



Jean Monnet Module Erasmus+

**European Values and Identity Studies
587684-EPP-1-2017-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE**

Vitalii Lebediuk, Dmytro Shevchuk, Olena Shershnyova

Course

**“EUROPE AFTER COMMUNISM:
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
AND INTEGRATION”**

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Didactic materials

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PROJECT

“EUROPEAN VALUES AND IDENTITY STUDIES”

Project Title: European Values and Identity Studies
(587684-EPP-1-2017-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE)

Timing of the Project: 01.09.2017 – 31.08.2020

Project Beneficiary: The National University of Ostroh Academy

Project objective and specific tasks:

– raise awareness of the target audience in the field of European values and identity Studies, of the EU and the EU-Ukraine relations, based on new teaching technologies and visions;

– initiate the active public debate on European values and identity policy at local, regional and national levels;

– involvement of the academic community, civil society, local authorities and the representatives of institutions, interested in the sustainable development of Ukraine, based on European values, that will ensure European standards of living and decent place of Ukraine in the world;

– coordination of partner cooperation in informing the society on European integration of Ukraine between authorities at the regional level, NGOs and other interested institutions.

Target group:

The project has 4 basic target audiences: students of NUOA; scientists and experts, members of interested institutions; government officials, practitioners from Ukraine and UE countries, NGOs members and Internet users.

Specific activities:

– 3 teaching course for Political Studies «East European Studies», Cultural Studies «European Cultural Studies», International

Relations «EU Studies» students, who came from different sides of Ukraine;

- book with project results, web site of this project, MOOC “What do we need to know about Europe and its values?”;

- 2 peer-reviewed articles, based on research made in this project;

- 2 international conferences, dedicated to the problem of cultural identity, European values and education, workshop for teachers, roundtable for representatives of public administration, NGO’s activists, students, academic staff, researchers.

Expected outcomes:

- enriching students interest in the topic of European values and identity studies and promotion of idea of a United Europe;

- getting an adequate level of information on the education of young people in a spirit of common European values, promoting partnerships with European youth NGOs, supporting Ukraine’s course toward integration into European structures. Increase of interest and mobility of young researchers in the European Union;

- creating new types of research assignments on MOOC or project web site, that include education and information component, archive materials about research, online platform for the knowledge exchange on the most pressing issues of the EU and European values and identity studies;

- carrying out of research activities on the themes about European Union, European values, and identity;

- learning to form leadership skills, ability to make responsible decisions, and gain experience in organizing information campaigns, spreading knowledge about European values and identity studies. To increase overall intellectual level by finding information, development of new printed and electronic sources in this topic, that relevant for graduates in their professional life.

COURSE:
**“EUROPE AFTER COMMUNISM: DEMOCRATIC
CULTURE AND INTEGRATION”**

Topic 1: Theories of the European Integration before and after Communism

The philosophical meaning of political and civic European integration – from West to East. Historical sequences and theoretical modelling of European integration (from the Middle Ages until the Treaty of Lisbon). Modern and contemporary authors about the problem of a European integration philosophy. The European cultural model. Pan Europe manifesto as an philosophical-political alternative. The European citizenship inside of the legislative framework. European integration theories as the alliance between knowledge, political action, spirituality, equilibrium, good will and legality.

Topic 2: Socio-cultural aspects of transition in Central and Eastern European countries

Establishment of democratic regime in former authoritarian societies. Socio-cultural factors and political systems. The political culture as series of social values, beliefs and attitudes about the political systems and its functions. Core political values: frustrations with democracy. Democratic re-socialization. Inequality and poverty. Political elites and direct democratic processes. Do we have a civic spirit in the «European» meaning? «Returning to Europe» of Central and Eastern Europe countries.

Topic 3: Political transition and the state of democracy in East Central Europe: between hopes and disillusion

Constitutional order and institutional framework. The Copenhagen Criteria. Consolidated democracies and semi-consolidated democracies. EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe. A «democratic deficit» in the EU

institutional structure. The EU Parliament and the everyday lives of citizens. Political changes with potential limitations to democracy (democracy in Slovakia and especially in Hungary and Poland). Party systems and party identification in CEE countries. The Impact of EU Integration on the Party System. Civil society, Civil liberties and human rights. National and ethnic minorities. Nationalism and the elitist-populist pendulum.

Topic 4: Elections, the electoral process and participation in East Central Europe

Unicameral legislatures (Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and bicameral legislatures (Czech Republic, Romania, Poland). Electoral process in CEE countries. E-voting. Election to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in the State of residence. Voter turnout in parliamentary elections in CEE countries. Democratic values and citizen' active participation in politics.

Topic 5: Corruption and state capture in post-Communist Europe

Causes of corruption. Citizens' perception of corruption. Consequences of corruption in CEE countries. Private interests and distribution of the public money. Quality of Government Institute. Between localized and full-scale capture. Corruptive Patterns of Patronage in CEE countries. The contractual network of organizations. Elite group in public procurement network structure. The Impact of EU Funds on Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Corruption control and labour migration. Effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.

Topic 6: “Shock” and “Therapy”: political post socialist transformation in Eastern European countries

System changes and functioning of economy. The strategies of economic growth. Economic reforms. The politics of transformation and strategy of development. Structural changes in post-communist

societies. Liberalization and free market. Re-distribution of goods and value of justice. Internalization of post-communist societies.

Topic 7: Passive and Active Leverages of EU: the case of Eastern Europe

Models of European impact. The conception of passive and active leverages. Influencing governments. Constitutional process in post-communist countries and European influence. EU's influence of the reform the state and economy. Debating the European influence and leverages.

Topic 8: Process of institution building in post-communist countries

The communist legacy and post-communist regime change. Re-conceptualization of regime. European strategies for promoting democracy in post-communist countries. The main theories of democratic institution. Implementing the principles of democratic institution building in post-communist countries.

Topic 9: Democratic institutions and their value (Civil society and rule of law)

The main models of civil society. Civil society and social development. Counter-democracy and civil control. The social projects and network of communication. The EU's programs for development the civil society. Rule of law as fundamental element of democratic society. The human rights.

Topic 10: Post-communist countries as European frontiers

The frontier studies and cultural studies of social and cultural identity. The idea of European frontiers. Post-communist countries and their socio-cultural identity. Ukraine-Belarus-Moldova as European frontiers and their EU's integration

Topic 11: The “Velvet” revolutions and political transformation

The concept of “velvet revolution”. The civil resistance in Europe. The case of Polish Solidarity. The “Velvet revolutions” and the end of communism in 1989. The rose revolution in Georgia. The Orange revolution in Ukraine 2004. The effect of “velvet revolution”

Topic 12: Ukrainian Euromaidan

Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. The causes of Euromaidan. EuroRevolution. The real and symbolic landscapes of Euromaidan. The revitalization of European idea and values. Understanding the Euromaidan: view from EU and Russia.

Topic 13: Ukraine-European Union relations

History of EU – Ukraine relations (early relations, post-Orange revolution relations, period of Yanukovych’s presidency, period of Poroshenko’s presidency), Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994), European Neighbourhood Policy, Association Agreement (AA). Economic relations. Perspectives of Ukrainian EU membership.

Topic 14: Europe and Ukrainian-Russian Crisis

The history of Ukrainian-Russian conflicts. The “Russian world” as geopolitical project. The case of Crimea. The case of Donbas. War on the Donbas and EU position. The security challenges in Europe.

Topic 15: Civic education and promoting the democratic values in Europe

The role of civic education in Europe. Promoting the European fundamental values. Educational communities. Informal learning as vector for civic ownership at local level. Democracy, economic stability and civic education. The using European experience in Ukraine.

TEACHERS

Vitalii Lebediuk

Ph.D. in Public Administration, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science, Dean of Faculty of Political Studies and Information Management at the National University of Ostroh Academy. 12 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Candidate's degree (Ph.D.): Organizational development of political parties in Ukraine: optimization of state influence mechanism (February 10, 2012). Research interests: Comparative politics, European Studies, Political Parties and Party Systems, Election Systems and Voting Behaviour, Quantitative Research Methods, Transition in post-Communist Europe.

Dmytro Shevchuk

Doctor of science in field of philosophy, Associated Professor of Department of Culture Science and Philosophy at National University of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Doctor of Science's degree: "The ontological dimensions of contemporary political world: a philosophical analysis" (April 28, 2015). Research interests: contemporary political philosophy, methodology of cultural studies, problems of identity, cultural and political processes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Olena Shershnova

Ph.D. in Public Administration, Senior Lecturer of Department of Document Science and Informational Activities at National University of Ostroh Academy. 14 years of academic teaching experience. Title of thesis for Candidate's degree (Ph.D.): "The public administration's mechanisms in the sphere of informational providing of tourism activities (on example of Rivne region)" (October 15, 2010). Research interests: information security in EU and Post-Soviet republics, sustainable development of local communities in UE and Ukraine, ICT for sustainable development, policy in local communities in UE and Ukraine, tragedy of the commons and its avoiding, problems of values in communities.

READING TEXTS

Martin Dangerfield

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE: ONE APPROACH OR SEVERAL

Abstract

Many believe that the European Union, even if it has not caused a new division of Europe, has been complicit in the creation of such a division by virtue of different strategies towards alternative groups of post-communist countries. However, have the 'Europeanization' prospects of 'left-out' countries in fact already been predetermined by the alternative strategies of the EU. A number of key questions arise in this context. Is 'inclusion' really dependent on whether the EU has given a membership promise? How true is it actually to speak of alternative EU strategies towards post-communist countries? Is a different perspective on the issue of inclusion or exclusion possible if we concentrate on the European integration process rather than regarding EU membership per se as the key to whether the future trajectory of Europe is continuation of division or end of it? Finally, what role are sub-regional co-operation processes playing in the Europeanization of so-called 'left-out countries'?

The Orange Revolution is over. In it, the Ukrainian society demonstrated its democratic credentials, its respect for the rule of law and its awareness of its right to free media. As a result of this, Ukraine has proved indisputably that it is a European state, not only in terms of geography but, most importantly, in terms of upholding key European values.

*(G. Gromadsky et al,
Stefan Batory Foundation Warsaw, May 2005)*¹

While Mr Yushchenko's ascent to power following the 2004 Orange Revolution was seen in the US and Brussels as a sign that Kiev had moved decisively towards the West, Mr Yanukovych's election triumph this year had cast doubt on prospects for further Euro-Atlantic integration.

(Financial Times, 15 September 2006)

We are moving away from Euro-romanticism and moving toward Euro-pragmatism. Our goal will primarily be to build a Europe in Ukraine.

*(Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych,
6 September 2006)*²

Ukraine is making an effort to fulfil the demands for EU accession candidates and expects a confirmation of its European perspective from Brussels.

*(Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko,
29 September 2006)*³

What is a 'European identity'? Is it something that can be bestowed or something that has to be earned? The enlargement of May 2004 meant that the European Union already included the majority of countries that are considered to be 'European'. The 'Danubian' enlargement of 2007 and the provisions to admit West Balkan countries in the not-too-distant future will further consolidate the position of the EU as a manifestation of Europe itself. Yet some European countries are also confronted by what may be interpreted as a deliberate EU policy of exclusion and face being left on the sidelines while perhaps even watching what many consider to be a non-European country (Turkey) enter the club. Some countries, of course, do not at present aspire to full membership of the EU. In Western Europe this group comprises Switzerland along with European Economic Area (EEA) members Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, who have all nevertheless developed intensive integration with the EU. In Eastern Europe, Russia regards itself as a strategic partner of the EU rather than a potential future member, while Belarus at present de facto excludes itself from even the most basic aspects of European integration.

To what extent, therefore, are the prospects for future inclusion of additional European post-communist states into the European integration process already predetermined by the alternative approaches the EU has adopted to the various categories of post-communist country? Distinguishing among the 2004 and 2007 EU entrants (East-Central Europe – ECE), the Western Balkan countries covered by the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) – Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – currently allocated to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), this article will argue that, despite some key differences, the EU approach to all post-communist states has nevertheless had a key consistency in that it involves a route map to an advanced position in the European integration process. With respect to the European integration prospects of the WNIS, the main focus of this contribution, the article will also propose that any talk of a strategic choice of ‘Europe or elsewhere’ which rests upon whether or not a promise of EU membership is available at the present time is an ill-advised discourse.⁴ Furthermore, assuming a European vocation genuinely exists, a lack of willingness to engage with the integration opportunities at hand just because membership is not clearly on the horizon at the present time would be a huge missed opportunity. For post-communist countries the ‘return’ or ‘turn’ to Europe is heavily connected to identity issues and – for certain segments of society, at least – the desire to leave behind the negative legacies of the past or avoid unpalatable associations with their other former Soviet neighbours. However, for these aspirations to be realized a dose of Euro-realism is necessary so that WNIS citizens are genuinely aware of what lies behind the pursuit of EU member status and the tough reality of what Europeanization entails in practice.

A Misguided Obsession with EU Membership?

Many EU member states are, to put it mildly, in somewhat reflective mood over future enlargement as the EU grapples with absorbing the latest batch of new entrants. Since May 2004 the enlargement issue has come on to EU citizens’ radar and this has

had important consequences for the enlargement stances of the existing member states' governments. It has also had the effect of toughening the entry conditions for the next generation of entrants and increasingly rigorous scrutiny of preparedness. As the European integration process spreads southwards and eastwards, the incorporation of additional countries inevitably becomes an ever more complicated and lengthy process, not least because it involves increasingly disparate levels of economic development and variations in both commitment to and progress in reform. In addition, beyond current membership promises, the future enlargement conundrum also involves states with a highly interdependent and somewhat unpredictable relationship with Russia; this not only complicates the business of defining what sort of relationship can develop with the EU but also means that other EU foreign policy considerations are brought into play.

A key question for those European countries so far denied an EU membership prospect – and this category clearly equates with Ukraine and Moldova⁵ – is what kind of relationship they can develop with the EU and with the EU integration process in general. A subsidiary two-part question is whether they can remain satisfied with what is on offer to them at the moment, namely the ENP, and whether the design of and resources allocated to the ENP are sufficient to ensure that its objectives will be realized. Difficult as it may be, perhaps one productive way forward is to relax the assumption that being 'in or out of' the EU are stark categories which depend purely upon actual membership. At the end of 2005 it was stated (during an interview given by the European External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the Ukrainian press) that 'contrary to statements in the beginning of the year, the Ukrainian government now does not put so much emphasis on membership with the EU anymore' and this was raised in order to establish whether interest in integration with the EU itself had cooled or simply become more realistic.⁶ To the extent that it holds true and is not a smokescreen for an alternative strategy focusing on deep integration with the Russian Federation and

others in a 'Eurasian' perspective, Yanukovich's statement quoted at the head of this article suggests that the latter prevails. Various alternative relationships with the EU are practised in Europe today. If in countries such as Ukraine the discourse of a European future can continue to be conducted more in terms of how the country's relationship or position in the European integration process can be developed and intensified – and less in terms of an obsession with EU membership per se – and the political agenda can be mobilized around this goal then prospects for successful Europeanization and affirming a European identity can be much more encouraging. This argument in turn depends on accepting that the ENP is more a device for inclusion than exclusion and that it can bring progress, in terms of both economic development and European integration prospects. It also depends on being realistic about membership aspirations at this stage.

One EU Strategy or Several?

Most commentators take the view that the EU has, by virtue of various modes of engagement, regionalized post-communist Europe into three distinct groups of states, each of which reflects different orders of priority and varied levels of privilege in EU relations. The first group is ECE, consisting of the eight entrants of May 2004 plus – notwithstanding later entry and some variation in entry conditions – Bulgaria and Romania. The second set of states covers the SAP group, all of which have a promise of membership but remain a diverse group consisting of candidates in negotiation (Croatia), candidates awaiting the start of negotiations (Macedonia), an associated state (Albania), and states currently moving towards association (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina). The third group includes East European states distinguished by explicit denial of a membership perspective or even prospects of an association. These states are the subject of an EU vision – or, some would say, rhetoric – in which they can develop a relationship short of full membership but nevertheless entailing advanced integration with

the EU. In principle this concept implies de facto something beyond association and along the lines of the EEA concept.

The third group is further sub-divided in terms of the formal mechanisms employed to meet the goal of intensified integration with the EU. All states in this group have signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU. PCAs are 'legal frameworks, based on the respect of democratic principles and human rights, setting out the political, economic and trade relationship between the EU and its partner countries. Each PCA is a ten-year bilateral treaty signed and ratified by the EU and the individual state'.⁷ Six PCA states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are participants in the ENP. According to the official EU position, the ENP 'offers our neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic integration. The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the extent to which these values are effectively shared'.⁸ Russia declined the offer of ENP status and its relations with the EU – though not essentially different from the goals of ENP – are managed through a framework that formally categorizes Russia as a 'strategic partner' rather than neighbour. From 2007 onwards, ENP partners and Russia will share the same EU funding instrument, the 'European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument' (ENPI).

It would be disingenuous to suggest that there are no serious variations in what has been on offer from the EU to these three regions. The absence of a membership perspective together with the declaration that 'the ENP is not about enlargement and does not offer an accession perspective'⁹ clearly reflects a fundamental distinction between the ECE and SAP areas on the one hand and the WNIS states on the other. Second, there has also been a patent ranking in terms of EU priorities, with the ECE countries prioritized first, followed by the SAP countries and WNIS. Third, there is the question of the ever-blurring distinction between the enlargement

process and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The May 2004 enlargement has been declared 'the most successful act of foreign policy that the EU has ever made',¹⁰ yet of course this process began when the CFSP was embryonic and the foreign policy effectiveness of enlargement and the attendant conditionality was yet to be fully revealed. The rapid steps forward in CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since the late 1990s has meant that relations of SAP and WNIS with the EU have become much more explicitly intertwined with EU foreign policy. EU engagement in the SAP zone has been driven by security imperatives, with accession having been deemed a necessary ingredient for fulfilment of EU foreign policy objectives for the region. Thus it has been the case that the pre-accession process and other instruments have been deployed in tandem with explicit EU 'hard' security undertakings, notably the completed and continuing EU peace-keeping missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively. Also, unlike its approach to ECE, the EU has made regional co-operation a central plank of its strategy in the SAP area and – via both the provisions of SAP itself and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SP) – has had very much a 'hands on' role in driving and guiding the regional co-operation process. Yet whereas the SAP states have been simultaneously part of the enlargement process and the CFSP, this is not the case so far for WNIS states, whose status in this respect is more explicitly a topic of CFSP and formally separated from the enlargement agenda.

Notwithstanding the significance of these differences, is the distinction between the ECE–SAP and the WNIS strategies of the EU one of ends rather than of means? As well as stressing variations, it is equally valid to point to some common threads in the way the EU has approached and interacted with the three regions. If the membership perspective is stripped out, it is clear that the EU has deployed its 'soft power' in a rather path-dependent way, to the effect that the process and instruments used by the EU towards its WNIS partners are very much based on the ECE and SAP approaches. The common ingredients have been: (i) political dialogue; (ii) economic

integration with the EU via various degrees of trade liberalization with a free trade area a goal in all cases;¹¹ (iii) technical assistance projects – backed by dedicated EU funding instruments (PHARE, TACIS, CARDS¹²) – to support the post-socialist transformation and eventually to facilitate the practicalities of adopting EU laws and regulations; (iv) the application of conditionality which links the provision of EU rewards with progress on EU-determined political and economic reforms; finally (v) the key principle of differentiation, which allows for individual countries' relations with the EU to progress at varying speeds, not tied to a group or regional timetable, with country-specific plans for EU preparation and concomitant deployment of EU technical and financial assistance.

One key comfort for states feeling marginalized by the EU should be the fact that, despite some key differences so far, mainly to do with the proscribed endgame for the WNIS, there is broad consensus that the EU's approach to all post-communist states has nevertheless had a key consistency in that it involves a route-map which is designed to end in an advanced position in the European integration process. As Cremona put it, ENP is 'an offer of an enhanced relationship with the EU based on the EEA model, that would be as close to the Union as can be without being a member and the use of instruments derived from the CEE states' pre-accession process'.¹³ Thus even the WNIS are being offered an intensive relationship with the EU, providing the necessary obligations can be met. By concentrating efforts on the European integration process rather than purely on the status of EU membership at this stage, eastern 'neighbours' could become *de facto* significantly more 'in' than 'out of' Europe. In sum, this means that the main differences have been in the principle of EU engagement with the WNIS – a relationship other than membership – rather than the practice of EU engagement. This in turn focuses debate on the question of the incentives that are available in order to ensure the implementation of the reforms needed to engage in the mainstream European integration process.

How Meaningful Would a Membership Promise Be at the Present Time?

A widely made critique of the application of the pre-accession methods used for the 2004 and 2007 entrants to WNIS states is that the ENP is heavily laced with conditionality. For the recent ECE entrants, the grand bargain was the acceptance of conditionality – essentially the toleration of large-scale external interference in internal affairs – in return for the prize of membership. As Mayhew and Copesey put it, a ‘fundamental dilemma of ENP is therefore the question of whether following closely the accession route in terms of procedures and conditionality and monitoring is not in fundamental conflict with an apparent determination not to offer these countries a perspective of accession’.¹⁴ Furthermore, recent research on the impact and effectiveness of conditionality during the pre-accession phase holds that a membership perspective is absolutely indispensable in order to compensate for the high costs of adaptation to EU norms and standards.¹⁵ Given that the EU makes any significant progress in integration dependent on the non-negotiable, sustainable establishment of standards for democracy and human rights along with the rule of law, then the findings of Schimmelfennig suggest that the ENP will ultimately founder at the first hurdle, or at least that engagement with the EU will not be the key force in such developments: ‘EU influence on compliance with human rights and democratic rules in the candidate countries has generally not been effective before the EU had developed a clear membership promise for the Central and Eastern European countries and if it did not make compliance an explicit condition of accession (or the beginning of accession negotiations)’.¹⁶

One riposte to Schimmelfennig’s position might be along the lines that, if the WNIS elites are socialized into recognizing that membership is a long-term goal at best and a stake in the European integration process is a feasible and valuable objective, then a goal short of EU membership may carry more incentives than it did in the ECE case. Also, in the ECE case there was no precedent that would have convinced those elites that compliance with human

rights and democratic rules would open the door to worthwhile progress in EU integration. For the WNIS states, the experiences of both ECE and, especially, SAP provide those crucial precedents. It is also impossible to evade the important question of how meaningful or relevant a membership perspective would be at this time. Past experience may provide a convincing argument that the prospect of membership is a necessary condition for effective conditionality; but there is also the argument that the provision of an accession date or time-frame is also an important ingredient. Critics of the EU's actions in the West Balkans, where the promise of membership is in place, have contended that, for the seriously lagging 'problem' states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, the accession perspective is so long-term that the EU's leverage on the reform process is compromised. Abramowitz and Hurlburt, for example, wrote that if 'even fast-progressing Croatia has to wait ten years for admission, what inducements can Brussels offer Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, and Macedonia? ... High representative Paddy Ashdown has been heard to remark that he has only one big carrot, EU membership, with which to influence Bosnian behaviour. But this carrot will start to seem less tempting if Brussels cannot make the prospect of membership realistic and the benefits tangible'.¹⁷

Even in Croatia, the increasingly hard-line EU approach to conditionality, which prevented negotiations beginning as planned in March 2005, generated significant disillusion with and resentment towards the EU.¹⁸ The EU stance on the Gotovina affair resulted in plummeting popular support for EU membership and widespread perceptions that the EU was acting as a 'bully'.¹⁹ Note also that the reformist party which led Croatia to candidate status was rejected at the elections of December 2003, meaning that the relevance of progress in integration with the EU was not the main priority for voters who 'may shift their allegiance away from the most western-oriented political forces if these fail to provide for effective governance and improvement of the economic situation'.²⁰ Moreover, the March 2006 parliamentary election in Ukraine showed that not only did the pro-Europe, pro-EU banner fail in

itself to constitute a decisive vote-winning platform but also has not been the most telling factor in determining whether the reformist elements in Ukraine's politics can even remain united. Finally, a potentially even more fundamental point is that some have recently been questioning the assumption that the EU has actually exerted a deep and lasting influence on the political environment of even the May 2004 entrants. Recent signs of 'failing or failed' governments in Hungary and Poland gives, according to the Financial Times, 'an impression of increasing instability in Eastern Europe. Yet it is just another sign that deep political divisions in the region are back on display after a long period when the countries were on their best and politest behaviour to get into the European Union, which they did in 2004'.²¹

A membership promise without a time-frame runs the risk of exerting only a relatively short-term impact on the reform process and it is likely that pressure for a date to be set will build, especially in the context of an electoral platform based on European integration. Reaching one milestone – achieving a membership promise – will soon put the next milestone on the agenda. Yet while it cannot be assumed that the EU will definitely not give a membership promise to WNIS states at some stage, it is a cast-iron certainty that no date will be given before or even when negotiations begin, as the Croatian and Turkish cases show. The run-up to the Bulgarian and Romanian accession bordered on the farcical, and the way the EU was 'stung' will leave a clear legacy for future enlargements:

the important thing is not to repeat this bungled Balkan timetable. The EU had never previously given candidate countries a final entry date before embarking on the actual negotiations with them. And, hopefully, it will never do so again. Indeed, the lesson may have been learnt. For in launching the inherently far more problematic negotiations with Turkey and other candidates, the EU subsequently decided entry would depend on candidates showing they had implemented and enforced EU rules, not just agreed to them on paper.²²

Finally, who is empowered to give a cast-iron membership promise at the present time? In theory, the need for accession treaties to be ratified by member state parliaments has meant that accession can never be guaranteed until it has advanced through all EU and member state ratification processes. But for enlargements which have already taken place this ratification was never a major issue in practice as all concerns of existing member states would be settled or compensated for during the accession negotiations which are themselves a two-level game – intra-EU deals to arrive at common EU negotiating positions, on the one hand, and deals between the EU collectively and the acceding states, on the other. Nowadays the situation is more unpredictable for putative entrants, since some member states – France (for all accessions after Croatia) and Austria (for Turkey) – have given notice that they will hold referenda as part of the member state phase of accession treaty ratification. Thus some candidates face the prospect of meeting all the accession criteria only to fall at the hurdle of public opinion. This will therefore render ‘membership promise’ dependent on a factor beyond the applicant’s control.

In any case, whether the EU membership promise is early or premature, delayed, or a credible or non-credible commitment, this does not alter the reality of the European integration process and the massive practical and political task of adopting the *acquis communautaire* and developing the genuine institutional capacity to deliver it. It took ECE states over ten years to transform themselves from associate to full members. A similar time-frame or longer would apply to the WNIS given the context of a lower starting base, a developing *acquis*, and a more hostile and rigorous assessment and monitoring environment for EU candidates. A mere glance at the current EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which works as a reform blueprint for Ukraine, including several measures also serving as preparation for developing integration with the EU, reveals the extent of the task at hand. The mere listing of action plan tasks takes up 25 pages of the action plan document and includes 71 different titles, each of which has several subheadings (some with

as many as ten). This is a substantial manifesto for change, with – if implemented – a justifiable claim that it will ‘significantly advance the approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union and. will build solid foundations for further economic integration’.²³

ENP: Exclusion Strategy or Integration Policy?

ENP has been interpreted in a number of ways.²⁴ This is not an exclusive list, but discernible perspectives most relevant to this discussion range from the rather pessimistic assessment which classes ENP as essentially a conscious strategy of exclusion and representing first and foremost an attempt to pre-empt future accession attempts by former Soviet states and settle the final borders of the EU. One explanation among others for this is based on the neo-realist perspective on international affairs, which views the EU expansion in geopolitical terms and the limits of that expansion defined by the parameters of the Russian sphere of influence in post-Cold War Europe, something which also affects accommodation within NATO too. In this view, the prospects for a genuine Europeanization of WNIS are poor and ENP is therefore of little value for this purpose, the EU’s lack of willingness to devote serious resources being further evidence of a disingenuous policy on its part. In this vein, Margot Light and her collaborators wrote:

n.o matter how frequently NATO and EU officials reiterate that they have no intention of redividing Europe, irrespective of how many ‘partnership’ agreements they offer to non-members, the inevitable consequences of admitting some countries to full membership of the organizations and excluding others is to produce ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.²⁵

Karen E. Smith supplements this by saying that ‘the policy instruments available to the EU are inadequate. Far too little is on offer, both to encourage democracy, economic reform and so on from the “bottom-up” (via aid and free movement of people), and to try to force governments to comply with political and economic conditions’.²⁶

Second, a marginally less critical position from Wolowski who (discussing the Ukrainian case in particular) sees an 'EU policy paradigm' based on 'only as much integration so as to not make Ukraine feel excluded by Europe'.²⁷ This view recognizes some genuine attempt by the EU to achieve a measure of integration but subject to strict limitations and driven mainly by the need to secure WNIS co-operation on matters that relate to the EU's economic and security interests in the WNIS region and also to balance the nature, scope and objectives of its engagement with an eye to the higher-ranked priorities of the EU relationship with Russia.

Third, ENP as an approach is inconsistent in that – as noted above – it relies in all its key features on the accession and enlargement approach yet excludes – if the aim is genuinely to promote democracy, stability, security and prosperity in the WNIS area – the key ingredient in the workability of this approach, namely the promise of membership. Just as the enlargement strategy for the ECE new members was clearly path-dependent because of its reliance on the 'classical' method of EU enlargement, ENP is similarly path-dependent but with reference to an enhanced version of the 'classical' method of EU enlargement used in the context of the transformation environment of ECE.²⁸ This path dependency can be taken as evidence that the EU either suffers from a lack of imagination or has faith that the success of the enlargement approach validates it as a formula for delivering similar EU security objectives elsewhere. A critical or optimistic assessment of ENP will therefore follow depending on the judgement of whether the WNIS states need a tailor-made approach and whether conditionality can work without a promise of membership or Romano Prodi's early optimism will prevail: 'the goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect?'²⁹

Fourth – and this may be as much an explanation of its path-dependent character – ENP has been seen from an institutionalist perspective as a way to maintain a prominent and influential position in EU foreign policy for the European Commission. As

Judith Kelley put it, 'the Commission relied on institutional learning and strategic adaptation from enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain ... the ENP extends the foreign policy role that the Commission played during enlargement, and enables the Commission to continue playing a significant role in external affairs'.³⁰

Finally, according to the official European Commission view, ENP is, for now at least, a 'concrete alternative to enlargement' that provides for a major step forward in the EU's engagement and a device for inclusion based on genuine partnership with clear integration prospects for designated neighbours who are prepared to programme their future political, economic and institutional development according to EU norms and standards. Furthermore it does not prejudge how relations with the EU could develop further down the line. In this official view ENP is a win-win game for both parties. A Commission official, Eneko Landaburu, has described it as 'a virtuous circle, a policy based on shared value and enlightened shared interest: by increasing our neighbours' prosperity, stability and security, by projecting our prosperity, stability and security beyond our borders we increase our own'.³¹

The future effectiveness of ENP will only be revealed over time, but so far it does seem that since it entered the implementation stage, especially where action plans have been agreed and come on stream, it has been possible to discern a growing level of optimism that ENP may at least deliver some benefits and indeed be a realistic way forward. In late 2005 the World Bank newsletter on transforming economies – Beyond Transitions – devoted a whole issue to the theme of Ukrainian reform and several observations on the merits of ENP featured. Anders Åslund was cautiously positive when he wrote that the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine 'contains many concrete steps to be taken by the EU and Ukraine. The demands on Ukraine amount to sensible reforms to which few would object. The EU offers might not be very generous, but they do foresee improvements in market access and substantial exchanges in the sphere of education and science'.³² A more optimistic viewpoint

was expressed by Andrew Tiffin, who saw the EU-Ukraine action plan as positive for Ukraine's economic prospects and definitely offering an integration perspective: 'The Ukraine-EU Action Plan is both timely and appropriate. The Action Plan covers a wide range of tasks and measures, and by harmonizing Ukrainian standards with those of the EU, it aims to accelerate Ukraine's progress toward a market-based economy that is firmly integrated within Europe and global markets'.³³ In even more upbeat fashion, Iryna Solonenko argued that prior to the ENP the main problem was not so much the absence of a membership promise that undermined Ukrainian reforms as the absence of 'strong integration incentives'. In contrast to the 'conditionality deficiency' arguments which surrounded the pre-ENP approach of the EU, 'the EU has acquired new instruments to promote democracy in Ukraine ... ENP has provided new incentives for Ukrainian reforms'.³⁴ According to Solonenko, the critical ingredients of the ENP include: (i) the fact that the EU-Ukraine action plan and the initiative of Ferrero-Waldner and Solana in the form of the 'ten-point supplementary plan' now provide the additional 'carrots' and 'conditional instruments' needed to stimulate reforms; (ii) an enhanced 'socialization' process based on people-to-people contacts, educational programmes, sharing of transition experiences, activities to improve 'capacity' of civil servants, etc.; (iii) a monitoring process – based very much on the modalities of the 'accession partnership' used for the ECE states – with capability to punish or reward efforts and progress and also perhaps to encourage a 'competitive' attitude among all ENP states in the race to implement the action plans.

Continuing with the optimistic take on ENP, in a substantial exposition of the economic and interconnected integration benefits of ENP, European Commission officials Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini – albeit not expressing an official Commission view but writing in the critical context of the foremost debating forum for scholars and practitioners of EU affairs – argue that the ENP does offer serious added value to the PCA arrangement and also brings the prospect of significant economic growth and development

effects that are desirable irrespective of any ambitions for European integration. Their analysis argues that a favourable economic impact will occur via structural reforms that 'should result in an upgrade of the regulatory framework to make it more conducive to growth'.³⁵ In addition, there will be the beneficial impact of a macro-economic policy anchor and the usual growth-creating effects of trade liberalization following reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers with the EU. The discourse of membership perspective has tended to overshadow the links between integration with the EU and the domestic economic reform and renewal of former Soviet bloc countries. There is 'a legacy of regulations that, even after a decade or more of reform, are inadequate to the needs of modern economies ... ENP offers countries a ready-made regulatory framework. For countries wishing to put in place a modern regulatory framework, adopting the *acquis* as a reference is likely to be easier than developing a new one from scratch'.³⁶

In general, what does seem to be increasingly indisputable is that the ENP offers a route to deeper integration with the EU and is a clear upgrade in relations from the concept of the PCA. This has been recognized in official circles in WNIS and is evident in deed (namely, the generally enthusiastic engagement with the action plans) and in political rhetoric. We must wait to see whether all this will ultimately equate with the famous 'Everything but the Institutions' statement made by Romano Prodi in the early ENP gestation period. Certainly, the integration 'endgame', as it stands in the concept of ENP, remains somewhat vague and the promise of a 'stake in the internal market' now on offer falls short of the suggestion of full participation in the 'four freedoms' that was part of the original 'wider Europe' proposal. The poor prospects for free movement of labour are an obvious problem, and this fact alone will probably ensure that the ENP will not deliver the equivalent of EEA membership.³⁷

There are also risks and uncertainties connected to any wholesale adoption of the internal market rules and it will be a challenge to achieve a more targeted application of them in order to balance the risks of premature over-regulation of WNIS economies with

threats to the integrity of the single market itself. However, it is certainly one that is better raised earlier rather than later. Uneven impact across the ENP countries will no doubt be another issue. In general, as Lavanex and Schimmelfennig caution, it is questionable whether ‘intensified functional co-operation can be a long-term alternative to accession for aspiring countries, such as Ukraine or Moldova ... the absence of incentives comparable to EU accession, budgetary constraints, competing priorities within the ENP and its oscillation between normative and strategic priorities may hamper its transformative potential’.³⁸ But these reservations cannot be answered at present and certainly lie well beyond the scope of this contribution. The focus here is the narrower issue of whether there is an integration perspective for WNIS and whether the measures and process involved conform to the more fundamental policy goals of economic growth and development. The answer seems to be yes, assuming that the EU economic governance model is the best way forward for the WNIS.

From Integration Perspective to Membership Perspective?

Kelley sees the ENP as ‘clearly an effort to extend, or even emulate, the success of enlargement. Indeed as one official said the ENP is “a diluted version of the enlargement policy”. But the neighbours are not current membership candidates and few have the potential of becoming so’.³⁹ The ‘few’ with potential are clearly the WNIS neighbours; however, as was argued above, a promise of membership is unlikely to materialize in the near future, it would be of questionable credibility or value at this stage, and to obsess about it now is unlikely to be productive. The idea that an integration perspective could become a membership perspective at some future point is a different matter, however. Although the barriers to EU entry will also remain considerable, at least for the foreseeable future, and the existing queue – long in terms of the time it will take to process it as well as numbers in it – must be cleared first, some grounds for optimism exist.

First, although the EU is sticking rigidly to the stance that ENP is not a stepping-stone to membership, it has not irrevocably said 'no' to ENP states. As far as the Commission is concerned, Gromadski and his associates wrote that its 'position is quite clear: it intends to focus on the ENP for now. However, while it accepts that the ENP is not about membership, it does not a priori exclude membership in the long term'.⁴⁰ There is a clear recognition that the WNIS are European countries and therefore meet the basic criterion for inclusion, as Olli Rehn reiterated in a speech given at the European Policy Centre (Brussels) in May 2006: 'The EU Treaty indicates that any European country which respects the values of democracy and the rule of law may apply for EU membership. The Union defines itself through its members' shared values, rather than by geography'.⁴¹ Views are also being aired that the EU will eventually have to incorporate all clearly European states, otherwise the issue of where the final border lies will never go away. For example in August 2006 Andreas Schockenhoff, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, wrote that Article 49 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 'should apply in principle to all European countries including Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova'.⁴²

Second, in speaking of the EU position, one must remember the nature of the political entity that is the EU and the multitude of alternative views and positions within it. Among the member states there is in fact anything but consensus on offering a membership perspective for Ukraine, for example. Gromadski et al. claim that in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution 'more than ten Member states have been keenly interested in the building of new relations with Ukraine'.⁴³ This of course reflects the important fact that enlargement itself has changed the dynamics of the debate on future enlargement processes, as seven out of the eight new ECE members (all except Slovenia) were included in this group and 'specifically, Poland, Hungary and Lithuania have fought for a new formulation on Ukraine's membership prospects'.⁴⁴ As well as inputs to the top-level strategic debates in the European Council, the new members are also in a special, perhaps unique, position

in terms of a role in the 'Europeanization' of the WNIS states, for example through the contributions of their exclusive sub-regional co-operation vehicles (such as the Višegrad Group) to the 'socialization' dimension of the ENP (see below). Different stances of the main elements of the EU governance structure should also be noted: 'in contrast with the European Parliament, the European Council representing EU member states and the European Commission, the EU executive, remain reluctant to accept that Ukraine could eventually join the EU'.⁴⁵ The reaction of the European Parliament to the Orange Revolution was an astonishing level of support for a membership perspective for Ukraine: the February 2005 EP vote on whether Ukraine should be given such a perspective was passed by 467 to 19.⁴⁶

Another reason for cautious optimism that an integration perspective can eventually pave the way for a membership perspective stems from the ENP methodology which, as noted several times above, is based on the enlargement method. It is therefore de facto a chance to prepare for EU membership. As Dodini and Fantini point out, 'successful participation in the ENP can be a very effective tool to demonstrate European credentials for those NCs hoping to eventually join the EU. Moreover, all progress made in the ENP framework would reduce future efforts to prepare for EU membership'.⁴⁷ The ENP therefore seems in principle to have considerable integrative scope to place WNIS – notwithstanding the uncertainties of what a 'stake in the internal market' will eventually amount to – in the core affair of the European project, which is economic integration. As Tsoukalis wrote in 2006, 'European integration started as an economic affair, though with strong political undertones. Today, economics remains the backbone of it'.⁴⁸ In other words, as the Financial Times put it, the 'business of Europe has always, among many other things, been business'.⁴⁹ In addition, the coincidence of ENP goals and the practical aspects of adaptation to the EU internal market offers a test for whether the Europeanization path is the right one for WNIS because internal

market adaptation entails many of the inescapable obligations that new EU members are required to assume.

Prior to the May 2004 enlargement the reservations and worries of the impact of large numbers of new members from the parts of Europe that are economically weaker and less secure in the 'soft security' sense were debated mainly at elite levels. Since the expansion took place, the enlargement issue has very much come on to the popular radar and a 'problem' for the political leaders in the member states to address in the domestic political discourse, and therefore an electoral issue. Thus, as far as further enlargement is concerned, the resonance of 'integration capacity' is particularly strong at the present time, and for some 'it is clear that in some member states the pace and scale of enlargement is approaching the limits of what public opinion will accept'.⁵⁰ Yet while current EU public opinion on enlargement is not especially encouraging neither is it disastrous. A special Eurobarometer report – published in July 2006 and based on data gathered in March–May 2006 – that focused on attitudes towards EU enlargement found that the EU population is divided on the issue: 45 per cent of EU citizens were found to be in favour of EU enlargement while 42 per cent were against; meaning anti-enlargement views were actually in the minority.⁵¹ The most enthusiastic states were the ten new members, where at least one out of two citizens supported further enlargement, while in Germany, Luxembourg, France, Austria and Finland more than 60 per cent of respondents disapproved of it.

On the negative side, there were inconsistent responses around perceptions of the impact of further enlargement on particular issue areas. Whereas 'most Europeans' had positive views about enlargement's impact on issues such as peace and stability, cultural enrichment, mobility in Europe and so on, 'with regard to the economic and social consequences of the process, EU citizens worry most about employment'.⁵² For the EU-25 as a whole, 75 per cent of respondents agreed (14 per cent disagreed) with the question 'in economic terms, the enlargement of the European Union increases jobs transferring to countries where labour is cheaper'. Also ominous

was the response – 62 per cent agreed, 27 per cent disagreed – to the suggestion ‘in social terms, the enlargement of the European Union increases the risks of criminal activities’.⁵³

Although the issue of enlargement beyond the present crop of countries slated for future entry was not included, these attitudes at least give some tentative indications of how an announcement about a membership perspective for WNIS would be received by the EU public. Clearly it is hard to imagine the prospects for lower restrictions on movement of people becoming more palatable even in the framework of ENP. On the other hand, part of the reason for this special Eurobarometer report was to tackle misperceptions of enlargement and to try to achieve a more balanced public view. Since it was notable that ‘citizens who feel they are well informed are more in favour of enlargement than those who do not’,⁵⁴ any chance of moderating the current public opinion constraint on future enlargement needs ‘more information and communication about EU enlargement in order to better assess the benefits and challenges of this process, in the context of a clear political project for Europe’.⁵⁵ A further positive angle is that the absence for now of prospective membership for the WNIS means that public opinion may be far less of a hindrance for implementing the ENP and the substantial moves forward in increasing the economic integration on offer through it.

Sub-regional Co-operation and the EU Integration Endeavour

Given that the interplay between the broader objective of economic and political transformation and the prerequisites of EU accession is clear and strong, it is useful to remember that other international organizations are engaged with the WNIS. As Kelley reminds us, ‘the Commission will not be alone in working towards reforms: the Council of Europe, the United States and the EU member states will also be among the actors pushing for reforms’.⁵⁶ In addition, there are also the outreach policies of sub-regional groupings such as the Nordic Council, and, lately, the Višegrad Group which is increasingly focusing its activities externally and on

co-operation with Ukraine in particular. Although operating at the micro-level, the various dimensions of sub-regional co-operation make valuable if often unnoticed contributions to Europeanization processes. Longer-established sub-regional groupings such as the Nordic Council have been providing various forms of assistance to EU pre-accession since the early 1990s and since the enlargement of May 2004 those sub-regional associations made up exclusively or predominantly of post-communist countries – Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Višegrad Group, the Central European Initiative – have secured their post-enlargement relevance by focusing their activities and resources on those European states lagging behind in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. In this way, the new member states, and particularly those directly neighbouring and therefore most interested in the WNIS, can play a key role in the ‘socialization’ dimension of the WNIS’ Europeanization as well as offering other sorts of practical assistance.

It is also extremely important not to forget that European integration is a multi-layered process with the EU at its core but not monopolized by the EU. WNIS can also participate in sub-regional integration programmes safe in the knowledge that such exercises are essentially compatible with, rather than contradictory to, their EU membership ambitions. In this sense, economic integration with other former Soviet states and Russia, such as could develop in the Single Economic Space (SES), should not be viewed as an alternative to EU integration but in principle as something compatible with and supportive of it.⁵⁷ The Central European Free Trade Agreement experience is particularly informative in this respect.⁵⁸ Scrutiny of CEFTA has shown that sub-regional integration complements rather than impedes integration with the EU. However, CEFTA’s success was ultimately predicated on the fact that it was largely restricted to free trade and market integration.⁵⁹ In this way, it not only enabled and resulted in mutual integration among those ECE states joining the EU at the same time but also made it possible for states that had in place a free-trade agreement with the EU to participate even though they had a slower EU accession timetable.⁶⁰

In the post-Soviet context, then, the key condition is that mutual economic integration should not go further than the degree of economic integration that all the participating states have reached with the EU. This is to avoid disruptive termination or reversal of economic integration in the event of any of the parties moving significantly ahead in the process.⁶¹ There are therefore sound practical reasons why Ukraine is 'only interested in that part of the Common Economic Space (CES, formed in 2003 together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus) that concerns free trade, while the CES aims for more, including a customs union and a monetary union, as in the EU'.⁶² Changes to this position would of course seriously risk placing intra-CIS integration on a collision course with further EU integration as a far-reaching integration plan for the SES at this stage would clearly derail progress towards reaching a free trade agreement with the EU. In the context of Prime Minister Yanukovich's statement of 14 September 2006 that Kiev's plan to join NATO was now on hold, it was also reported that that 'while Kiev would like a trade deal with Brussels, EU officials warn this will be impossible if Kiev joins a customs union with Russia. Moscow is promoting such a customs union with several former Soviet neighbours'.⁶³

One final point on this issue concerns Moldova and the fact that this country is also covered by the SP. Trade liberalization has been an important element of the SP programme for some time now and Moldova has been part of the network of free trade agreements put in place for the SP area, which introduces a rather complicated situation for any potential Moldovan participation in the SES or sub-regional economic integration project for WNIS countries. Even if the SES were to result in just a free trade area, a system of certificates of origin would be needed, but if the SES is based on a customs union or more then all SES countries will have to match Moldova's trade provisions with other SP countries, or Moldova's trade arrangements with the SP area would face very serious disruption. Looking forward to the next stage in intra-SP trade liberalization, which is set to be a multi-lateralization of free trade via a 'big bang'

enlargement of CEFTA – to be known henceforth as ‘CEFTA 2006’ – due to take effect on 1 May 2007, the situation becomes even more complex. For Moldova, how would CEFTA membership fit with SES membership? Apart from the very complex technical aspects of membership of two bodies, will the sub-regional integration in South-Eastern Europe remain the main pull for Moldova?

CEFTA and SP developments also raise the important question of whether Ukraine and other CIS states could join CEFTA and whether an enlarged CEFTA could become an alternative option to the SES project. The original CEFTA membership conditions have been significantly relaxed to allow the participation of all SP states – such as Moldova – and this certainly opens the door to other former Soviet republics. For Ukraine in particular, accession should be eminently possible under the CEFTA 2006 accession criteria, and let us not forget that links with CEFTA are not new. In the mid-1990s Ukraine was pushing hard for CEFTA membership and attended CEFTA summits as an observer in 1996 and 1997. Ukraine even lodged a formal application to join on 3 July 1997. Croatia successfully promoted the idea of CEFTA as the tool for multi-lateralizing intra-SP trade in order to avoid being thrust into a discrete economic integration association for South-East Europe, something that was anathema to Croatia because of a mixture of associations with ‘re-creating Yugoslavia’ and Croatia’s EU ambitions. Yet there was also a sound practical argument along the following lines: why create new economic associations when vehicles fit for the purpose are not only already available but also require certain standards to be met that are needed in any case if the broader EU integration objectives are to be realistic? CEFTA has already shifted its focus from ‘Central Europe’ to ‘South-East Europe’ so why can it not take in Eastern Europe too? Sentiments expressed in the past that ‘CEFTA is a finishing school for the EU’ may be a little strong, especially for the reconfigured CEFTA, but the fact that CEFTA states must have, or be on course to acquire, a free trade agreement with the EU is a condition that builds in an automatic compatibility with further integration with the EU. There is a strong argument that WNIS debates on strategies for mutual

integration should seriously start investigating the possible CEFTA option.

Conclusions

The EU enlargement scenario is somewhat confused at present and the only certainty is that further expansion will inevitably be a long-term process. 'Europeanization' is available to all post-communist countries and the real choice is over the direction of internal reform and the external regime to which those reforms are meant to foster access. It is the success or failure of the internal reform process that will ultimately determine what level of integration with the EU will be feasible. The key challenge for European states without an existing promise of membership is therefore essentially about political strategies for keeping EU integration and the associated reform measures on track. Significant and generous engagement of the EU is vital, and questions about whether the EU will provide adequate support will loom large. At the present stage, pressure on the EU to increase the resources on offer to assist that transition and open up as many EU programmes as possible in the meantime seems a much better option than wasting energy on fruitless attempts to accelerate membership itself.

It is also vital to question – if not debunk – the idea that the WNIS face some kind of stark choice between integration with the EU and integration with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For one thing, the two activities are both part of the multi-layered, multi-level broader European integration process. Second, the two processes are more likely to be complementary than contradictory since the reform measures needed to make integration with the EU work are much the same as those needed to foster sub-regional economic integration. An intensification of mutual integration will automatically occur between fellow travellers to deeper relations with EU integration. Assuming any intra-CIS integration that might occur is founded on market integration it should be pursued alongside EU integration processes with the proviso that the level of integration should not

go further than that which all parties have in place or are on course to achieve with the EU. At the present time, if the SES project does go ahead it should clearly aim at 'shallow' free trade (i.e. tariff and quota removal). Moreover, since Moldova joined CEFTA in 2006 and this has in principle opened the door to other WNIS future members, is the SES really necessary as a separate exercise if market integration is the main objective? Of course, if an intra-CIS integration model were to be predicated on dirigiste principles that undermined the compatibility with EU integration, then intra-CIS integration would be a strategic choice of a kind, but destined to be a dead-end as far as results of integration are concerned or even a case of economic union based on 'annexation' rather than integration.

As for the ENP, despite the reservations over the lack of a membership perspective and whether the method and instruments of the accession process for ECE countries can work in the context of former Soviet republics, it seems rather indisputable that the ENP process entails an all-important integration perspective that could result in, at a minimum, an 'enhanced association' between ENP countries and the EU. Europe would be genuinely divided if there were no process of engagement between the EU and the WNIS; by increasing the WNIS' involvement in cross-border connectivity, the process of knitting WNIS into the European fabric is already at work. The EU member states at present appear to hold the cards on how deep the relationship between WNIS states and the EU can go, but ultimately it will be up to the societies and governments of the ENP countries to determine whether there is meaningful and committed engagement in the European integration process. In Ukraine, the post-Soviet state directly in the spotlight on the EU membership perspective issue, at least some elements of the political elite have allegedly replaced Euro-romanticism with Euro-pragmatism. Yet a heavy dose of Euro-realism also needs to be prescribed because – membership promise or not – integration is the reality of the process. It is already under way but could easily be derailed; either way it involves travelling a long and arduous path. Citizens of the WNIS will need to understand what lies behind the political slogans

and be carefully prepared for the costs of Europeanization and persuaded that the long-term gains are real and worth waiting for. It is a peculiar fact that the EU tends to be more popular in countries outside it than in countries that are already members. This precious asset should not be squandered!

Notes

1. Gregorz Gromadski, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, *Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit? EU-Ukraine Relations in 2005 and the Beginning of 2006* (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2005), p.7.

2. 'Prime Minister Yanukovych: Ukraine not changing course from integration into European Union and NATO, but it will change tactic', Web Portal of Ukrainian Government, 8 Sept. 2006; available at <<http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en>>, accessed 8 Sept. 2006. The report added that 'Mr. Yanukovych said, stressing that the current Ukrainian government understands very well that transformation of Ukraine into a European country depends largely on Ukrainians'.

3. 'Ukraine looks to Berlin to strengthen its EU ties', euobserver.com, 29 Sept. 2006, available at <<http://euobserver.com/9/22523/?rk=1>>, accessed 29 Sept. 2006.

4. This article acknowledges that Belarus is clearly a member of the WNIS but since Belarus is not yet properly engaged in the ENP the discussion mainly applies to Ukraine and Moldova, and concentrates on Ukraine in particular. It should also be said that the ENP covers various middle east and north African neighbours 'by land or sea' of the EU too, something which often prompts claims that ENP's range somehow compromises its suitability for the East European neighbours and confirms that it is an arrangement for the 'excluded'. This dimension of the debate is not followed up here as it seems a somewhat rhetorical point – the approach taken here is that it is the substance of ENP which counts and a key premise of this article is also that 'in' or 'out' cannot be defined purely by the membership factor.

5. Of course, the 'eastern wing' of the European Neighbourhood Policy also includes the Caucasian countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia whose putative EU membership credentials may be less grounded in an unambiguous European identity. However, they are included in the same integration scenario open to Ukraine and Moldova.

6. 'Gazeta po-ukrainiski', 2 Dec. 2005, interview with Benita Ferrero-Waldner; available at <<http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/page37467.html>>, accessed 8 Sept. 2006.

7. <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm>, accessed 15 Sept. 2006. PCA countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; not all PCAs have entered into force, which is the case for Belarus as far as the WNIS group is concerned.

8. <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm>, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.

9. Ibid.

10. Wim Kok, *Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges* (Report to the European Commission) (Brussels: EUI/RSC, 2003), p.11, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kok/report_kok_en.pdf>, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.

11. Although a free trade area with the EU was offered as part of the first contractual agreement with ECEs, SAP states, like PCA states, have to go through a preparatory stage with strong conditionality before qualifying for free trade with the EU.

12. PHARE: Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies; TACIS: Technical Assistance: Commonwealth of Independent States; CARDS: Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (in the Balkans).

13. Marise Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Partnership, Security and the Rule of Law', in Alan Mayhew and Nathaniel Copsey (eds.), *Ukraine and European Neighbourhood Policy* (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2005), pp.25-54 (p.25).

14. Alan Mayhew and Nathaniel Copsey, 'Introduction', in Mayhew and Copsey (eds.), *Ukraine and European Neighbourhood Policy*, pp.7–16 (p.11).

15. See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

16. Frank Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-candidate Neighbouring Countries', paper presented at the 9th EUSA Biennial International Conference, Austin, TX, 31 March–2 April 2005, p.9.

17. Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt, 'Can the EU Hack the Balkans? A Proving Ground for Brussels', *Foreign Affairs*, Sept.–Oct. 2002, pp.2–7 (p.3).

18. Similar trends have been observable in Turkey, where public support for EU membership has been on a steady decline with the EU's tendency to play increasingly 'hard ball' since accession talks were opened.

19. Lieutenant-General Ante Gotovina, of the Croatian army, was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on charges of sanctioning war crimes against Serbs in 1995 during the war in eastern Croatia. His arrest and transfer to international custody was demanded by some countries as part of the price for opening accession negotiations. Captured in December 2005 after several years in hiding, he retains widespread popularity in Croatia as a war hero.

20. Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy', p.11.

21. See 'East Europe unbound. Poland and Hungary show limit or unreality of EU influence', *Financial Times*, 29 Sept. 2006, p.16. Clear signs of democratic regression in the form of reverting to 'old ways' of conducting politics were also reported at the time of the October 2007 Polish parliamentary election. The ruling party was said have (*Financial Times*, 19 Oct. p.14) 'resorted to blatant abuse of power: dominating state television, threatening opponents with legal action and using confidential police files to blacken rivals' reputations.' At

minimum, if democratic rights need defending after EU accession then this suggests that an EU membership promise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for building a modern democratic state.

22. 'Balkan Bungling – Best EU option now is to admit Bulgaria and Romania early', *Financial Times*, 6 Sept. 2006, p.22.

23. EU-Ukraine Action Plan, p.1. The full text of the plan is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf>, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.

24. At the time of writing it was confirmed that the ENP is to undergo a process of enhancement following the European Commission's proposals 'On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy' released on 4 Dec. 2006 (see COM (2006) 726 final, available via <<http://www.europa.eu.int>>, accessed 15 June 2007). These proposals also provided a context for negotiations that started on 5 March 2007 in Brussels between the EU and Ukraine on a successor agreement to the PCA. The details of the enhanced ENP are not included in this article but it should be stated that, if the proposed new arrangements go through and are reflected in the new agreements eventually signed with WNIS countries, then the main premises of this article are themselves further strengthened.

25. Quoted in Karen E. Smith, 'Enlargement and European Order', in Michael Smith and Christopher Hill (eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.270–91 (p.287).

26. *Ibid.*, pp.287–8.

27. Pawel Wolowski, 'The EU Policy towards Ukraine: Integration and Exclusion Dilemmas', in Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, Alexander Duleba, Laszlo Poti and Vladimir Votapek (eds.), *Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union: A Visegrad Perspective* (Bratislava: SFPA, 2003), pp.224–39 (p.224).

28. See Christopher Preston, 'Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.33, No.3 (1995), pp.451–63.

29. Prodi's comment's reproduced from Judith Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms through the ENP', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.44, No.1 (2006), pp.29–56 (p.38).

30. Ibid., p.49.

31. Eneko Landaburu, 'From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are There Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?', keynote speech at CEPS Conference 'Revitalising Europe', Brussels, 23 Jan. 2006, p.2, available at <<http://www.europa.eu.int>>, accessed 7 Sept. 2006.

32. Anders Åslund, 'The Rise and Decline of Economic Populism after the Orange Revolution, Beyond Transitions, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), pp.14–15 (p.15).

33. Andrew Tiffin, 'The Role of Institutions and Efficiency in Ukraine', *Beyond Transitions*, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), pp.3–4 (p.4).

34. Iryna Solonenko, 'Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: The Role of the EU', *Beyond Transitions*, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), p.5.

35. Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.44, No.3 (2006), pp.507–32 (p.512).

36. Ibid., p.516

37. For discussion of problems of an EEA-style relationship for the ENP countries see Tim Gould, 'The European Economic Area: A Model for the EU's Neighbourhood Policy?', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.5, No.2 (2004), pp.171–202. Dodini and Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', also regard the ENP as falling short of the 'near-total' integration of the EEA, although they see some relevance of the EEA example in that it is a precedent of countries willing to exchange some sovereignty in return for the economic advantages of an intense relationship with the EU. The ENP will have the added advantage of offering EU funding, something that the EEA countries did not have, of course.

38. Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Relations with the Wider Europe', in Ulrich Sedelmeier and Alasdair Young (eds.), *The JCMS Annual review of the European Union in 2005* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2006), pp.137–54 (p.144).

39. Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms', p.49.

40. Gromadski et al., *Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?*, p.17.

41. Olli Rehn, 'Building a New Consensus on Enlargement: How to Match the Strategic Interest and Functioning Capacity of the EU',

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42. Andreas Schockenhoff, 'Enlargement: Six Tests for the EU's Absorption Capacity', *Europe's World* (Autumn 2006), pp.90-97 (p.94).

43. Gromadski et al., *Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?*, p.16.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Financial Times*, 14 Feb. 2005.

46. Note that this enthusiasm on the part of MEPs cooled somewhat after the 'Orange Revolution Effect' faded; on this see Gromadski et al., *Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?*

47. Dodini and Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', p.517.

48. Loukas Tsoukalis, 'The JCMS Annual Lecture: Managing Diversity and Change in the EU', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.44, No.1 (2006), pp.1-16 (p.3).

49. *Financial Times*, 12 Sept. 2006.

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51. European Commission, 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', *Special Eurobarometer 255*, July 2006.

52. *Ibid.*, p.74.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*

56. Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms', p.51.

57. The Commission's proposals for the enhanced ENP discuss sub-regional co-operation, but mainly focus on an issue or sector-based approach, identifying a possible key role for the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization (BSEC). Mutual economic integration in the classical mode of a free trade area for WNIS states is not mentioned, meaning that sub-regional integration in the tradition of CEFTA and 'CEFTA 2006' either is not on the EU agenda or is being sidestepped for the moment.

58. CEFTA began life as an integration tool for Višegrad states and has since evolved into the main tool for trade multi-lateralization in the Western Balkans.

59. See Martin Dangerfield, 'CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.26, No.3 (2004), pp.309–88; also Martin Dangerfield, 'Sub-regional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.44, No.2 (2006), pp.305–24.

60. By the time CEFTA was reduced in size in May 2004 its membership included five states that left to join the EU (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) along with Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.

61. The CEFTA experience also suggests that, other than a customs union move, this may be impossible for practical reasons in any case: see Dangerfield, 'CEFTA'.

62. Åslund, 'The Rise and Decline of Economic Populism', p.15; SES is sometimes referred to as CES.

63. *Financial Times*, 15 Sept. 2006, p.8.

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Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes

**EXPLAINING EASTERN EUROPE:
IMITATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS**

Abstract

For countries emerging from communism, the post-1989 imperative to “be like the West” has generated discontent and even a “return of the repressed,” as the region feels old nationalist stirrings and new demographic pressures. The origins of the region’s current illiberalism are emotional and preideological, rooted in rebellion at the humiliations that accompany a project requiring acknowledgment of a foreign culture as superior to one’s own. Further contributing to illiberalism in the region is a largely unspoken preoccupation with demographic collapse—resulting from aging populations, low birth rates, and massive outmigration—which manifests as a fear that the arrival of unassimilable foreigners will dilute national identities and weaken national cohesion.

In Mary Shelley’s 1818 horror story *Frankenstein*, an inventor driven by Promethean ambition creates a monster by assembling body parts drawn from “the dissecting room and the slaughterhouse” and even “the unhallowed damp of the grave” into a humanoid creature. Yet the experimenter, Victor Frankenstein, soon comes to regret his overambitious attempt to construct a facsimile of his own species. The monster, bitterly envious of its creator’s happiness and feeling doomed to loneliness and rejection, turns violently against his inventor’s friends and family, laying waste to their world and leaving only remorse and heartbreak as legacies of a misguided experiment in human self-replication.

The U.S. sociologist Kim Scheppelle, without pushing the analogy too far, describes today’s Hungary (presided over by another Viktor) as a “Frankenstate”—that is, an illiberal mutant composed of ingeniously stitched-together elements of Western liberal democracies. What she shows, remarkably enough, is that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has succeeded in destroying liberal

democracy by implementing a clever policy of piecemeal imitation. He has created a regime that represents a happy marriage between Carl Schmitt's understanding of politics as a series of melodramatic friend-versus-enemy confrontations and the institutional façade of liberal democracy. When the European Union criticizes the Orbán government for the illiberal character of its reforms, that government is always quick to point out that every controversial legal change, rule, or institution has been faithfully copied from the legal system of one of the EU's member states. Thus it should come as no surprise that many Western liberals look at the political regimes in Hungary and Poland with the same "horror and disgust" that filled the heart of Victor Frankenstein when he beheld his creature.

To understand the origins of today's Central and East European illiberal revolution, we should look neither to ideology nor to economics, but instead to the pent-up animosity engendered by the centrality of mimesis in the reform processes launched in the East after 1989. The region's illiberal turn cannot be grasped apart from the political expectation of "normality" created by the 1989 revolution and the politics of imitation that it legitimized. After the Berlin Wall fell, Europe was no longer divided between communists and democrats. It was instead divided between imitators and the imitated. East-West relations morphed from a Cold War standoff between two hostile systems into a moral hierarchy within a single liberal, Western system. While the mimics looked up to their models, the models looked down on their mimics. It is not entirely mysterious, therefore, why the "imitation of the West" voluntarily chosen by East Europeans three decades ago eventually resulted in a political backlash.

For two decades after 1989, the political philosophy of postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe could be summarized in a single imperative: Imitate the West! The process was called by different names—democratization, liberalization, enlargement, convergence, integration, Europeanization—but the goal pursued by postcommunist reformers was simple. They wished their countries to become "normal," which meant like the West. This involved

importing liberal-democratic institutions, applying Western political and economic recipes, and publicly endorsing Western values. Imitation was widely understood to be the shortest pathway to freedom and prosperity.

Pursuing economic and political reform by imitating a foreign model, however, turned out to have steeper moral and psychological downsides than many had originally expected. The imitator's life inescapably produces feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, dependency, lost identity, and involuntary insincerity. Indeed, the futile struggle to create a truly credible copy of an idealized model involves a never-ending torment of self-criticism if not self-contempt.

What makes imitation so irksome is not only the implicit assumption that the mimic is somehow morally and humanly inferior to the model. It also entails the assumption that Central and Eastern Europe's copycat nations accept the West's right to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards. In this sense, imitation comes to feel like a loss of sovereignty.

Thus the rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe has its roots not in political theory, but in political psychology. It reflects a deep-seated disgust at the post-1989 "imitation imperative," with all its demeaning and humiliating implications.

The origins of the region's current illiberalism are emotional and pre-ideological, rooted in rebellion at the humiliations that must necessarily accompany a project requiring acknowledgment of a foreign culture as superior to one's own. Illiberalism in a strictly theoretical sense, then, is largely a cover story. It lends a patina of intellectual respectability to a desire, widely shared at a visceral level, to shake off the colonial dependency implicit in the very project of Westernization.

The Counterrevolution Against Liberalism

When Poland's Jarosław Kaczyński accuses "liberalism" of being "against the very notion of the nation,"¹ and when Orbán's lieutenant Mária Schmidt says "we are Hungarians, and we want to preserve

our culture,"² their overheated nativism embodies a refusal to be judged by foreigners according to foreign standards. In effect, they are saying "we are not trying to copy you, and therefore it makes no sense for you to consider us botched or poor-quality copies of yourselves." To repeat, the self-styled "ideology" of illiberalism ranks below its proponents' emotional urge to restore national self-respect by denying that Western liberalism provides the model to which all societies must conform. The abhorrence of compulsory imitation is primary, the intellectual criticism of the model being imitated merely secondary and collateral.

To be sure, this humiliation-driven repudiation of liberal ideas and institutions has not emerged in a vacuum. Favorable ground for an illiberal counterrevolution has been prepared by several important shifts in global political affairs. Authoritarian China's rise as an economic powerhouse has dissolved what had once been seen as the intrinsic link between liberal democracy and material prosperity. While in 1989 liberalism was associated with appealing ideals of individual freedom, legal fairness, and governmental transparency, by 2010 it had been tainted by two decades of association with really existing and inevitably faulty postcommunist governments. The disastrous consequences of the Iraq War, launched in 2003, discredited the idea of democracy promotion. The economic crisis of 2008 bred a deep distrust of business elites and of the "casino capitalism" that almost destroyed the world financial order. Central and East Europeans turned against liberalism not so much because it was failing at home as because in their view it was failing in the West. It was as if they had been told to imitate the globally dominant West just as the West was losing that very dominance. Such a context could hardly have favored the politics of imitation.

The counterrevolutions that broke out in Hungary in 2010 and Poland in 2015 represented a perfectly predictable return of the repressed. Attempts by Central and East Europeans to imitate post-1945 Germany's way of dealing with its recent history turned out to encounter insuperable problems.

German democracy rests on the assumption that nationalism leads ineluctably to Nazism. The transnational EU originated as part of a geopolitical strategy to block a potentially dangerous reassertion of German sovereignty by integrating the country economically into the rest of Europe and by giving the Federal Republic a “postnational” identity. In Germany, as a result, ethnonationalism came close to being criminalized. Central and East Europeans, by contrast, find it difficult to share such a negative view of nationalism—first, because their states are children of the age of nationalism that accompanied the breakup of multinational empires; and second, because nationalism played an essential role in the mostly nonviolent anticommunist revolutions that began in 1989.

In Central and Eastern Europe, unlike in Germany, nationalism and liberalism are likely to be seen as mutually supporting rather than clashing ideas. Poles would find it absurd to cease honoring the nationalistic leaders who lost their lives defending Poland against Hitler or Stalin. The region also was forced to suffer for decades under communist propaganda that reflexively, indeed numbingly, denounced nationalism. Here is perhaps another reason why Central and East Europeans feel wary of Germany’s obsessive desire to detach citizenship from hereditary membership in a national community. For a time during the 1990s, the Yugoslav wars led Europe as a whole (including the postcommunist portion) to see or pretend to see nationalism as the root of all evil. In the long run, however, the identification of liberalism with antinationalism did more than merely make people less prone to support liberal parties in postcommunist countries. It also made liberalism, including so-called constitutional patriotism, seem to be a new “German ideology” designed to govern Europe in the interests of Berlin.

The Double Meaning of Normality

The revolutions of 1989 seemed exciting at the time, but viewed in retrospect, they turn out to have been colorless revolutions. “Not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989,” François Furet, the great historian of the French Revolution, famously

observed.³ Germany's leading philosopher Jürgen Habermas concurred. He was not especially scandalized by "the lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future," since for him the East European revolutions were "rectifying revolutions"⁴ or "catch-up revolutions."⁵ Their goal was to return East European societies to the mainstream of Western modernity by allowing the East Europeans to gain what the West Europeans had long possessed.

In 1989, Central and East Europeans were not dreaming of some perfect world that had never existed. They were longing for a "normal life" in a "normal country." As Poland's Adam Michnik later confessed, "My obsession has been that we should have a revolution that does not resemble the French or the Russian, but rather the American, in the sense that it be for something, not against something. A revolution for a constitution, not a paradise. An anti-utopian revolution. Because utopias lead to the guillotine and the gulag." His cry was therefore "Liberty, Fraternity, Normality."⁶ When Poles of his generation spoke of "normality," it should be said, they did not mean some earlier precommunist period of Polish history to which their country could happily revert once the parenthesis of Soviet occupation was closed. What they meant by "normality" was the West.

Czechoslovakia's Václav Havel described his country's struggle to escape communist rule as "simply trying to do away with its own abnormality, to normalize."⁷ After decades of living with eyes focused on a purportedly radiant future, the main idea now was to live in the present and to enjoy the pleasures of everyday life.

This elevation of Western "normality" as the principal goal of political revolution had two perverse effects. It dramatically raised the question of how to reconcile "normal" in the sense of "what is widespread in one's country" with "normal" in the sense of "something that the West somehow is while the East is not." It also made emigration the natural choice of Central and East European revolutionaries.

One of the crucial problems with communism was that its ideal was a society that never existed and that nobody was sure ever would

exist. One of the central problems for Westernizing revolutions, on the other hand, is that the model they aim to imitate is constantly morphing before our eyes. The socialist utopia may have been eternally unreachable, but at least it possessed a comfortingly unchanging quality. Western liberal democracy, by contrast, has proved shape-shifting and protean to an extreme. Because Western normality is defined not as an ideal but as an existing reality, every change in Western societies brings a new image of what is normal. Just as technology companies insist that you should buy their latest model and make it difficult to rely on the previous one, the West insisted that only Europe's latest postnational political model was worth buying.

The disturbing effect of an elusively changing "normality" is best illustrated by the way Central and East Europeans have reacted to changing cultural norms in Western societies over the last two decades. In the eyes of conservative Poles in the days of the Cold War, Western societies were normal because, unlike communist systems, they cherished tradition and believed in God. Then suddenly Poles discovered that Western "normality" today means secularism, multiculturalism, and gay marriage. Should we be surprised that Poles and their neighbors felt "cheated" when they found out that the society they wanted to imitate had disappeared, washed away by the swift currents of modernization?

If, in the immediate aftermath of 1989, "normality" was understood largely in political terms (free elections, separation of powers, private property, and the right to travel), during the last decade normality has increasingly come to be interpreted in cultural terms. As a result, Central and East Europeans are becoming mistrustful and resentful of norms coming from the West. Ironically, as we shall see below, Eastern Europe is now starting to view itself as the last bastion of genuine European values.

In order to reconcile the idea of "normal" (meaning what is widespread at home) with what is normatively obligatory in the countries they aim to imitate, East Europeans consciously or unconsciously have begun to "normalize" the model countries,

arguing that what is widespread in the East is also prevalent in the West, even though Westerners hypocritically pretend that their societies are different. East Europeans often relieve their normative dissonance—say, between paying bribes to survive in the East and fighting corruption to be accepted in the West—by concluding that the West is really just as corrupt as the East, but Westerners are simply in denial and hiding the truth.

A liberal revolution of normality was not thought to be a leap in time from a dark past to the bright future. It was instead imagined as a movement across physical space, as if all of Eastern Europe would be relocating to the House of the West, previously seen only in photographs and films. Explicit analogies were drawn between the unification of Germany realized after the Wall came down, and the idea of a unified Europe. In the early 1990s, in fact, many East Europeans burned with envy at the astonishingly lucky East Germans, who had overnight collectively migrated to the West, waking up miraculously with West German passports in their hands and (so some thought) deutschmark-stuffed wallets in their pockets. If the 1989 revolution was a regionwide westward migration, then the main question was which East European countries would arrive first at their shared destination.

Exit, Imitation, and Disloyalty

On 13 December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a state of emergency in Poland, and tens of thousands of participants in the anticommunist Solidarity movement were arrested and interned. A year later, the Polish government proposed to release those willing to sign a loyalty oath as well as those prepared to emigrate. In response to these offers, Adam Michnik penned two open letters from his prison cell. One was entitled “Why You Are Not Signing” and the other “Why You Are Not Emigrating.”⁸ His arguments for not signing were straightforward. Solidarity activists should not swear loyalty to the government because the government had broken its faith with Poland. They should not sign because signing to save one’s neck would mean humiliation and loss of dignity, but

also because, by signing, they would be putting themselves in the company of people who had betrayed their friends and their ideals.

As for why the jailed dissidents should shun emigration, Michnik thought this required a more nuanced answer. A dozen years before, as a Polish Jew and one of the leaders of the March 1968 student protests in Poland, Michnik had been distressed to see some of his best friends leave the country. He also watched as the communist regime tried to persuade ordinary people that those who left had done so because they cared nothing about Poland: Only Jews emigrate—that was how the government had tried to turn Pole against Pole.

By 1982, Michnik was no longer angry at his friends who had left the country fourteen years before. He also recognized the important contribution of the émigré community to the birth of Solidarity. But while admitting that emigration remained a legitimate expression of personal freedom, he strongly urged Solidarity activists not to go into exile, because “each decision to emigrate is a gift to Jaruzelski.” Moreover, dissidents who left for freedom beyond Poland’s borders would be betraying those who stayed behind, especially those working and praying for a better Poland. Leaving would also undermine the democratic movement and help the communists by rendering society too easily pacified and by associating the opposition cause with selfishness and disloyalty to the nation. The best way to show solidarity with one’s suffering countrymen and to resist the communist rulers was to refuse the poisoned gift of personal freedom in the West, for being able to emigrate and thereby enjoy such freedom was hardly an option for the vast majority of Poles.

By deciding not to emigrate, Michnik argued, the imprisoned activists would also give meaning to those who had decided to emigrate earlier and were supporting the Polish resistance from abroad. Freedom itself means that people have a right to do what they want. But in the circumstances of 1982, “the interned Solidarity activists who choose exile are committing an act that is both a capitulation and a desertion.” Michnik admitted that this statement

sounded harsh and intolerant and that some might think it conflicted with his belief that “the decision to emigrate is a very personal one.” But in 1982, to emigrate or not to emigrate was the ultimate loyalty test for Solidarity activists. Only by choosing to remain in jail instead of taking up the attractive offer of personal freedom in the West could they earn the trust of their fellow citizens, upon which the future of a free Polish society depended.

If in 1982 emigration was an act of betrayal, that is not how it seemed in 1992. After 1989, the desire to have what Havel called “a normal political life” led to mass emigration. If in East Germany “exit” was followed by “voice” (to use Albert O. Hirschman’s famous terms), then in Central and Eastern Europe it was the other way around: Voice came first, then exit. At first, euphoria over communism’s end fed hopes for immediate, radical improvement. Central and East Europeans would wake from the communist nightmare to freer, more prosperous, and, above all, more Western countries. When no magic and instant Westernization came, many took their families and left for the West. After the shocking success of a revolution aimed at copying Western normality, Michnik’s harsh 1982 claim that emigration to the West was a capitulation and a desertion no longer made any sense. The personal choice to decamp to Western Europe could no longer be stigmatized as disloyal to nations devoted to becoming like the West. A revolution that had made imitation of the West its goal could give no strong reasons against westward emigration.

Revolutions as a rule force people to cross borders—moral borders if not territorial ones. When the French Revolution broke out, many of its enemies decamped. When the Bolsheviks set up their dictatorship in Russia, millions of White Russians left the country and lived abroad for years with suitcases packed in hopes of a Bolshevik collapse. In these cases, however, the defeated enemies of the revolution were the ones who left. The contrast brings out the historical anomaly of 1989. After the velvet revolutions, it was the winners—not the losers—who moved away. Those most impatient to see their countries change were also the ones most eager to

plunge into the life of a free citizenry. They were the first to go abroad to study, work, and live in the West, taking their pro-Western inclinations with them.

It is hard to picture Leon Trotsky, after his Bolsheviks won, deciding that it was time to go study at Oxford. But that is what Viktor Orbán and many others did. And they had good reasons to do so. Unlike the French and Russian revolutionaries, who believed that they were building a new civilization hostile to the old order of throne and altar, and that Paris and Moscow were where this future was being forged, the revolutionaries of 1989 were strongly motivated to travel to the West in order to see up close how the normal society they hoped to build at home actually worked in practice. Every revolutionary wants to live in the future, and if Germany was the future of Poland, then the most heartfelt revolutionaries might as well pack up and move to Germany.

The dream of a collective return to Europe made such a choice both logical and legitimate. Why should a young Pole or Hungarian wait for his country one day to become like Germany, when he could start working and raising a family in Frankfurt or Hamburg tomorrow? After all, it is easier to change countries than to change your country. When borders were opened after 1989, exit was favored over voice because political reform requires the focused cooperation of many organized social interests, while emigration requires only you and yours. The mistrust of nationalistic loyalties and the prospect of a politically united Europe also helped to make emigration the political choice for many liberal-minded East Europeans. This, alongside the vanishing of anticommunist dissidents, is why Michnik's thundering against emigration lost its moral and emotional punch after 1989. This brings us to the refugee crisis that struck Europe in 2015 and 2016.

Demography Is Destiny

The dominant storyline of the illiberal counterrevolution in Central and Eastern Europe is encapsulated in the inverted meaning of the idea of an “open society.” In 1989, the open society meant

a promise of freedom, above all a freedom to do what had been previously forbidden, namely to travel to the West. Today, openness to the world, for large swaths of the Central and East European electorate, connotes not freedom but danger: immigrant invasion, depopulation, and loss of national sovereignty.

The refugee crisis of 2015 brought the region's brewing revolt against individualism and universalism to a head. What Central and East Europeans realized in the course of the refugee crisis was that, in our connected but unequal world, migration is the most revolutionary revolution of them all. The twentieth-century revolt of the masses is a thing of the past. We are now facing a twenty-first-century revolt of the migrants. Undertaken anarchically, not by organized revolutionary parties but by millions of disconnected individuals and families, this revolt faces no collective-action problems. It is inspired not by ideologically colored pictures of a radiant, imaginary future, but by glossy photos of life on the other side of the border.

Globalization has made the world a village, but this village lives under a kind of dictatorship—a dictatorship of global comparisons. People these days no longer compare their own lives only to the lives of their neighbors; they also compare themselves to the most prosperous inhabitants of the planet. Thus if you seek an economically secure life for your children, the best thing you can do is to make sure that they will be born in Denmark, Germany, or Sweden, with the Czech Republic or Poland as perhaps second-tier options.

The combination of an aging population, low birth rates, and an unending flow of outmigration is the ultimate source of demographic panic in Central and Eastern Europe, even though it is expressed politically in the nonsensical claim that invading migrants from Africa and the Middle East pose an existential threat to the nations of the region. Immigration anxiety is fomented by a fear that unassimilable foreigners will enter the country, dilute national identity, and weaken national cohesion. This fear, in turn, reflects a largely unspoken preoccupation with demographic collapse.

Between 1989 and 2017, Latvia hemorrhaged 27 percent of its population; Lithuania, 22.5 percent; Bulgaria, almost 21 percent. Two-million East Germans, or almost 14 percent of the country's pre-1989 inhabitants, decamped to West Germany in search of work and a better life.⁹

The number of Central and East Europeans who left their home region (mostly bound for Western Europe) as a result of the 2008 economic crisis exceeds the total number of refugees who came to Western Europe from outside Europe, including the refugees from Syria. About 3.4 million people left Romania in the decade after 2007—numbers usually associated with a war or some other catastrophe. Three-quarters of these Romanians, moreover, were 35 or younger when they left. The threat that confronts Central and Eastern Europe today resembles the prospect of depopulation that East Germany faced before the communists put up the Berlin Wall. It is the danger that working-age citizens will leave the East to pursue lives in the West.

Panic in the face of a nonexistent immigrant invasion¹⁰ should be understood as a distorted echo of a more realistic underlying fear that huge swaths of one's own population, including the most energetic and able young people, will leave the country and settle permanently abroad. The magnitude of the post-1989 migration out of Central and Eastern Europe explains why there has been such a deeply hostile reaction to the refugee crisis across the region even though hardly any refugees have relocated to it (as distinguished from transiting across it).

Fear of diversity is at the core of the rise of European illiberalism, but it has a different meaning in the East than in the West. In Western Europe, illiberalism is born of the fear that liberal societies are unable to cope with diversity. In the East, the question is how to prevent diversity from arising in the first place. If a century ago Eastern Europe was the continent's most ethnically diverse part, today it is unbelievably homogeneous. Only 1.6 percent of current Polish citizens were born outside Poland, while the proportion of Muslims among Polish citizens is less than 0.1 percent.

Accounting for Anti-Immigrant Hysteria

The trauma of people pouring out of the region explains what might otherwise seem mysterious—the strong sense of loss in countries that have benefited from the political and economic changes since 1989. Across Europe, the areas that suffered the greatest hemorrhaging of population in recent decades have been the ones most inclined to vote for far-right parties. This strongly suggests that the illiberal turn in Central Europe, too, is deeply rooted in the mass exodus from the region, especially of young people,¹¹ and the demographic anxieties that this outmigration has left behind.

The second factor explaining anti-immigrant hysteria without immigrants brings us back to our main argument. While there has been no “invasion” by African and Middle Eastern immigrants trying to settle in the region, Central and East Europeans are constantly exposed through sensationalized television reporting to the immigration problems that plague Western Europe. The consequence is a new understanding in the East of the essential divide between the two halves of the continent: While the East is still homogeneous and monoethnic, the West is viewed as having become heterogeneous and multiethnic as a result of a thoughtless and suicidal policy of allowing easy immigration. The radical reevaluation of values here is remarkable. Rather than West Europeans being considered far ahead and East Europeans far behind, West Europeans are now described, in the rhetoric of xenophobic populists, as having lost their way. In the febrile imaginations of these populists, Western Europe has become the periphery of a Greater Africa and Greater Middle East.

As a result, Western Europe no longer represents the model of a culturally triumphant West that Central and East Europeans long aspired to imitate. On the contrary, the open societies of Western Europe, unable to defend their borders against foreign (and especially Muslim) “invaders,” provide a basically negative model, a living picture of the social order that East Europeans are most eager to avoid.

To resurrect the moral disapproval that once attached to emigration, Central and East European populists must reject the claim that Hungary, Poland, or the other countries in the region can succeed politically and economically only if they faithfully imitate the West. The rise of nationalistic rhetoric and the illiberal turn in the East look suspiciously like a desperate attempt to build a “loyalty wall” that will stanch the hemorrhaging and stop young Central and East Europeans from leaving their countries. Formulated differently, populists in Warsaw and Budapest have turned the refugee crisis in the West into a “branding opportunity” for the East. Only if the nation stops trying to be like the West will its citizens stop leaving for the West. To halt outmigration, it is necessary to ruin the reputation of the West as a land of opportunity and to tear down the idea that Western liberalism is the gold standard of an advanced social and economic order. Western Europe’s open immigration system is rejected less because it has invited in Africans and Middle Easterners than because it has served as an irresistible magnet for Central and East Europeans themselves.

Europe today is haunted by the specter of reverse imitation. The players in the post-1989 “imitation game” are, at least in some respects, changing places. In a few cases, the mimics have become the models and vice versa. The ultimate revenge of the Central and East European populists against Western liberalism is not merely to reject the “imitation imperative,” but to invert it. We are the real Europeans, Orbán and Kaczyński claim, and if the West wants to save itself, it will have to imitate the East. As Orbán revealingly declared in a speech in July 2017, “Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.”¹²

Notes

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2. Quoted in Philip Oltermann, “Can Europe’s New Xenophobes Reshape the Continent?” *Guardian*, 3 February 2018.

3. Quoted in Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2005), 27.

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8. Adam Michnik, "Why You Are Not Signing ...: A Letter from Białołęka Internment Camp 1982," and "Why You Are Not Emigrating ...: A Letter from Białołęka 1982," in Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, trans. Maya Latynski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 13–24.

9. These data, and figures on Central and East European demographics, come from Eurostat data and the authors' own calculations, based on the variable "Population on 1 January by age and sex (demo_pjan)." http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_pjan&lang=en.

10. "We must confront a flood of people pouring out of ... the Middle East, and meanwhile the depth of Africa has been set in motion. Millions of people are preparing to set out. Globally the desire, the urge and the pressure for people to continue their lives in some place other than where they began them is increasing. This is one of history's largest tides of people, and it brings with it the danger of tragic consequences. It is a modern-day global mass migration, which we cannot see the end of: economic migrants hoping for a better life, refugees and drifting masses mixed up together. This is an uncontrolled and unregulated process, and—now that I am speaking before the scientific community—the most precise definition of this is 'invasion.'" Viktor Orbán, "Speech at the Opening of the World Science Forum," 7 November 2015.

11. “Perhaps you young people. feel as if the whole world is yours. ... But in your lives, too, there will come a moment when you realise that one needs a place, a language, a home where one is among one’s own, and where one can live one’s life in safety, surrounded by the goodwill of others. A place where one can return to, and where one can feel that there is a point to life, and that in the end it will not just slide into oblivion. ... Young Hungarians, now the homeland needs you. ... Come and fight with us, so that when you need it, your homeland will still be there for you.” Viktor Orbán, “Ceremonial Speech on the 170th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848,” 15 March 2018.

12. “Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp,” 22 July 2017.

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Mykhailo Minakov

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EUROMAIDAN
FOR UKRAINE AND EUROPE**

Five years ago, civic protests against the government's decision to withhold from association with the European Union began in Kyiv. These events evolved into Euromaidan, an event that changed Ukraine and international order in the region.

But how can this change be measured?

To get the answer, I asked scholars of Ukrainian culture in Europe and the United States the question, "What is the significance of Euromaidan for Ukraine and Europe?"

Their answers to this question are below.

George G. Grabowicz, Dmytro Chyzhevs'kyj Professor of Ukrainian Literature, Harvard University (USA)

In terms of the larger picture, the significance of the Euromaidan, or generally the Maidan, of 2013-14 can hardly be overstated: it not only caps the period of hybrid post-Soviet existence initiated by independence in 1991, but also provides a kind of closure to the complex and drawn-out process of Ukrainian nation-formation that began in the 19th century.

The Ukraine that emerged from the Maidan and the resultant Russian response—the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in the Donbas—is arguably fundamentally different from both Soviet Ukraine of 1922-1991 and the first stage of post-Independence Ukraine (1991-2013). That difference can be measured in various ways. Most frequently discussed is the political or geopolitical factor; in effect, Ukraine's shift from "unaligned," or "multi-vectored" to a clearly pro-European and hence a pro-democratic official self-designation (including ongoing efforts to join the EU and NATO).

Underlying it are more significant tectonic shifts: the emergence of civil society and the growing recognition—precisely in society and not just among some real or putative elites—that a prerequisite for participation in both Europe and democracy is the rule of law. The fact of such “recognition,” however, i.e., its presence in various forms of social discourse, does not mean immediate implementation; impeding it, of course, is almost a whole century of Soviet and post-Soviet “crypto-law,” or authoritarianism/totalitarianism (“diktat” and “proizvol”) masquerading as rule of law.

The shift from the simulacrum to the real thing will clearly take time, especially implementation through institutions—which themselves need to be created or “discovered.” Subtending this is the central factor of identity: specifically, whether Ukraine and “Ukrainianness” are imaginable without Russia. For Lenin it was not, as the last remaining Kyiv monument to him loudly asserted; but the Maidan brought it down—and hundreds of such effigies all across Ukraine. That was on the surface, but also deeply symbolic. The attempts to free the Ukrainian Orthodox church from its subservience to the Moscow Patriarchate are still ongoing—but now are supported by the state. Corruption still remains (and not only in Ukraine).

Giovanna Brogi, Professor Emeritus in Slavic Studies and Literature, State University of Milan (Italy)

Whatever complications Ukraine has today, I am convinced that the events of 2013-2014 will remain a glorious event in its history.

Events in Ukraine reflect general global trends in an original, often paradoxical way. Euromaidan demonstrated that the seemingly dormant society under Yanukovych collected an enormous potential of opposition, and that this opposition was able to manifest its strength without aggression. The Maidan participants in Kyiv and in other parts of Ukraine showed excellent capacity of organization and unusual cold blood and pragmatism: in my view, this is the beginning of a new way of approaching socially and politically difficult situations in the Ukrainian reality.

True, the aftermath of the Maidan was often frustrating. Many requests proposed by the Revolution of Dignity have not yet been satisfied. The acting government(s) were not always able to actualize the ideas promoted by Maidan in tangible political terms. In my opinion, this is physiological in any “revolutionary” movement. Let us be content with the extraordinary fact that the Maidan revolution did not evolve into violence and terror from the inside—violence came from outside.

The annexation of Crimea and the subsequent—still ongoing—war in Eastern Ukraine represent the most tragic events in Europe after 1989, comparable only to the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. Unlike the Balkan situation, paradoxically, the tragic events and war of 2014-2018 may have contributed to the crystallization of a new sense of nationhood in Ukraine. True, difficulties are enormous: the existing government(s) are far below expectations; contrasts are strong between different social layers; and cultural backgrounds of large groups coming from different historical, linguistic and economic contexts. Still, I am convinced that in the last four years Ukrainians have learned to face the hard, long-lasting, often frustrating, but inevitable and necessary “everyday work” of forging one’s own identity and social cohesiveness with much more endurance and pragmatism.

To sum up, I am convinced that Maidan contributed strongly to bolster development of Ukrainian society and integrate it with Europe.

Olena Betlii, Associate Professor in History, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine)

“We are going to die for ourselves and for Europe”: this formula, tested in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968, became the essence of the winter events in Kyiv in 2013-2014. Thus, the events themselves, their mythology, philosophy, and perception were purely European in their nature. Hardly could one find other examples of such readiness to die for a continent understood as an idealistic idea of exclusive collective identity as those which were demonstrated by people in Maidan.

The Ukrainians definitely fueled the story of Europe with unprecedented examples of sacrifice, and in doing so they actually made the whole idea of Europe alive again. That was a wake-up call for our continent—a moment which clearly demonstrated that there is something more that connects Europe. And that connection is not so much about the EU, Copenhagen criteria, or endless discussions about one’s Europeanness.

What one can observe analyzing Ukraine in the winter of 2013-2014 is not only a fight for an abstract Europe, but a fight for very practical outcomes: liberty, equality, fraternity. We went to Maidan in late November because our own freedom was everything we were left with and it was in danger. We protected it. We started the fight with the corrupted Yanukovich regime, and its dismantling led us to restart the transformation period based on rule of law and state building. Finally, we discovered fraternity. Unprecedented eagerness to protect and support each other during Maidan and the first years of ongoing war with Russia became the most important feature of Ukrainian collective identity revealed during the most tragic events of the contemporary history of Ukraine.

All of that was significant for both Ukraine and for Europe.

Denys Kiryukhin, philosopher, Research Fellow, The Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Ukraine)

It would be no exaggeration if I were to say that Euromaidan became the most important political event for Ukraine since it gained independence in 1991, the event that determined the direction of the state’s development for many years to come. This is mainly because Euromaidan solved the difficult Ukrainian dilemma of choosing between an orientation toward the European Union and staying in Russia’s orbit. Today, no political force can achieve a rejection of the “European choice” since such a rejection requires a significant change in legal norms and political institutions, as well as a radical revision of international obligations. But no less important is the change in the role of civil society in the Ukrainian

political system. Euromaidan showed that civil society was mature enough to organize and mobilize for protest. As a result, the state power in Ukraine finds itself in a situation where it is forced, if not to cooperate, then at least not to be in a state of conflict with civil society, since such a conflict threatens to undermine its legitimacy.

On the other hand, Euromaidan revealed that civil society did not have—and still does not have—the necessary resources to effectively neutralize those threats to the democratic development of the state, which are still present in such post-Soviet countries as Ukraine. The protests of 2013–2014 united and legitimized various political forces, from liberal to radical right. As a result, radical political forces and radical points of view became integral parts of the Ukrainian political process. This is a serious challenge for Ukraine’s democracy and the “European choice.»

Finally, the Euromaidan accumulated contradictions in the system of relations between the EU and Russia. These protests have become a challenge for European “Russian policy” and the logic of European development. It is obvious, for example, that the Eastern Partnership policy does not satisfy those aspirations for integration into the European legal, political, and economic space that Ukraine is proposing. Unfortunately, Ukraine still does not have a clear prospect of joining the EU.

In a sense, Euromaidan is not yet ended. It has started the transformation processes in Ukraine, and only by the results of these processes will we be able to adequately assess its significance and role.

The Euromaidan legacy continues to be a topic of active discussion in Ukraine and in the West. I hope that these assessments can uncover ways Ukraine and Europe have changed over time, as well as enhance broader debates on this topic for a deeper understanding of Euromaidan’s legacy.

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Kimberly Amadeo

UKRAINE CRISIS SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION

The Ukraine crisis is a power struggle between factions within Ukraine. One of the factions wants to align with the European Union and the other with Russia. As one of the founding states of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had been an important contributor to the Soviet Union's economy between 1920–1991.¹ In March of 2014, the current crisis erupted when Russian special forces occupied Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, claiming it was protecting its port access to the Black Sea.² Ukraine had planned to develop Crimea's natural gas reserves in two years in a partnership with U.S. companies.

If it had accomplished this, Russia would have lost one of its largest customers.

Between 2014–2018, a military conflict between Ukrainian soldiers and Russian-backed separatists continued in eastern Ukraine, and more than 10,000 people were killed.³ On November 25, 2018, Russian ships attacked and boarded three Ukrainian vessels in the Crimean port of Azov near the Black Sea. It placed a freighter to block the port, stating that Ukraine had violated Russian waters, although the two sides signed an agreement in 2003 to guarantee free passage through the strait.⁴

Critics at the United Nations Security Council meeting said Russia's attack was a violation under international law. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization increased its military presence in the area.⁵

Explaining the Conflict

Putin's attack responded to the February 23, 2014, overthrow of his ally Viktor Yanukovich, where the pro-West faction of Ukraine's Parliament took over the government.⁶

The crisis occurred because Yanukovich mismanaged the budget and forced Ukraine to ask for financial help. It appealed to

the EU, then Russia, causing political unrest. Those who wanted to be closer to the EU objected when that solution was abandoned. Russia's military strike supported Yanukovich's return to Kiev and closer ties to Russia.

In April 2014, Russia supported local rebels who took over city halls and police stations throughout eastern Ukraine, an area home to ethnic Russians who don't want to be part of the EU.⁷ Those Russians were moved there by Joseph Stalin, who intended to strengthen the Soviet Republic's hold on the area.

Earlier that month, NATO revealed satellite photos showing Russia's invasion of Ukraine's eastern border.⁸ An EU emergency meeting added further sanctions on Russia's oil and banking sectors, which occurred shortly after Russia sent a convoy of trucks over the border.⁹ They were bearing aid to Ukraine's eastern cities, held by pro-Russian rebels. Several of those trucks entered without approval.

Ukraine had also destroyed a convoy of Russian military vehicles that were bringing arms to the rebels.¹⁰ It was the first time that Ukraine attacked Russian forces directly. A few days later, Ukraine reported that several military vehicles were near the Russian border at the Crimean port of Azov.¹¹ It claimed that Russia was creating a second front for the rebels and wanted land access through southern Ukraine—a shorter route to Crimea.¹²

In July 2014, Russia built up its military force on the border.¹³ Since 2014, Russia has added an airborne battalion to the naval infantry brigade and doubled the number of troops to 30,000.¹⁴ It was a battle-ready force that could launch an attack into eastern Ukraine at a moment's notice. Russia had already launched rockets across the border in support of Ukrainian rebels.

Why Ukraine Is So Important to Putin

Putin's standoff over Ukraine boosted his popularity rating in Russia to 80%.¹⁵ To maintain this popularity, he will continue to hold onto Ukraine despite the cost. Putin knows that NATO won't protect Ukraine since it is not a member, and that encourages him to continue to attack.

Ukraine, which provided the Soviet agricultural output, had been an important contributor to the former Soviet Union's economy.¹⁶ It also supplied heavy industrial equipment and raw materials to industrial sites throughout the former USSR.¹⁷

Sanctions Against Russia

On July 29, 2014, the United States and the EU extended economic sanctions against Russia.¹⁸ ¹⁹ They wanted to convince Putin to stop supporting those in eastern Ukraine who want to break up the country. The United States had proof that Russia supplied separatists that shot down a Malaysia Airlines commercial jet over eastern Ukraine on July 17, killing 298 people.²⁰

The sanctions severely limit five major Russian banks' ability to obtain medium and long-term financing from Europe. The United States also restricted technology exports to Russia's deep-water Arctic offshore or shale oil production.⁹ Russia had already been ousted from the Group of Eight.²¹

Goldman Sachs, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan, Barclay's, Deutsche Bank, and UBSBoeing are the largest investment banks doing business in Russia. Morgan Stanley announced in 2019 that it will cease operations in the country by 2020.²²

United Technologies started hoarding titanium.²³ In response, Russia banned imports of U.S. and European foods for one year.²⁴ This included \$300 million of U.S. poultry products.²⁵

To head off inflation, Russia's central bank raised interest rates.

The sanctions created a recession in Russia, and the International Monetary Fund cut its 2014 growth forecast for Russia from 1.3% to 0.2%.²⁶ Russia is one of the emerging markets that suffered a currency meltdown in 2014.²⁷ Forex traders abandoned these markets when the Federal Reserve began tapering its quantitative easing program, which reduced credit around the world.²⁸ Even though Putin continues to be popular at home, these sanctions are hurting the country's economy.

The Bottom Line

Ukraine's desire to open its markets to the EU and to collude with U.S. companies to develop its natural gas reserves were perceived by Russia as huge threats to its economy.²⁹³⁰ So, in March 2014, Russia invaded and occupied Crimea.

Since then, relations between the United States and Russia have continued to deteriorate with the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement have failed.

In April 2016, NATO announced its deployment of battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to deter further Russian aggression especially in the Baltic region.

The Baltic states have become NATO and EU members since 2004. Should Russia invade the Baltics, the United States and NATO would be compelled or bound by Article 5 of the NATO treaty to retaliate. Such could escalate into a war between Russia and the United States and its NATO allies.³¹

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Javad Nikmoeen

REVIEW OF COLOR REVOLUTION

Abstract

The Velvet Revolution or the Color Revolution is a bloodless transformation that was first proposed by the former Czech president, Vaclav Havel, who at that time was the leader of the opposition. Color revolutions developed into a series of related movements in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Central Asia. This movement is not a real revolution, since it is not spontaneously public, rather it is guided and supported by a foreign power.

Index Terms: Color Revolution, Post-Communist, Features.

I. Introduction

The «color revolution» refers to the changes that have taken place so far in the remaining countries of the former Eastern bloc, and the governing body of these countries has given way to pro-Western governments.

These developments began with the «velvet revolution» occurring during a 6 weeks period of November 17th to December 29th, 1989 in Czechoslovakia, and continued with similar developments in Serbia (two stages 1997 and 2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kirghizia (2005). A revolution is a process in which power is transferred through, violence, from one group to another while its position gets completely changed. In classic revolutions, the political structure and rulers are definitely and completely changing while new political, economic and social institutions emerge. Violence increases the cost of change and sometimes creates temporary chaos in the society. 1

In 1989, a new theory was introduced in order to make changes in the communist regimes, known as Velvet Revolution or Color Revolution. The color revolutions in the past decade have been able to change communist regimes and socialist systems. There is

no or less «violence» in velvet or color revolutions while it is more reliant on peaceful moves for political change. Color revolutions occur during the «election». That is the opposition groups in the election time, when more free space is created, unite and establish peaceful gatherings and widespread protests using the power of domestic and foreign media, against the ruling or winning group while encouraging their supporters out into the street in order to challenge the winner of the election. Thus, without resorting to violence, the political system changes. 2

In color revolutions, opponents of the ruling system gather in front of the governance institutions, such as parliament, electoral commission, police, etc., stop these institutions from moving and reacting while preventing the entry of parliamentarians or police officials into the buildings and impede the legitimacy of the governance institutions.

In Ukraine and Georgia, opponents of the communist regime gathered in the streets and main squares for several days, Javad Nikmoeen, School of Medicine, Shahrekord University of Medical Sciences, Rahmatiteh, Shahrekord, Iran while in Kirghizia, opponents gathered in front of the parliament and the presidential congress and forced the sovereignty to surrender, etc.

II. Findings

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, the countries of the Eastern bloc moved to authoritarianism with the departure of communism, therefore these countries were the first target of color revolutions. The main purpose of these revolutions is to completely eliminate the great obstacle to the United States' hegemony on the world, namely, Russia and China, and more recently Islam. These efforts are still in the midst of a non-ideological soft war, and has not yet revealed its final outcome. 3

III. Examples of color revolutions

Between 2000 and 2006, various color revolutions took place in different countries, some of which failed, and some resulted in

victory. The Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Tulip Revolution in Kirgizia, the Green Revolution in Lebanon, the White Revolution in Belarus, the Blue Revolution in Kuwait, the Grain Revolution in Moldova, and the Colorless Revolution in Venezuela.⁴

IV. Common features of color revolutions

The common features that appear in these color revolutions is that, except in Kirgizia, all of them took place without using violent means. Also, the role of the media, especially the Western media, students and NGOs had been significant in the revolution. A few examples of color revolutions will be discussed. ⁵

V. Czechoslovakia

{On January 1, 1993, after the separation of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the country entered the international arena as an independent state.}

In 1998, protesters came to the streets besieged by the police, and then rumors spread that in the clashes, Martin Schmid, a 19-year-old student of mathematics, was brutally killed.

A large number of protesters were beaten up, but in fact nobody was killed. In the afternoon, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America went on a daily basis reports on the violent clashes of the police and the death of a student named Martin Schmid (later it turned out that the news did not materialize). This news came as a thunderbolt spread in the country that made students and people so angry and emotional that even members of the Communist Party and several members of the Central Committee joined the demonstrators.

On December 19, 1989, the Clotour Society convened at the home of the actor and writer, Waslaw Hawl (later he was the president for three presidential periods and is now an originally Jew multi-millionaire anti-communist millionaires who had also organized an anti-government insurgent in 1977). At 10 p.m., they formally formed a party called «National Participation» without a partisan

constitution and announced November 27th as the day of the mass demonstrations throughout the country. 6

Massive protests continued to spread in other cities days later, and at the same time, the Western broadcasting networks, whose signals were easily accessible and clear, increased the hours of broadcasting in Czechoslovakia, especially at night, and provoked people with broadcasting pictures.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was eventually forced to accept the proposals of the National Participation Party, and Gustaf Husak, president and secretary of the Central Committee, introduced a new cabinet called the «National Covenant of Civilization» on December 10, 1989. He was so much scared that he immediately resigned after 21 years of the kingship. 7

On December 29, 1989, he elected the Communist Party of Waslaw Hawl as interim president. In June, 1990 election, the National Participation Party won 51% of the vote in the election of June, 1990. While the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost the election with 13% moving to the minority, and could not even win 3% for the next ten years.

VI. Georgia

In the Georgian parliamentary elections of 2003, the New Georgia coalition led by Eduard Shevardnadze and Georgian troika led by Mikhail Saakashvili competed against each other. In the heat of election, Soros Foundation, through a survey, announced troika's victory in advance. But after the election, the results of the vote count announced the victory of the New Georgia.8

The Georgian Troika accused the government of cheating while protesting the election results. Also, with the support of the media from the West and the United States, called on its supporters to negative campaign and civil disobedience. They gathered in front of the presidential palace for several days and eventually entered the parliament without police resistance. Then, Student movement of Kamaara interrupted the speech of the Western-opponent Shevardnadze.

VII. Ukraine

During the presidential election of Ukraine in 2004, no candidate was able to win the first round. Yanukovych, the Russian-backed candidate won 39/88% and Viktor Yushchenko, supported by the United States and Western governments, won 39.22% of the total votes.

In the second stage, according to the unofficial announcement, Yanukovych won 49/46% and Yushchenko won 46.61% of the total votes. But the result was not accepted by Yushchenko and his supporters, accusing the government of cheating, taking part in sit-ins and demonstrations while preventing Yanukovych from entering the prime minister's office (Para's movement).

Despite the fact that the Electoral and Parliamentary Commissions endorsed the results. Still, as the crisis worsened, the Supreme Court overturned the results and 12,000 electoral observers arrived in Ukraine. Finally, with US financial and promotional aid, Yushchenko won 52.55 percent of the vote and became president.

George Soros later said that our institution spent \$ 70 million. The Los Angeles Times (December 30, 2004) announced that USA spent \$ 58 million on promoting democracy in Ukraine (New York Times announced it as \$ 65 Million).

National Democracy Foundation spent \$ 820,000 including:
\$ 400,000 - Training the Trade Unions
\$ 2-3,000 - Training the Teachers of middle schools
\$ 50,000 - Polling
\$ 50,000 - Analyst Website for Ukrainian media

The American Bar Association has provided \$ 400,000 for legal and electoral training of judges, including the five Supreme Court judges who void the election. NATO, also, spent some 10 years in training Ukrainian military officers, which caused them to not react to the demonstrators. 8

VIII. Kirghizia

In 2005, the revolution was sparked with the disqualification of opposition candidates in parliament. Thus, holding two

parliamentary elections and announcing its results, the opponents of Asgar-e-Yadef united while the OSCE defined the process of the election as deficient. Yet, the Organization of Russia-supporting States announced the election as a free voting.

The first protests against the electoral process started from the southern cities (youth resistance movement) and then continued spreading through other areas. Under the pressure of public, Aghayev asked for investigating possible violations. But on March 24th, during the first mass gatherings in Bishkek, the state areas and the presidential palace was seized and the government collapsed.⁹

Aghayev fled with his family on a helicopter to Kazakhstan and then to Russia. The Tulip revolution was titled after the fact that it was occurred in the spring. Kolov, Bakiyev, Otono Baya came to power with the support of White House and the Soros Foundation.

IX. The founders and theorists of color revolutions

Gene Sharp, director of the Einstein Institute and the color revolution theorist, introduces four main steps to persuade people to participate in social movements of violence:

1) It is necessary to strengthen the will, confidence, and resistance skills in the oppressed people.

2) It is necessary to create and strengthen independent social groups and special organizations of oppressed people.

3) A powerful internal force is needed.

4) A wise strategic plan is needed for freedom to be designed and skilled. ¹⁰

Short-term goals: Humanitarian coverage (Health, Law, Women, etc.)

Medium-term goals: Creating culture, institution, and network

The final goals: Using the empowered network at a given time against sovereignty. After entering the new government.

She is one of the known theorist in civil disobedience. She has provided guidelines for agents of velvet and color revolutions, which have been widely welcomed by oppositions in some countries. In this pamphlet, 198 acts as «nonviolent action methods», aimed at creating civil disobedience, are listed in 34 categories; including:

Using flags and symbolic colors
Symbolism (wearing special icons)
Naked demonstration
Using new names and symptoms
Mocking the authorities
Political mourning
Fake funerals
Condemning official appreciation
Not participating in public programs
Disregard for customs and lack of cooperation with organizations
Boycotting goods by consumers
Exiting money from banks
Refusal to pay wages, fees and taxes
Boycotting the elections
Sanctions for organizations supported by the government
Refusal to accept government appointments
Escaping and using fake identity documents
Disruption of information and command lines
Fasting (moral fasting, hunger strike, sanctioned fasting)
Ignoring the rules of the barracks
Working but not cooperating etc.¹⁰

X. Conclusion:

In general, the overthrows by the so-called color revolution in the past decade, have common features other than the use of a symbol especially during the election and the claim of fraud, including the use of opposition forces and opponents of the ruling state inside the country. In all cases, the ruling governments are not in line with the Western ones possessing national tendencies and are sometimes aligned with Russia, while the opposing trends (velvet) tended toward the West.

Of the other common points, the Westerns such as the United States and the European Union member states, follow this type of revolution and, through their vast support of the financial, political, propaganda and psychological operations against the

government and its supporters in favor of the opposition, they shape the pressured atmosphere against the government. In fact, the West, with all its strength, supports the overthrow of the ruling government because of the government's inconsistency and brings the opposition to power.¹¹

These political developments and the power replacement take place by dragging the opposition into the streets while creating crises and massive civil unrest. Among the most important tools for creating these revolutions, we can mention the role of media (student organizations, NGOs, NGO's and polling organizations, the press and the Internet, etc.) with external guidance.

The role of the CIA in these velvet and color revolutions is very prominent. A CIA-affiliated political foundation, «Freedom House», played a prominent role in guiding and influencing the developments of the countries in question. Americans believe that color revolutions are the best strategies for changing and overthrowing independent, national, and non-aligned governments in target countries. They believe that this type of subversion is very costly and, because of its democratic nature and the presence of people on the streets, enjoys some kind of legitimacy. In sum, America's purpose of color revolutions includes:

1. Domination of areas which are of particular political and strategic importance
2. Controlling the energy transfer path and preventing its weaponization
3. Eliminating or suppressing the systems that block the expansion of American domination
4. Preventing the establishment of military and security unions in Asia, Middle East and Central Asia
5. Making the countries to be consistent with US policies
6. Economic opportunities
7. Curbing Islamic Awakening.

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ABOUT JEAN MONNET

Jean Monnet, (born Nov. 9, 1888, Cognac, France – died March 16, 1979, Houjarray), French political economist and diplomat who initiated comprehensive economic planning in western Europe after World War II. In France he was responsible for the successful plan designed to rebuild and modernize that nation's crumbled economy.



During World War I Monnet was the French representative on the Inter-Allied Maritime Commission, and after the war he was deputy secretary-general of the League of Nations (1919-23). Then, after reorganizing his family's brandy business, he became the European partner of a New York investment bank in 1925.

At the start of World War II he was made chairman of the Franco-British Economic Co-ordination Committee. In June 1940 it was he who suggested a Franco-British union to Winston Churchill. After the Franco-German armistice he left for Washington, D.C., and in 1943 he was sent to Algiers to work with the Free French administration there.

After the liberation of France, Monnet headed a government committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction and modernization of the French economy. On Jan. 11, 1947, the Monnet Plan was adopted by the French government, and Monnet himself was appointed commissioner-general of the National Planning Board. In May 1950 he and Robert Schuman, then the French foreign minister, proposed the establishment of a common European market for coal and steel by countries willing to delegate

their powers over these industries to an independent authority. Six countries – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg – signed the treaty in 1951 that set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). From 1952 to 1955 Monnet served as the first president of the ECSC's High Authority. The ECSC inspired the creation of the European Economic Community, or Common Market, in 1957.

In 1955 Monnet organized the Action Committee for the United States of Europe and served as its president from 1956 to 1975. In 1976 the heads of the nine Common Market governments named Monnet a Citizen of Europe. In the same year, he published his *Mémoires* (Memoirs, 1978).

Source:

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jean-Monnet>

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Key activities include courses, research, conferences, networking activities, and publications in the field of EU studies.

European Union studies comprise the study of Europe in its entirety with particular emphasis on the European integration process in both its internal and external aspects. The discipline also covers the role of the EU in a globalised world and in promoting an active European citizenship and dialogue between people and cultures.

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Vitalii Lebediuk, Dmytro Shevchuk, Olena Shershnyova

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