives and international media. Such occasions transform technical assistance into a visible act of international solidarity, shaping the perception of Ukraine as a reliable recipient capable of effective project management. This in turn legitimizes further donor financial commitments and lays the groundwork for a gradual transition from humanitarian to investment-oriented partnership [6; 11].

Normative Integration Dimension. Ukraine's participation in UNDP programmes, particularly the EU4Recovery initiative, promotes the harmonization of local governance standards with the Copenhagen Criteria and EU norms. Recovery thus transforms not only into the physical reconstruction of facilities but also into the formation of new institutional practices that bring Ukraine closer to European governance standards. The UNDP Country Programme Document for 2025–2029 identifies these processes as key organizational priorities in Ukraine [3].

Conclusions. The analysis demonstrates that UNDP's humanitarian diplomacy in Ukraine under conditions of full-scale war has evolved into a systemic instrument of international engagement with a pronounced public diplomacy dimension. UNDP functions not only as a humanitarian actor but also as an institutional mediator between the Ukrainian state, local self-government bodies, and international partners.

Community recovery projects serve as a practical diplomatic mechanism through which international trust in Ukraine's capacity to effectively manage recovery processes is constructed. The public demonstration of cooperation facilitates the transition from short-term humanitarian response to long-term strategic partnership oriented towards resilience, inclusiveness, and institutional development. Prospects for further research lie in an empirical analysis of the correlation between the intensity of public communication regarding recovery and the dynamics of donor commitments, as well as in a comparative study of humanitarian diplomacy strategies employed by different UN system actors in Ukraine.

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UDC: 355.451(477)

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THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK: THE UKRAINIAN CASE

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how Ukraine's strategic communications have evolved, driven by the need to counter Russian propaganda, which has become one of the Kremlin's key tools in the war against the Ukrainian people. The article examines how Ukraine adapted to hybrid warfare, moving from reactive debunking of disinformation to more strategic management of national narratives. The author also focuses on the process of integrating the provisions of Ukraine's Information Security Doctrine and Strategy into the practical activities of state institutions.

Modern wars have long since gone beyond the battlefield. Hybrid aggression has also become a significant factor in the ability to undermine another country from within. Using various methods, it is easy to manipulate public opinion and use it to create instability within a country. To prevent this, a country must understand how to utilise strategic communications. The author also aims to demonstrate that strategic communications have evolved into a multidisciplinary system that ensures society's cognitive resilience in the face of the Russian Federation's constant attempts to use propaganda as a means of influencing society.

Keywords: *strategic communications, national resilience, information sovereignty, war of meaning, attribution, information security.*

ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ СТРАТЕГІЧНИХ КОМУНІКАЦІЙ У СИСТЕМІ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ СТІЙКОСТІ: УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ КЕЙС

Метою статті є показати яким чином відбувалася трансформація стратегічних комунікацій України, що було викликано необхідністю дати відсіч російській пропаганді, використання якої стало одним з активних інструментів кремля у війні проти українського народу. В статті було досліджено як Україна адаптувалася під гібридну війну, переходячи від реактивного спростування дезінформації, до більш стратегічного управління національними наративами. Автор також приділив увагу процесу інтеграції положень Доктрини та Стратегії інформаційної безпеки України у практичну діяльність державних інституцій.

Сучасні війни давно вже вийшли лише за межі поля бою. Гібридна агресія також стала вагомою частиною у тому, аби мати можливість чинити опір на іншу країну зсередини. Використовуючи різні методи, можна з легкістю керувати поглядом суспільства, і використовувати його задля створення нестабільної ситуації всередині країни. Аби не допустити цього, у країни повинно бути розуміння, як використовувати стратегічні комунікації. Автор має на меті також довести, що стратегічні комунікації еволюціонували у мультидисциплінарну систему, яка забезпечує когнітивну опірність суспільства в умовах постійних спроб РФ використовувати пропаганду, як засіб впливу на суспільство.

Ключові слова: *стратегічні комунікації, національна стійкість, інформаційний суверенітет, смислова війна, атрибуція, інформаційна безпека.*

Introduction. The information space has always fulfilled various functions as technology has evolved. Looking at the present day, in addition to serving as a medium for data transmission, this space also functions as yet another battlefield that is actively utilised. Consequently, states face a new challenge: in addition to the need to protect their infrastructure, there is now also a need to protect the minds of their citizens. If we turn to Walter Lippmann, specifically his work ‘Public Opinion’, we can learn that a person can operate within a ‘pseudo-environment’ – a subjective model of reality formed from the information they consume. It is therefore in the state's interest to ensure that this environment is protected from hostile propaganda.

Russian aggression towards Ukraine was not something sudden that appeared overnight. It had been manifesting since the collapse of the Soviet Union, though it was not so obvious at the time. Since 2014, this aggression has taken on a new, active form, and since then Ukraine has faced the need to evolve its strategic communications. In this article, we will examine the path of this evolution, drawing on the theoretical foundations of hybrid warfare and Ukraine's normative framework.

Topicality of the research. Global security has undergone a transformation in recent decades, and Ukraine has faced many challenges as a result of the Russian invasion. The rise of hybrid warfare has transformed strategic communications from a mere tool for disseminating information into a vital element in ensuring national resilience. The Ukrainian case is significant due to its recent experience in building a system that both counters disinformation and works to unite society, boost morale and secure international support in the face of Russian aggression. By examining the evolution of strategic communications, we can identify the most effective models of cooperation between the state, civil society and the media, which helps to strengthen national security.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the stages in the evolution of Ukraine's strategic communications as a tool for countering Russian propaganda. The objective is to identify the patterns underlying the transition from tactical countermeasures against disinformation to the strategic management of national narratives. The object of the study is Ukraine's system of state and public communications in the context of hybrid and full-scale war, whilst the subject is the mechanisms of transforming communication models in response to the challenges of the security environment.

Literature review. The theoretical aspects of studying the impact of propaganda and perception management have been widely explored. We have selected the works of W. Lippmann and G. Pocheptsov, as they provide a better understanding of how the cognitive dimensions of hybrid wars operate. Turning to the evolution of Ukrainian strategic communications during the early stages of Russian aggression, it is worth referring to the monograph 'Strategic Communications in the Context of Hybrid War'. To understand more contemporary threats, we will draw on reports from the NATO StratCom COE. However, we face a problem in that there is no comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian strategic communications for the period from 2022 to the present. In addition, there are two further issues worth considering:

1. The process of transforming reactive methods of debunking disinformation into coherent institutional systems of public attribution.

2. The synergistic effect of the interaction between state institutions and independent volunteer OSINT networks in shaping nationwide cognitive resilience.

The article will consist of the following sections: Theoretical Foundations, Regulatory Framework, Evolution of Strategic Communications, Technological Context.

The results and discussion. Theoretical foundations. When we talk about strategic communications, we must also understand that there is a difference between an information war and a war of meaning. Today, we can speak of an information overload in our public sphere. Thus, the fact itself is not valuable; rather, it is its interpretation that is valuable. There is a difference between simply scattering information and completely changing society's value matrix through its correct interpretation.

We should pay more attention to the war of meaning. Hybrid wars usually attempt to create two sides – right and wrong – using frames for this purpose: the lenses through which a person filters their reality. When we impose our frame on a person, they will ignore all other frames or view them negatively. Based on this, we can conclude that strategic communications are necessary not only for spreading the truth, but also for strengthening national frames, thereby making society more resilient to hostile propaganda.

Regulatory framework. Ukraine's strategic communications have developed thanks to government strategic documents. According to Ukraine's Information Security Doctrine (2017), information sovereignty was defined as one of the most important components of state sovereignty. This approach has undoubtedly had a more positive impact on the development of strategic communications than if they had, for example, developed in a chaotic manner. The Doctrine enabled a shift towards more active measures in the media sphere, aimed at identifying and countering hostile propaganda.

The next step was the Ukraine Information Security Strategy (2021). The difference between it and the Doctrine is that the Strategy is geared towards a new format of struggle, using new methods in addition to bans. These include the development of critical thinking, strategic risk forecasting, and synergies between the public sector and civil society. In this strategy, disinformation was recognised as a problem that cannot be solved by technical solutions alone, but which also requires active work on meanings and national values. The Information Security Strategy has enabled strategic communications to be viewed as a function that brings together people from different disciplines for a common purpose.

Evolution of strategic communications. From 2014 to the present day, strategic communications have continued to evolve, adopting new methods and tools. We have decided to divide this development into three stages. The first stage lasted from 2014 to 2016. As Russian aggression took on an active form, this was accompanied by the active use of hybrid forms of attack, for which the state was unprepared. Consequently, the fight against propaganda had to be taken up by volunteers and civil society initiatives. This stage focused on combating the most absurd disinformation coming from the Russian media. This was mainly a method of refutation. The work of volunteers demonstrated that, in a crisis, horizontal communication networks are faster and inspire greater trust than official structures. The next stage began with the adoption of the Doctrine (2017), after which the state began to build up its capabilities to counter hybrid threats. The concept at the time aimed to coordinate the actions of all security agencies. A process also began not merely to refute enemy propaganda, but also to analyse Russian narratives, facilitated by the creation of specialised centres. Even then, strategic communications began to be seen as a tool for supporting state policy. In 2022, Russia launched a new phase of aggression against Ukraine, initiating a full-scale invasion. This also led to an increase in attempts to spread its propaganda within Ukrainian society, which required Ukraine to transition to the fastest and most technologically advanced model of communications. At this stage, the method of publicly exposing the intentions and sources of hostile operations is already being used. Ukraine is actively building its citizens' resilience to hybrid threats, as understanding their mechanisms allows one to develop immunity against them.

Technological context. The digital environment has become closely intertwined with modern strategic communications. Social media is one of the environments most vulnerable to propaganda, particularly due to commercialisation, which allows an aggressor to rapidly spread their attacks. In turn, this creates additional challenges in terms of the ability to respond to hybrid threats in a timely manner.

Ukraine, however, has demonstrated that if social media or other platforms are unable to completely clear their space of both bots and Russian propagandists, it is better to focus efforts on enhancing national resilience. Strategic communications work more effectively in such cases – instead of constantly trying to remove propaganda, the public is taught to recognise and counter it, and it is also important to create one's own content that would fill the information space faster than the enemy's.

Conclusions. Since 2014, Ukraine's strategic communications have undergone a significant evolution, progressing from a state of vulnerability to one of strategic advantage. The country has moved from a situation where volunteers simply debunked fake news to the state actively working to ensure national resilience. The adoption of the Doctrine (2017) and Strategy (2021) enshrined the concepts of 'information sovereignty' and 'information resilience', enabling the synchronisation of efforts by state bodies and the civil sector to combat Russian propaganda. Looking ahead, it is worth noting that strategic communications will continue to evolve alongside technology; however, only trust and cooperation between the state and society will enable their optimal use in combating hybrid threats. The Ukrainian experience proves that in the war of narratives, victory goes not to those with the most powerful broadcasting resources, but to those whose narrative is more sincere, understandable and valuable to citizens.

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UDC: 341.232.1:061.1ЄС]:355.48(477-651.2:470-651.1)"2022.02/…"

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EU SECURITY INITIATIVES AS RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

This article analyses the transformation of the European Union's security policy in response to the Russia–Ukraine war, with a particular focus on the European Peace Facility (EPF). It examines how the EPF has become the EU's main instrument for financing military assistance to Ukraine and strengthening Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) actions. The study demonstrates that the EPF represents an important shift in EU security governance by enabling the financing of lethal military support and improving coordination among Member States. At the same time, its intergovernmental structure continues to limit decision-making efficiency. The research concludes that the EPF reflects both the deepening of EU defence integration and the persistence of institutional constraints within EU security policy.

Keywords: *EU Security, Strategic Autonomy, Russia-Ukraine War, CSDP, European Peace Facility (EPF).*

ОБОРОННІ ІНІЦІАТИВИ ЄС ЯК ВІДПОВІДЬ НА РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКУ ВІЙНУ

У цій статті аналізується трансформація політики безпеки Європейського Союзу у відповідь на російсько-українську війну, при цьому особлива увага приділяється Європейському фонду миру (ЄФМ). У ній розглядається, як ЄФМ став головним інструментом ЄС для фінансування військової допомоги Україні та посилення заходів у рамках Спільної політики безпеки та оборони (СПБО). Дослідження демонструє, що EPF є важливим зрушенням у системі управління безпекою ЄС, оскільки дозволяє фінансувати летальну військову допомогу та покращує координацію між державами-членами. Водночас його *міжурядова структура продовжує обмежувати ефективність прийняття рішень. У висновках дослідження зазначається, що EPF відображає як поглиблення оборонної інтеграції ЄС, так і збереження інституційних обмежень у політиці безпеки ЄС.*

Ключові слова: *безпека ЄС, стратегічна автономія, російсько-українська війна, СПБ, Європейський фонд миру (ЄФМ).*

Introduction. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has acted as a «geopolitical awakening» for the European Union. Historically designed as a peace project rooted in economic integration, the Union has been forced to rapidly improvise a collective defense identity that previously took decades to discuss without action.

Among these, the European Peace Facility (EPF) has emerged as a central tool for providing military assistance to Ukraine and supporting partner states. As highlighted in academic research, the EPF introduces a new financial framework that enables the EU to fund both CSDP operations and external military assistance, marking a significant evolution in EU foreign and security policy.

This article focuses on how the EPF functions as a response to the Russia–Ukraine war and what this reveals about the broader transformation of the EU from a predominantly economic actor into a more active security provider.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the transformation of the European Union's security policy in response to the Russia–Ukraine war, with a particular focus on the role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as the EU’s primary instrument for financing military assistance.

The study pursues the following **objectives:**

1. To examine the legal foundations, institutional structure, and two-pillar financing model of the European Peace Facility.
2. To assess the changes in EU security policy before and after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
3. To analyse the practical implementation of the EPF, with emphasis on its application as a mechanism for providing military assistance to Ukraine.
4. To evaluate the EPF's contribution to the advancement of EU strategic autonomy and deeper European defence integration.
5. To identify the key institutional limitations of the EPF, particularly those arising from its intergovernmental decision-making structure and the requirement for unanimity among Member States.

6. To explore the broader geopolitical significance of the EPF in the context of the EU's evolving role as a security actor.

The topicality of this research is determined by the ongoing war in Ukraine and its profound impact on European security structures. The EU has significantly expanded its defence and security role through instruments such as the EPF, which has been used to finance military aid to Ukraine and other partner countries. This development reflects a shift in the EU's strategic orientation toward greater responsibility in security and defence matters.

The relevance of the topic also lies in the fact that the EPF represents a new model of collective EU defence financing based on Member State contributions and joint decision-making. Its growing importance highlights ongoing debates about EU strategic autonomy, burden-sharing, and the effectiveness of intergovernmental security mechanisms.

Methodology. The research is based on a qualitative methodological approach. It combines several methods to ensure a comprehensive analysis of the European Peace Facility and its role in EU security policy.

The institutional and legal analysis method is used to examine the structure, legal basis, and functioning of the EPF, including its two-pillar financing model.

The comparative method allows for the assessment of changes in EU security policy before and after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022.

The case-study method is applied to analyse the EPF's practical implementation, particularly its role in providing military assistance to Ukraine.

Finally, content analysis is used to examine official EU documents, policy papers, and academic literature, which provides key insights into the institutional design and limitations of the EPF.

Literature review. The issue of the European Union's security transformation after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war has received significant attention in academic and policy-oriented literature. Particular focus has been placed on the European Peace Facility (EPF) as a new financial and institutional instrument of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).The legal foundations of the EPF are established in Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, which created the mechanism as an off-budget instrument designed to finance military and defence-related actions under the CFSP. The document outlines the EPF's objectives, financing mechanisms, and institutional structure, including the principle of contributions from Member States based on Gross National Income.

Official EU materials, particularly European Peace Facility: EU Support to Ukraine, provide updated information on the practical implementation of the EPF and the scale of military assistance allocated to Ukraine. These sources demonstrate the growing role of the EU in coordinating military aid and supporting Ukraine's defence capabilities. Academic research by Fabbrini (2023) analyses the EPF together with the Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument and argues that these mechanisms contribute to the gradual emergence of a stronger EU fiscal and defence capacity. The author emphasises that the Russia–Ukraine war accelerated financial integration in the security sphere and expanded the EU's geopolitical role.

The article by Mustasilta and Karjalainen examines the EPF through the concept of European strategic culture. The authors argue that the EPF reflects important changes in EU security thinking by enabling collective financing of military assistance, including lethal weapons. At the same time, they stress that decision-making remains intergovernmental and dependent on political consensus among Member States.The institutional origins of the EPF are discussed in the Proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2018), which explains the rationale for creating a unified mechanism capable of financing military operations and assistance measures outside the EU budget framework.

Finally, Genini (2025) analyses how the Russia–Ukraine war transformed the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The study highlights the EPF as one of the most important innovations in EU security policy, demonstrating the transition of the European Union toward a more active and strategically oriented security actor.

The results and discussions. The research demonstrates that the European Peace Facility (EPF) became one of the central instruments of the European Union's response to the Russia–Ukraine war. Initially established in 2021 as an off-budget mechanism to support peacekeeping and military cooperation, the EPF rapidly evolved after February 2022 into the EU's primary mechanism for financing military assistance to Ukraine. According to the Council of the European Union, between 2022 and 2024 the EU mobilised more than €11 billion through the EPF, including a special Ukraine Assistance Fund created in 2024.

At the explosion of the war in Ukraine, the EU quicklydecided to mobilize the EPF to provide financial supportto the Ukrainian military, including funding for the pur-chase of lethal weapons–a step which was hailed as his-toric (not least given that some EU member states stillabide by a policy of military neutrality). In particular, inFebruary 2022, the

Council approved Decision 2022/338(see Council of the EU, 2022a) on assistance measuresfor the supply to the Ukrainian armed forces of military equipment, bringing the total size of support to €3.1 billion.

Academic literature also emphasises that the EPF accelerated the development of European strategic autonomy and defence integration. Mustasilta and Karjalainen describe the EPF as a "gamechanger" that transformed EU strategic culture and increased the EU's ability to act collectively in security matters. The shared experience of supporting Ukraine contributed to stronger consensus among member states regarding the necessity of common European defence mechanisms. The EPF has been endowed with the highest level of funding ever in the history of the CSDP: €5692 billion in current prices for the period 2021–2027. However, this amount resulted from a compromise at the lowest common denominator, as the original proposal was €10.5 billion. The initial financial ceiling of the EPF expanded significantly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, rising from €5692 billion in 2021 to €17 billion in 2024.

In addition, the EPF became closely connected with other EU security initiatives, including the Strategic Compass and the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). This indicates that the Russia–Ukraine war accelerated the institutionalisation of EU defence policy and expanded the practical role of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The EPF is not the EU's first fully-fledged CFSP funding instrument but replaces and incorporates the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility. In particular, the EPF institutional framework is a 'continuum' of the previous Athena Mechanism and maintains a direct link between each Member State and the governance system, inspired by the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. Endowed with full legal capacity, the EPF manages bank accounts as well as acquires, holds and disposes of assets under the authority of the Facility Committee. The EPF's decisions draw upon the conclusions of the European Council and the Council (Article 26(1) TEU) and take into account the orientation provided by the Security and Political Committee at least twice per year (Article 38 TEU).

The European Peace Facility (EPF) represents a key innovation in EU security and defence financing in response to the Russia–Ukraine war. EPF introduces a two-pillar structure that allows the EU to combine financing for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations with external assistance measures, thereby improving the coherence and flexibility of EU defence funding. First, the EPF strengthens funding for CSDP common costs, moving beyond the traditional "costs lie where they fall" principle under Article 41(2) TEU. Instead, it is financed through annual GNI-based contributions from all Member States, creating a more stable and solidaristic financial mechanism. This includes a liquidity system that enables rapid financing of urgent military operations, increasing the EU's operational responsiveness.

Second, the EPF funds assistance measures under Article 28 TEU, which include capacity-building for third states and support for international peace operations. After 2022, Ukraine became the largest beneficiary, receiving unprecedented EU funding for military equipment and training. This marked the first time the EU financed lethal military assistance on such a scale, alongside smaller support packages for countries such as Moldova and Somalia.

However, academic literature highlights important limitations. EPF decision-making remains intergovernmental and based on unanimity, which allows Member States to block or delay assistance decisions, including through constructive abstention under Article 31 TEU. This has been visible in repeated political disagreements among Member States, particularly regarding Ukraine-related funding.

Overall, the literature suggests that the EPF represents a significant but constrained transformation of EU security policy. It enhances the EU's ability to finance military assistance and act as a geopolitical actor, but its effectiveness remains limited by intergovernmental control and political fragmentation within the Union.

Conclusions. The analysis also shows that the EPF has broader geopolitical significance beyond Ukraine. The mechanism expanded the EU's ability to provide military assistance to partner countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. However, after 2022 the majority of EPF resources were redirected toward Ukraine, which influenced the EU's external security priorities globally.

Overall, the findings confirm that the European Peace Facility became a turning point in the evolution of EU security policy. The Russia–Ukraine war accelerated the transformation of the EU from a primarily normative and economic actor into a more strategically oriented security actor capable of financing and coordinating military assistance on an unprecedented scale. Despite political and institutional challenges, the EPF significantly strengthened the EU's geopolitical role and contributed to deeper European defence cooperation.

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THE IMPACT OF THE US-ISRAELI OPERATION AGAINST IRAN ON EU ENERGY SECURITY

On February 28, 2026, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, launched a military operation against Iran. This provoked a sharp response from Iran in the form of massive strikes on military and civilian targets in nearly all Gulf states. In an attempt to pressure the U.S. and Israel to halt the operation, Iran adopted a strategy of chaotic strikes on American military bases, as well as energy and civilian facilities within the territories of the Gulf states. In particular, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, and Azerbaijan were targeted by Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. Additionally, NATO air defense systems intercepted Iranian aerial targets en route to Turkey and Cyprus. Thus, the conflict has expanded to a regional scale, risking escalation into a protracted and exhausting confrontation with numerous consequences for both the directly involved states and all other actors in international relations.

In this context, the question of how these events affect the European Union's military-political, economic, and energy situation takes on particular relevance. Although the current stage of this operation and the high intensity of events make it difficult to predict all potential consequences, it is already possible to identify a number of key threats and challenges that the EU faces or will face in the future.

Keywords: *EU, USA, Iran, US-Israeli operation, Strait of Hormuz, energy security.*

ВПЛИВ АМЕРИКАНО-ІЗРАЇЛЬСЬКОЇ ОПЕРАЦІЇ ПРОТИ ІРАНУ НА ЕНЕРГЕТИЧНУ БЕЗПЕКУ ЄВРОПИ

28 лютого 2026 року, Сполучені Штати Америки спільно з Ізраїлем розпочали військову операцію проти Ірану. Це *викликало різку відповідь з боку Ірану у вигляді масованих ударів по військових та цивільних цілях майже усіх держав Затоки. Намагаючись тиснути на США та Ізраїль зупинити операцію, Іран обрав стратегію хаотичних ударів по американських військових базах, а також енергетичних та цивільних об'єктах на територіях держав Затоки. Зокрема ударів іранськими безпілотниками та балістичними ракетами зазнали такі країни як Саудівська Аравія, Катар, ОАЕ, Бахрейн, Кувейт, Йорданія, Оман та Азербайджан. Також системи протиповітряної оборони НАТО перехопили іранські повітряні цілі на шляху до Туреччини та Кіпру. Таким чином конфлікт розширився до регіонального масштабу, ризикуючи перерости в затяжне і виснажливе протистояння із численними наслідками як для безпосередньо залучених держав, так і для усіх інших акторів міжнародних відносин.*

У цьому контексті особливої актуальності набуває питання впливу зазначених подій на військово-політичну, економічну та енергетичну ситуацію Європейського Союзу. Хоча поточний етап цієї операції та висока інтенсивність подій ускладнює прогнозування усіх потенційних наслідків, вже зараз можна виокремити низку ключових загроз та викликів, що постали або постануть у майбутньому перед ЄС.

Ключові слова: *ЄС, США, Іран, американсько-ізраїльська операція, Ормузька протока, енергетична безпека*

Introduction. The prolonged US-Israeli strikes against Iran and Tehran's retaliatory actions in the Gulf region have caused one of the most serious disruptions to global energy markets in recent decades. The Strait of Hormuz became the epicentre of the crisis as a key hub for global energy trade, through which around 20% of the world's oil supplies were transported daily. The threat of Iranian sea mines and missile attacks has effectively paralysed the movement of commercial tankers, as most operators have decided to anchor outside the strait to avoid the risk of passing through the combat zone. The strikes on Iran and Tehran's attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure of the Gulf states caused one of the most serious disruptions in global energy markets in recent decades.

The topicality of this research. The U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran has led to the unprecedented volatility in global energy markets. As the EU faces critical gas shortages and intense competition with Asian markets for remaining LNG supplies, understanding these new geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities is crucial for ensuring the bloc's immediate and long-term energy security.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of the Middle East escalation on the EU's energy security, specifically focusing on disruptions to the global LNG market. The purpose presupposes the following objectives:

1. evaluate the direct consequences of the Strait of Hormuz blockade and the strikes on Qatar's LNG infrastructure on European energy prices and supply chains.
2. examine the challenges the EU faces regarding an intensified competition with Asian economies for scarce LNG cargoes.
3. investigate the long-term strategic threat of the EU's growing energy dependence on the United States, including the potential for political blackmail and trade pressure from the U.S.

Methodology. Among methods used in the research we find useful the following ones: a case study; event analysis; content analysis. The research utilizes a case study of the disruption in Qatari LNG production to provide an in-depth understanding of the EU's current structural vulnerabilities. Event analysis is used to describe and explain the military strikes and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Content analysis of political rhetoric from U.S. and EU officials is used to identify risks of diplomatic blackmail.

Literature review. The catalyst for the current crisis is extensively documented in real-time reporting. Saba and Dahan (2026) detail the immediate physical consequences of the regional military escalation, specifically noting the targeted strikes that disabled critical energy nodes, including Qatari LNG facilities, Saudi refineries, and Israeli oil and gas fields. This establishes the baseline for the global supply shock resulting from the Middle East conflict.

A significant portion of the literature focuses on the immediate economic and structural threats to Europe. Foundational data provided by the European Council (2026) outlines the bloc's pre-existing gas import dependencies. Building upon this structural reality, Basquel (2026) offers a macro-level analysis of how the Iranian conflict serves as a direct trigger for a distinct European energy crisis.Beyond energy markets, the literature examines the broader strategic fallout and the erosion of traditional alliances.

Vialko (2026) highlights the risks of Europe's geopolitical dependency on the United States, illustrating how the Trump administration utilizes the threat of withholding critical supplies (such as weapons to Ukraine) as a mechanism to pressure Europe

The results and discussions. The blockade of the Strait immediately affected global energy markets. The price of Brent crude rose by 25–40% during the first days of the crisis, whilst spot prices for liquefied natural gas (LNG) reached levels last seen in 2022. Although the actual closure of the strait caused a shock specifically in global oil markets, the EU's immediate vulnerability lies in its need to import liquefied natural gas (LNG). The Strait of Hormuz accounted for 20% of global LNG trade, a significant portion of which came from Qatar. Although Qatar is not the EU's main LNG exporter (accounting for 3.8% of imports as of the end of 2025), given Brussels's desire to diversify supplies and phase out Russian gas, it plays a vital role as an alternative and strategically significant source of energy.

European gas storage facilities are usually filled in the spring as part of preparations for the coming winter. The EU is entering this period from one of its weakest starting positions in recent years. The situation is complicated by a structural dependence on LNG imports, which has emerged following the rapid shift away from Russian pipeline gas. According to the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI), storage levels currently stand at less than 30%, a five-year low. Increased demand is exacerbating the shortage on several fronts: a colder-than-average winter, combined with rising consumption in the energy sector, has increased overall gas demand in the EU by almost 7% since the start of the year, whilst pipeline gas exports from the EU to Ukraine have risen more than tenfold compared to the same period last year, significantly accelerating withdrawals from storage facilities. Even before the escalation of the situation in the Gulf, the EU had planned record LNG imports in 2026 due to depleted gas storage facilities.

Iran's strike on Ras Laffan, Qatar's largest LNG processing centre, forced production to be suspended. QatarEnergy declared force majeure, meaning a temporary suspension of contractual obligations regarding gas supplies to customers. This announcement triggered a sharp rise in prices on the European market of more than 50%. In fact, this is the largest single-day increase since the 2022 energy crisis, which arose following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent disruption of Russian pipeline flows.

Another challenge is that this market pressure could lead to competition between European and Asian importers for scarce LNG cargoes. In 2022, the EU was able to divert cargoes originally contracted for Asian markets to its own terminals, primarily thanks to higher spot prices and the flexibility of European buyers. The current situation may unfold according to a different scenario. The crisis in the Gulf region is directly reducing Qatari exports, and Qatar is one of the key suppliers of LNG to both Europe and Asia. In the face of supply shortages, the four leading East Asian economies–China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan–are capable of posing much stiffer competition to Europe for available cargoes. According to data from the analytical platform Kpler, these four countries together accounted for around three-quarters of all Asian LNG imports in 2025. China alone, as the largest importer of LNG, met 29% of its needs through Qatari supplies.

Although US gas liquefaction plants are operating at near full capacity, the likelihood of fully offsetting the loss of supplies from Qatar is slim. The US is the world’s largest LNG exporter, and its business model is based on cargoes with flexible destinations: buyers, most of whom operate under long-term contracts with fixed volumes, can technically redirect these cargoes to any market. However, this very flexibility is also a constraint, as most American producers have virtually no spare capacity beyond contracted volumes, making it impossible to rapidly ramp up exports in a crisis.

Furthermore, having overcome its dependence on Russian energy sources, it is important for the EU not to fall into dependence on American ones. The US-EU trade agreement sets out the intention to purchase energy resources (in particular, LNG, oil and nuclear energy) from the US to the value of $750 billion by 2028.However, following Donald Trump’s threats to assert control over Greenland, Brussels became concerned about the risks of dependence on American energy supplies. In particular, the EU Commissioner for Energy stated that the crisis caused by the statements regarding Greenland had become a ‘wake-up call’ for Europe’s energy security, warning that the bloc risked ‘replacing one dependency with another’ by gradually moving away from Russian energy.

Given the current rhetoric of the US President, even LNG supplies could become a factor for blackmail, particularly due to Europe’s critical need for this resource. Donald Trump has already openly threatened to halt US LNG supplies to Europe if Brussels refuses to ratify a trade agreement on terms favourable to Washington. Such threats could therefore pose yet another challenge for the EU.

Conclusions. The article explores a 2026 scenario in which a U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran triggers a major regional war, severely destabilizing global energy markets. A blockade of the Strait of

Hormuz and Iranian strikes on Qatar's gas infrastructure severely cripple global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies. This creates a critical energy crisis for the European Union, which is already facing historically low gas reserves and must now compete fiercely with Asian economies for scarce LNG cargoes. Ultimately, the crisis exposes a deep strategic vulnerability for the EU: having moved away from Russian energy, Europe is now dangerously dependent on the United States, leaving it open to political blackmail and trade pressure from the U.S. administration.

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УДК: 811.111'38

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АНАЛІЗ МЕТАФОР В ПРОМОВІ КОЛИШНЬОЇ ПРЕМ'ЄР-МІНІСТЕРКИ МАРГАРЕТ ТЕТЧЕР

Стаття присвячена аналізу метафор використаних колишньою прем'єр-міністеркою Маргарет Тетчер у відомій промові до британського народу «Британіє, прокинься». У статті описано теоретичне визначення ролі метафор та проведено детальний аналіз їх використання у зверненні до народу.

Ключові слова: *метафора, промова, політика, Велика Британія, Маргарет Тетчер.*

ANALYSIS OF METAPHORS IN THE SPEECH BY FORMER PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

The article is devoted to the analysis of metaphors used by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her famous speech to the British people "Britain Awake". The author describes the theoretical definition of the role of metaphors and conducts a detailed analysis of their use in addressing the people.

Keywords: *metaphor, speech, politics, Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher.*

Постановка проблеми та її значення. Політичні промови завжди насичені стилістичними засобами, які допомагають зробити мовлення політика цікавішим та зрозумілішим для аудиторії. У своїх промовах Маргарет Тетчер використовує метафори для фокусування на важливих моментах.

Аналіз останніх досліджень. Явище метафори досліджували у своїх працях Худолій А.О. [1], Овсієнко А.С. [2], А. Курас, О. Жулавська [3] та інші.

Метою статті є аналіз метафор у промові Маргарет Тетчер «Британіє, прокинься» [4] з урахуванням важливості контексту у тлумаченні метафор.

Виклад основного матеріалу. Вчення про метафору бере свій початок з «Поетики» давньогрецького філософа Арістотеля. Метафора – вид тропів, побудованих на основі вживання слів та виразів у переносному значенні. Арістотель розумів метафору насамперед як необхідний компонент стилю, що є, однак, зовнішнім щодо думки [2, с. 105]. Метафора, в сукупності з іншими образними засобами, сприяє розрізненню як функціональних, так й індивідуальних стилів мови. Нерідко саме метафора робить стиль автора самобутнім, оригінальним. Кожний період розвитку літературної мови характеризується певними тенденціями творення метафори, використанням тих чи інших асоціативних зв'язків [2, с. 107].

Промова Маргарет Тетчер насичена метафорами, які вона сміливо використала для підкреслення важливих моментів. З них можна виділити метафори *сну та пробудження*, що перегукуються з назвою промови «Британіє, прокинься» [4], а саме: *reawakening* [4]*; to wake up to those developments* [4]*; the vital task of shaking the British public out of a long sleep* [4]*; sedatives have been prescribed by people* [4]. Вона наголошувала на необхідності збільшення фінансування військово-оборонної інституції, двічі використовуючи метафору про Радянський Союз, який інвестує в розповсюдження комунізму: *the Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, arms and front-line troops* [4]. А також використовує метафори, які показують Радянський Союз як реальну загрозу, а не просто сусіда на геополітичному просторі: *threatens our oil rigs and our traditional life-lines, the sea routes* [4]*; swallowed up by Communist aggression* [4]*; in the hope of dragging it into the Communist bloc* [4]*; in their words – to end up on ‘the scrap heap of history* [4]*; Sedatives have been prescribed by people... sweetness and light in Moscow* [4].

Детальний розбір метафор з промови Маргарет Тетчер:

1) *The men in the Soviet politburo don't have to worry about the ebb and flow of public opinion* [4]. Членам радянського політбюро не потрібно турбуватися про коливання громадської думки. Метафора *the ebb and flow,* що дослівно означає *припливи і відпливи* [8], порівнює мінливість морських хвиль із вільною громадською думкою, притаманною західному суспільству і відсутньою в Радянському Союзі.

2) *The rise of Russia as a world-wide naval power, threatens our oil rigs and our traditional life-lines, the sea routes* [4]. Зростання Росії як глобальної морської держави становить загрозу для наших нафтових платформ та наших традиційних життєвих артерій – морських шляхів. Ось яке визначення дає Кембриджський словник іменнику

lifeline, який використаний у тексті, як метафора: "Щось, що допомагає комусь або чомусь у важкій ситуації, тож вони можуть надалі існувати в нормальних умовах" [5] і перекладається на українську мову як: *рятувальний трос, життєво важливий шлях, лінії життя* [6]. Метафора передає занепокоєння загрозою британським нафтовим платформам, економіці та безпеці загалом.

3) *We have seen Vietnam and all of Indochina swallowed up by Communist aggression* [4]. Ми стали свідками того, як В'єтнам і весь Індокитай були поглинуті комуністичною агресією. Використання метафори *swallowed up* у поданому прикладі підкреслює агресивний характер поширення комунізму, який заполонив В'єтнам та весь Індокитай.

4) *And now the Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, arms and front-line troops into Angola in the hope of dragging it into the Communist bloc* [4]. А тепер Радянський Союз та його сателіти вливають в Анголу величезні кошти, зброю та відправляють туди бойові війська, сподіваючись затягнути її до комуністичного блоку. В цьому уривку використано одразу дві метафори: *pouring money, arms and front-line troops* та *in the hope of dragging it* [4]**.** Метафора *pouring money* передає масивне та стрімке вкладання ресурсів радянськими силами в Анголу**,** в надії втягнути її в блок. Метафора *in the hope of dragging it* підкреслює майже примусове втягування за рахунок зовнішніх факторів, таких як серйозні інвестиції в Анголу.

5) *The MPLA is gaining ground because the Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, guns and front-line troops into the battle* [4]. МПЛА досягає успіхів, бо Радянський Союз та його сателіти вливають у цю війну величезні кошти, зброю та направляють туди бойові підрозділи. Це речення є ще одним прикладом, де була вжита метафора про вливання ресурсів Радянським Союзом, використана, щоб підкреслити необхідність збільшити фінансування оборонної сфери Британії.

6) *If we cannot understand why the Russians are rapidly becoming the greatest naval and military power the world has ever seen if we cannot draw the lesson of what they tried to do in Portugal and are now trying to do in Angola then we are destined–in their words–to end up on 'the scrap heap of history'* [4]. Якщо ми не можемо зрозуміти, чому росіяни швидко перетворюються на найбільшу військово-морську та військову силу в світі, якщо ми не можемо винести уроки з того, що вони намагалися зробити в Португалії і зараз намагаються зробити в Анголі, то нам судилося – за їхніми словами – опинитися на «звалищі

історії». Цією метафорою, *the scrap heap of history*, Маргарет Тетчер цитує радянське керівництво і наголошує на необхідності зрозуміти, чому Радянський Союз міцнії. Вона хотіла підкреслити, що якщо британці не прокинуться та не почнуть якось реагувати на те, що відбувається у світі, то вони занапастять своє майбутнє та спаплюжить величне минуле.

7) *But we are all aware of how the bitter experience of Vietnam has changed the public mood in America* [4]. Але ми всі знаємо, як гіркий досвід В'єтнаму змінив настрої в американському суспільстві. Метафора *the bitter experience* тут підкреслює негативний досвід американської участі у війні за Південний В'єтнам. Як відомо, В'єтнамська війна стала фатальною для США, а її безславний фінал призвів до негативної оцінки діяльності президента Л. Джонсона [7, c.187].

8) *Of course this places a burden on us. But it is one that we must be willing to bear if we want our freedom to survive* [4]. Звичайно, це покладає на нас тягар. Але це тягар, який ми повинні бути готові нести, якщо хочемо, щоб наша свобода вижила. Метафори *places a burden on us* та *be willing to bear* передають необхідність зміни національних пріорітетів. Якщо країна хоче вижити, вона має бути готова жертвувати державними субсидіями чи соціальними програмами. Метафора *we want our freedom to survive* передає бажання вижити та відстояти свою суверенність, незважаючи на виклики сучасності.

9) *Throughout our history, we have carried the torch for freedom* [4]. Протягом усієї історії ми несли факел свободи. Метафора *the torch for freedom* передає лідерство країни, яка є прогресивною, цивілізованою та несе месіанство світу. В стандартній англійській мові слово *torch* перекладається як *ліхтар, факел* чи *смолоскип* [8]. У своїй промові М. Тетчер використовує його у поєднанні з абстрактним поняттям *свободи,* тому вираз можна перекласти як *факел свободи*, що ще більше підкреслює пафосність заяви про те, що Велика Британія, за словами М. Тетчер, несла цивілізацію та прогрес у світ як у фізичній, так і в духовній площині.

10) *They want to know why we are hiding our heads in the sand, why with all our experience, we are not giving a lead* [4]. Вони хочуть знати, чому ми ховаємо голови в пісок, чому, з усім нашим досвідом, ми не беремо на себе лідерство. Метафора *hiding our heads in the sand* означає спробу уникнути відповідальності, страх перед чимось та ігнорування реальності. В даному контексті вона передає

здивування країн по всьому світу пасивною роллю Великої Британії у зовнішній політиці.

11) *In the meantime, the Conservative Party has the vital task of shaking the British public out of a long sleep* [4]. Тим часом, Консервативна партія має життєво важливе завдання – пробудити британську громадськість від тривалого сну. Метафора *shaking the British public out of a long sleep* передає необхідність негайного усвідомлення британцями проблем всередині країни та заклик до їх вирішення.

Висновок. Використання метафор у промовах політиків – це класичний прийом і промова Маргарет Тетчер не є виняток. Усі метафори підібрані вдало та фокусуються на трьох головних моментах, пов'язаних з необхідністю усвідомити загрозу з боку комуністичного СРСР, засудженням пасивності британського уряду перед лицем цієї загрози та закликом до дій, які мають бути здійснені задля захисту суверенітету та щасливого майбутнього держави.

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UDC: 316.77:303.443

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METODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN STUDYING THE MODERN INFORMATION SPACE

The article examines key methodological challenges facing researchers of the contemporary information space in the context of digital transformation of society. Traditional and novel approaches to media environment study are analyzed, and the necessity of interdisciplinary synthesis of methods is substantiated. Particular attention is paid to the operationalization of concepts, representativeness of samples in online content research, and data verification challenges in the context of information overload. The author proposes an original methodological framework for comprehensive studies of the information space.

Keywords: *information space, research methodology, media analysis, digital media, content analysis, interdisciplinary approach, information society.*

ПРОБЛЕМИ МЕТОДОЛОГІЇ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ СУЧАСНОГО ІНФОРМАЦІЙНОГО ПРОСТОРУ

У статті розглядаються вагомі методологічні виклики, що постають перед дослідниками сучасного інформаційного простору в умовах цифрової трансформації суспільства. Аналізуються традиційні та нові підходи до вивчення медіасередовища, обґрунтовується необхідність міждисциплінарного синтезу методів. Ключова увага приділяється проблемам операціоналізації понять, репрезентативності вибірок у дослідженнях онлайн-контенту, а також викликам верифікації даних в умовах інформаційного дискурсу. Запропоновано модель методологічного забезпечення комплексних досліджень інформаційного простору.

Ключові слова: *інформаційний простір (інфопростір), методологія дослідження, медіааналіз, цифрові медіа, контент-аналіз, міждисциплінарний підхід, інформаційне суспільство.*

Introduction. The modern information space represents a complex, multidimensional, and dynamic system that is undergoing continuous transformation under the influence of technological, social, and political factors. The rapid development of digital technologies, the spread of social networks, and the emergence of new forms of media consumption have profoundly reshaped not only the structure of information exchange but also the very nature of communicative processes.

The study of the information space has acquired particular relevance in connection with the phenomena of "post-truth," information wars, and large-scale disinformation campaigns, which became defining features of the media environment of the 2010s–2020s. As D. Bowler notes, *"the transformation of the media space does not merely alter the channels of information transmission – it reinterprets the very ontology of informational reality"* [2,c.47]. At the same time, the methodological toolkit employed in the field of information space research often lags behind the rapid changes of the object under study.

At present, methods developed for the analysis of traditional media prove insufficient or require transformative adaptation to adequately comprehend the digital information environment. This gives rise to a systemic scholarly problem. Above all, it is necessary to emphasize the discrepancy between the complexity of the contemporary information space and the methodological characteristics of its academic study.

The purpose of this article is to identify and systematize the principal methodological challenges in studying the contemporary information space, as well as to substantiate approaches to overcoming them on the basis of interdisciplinary synthesis.

The primary objective of the study is to identify and systematize the key methodological challenges in researching the modern information space under conditions of digital transformation. Specifically, the article aims to:

1. Examine the limitations of traditional media research methods in the digital environment.
2. Highlight the complexity of defining the boundaries of the information space as a research object.
3. Analyze issues of representativeness, volatility of digital content, and verification of sources in an era of disinformation.

4. Substantiate the necessity of interdisciplinary synthesis to overcome methodological fragmentation.

5. Propose a coherent multi-level methodological framework for comprehensive studies of the information space.

The concept of the "information space" is one of the fundamental notions in contemporary communication studies; however, its scholarly operationalization remains a matter of debate. *"In a broad sense, the information space encompasses the totality of information resources, channels of dissemination, actors of informational activity, and regulatory mechanisms that determine the nature of information exchange within society"* [14].

Literature review. In the Ukrainian scholarly tradition, the concept of the information space has been examined primarily in the context of state information policy and media security (V. Rizun, B. Potyatynyk, M. Zhenchenko). By contrast, in international scholarship, the dominant frameworks are those of the *mediasphere* (R. Debray), the *public sphere* (J. Habermas), and the *network society* (M. Castells). In his seminal work *The Network Society*, Castells emphasizes that *"communication networks constitute the architecture of power in the twenty-first century"* [3], thereby underscoring the transformation of the information space into an arena of struggle for influence and legitimacy. This thesis is of particular importance for the researcher's methodological choices, since the analysis of the information space is impossible without accounting for its power dimension. It is also worth highlighting the contributions of scholars such as H. Pocheptsov, V. Horbulin, and Ye. Mahda, who have made conceptual advances in studying the information space in the context of information and hybrid wars, as well as the analysis of strategic communications (A. Barovska) and media resilience (D. Dubov).

Metodology. The article employs a conceptual and analytical approach, drawing on both Ukrainian and international scholarship. The methodology includes literature review, structural–functional analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis, computational social science, and critical media theory, identification of methodological problems.

Results and Discussion. The study reveals several interrelated findings:

1. Boundaries of the research object. Unlike traditional media, the digital information space is inherently boundless, requiring explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria for sampling.

2. Volatility of content. Digital texts are unstable (edited, deleted, relocated), complicating longitudinal analysis and verification. Automated data collection introduces biases due to platform algorithms.

3. Verification challenges. In a disinformation-saturated environment, distinguishing truth from manipulation becomes both a technical and epistemological dilemma.

Among the principal methodological approaches to the study of the information space, several directions should be distinguished. Structural–functional analysis views the media system as a set of institutions endowed with specific social functions. Discourse analysis focuses on the mechanisms of meaning construction within media texts. Content analysis is employed for both quantitative and qualitative examination of informational materials –such as mass media and social networks – in order to identify trends, themes, and the emotional-semantic tonality of communication.

The methodological problems of studying the contemporary information space are also addressed by critical media theory, which investigates power relations in the domain of information production and consumption, as well as by new approaches in computational social science, which rely on big data and algorithmic methods of analysis.

Among the key methodological problems, researchers highlight:

1. The problem of defining the boundaries of the research object, which is the first and arguably the most fundamental methodological challenge in this field. While in the era of traditional media the researcher could relatively clearly delineate the subject of analysis (press, television, radio), the digital information space is characterized by inherent boundlessness and blurred distinctions between public and private, as well as between the producer and the recipient of information.

C. Shirky, in his book *Here Comes Everybody*, describes this phenomenon as *"cognitive surplus"* [17]–a qualitatively new situation in which billions of people simultaneously act as authors, audiences, and disseminators of information. This demonstrates that the classical linear model of communication –"source–message–recipient"– no longer provides an accurate description of real information flows.

In this regard, the practical consequence of the problem is the necessity of theoretically defining inclusion and exclusion criteria when forming the sample. The researcher must first answer the question: *"Which platforms, channels, and actors are incorporated into the analyzed information space, and why?"* Without addressing this question, the study loses its scientific verifiability.

2. A second challenge is the volatility of content. Digital texts may be edited, deleted, or relocated after publication, complicating their verification and comparative analysis. E. Rogers and S. Shoemaker, in

their classic work *Diffusion of Innovations*, noted that *"media content is always an artifact of a specific moment in time"* [15,89]–a statement that acquires literal significance in the digital era.

In addition, automated data collection (web scraping, use of social media APIs) introduces its own methodological risks. Platform algorithmic constraints determine which data are accessible to the researcher and which are not. As A. Salganik's studies demonstrate, *"data collected through APIs systematically differ from the actual distribution of content on the platform"* [16].

3. Equally significant is the problem of verification and reliability of sources. In an environment saturated with disinformation, the researcher confronts a paradox: the very object of study – fake news, manipulative narratives – is simultaneously part of the information field and a distortion of reality. Technical solutions such as automated fact-checking systems (e.g., NewsGuard, MediaBiasFactCheck) provide partial remedies, yet the epistemological dilemma persists: distinguishing "true" from "false" in a media landscape where competing narratives claim legitimacy. Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the "field" underscores that what is considered real in the social world is always the outcome of symbolic struggle, a principle directly applicable to the study of information flows.

P. Bourdieu, in his concept of the "field," emphasized that *"what is considered real in the social world is always the result of symbolic struggle"* [1]. Applying this idea to the analysis of the information space, one may argue that the researcher does not merely record information flows but inevitably becomes engaged in the contest over the definition of reality.

4. The problem of interdisciplinarity

It should be noted that the contemporary information space is simultaneously the object of study for several academic disciplines, including journalism, sociology, political science, psychology, computer science, and linguistics. Each of these offers its own methodological toolkit and theoretical lens. The difficulty lies in the fact that these approaches are often incompatible or contradictory. Thus, quantitative methods of computational social science allow researchers to process vast datasets but suffer from a "blindness to meaning," being unable to capture hidden nuances of significance. Conversely, qualitative methods of the interpretative tradition (for example, hermeneutics, discourse analysis) provide deep contextual understanding but do not permit statistically significant generalizations.

C. Snow, as early as 1959, described the divide between the "two cultures" of the humanities and the natural sciences [18], and this divide continues to leave its mark on contemporary media research methodology. Overcoming it requires not an eclectic mixing of methods but the construction of a coherent interdisciplinary methodological framework, in which different approaches complement one another on the basis of shared theoretical foundations.

1. The development of mixed methods research, which combines the advantages of quantitative and qualitative approaches. In particular, the methodology of *"big data with thick description"* entails automated analysis of large datasets followed by qualitative interpretation of the patterns revealed. J. Creswell and C. Plano Clark, in their foundational handbook *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*, argue that *"the integration of quantitative and qualitative data provides a more complete understanding of the phenomenon under study than either approach alone"* [4].

2. The introduction of methodological protocols of research transparency (open science practices). In a context where the reproducibility of media research results is increasingly questioned, the mandatory publication of raw data, coding instructions, and analytical scripts becomes not only an ethical norm but also a methodological requirement.

3. The development of sectoral standards for describing sampling procedures in studies of the digital environment. The absence of unified standards makes it impossible to compare the results of different studies and significantly limits the cumulative advancement of knowledge in the field.

4. The advancement of researcher reflexivity. A scholar studying the information space is an inseparable part of it and therefore cannot claim the position of an independent observer. The methodological resolution of this problem lies in the domain of reflexive social science, which requires the researcher to explicitly articulate their position, value assumptions, and potential biases [13].

On the basis of the conducted analysis, a multilevel methodological model.

The first, ontological level presupposes a clear definition of the ontological foundations of the study. It addresses questions concerning the essence of the information space, the structuring of its elements, and the investigation of interrelations among them. The choice of research methods at all subsequent levels depends on the answers to these questions.

The second level is epistemological. It determines how scientific knowledge of the information space is possible. It provides an understanding of whether the researcher seeks an objective description, an interpretation of subjective meanings, or a critical deconstruction of power relations.

The third level is methodological. This level encompasses a specific set of research techniques, such as content analysis, discourse analysis, network analysis, in-depth interviews, focus groups, and big data analysis. The selection of particular methods must be justified in light of the research question and the ontological–epistemological premises.

The fourth level is technological. This level covers the tools of data collection and processing, which have acquired special significance in the digital era, since technological decisions (choice of platform for data collection, clustering algorithms, etc.) substantially influence research outcomes.

The integration of all four levels into a unified methodological system ensures the internal coherence of the study and constitutes a key condition of its scientific validity.

Conclusions

The study of the contemporary information space encounters a complex set of interrelated methodological problems, determined both by the internal complexity of the subject and by the traditional limitations of existing research tools. The key challenges include the indeterminacy of the boundaries of the information space as a research object; the methodological inefficiency of traditional methods in the new digital environment; the acute issues of verification and reliability under conditions of large-scale disinformation; and the structural divide between quantitative and qualitative research traditions. Overcoming these problems requires not merely technical refinement of individual methods but a systemic rethinking of the methodological foundations of media research. The proposed four-level methodological model can serve as a guide for constructing internally coherent programs of information space studies. Prospects for further scholarly inquiry are linked to the development of specific methodological protocols for each type of media research, as well as to the establishment of international quality standards in this field.

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UDC: 316.77:172.1(=161.2)

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COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN "BE BRAVE LIKE UKRAINE" AS AN EXPORT PRODUCT OF BRAVERY

This article examines Ukraine's "Be Brave Like Ukraine" nation-branding campaign launched in April 2022 during Russia's full-scale armed invasion, analyzing it through the intersecting lenses of branding theory, strategic communications, and international relations. The study draws on the campaign's official Instagram page, materials from Banda Agency, and academic scholarship to assess why the campaign proved effective and what makes it unprecedented in the history of nation branding. The article argues that the campaign's core innovation was the transformation of an intangible value – bravery – into a convertible strategic asset capable of mobilizing military, economic, and moral support from the international community. Unlike conventional nation-branding efforts that seek to project a desired image, "Be Brave Like Ukraine" documented and crystallized a reality already witnessed by the world, thereby aligning authentic national identity with global soft power objectives. The campaign's reach across 22 countries and over 160 cities, achieved largely through pro bono media partnerships, demonstrates that earned media and cultural discourse can substitute for large advertising budgets. The article concludes that this campaign sets a new precedent for crisis communication and public diplomacy, establishing country branding not merely as a peacetime instrument but as a tool of national survival and international agency.

Keywords: *nation branding, "Be Brave Like Ukraine", strategic communications, soft power, public diplomacy, crisis communication, Banda Agency, Ukraine, information warfare, earned media.*

КОМУНІКАЦІЙНА КАМПАНІЯ «BE BRAVE LIKE UKRAINE» ЯК ЕКСПОРТНИЙ ПРОДУКТ СМІЛИВОСТІ

У цій статті розглядається кампанія з брендингу нації України «Будь сміливим, як Україна», розпочата у квітні 2022 року під час повномасштабного збройного вторгнення Росії, аналізуючи її крізь перетин призмів теорії брендингу, стратегічних комунікацій та міжнародних відносин. Дослідження спирається на офіційну сторінку кампанії в Instagram (@brave.ua), матеріали Banda Agency та академічні дослідження, щоб оцінити, чому кампанія виявилася ефективною та що робить її безпрецедентною в історії брендингу націй. У статті стверджується, що основною інновацією кампанії було перетворення нематеріальної цінності – хоробрості – на конвертований стратегічний актив, здатний мобілізувати військову, економічну та моральну підтримку з боку міжнародної спільноти. На відміну від традиційних зусиль з брендингу нації, які прагнуть створити бажаний імідж, «Будь сміливим, як Україна» задокументувала та кристалізувала реальність, яку вже бачив світ, тим самим узгоджуючи справжню національну ідентичність із глобальними цілями м'якої сили. Охоплення кампанії у 22 країнах та понад 160 містах, досягнуте значною мірою завдяки партнерству pro bono у сфері медіа, демонструє, що зароблені медіа та культурний дискурс можуть замінити великі рекламні бюджети. У статті робиться висновок, що ця кампанія створює новий прецедент для кризової комунікації та публічної дипломатії, утверджуючи брендинг країни не лише як інструмент мирного часу, а й як інструмент національного виживання та міжнародної діяльності.

Ключові слова: *брендинг нації, «Будь сміливим, як Україна», стратегічні комунікації, м'яка сила, публічна дипломатія, кризова комунікація, агентство Banda, Україна, інформаційна війна, зароблені медіа.*

Introduction. In April 2022, in the midst of a full-scale armed invasion by Russia, Ukraine did something no other country in modern history had done: it launched an official nation-branding campaign during a war. The Be Brave Like Ukraine campaign – or simply "Courage" – became more than just an advertising product, but a strategic weapon in the information space, a precedent in the theory and practice of national branding, and a phenomenon of global communications.

So in this study we will focus on the topic of Ukrainian communication campaigns, in particular "Be Brave Like Ukraine" and their impact on the situation at the beginning of a full-scale invasion. We will focus on the uniqueness of the campaign, its innovation and the meanings it carries. Additionally, we will consider several messages that were broadcast during this information campaign, which were addressed to both ordinary people and politicians.

Purpose of research. In this article, we will examine the campaign through the prism of three disciplines: branding, strategic communications, and international relations. Using the brand's official Instagram page [2], materials from the Banda Agency, and academic research on the phenomenon as sources, we will analyze why the campaign worked, what made it unprecedented, and what lessons it holds for the global branding of countries in the future.

In this article, the object of research is the campaign "Be Bold Like Ukraine", its messages and meanings, its impact on the perception and brand of Ukraine in the global communication arena.

Topicality of the research. To understand the revolutionary nature of the "Courage" campaign, it is necessary to understand what Ukraine's branding was like before February 2022. Starting in 2014, the country methodically built a new identity on the international stage: the Brand Ukraine [1] organization coordinated strategic communications, emphasizing cultural, economic, and technological achievements. In 2018, the "Ukraine Now" campaign was launched – a classic tourism and investment positioning with an emphasis on the IT sector, agricultural potential, and European integration. These efforts followed the standard logic of

nation branding: to divert attention from the conflict, to emphasize the positive potential, to attract tourists and investors. However, the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022, instantly destroyed the previous narrative.

Literature review. Not as many scientific works have been written about Ukrainian information campaigns as we would like, because this is the sphere of activity of Ukrainian international communications. However, while preparing this article, I read the works of those who have already begun to research this topic.

Researchers such as Burlakova Ya. [8], Hakimova V. [9], Opanaschuk P. [10] and many more others have taken steps in researching this topic. The analysis of the "Be Brave Like Ukraine" campaign reveals several interconnected findings that together constitute a new paradigm in nation branding and crisis communication.

The campaign's most significant result was demonstrating that an intangible national value can be operationalized as a measurable instrument of foreign policy. Rather than appealing for sympathy directly, Banda Agency transformed documented Ukrainian resistance into a brand proposition that foreign audiences could actively adopt – securing pro bono placement across 22 countries, more than 160 cities, and approximately 13,000 digital screens without a conventional advertising budget. This confirms that authentic national identity, when precisely crystallized, generates soft power effects that paid media cannot replicate.

Simon Anholt's foundational critique – that campaigns divorced from real actions are ineffective – was structurally reversed here. The campaign did not construct an aspirational image; it named what the world was already witnessing live. This alignment between brand message and observable reality distinguished "Be Brave Like Ukraine" from prior Ukrainian campaigns such as "Ukraine Now" (2018), which relied on standard investment and tourism positioning with no comparable international resonance.

As Nadia Kaneva identifies, the campaign operated on two simultaneous registers: internally reinforcing civilian and military morale, and externally converting international sympathy into a call to action. This dual functionality is without precedent in nation branding scholarship, which has historically treated internal and external communication as separate concerns.

Taken together, these results establish a new category within the field – crisis branding – demonstrating that strategic communication, when grounded in authentic identity and deployed with creative precision, can function as a tool of national survival: mobilizing material resources, sustaining international attention, and shaping the moral framing of a conflict in the global information space.

The results and discussion. It was in this existential context that Banda Agency – an agency with offices in Kyiv and Los Angeles, which had previously promoted Ukraine as a tourist and investment destination – proposed a radically new idea: to make bravery not just a description of the behavior of Ukrainians, but the official brand of the country. The campaign was the first time in history that brand communication was used as a strategic tool during an armed conflict.

The conceptual breakthrough of the campaign was to transform an abstract value – courage – into a convertible asset. As the academic analysis accurately puts it, the campaign “attempts to transform an intangible value, such as bravery, into an asset that can be converted into real military, economic, and moral support." Instead of asking the world for help, Ukraine invited the world to identify with courage – to become part of something bigger than itself.

The slogan "Be Brave Like Ukraine" brilliantly copies the grammatical structure of the greatest brand slogans in history. Nike's "Just Do It" calls for action, Apple's "Think Different" invites self-identification. "Be Brave Like Ukraine" does the same, but with an unprecedented attitude at stake – not "look more successful" or "think bigger," but "become a better version of yourself by choosing bravery." The best brand messages invite the consumer to imagine themselves better – that's exactly what the campaign does. The Instagram page @ brave.ua demonstrates an uncompromising editorial style: large text messages, documentary photography of real people in real situations of bravery – rescuers, volunteers, civilians stopping military equipment with their bare hands. No illustrative "advertising." For a Western audience, the campaign strategically uses quotes from reputable media outlets– including the headline of a New York Times column: "I Thought I Knew What Courage Was. Then I Saw Ukraine."[3] The lack of a media budget was not a limitation, but a catalyst for creativity. Banda reached out to global media partners to provide advertising space free of charge–and received a positive response. Outdoor advertising appeared in more than 22 countries and over 160 cities, including Times Square in New York and central squares in European capitals. Approximately 13,000 digital screens in subways, at transport stops, and on billboards were provided pro bono.

Nadia Kaneva, a media studies scholar at the University of Denver, identifies three ways in which the campaign is unprecedented in nation branding theory. First, no country has used nation branding as a weapon during an active armed conflict as of 2022. Second, the campaign simultaneously targets two audiences–internal (supporting the morale of citizens and the military) and external (converting global sympathy into material aid). Third, the campaign functions as a strategic alternative to the news cycle–while the media eventually shifts to other topics, billboards, Instagram, and merch continue to hold the attention of a global audience [4].

Let's consider the mechanics of soft power through the lens of a communications campaign. Nation branding theorist Simon Anholt insists that a country's true reputation is built not by advertising campaigns but by real actions and achievements.[5] Be Brave Like Ukraine brilliantly avoids this trap: the campaign does not invent an image of bravery–it documents and reinforces the bravery that already exists and that the whole world is watching live. When Zelensky refuses to evacuate, saying "I need a weapon, not a ride"[6], when civilians stop columns of armored vehicles–the brand does not construct reality, it names and crystallizes it.

The second strategic decision is to engage thought leaders and institutions. The Vogue cover with Olena Zelenska, authored by Anna Leibovitz, fits into the same communication architecture: not news, but cultural discourse. The title "A Portrait of Bravery"[7] echoes the central message of the campaign through a

medium that reaches a completely different audience than traditional media. This is a masterful orchestration of earned media.

Conclusion. So, to sum up, the Be Brave Like Ukraine campaign will remain in textbooks on nation branding, strategic communications, and public diplomacy as a case study that rewrites the rules. It demonstrates several fundamental truths.

Firstly, a true country brand must grow from real values and moral actions, not from a desired image. Banda did not invent "bravery" – she crystallized it into something that the whole world had already seen and experienced. Branding at its best is not manipulation, but the accurate naming of what is. Second: in crisis communication, emotional authenticity is more important than polished aesthetics. Instagram @ brave.ua lives not with staged photos, but with documentary truth – and it is this truth that pierces through any defensive cynicism of a global audience. At the third place, a brand that invites participation, not passive contemplation, creates a cartoon effect. "Be Brave Like Ukraine" is a call to action addressed to everyone: become brave like Ukraine. This makes every wearer of the cap or reposter of the publication a part of the narrative, and not just its viewer. Fourth: in the modern media environment, support for earned media through cultural institutions (Vogue, NYT, international awards – the campaign received the Red Dot Design Award in the Corporate Identity category) can replace billion-dollar advertising budgets. This is fundamentally important for countries that do not have the resources of leading economies.

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ЗМІСТ

Наукове видання

СТУДЕНТСЬКІ НАУКОВІ ЗАПИСКИ
Національного університету
«Острозька академія»

Серія «Філологічна»

Збірник наукових праць

ВИПУСК 23

Формат 42х30/4. Ум. друк. арк. 7,56. Зам. № 15–26.
Папір офсетний. Друк цифровий. Гарнітура «Times New Roman».

Оригінал-макет виготовлено у видавництві
Національного університету «Острозька академія»,
Україна, 35800, Рівненська обл., м. Острог, вул. Семінарська, 2.
Свідоцтво суб'єкта видавничої справи РВ № 1 від 8 серпня 2000 року.